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Abstract 
This thesis studies the economic and social consequences of unemployment 
and long-term (or repeated) unemployment. The first two chapters are concerned with 
economic consequences. They study how unemployment affects the working of the 
labour market. The last two chapters are interested in social consequences. They look 
at whether future generations' outcomes are altered by their parents' unemployment. 
Chapter two uses data on UK regions over a period of 23 years to test the 
hypothesis that the composition of unemployment alters the dampening effect of 
unemployment on wages. Several specifications are estimated using dynamic panel 
data methods and are tested to check the robustness of the results. The hypothesis is 
verified for manual or unskilled workers, but not for non-manual or skilled workers. 
The next three chapters use the British National Child Development Study 
(NCDS). The third chapter studies the job search behaviour of individuals who 
declared themselves unemployed and looking for work when aged 23 years old. We 
define job search as the combination of three decisions: whether they have considered 
applying for a job which would mean moving house, which would have a lower pay 
than their previous job, or which would require a lower qualification. We find that 
using a model that incorporates the dependence of these decisions improves 
efficiency. Young people who have been unemployed before are found to accept 
mobility but not to alter their expectations on wages and skill content. 
In the fourth chapter, we want to determine whether the labour market 
situation of the parents influences in any way the social behaviour of children. The 
findings show that, controlling for - persistent - financial difficulties, the 
unemployment of the father during childhood seems to have a detrimental effect on 
his children's outcomes. There is some evidence that those who have a non-working 
mother during early childhood are better off than others, except in cases where the 
mother is single. 
The last chapter draws on the previous one and studies whether these effects 
can be translated into unfavourable outcomes in adult life, in particular social 
exclusion. A new index of social exclusion is constructed. We find that anti-social 
behaviour and social difficulties during childhood are associated with later risks of 
social exclusion. 
x 
Chapter one 
Introduction 
This thesis studies the economic and social consequences of unemployment 
and long-term unemployment. In the past thirty years, the rates of unemployment 
across European countries have been persistently high. Although, as witnessed in the 
recent past, macroeconomic and labour market policies have eventually brought these 
figures down, a large number of people have known unemployment either by 
experiencing it directly or through their family members or friends. A whole 
generation of people bom in the 1970s has been brought up with the background of 
fear of unemployment. Economies have seen the evolution of a dual labour market 
where the demand for unskilled people has apparently decreased sharply, and the 
demand for skills has increased; where the number of households where no adult 
works has risen at the same time as the number of households where all adults work; 
where certain geographical areas have been forgotten in times of recovery. The long 
period of economic difficulties has also led to the specific problem of social 
exclusion. The latter has become a major political issue in Europe and various 
governments have designed policies to try to integrate people. These measures include 
giving a subsistence level of benefit to anybody with insufficient income, but also 
measures aimed at improving life and giving a sense of community to people in 
disadvantaged areas. 
Although short periods of unemployment can be seen as useful, enabling 
workers to find better jobs, the effect of repeated or protracted periods of 
unemployment can be damaging. The extent to which this is the case is not well 
known. There is evidence on the negative impact of experiencing unemployment, but 
there is no consensus regarding the longer-term effect of this experience. This thesis is 
interested in these long-term effects. One aim is to determine whether the attempts to 
and to alleviate unemployment are intervene through active labour market poll 1 
2 
justified and useful. Another is to attempt to understand what unemployment does to 
the unemployed and their families, in particular their children. 
The thesis is organised as follows. The first two chapters are concemed with 
economic consequences. They study how unemployment affects the working of the 
labour market. The last two chapters are interested in social consequences. 
Acknowledging the detrimental impact of unemployment on the unemployed 
themselves, we look at whether these effects are transmitted to the children, that is, 
whether future generations' outcomes are altered by their parents' unemployment. If 
we find that such an effect does exist, the economic and social costs are potentially 
important. The social costs come from the inequality which would exist (and already 
exists to a certain extent) between people coming from less favoured families and the 
rest of the population. This situation would potentially lead to social unrest and social 
instability (which is evidenced by the effects of unemployment in certain suburbs or 
inner cities). The economic costs are linked to the activities of these "secondary 
citizens". The rest of the economy may suffer direct financial costs due to a higher 
level of crime and indirect costs due to lower human capital and foregone revenue 
from tax. The economy would potentially suffer lower growth and/or higher 
insecunty. 
Although the first two chapters have a direct relation with economics, one may 
think that the last two chapters have as much to do with quantitative sociology as with 
economics. In recent years, research in economics has increasingly been taking into 
account the findings of other disciplines such as sociology, psychology, political 
science, etc. This seems a healthy process and it may bring depth to economics 
research. We consider that this thesis is part of this process, and, as we will show, 
has 
relevant implications for economics. 
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Chapter two uses data on UK regions over a period of 23 years to study the 
relationship between unemployment, long-term unemployment and wages. In 
particular it tests the hypothesis that the composition of unemployment (namely, the 
proportion of people unemployed for twelve months or more) alters the dampening 
effect of unemployment on wages. The chapter begins with a literature review on the 
topic. After identifying weaknesses in previous studies, we then provide our own 
analysis. Several specifications are estimated using dynamic panel data methods and 
are tested to check the robustness of the results. 
The next three chapters use the British National Child Development Study 
(NCDS). This is a longitudinal survey of persons bom between 3 and 9 March 1958 
and living in Great Britain. Five waves of surveys were carried out when the studied 
person was 7,11,16,23 and 33 years old. There is also information in 1978 on exam 
results. The first two waves consist of an interview with the parents, questionnaires 
completed by the school, results from a medical examination conducted by the 
school's health service and tests of ability of the subjects themselves. The third wave 
is basically the same, with the addition of an interview of the cohort members. The 
fourth wave consists of an interview with the cohort member. The fifth wave also 
contains such an interview as well as questionnaires for the partner of the cohort 
members and for cohort members who are mothers. Cohort members also have to fill 
in a calendar which covers the 10-year period between 23 and 33 years old. 
The third chapter uses inforination obtained on individuals who declared 
themselves unemployed and looking for work in the 1981 wave, when aged 23 years 
old. We are interested in studying the job search behaviour of these individuals. We 
define job search as the combination of three decisions: whether they have considered 
applying for a *ob which would mean moving house, which would have a lower pay 
than their previous job, or which would require a lower qualification. The chapter 
4 
starts with a review of the relevant literature. We first estimate simple probit models 
and then, taking into consideration that these three decisions are interdependent, we 
use a trivanate probit model. The aim of this chapter is to identify the determinants of 
the flexibility or otherwise of unemployed people. In particular, we study whether 
past expenences of unemployment affect job search intensity. 
In the fourth chapter, we are interested in the lives of the cohort members 
during childhood. We want to determine whether the labour market situation of the 
parents influences in any way the social behaviour of children. This question covers a 
range of topics and we first review the relevant literature. We include related findings 
from economics but also from other disciplines such as sociology and psychology. 
Social behaviour is defined by four outcomes. The first two are the reports of parents 
and of the school on the behaviour of the children. The third measures whether they 
have been in contact with the police by the age of 16, and the fourth whether they 
have been referred to a social agency for behaviour or educational problems. We first 
use the data set as a panel; the panel data methodology (fixed and random effects 
models) enables us to control for individual effects. The specification contains 
variables which are consistently observed in the first three waves of the NCDS. 
Because the number of variables available in such a way is limited, we also use 
simple cross-section probit models. The latter have each of the adolescent behaviours 
(at 16 years old) as dependent variables, and family background, personal 
charactenstics, external and school factors as explanatory variables. Several questions 
are answered in this chapter. We study the extent to which the unemployment of the 
father and the employment of the mother are correlated with the social behaviour of 
their children, controlling for other possible factors. We also estimate what 
characteristics could offset these effects, for example, the extent to which the interest 
5 
of the parents in their child's education can counteract any possible detrimental effect 
of having an unemployed father. 
The last chapter draws on the previous one and studies whether these effects 
can be translated into unfavourable outcomes in adult life. We are particularly 
interested in social exclusion. We first define what we mean by social exclusion. We 
measure social exclusion in a way which enables us to determine the risk of social 
exclusion as opposed to the risk of specific outcomes which, although they are often 
associated with social exclusion, do not necessarily indicate social exclusion on their 
own. It is hoped that by having a composite index of several outcomes, such an issue 
is avoided. We offer three ways of constructing our index of social exclusion and we 
verify that the main results are not affected by the method used. Our indices are 
naturally ordered discrete variables and we use ordered probit models to study their 
determinants. Our explanatory variables include family background measures, similar 
to those used in the previous chapter; we also include the anti-social behaviour 
variables, in order to check whether these have an effect; other controls are also 
included. We control for individual effects by including variables indicative of 
personal characteristics. We study whether the labour market situation of the parents 
has a direct effect on the probability that their children are socially excluded, and 
whether it has an indirect effect, through adolescent anti-social behaviour. We again 
ponder whether there are offsetting effects which could be enhanced to prevent any 
potential deti-imental influence. 
The sixth chapter draws conclusions from the work undertaken in the thesis 
and suggests areas for further research. 
6 
Chapter two 
Does a Higher Proportion of Long-term Unemployment 
Really Increase Wage Pressure? 
2.1 Introduction 
The unemployment rate and general labour market conditions have an 
influence on the determination of wages. According to recent theories, the higher is 
the unemployment rate the lower are wage claims. These theories can be classified 
into three main groups (Blanchard and Katz, 1997). The first is based on bargaining 
between the firm and workers (Diamond, 1982): unemployment, or more precisely the 
exit rate from unemployment, plays a role in determining the relative power of the two 
sides. Second, in the efficiency wage models, the production function is determined 
not only by employment but also by the effort level of workers. The wage is kept 
above the market clearing level by the firm in order to prevent workers from shirking 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), to attract high quality candidates (Weiss, 1980), to keep 
trained workers (Salop, 1979 and Stiglitz, 1974), or to obtain a higher effort level 
from them (Akerlof, 1982 and 1984). A higher unemployment rate then reduces the 
need for an "efficiency wage". Finally, the "competitive approach" is based on the 
idea that unemployment is voluntary and due to poor labour market opportunities 
(Blanchard and Katz, 1997). Labour market opportunities determine unemployment 
(or non-employment). This may be particularly valid for unskilled workers, for whom 
there is no question of efficiency wage. Their willingness to work depends on the 
difference between their reservation wage and the wage offered. If the opportunities 
are poor, they will prefer not to work at all and stay unemployed or out of the labour 
force. In that case, high unemployment is associated with low wages. 
In recent years, however, the negative relationship between unemployment and 
wages seems to have weakened (Layard and Nickell, 1987). 
A popular explanation, 
first developed by Layard and Nickell (1986,1987), and Nickell (1987), states that the 
composition of unemployment is important in 
determining its effectiveness in 
8 
reducing wage pressure. Layard and Nickell think that the increase in long-term 11 
unemployment incidence explains the failure of unemployment to keep the wage level 
down. Long-term unemployed people are less effective in looking for a job and 
employers may use their previous unemployment as a screening device. In effect, 
long-term unemployed people are 'absent' from the wage determination process so 
that a given level of unemployment is less powerful in keeping wages down. Such a 
phenomenon can easily be introduced in the theories mentioned above (Machin and 
Manning, 1999). This hypothesis has important policy implications: it suggests that 
policies directed at helping the long-term unemployed find jobs will have no 
inflationary pressures on wages. 
Even though this explanation is intuitively appealing and often accepted as 
true, the empirical evidence gathered so far has not brought a consensus among 
economists. This chapter aims at providing a conclusive answer. It investigates the 
question taking into consideration the issues encountered in previous empirical 
studies. The results obtained show stronger support for the Layard and Nickell 
hypothesis than other evidence so far. 
Section 2.2 presents a review of the literature and shows why the current 
evidence is not convincing. Section 2.3 introduces and justifies the specification that 
will be estimated. Section 2.4 presents extensive results and section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 The weakness of the evidence 
Numerous authors have attempted to verify the Layard and Nickell hypothes's 
and this section provides an overview of their findings. The literature that is reviewed 
below is summarised in table A. 2.1 in appendix A. Typically, the emp'ncal analysis 
consists of checking the direction of the influence of the proportion of 
long-term 
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unemployment on wages. While the coefficient of unemployment is almost always 
found to be significant and negative in wage equations, results concerning long-term 
unemployment are sensitive to the specification chosen and the data used. The article 
by Nickell (1987) sets out the basis of the hypothesis developed by Layard and Nickell 
(1986). Nickell carried out a time series analysis and found that, other things constant 
(including the unemployment rate), the proportion of long-term unemployment has a 
significant and positive effect on real wages. Because of the strong relationship 
between the level of unemployment and the proportion of long-term unemployment, 
Nickell suggests that it is best to use the relationship between the proportion of long- 
term unemployment and unemployment itself. He expresses the proportion of long- 
term unemployment as a function of log unemployment, the level of unemployment, 
the change in the level of unemployment and the lag of the proportion of long-term 
unemployment. He then substitutes this into his initial wage equation, and develops a 
detailed explanation of the working of the effect of unemployment on wages. The 
effect of the level of unemployment is positive because of "the long-run tendency for 
the long-term unemployed proportion to rise with unemployment" (page 122). He 
finds a negative coefficient for the change in unemployment; this represents the fact 
that when unemployment increases the immediate effect is to decrease the proportion 
of long-term unemployment, so that unemployment has a stronger negative effect on 
wages. The logarithm of unemployment has a negative coefficient. This means that 
the unemployment effect is concave (at high levels of unemployment further 
unemployed people do not affect wage setting very much, as firms 
have no difficulty 
in finding replacements). 
Although Nickell focuses on the composition effect of unemployment, certain 
authors (Machin and Manning, 
1999) note that, because lags of unemployment 
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explain wages as well as the proportion of unemployment, this evidence remains 
inconclusive. Moreover, as Nickell notes in his paper, this study is quite limited 
because of the simplicity of the model and the usual problems of time series models. ' 
Following this paper, several authors have used microeconomic data to 
explore the issue. The relationship central to these studies is the "wage curve". The 
latter was developed by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) and consists of a non-linear 
relationship between wages and local unemployment. Using a wage curve framework, 
they found that the coefficient of local long-term unemployment is not significantly 
different from zero. Their result questions the hypothesis of Layard and Nickell. 
However, they find a positive coefficient, which is the right sign for Layard and 
Nickell, and are cautionary about type H error. Blackaby and Manning (1990a) and 
Blackaby et al. (1991) argue that when they introduce regional prices the long-term 
unemployment effect reappears even in the wage curve specification. Blackaby and 
Hunt (1992), arguing that the non-linear terms are introduced in a "rather ad hoc 
way", develop a general model. They divide unemployment into its long-term and 
short-term componentS2 and include them and their squares in their estimation. Their 
most successful equation is a wage curve in the short-term unemployment rates terms. 
This means that long-term unemployment has absolutely no effect in wage 
determination. However, unlike Blanchflower and Oswald, the latter two studies did 
not include regional dummies in their preferred specification so that a bias due to 
omitted variables may have existed. Moreover, the results seem sensitive to the type 
of price indices used (in particular to whether prices Include housing costs or not). 
These studies stay at the cross-section level so that dynamics cannot be 
1 Nickel] has only twenty-eight observations while he estimates equations containing between ten and 
twelve independent variables. 
2 Note that they take the long-term unemployment rate, not the proportion of long-term unemployment. 
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included. They also use individual or firm data on wages and other characteristics, 
together with regional or national measures of unemployment and long-term 
unemployment. There are a number of potential difficulties documented in the 
literature, notably those discussed by Moulton (1990). In addition to the usual 
econometric issues present in empirical studies (such as errors in variables, omitted 
variables bias, aggregation issues, etc. ), Moulton identifies a particular bias due to the 
commonly made assumption that the disturbances are independent. He argues that 
units sharing an observable characteristic (region in the case of the wage curve) may 
also share unobservable characteristics that would lead the regression disturbances to 
be correlated. He finds that estimations including regional or industry unemployment 
and micro units have coefficients with too low standard errors, leading to possible 
spunous findings of statistical significance. 
Subsequent studies have used microeconornic data (or regional or firin data) 
available over several years. The study by Jackman and Savoun (1991) provides an 
estimation across time and regions, and also the additional interest of being carried out 
for different groups of male wage earners. 3 Their results indeed vary according to the 
occupation of the employees. This is justifiable in the theory. The authors' findings 
indicate that the coefficients on the proportion of long-term unemployment are 
statistically insignificant and positive except when all (male) employees are 
considered. The results of the study lead us to think that this kind of differentiation 
should be undertaken when answering the question which interests this chapter. 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) use microeconomic data on firms to estimate a wage 
'on (us' 9 equation. They Ming a fair level of disaggregati in company accounts data) and 
3 The groups are the following: all employees, manual employees, non-manual employees, manual 
employees in manufacturing, non-manual employees in manufacturing, manual employees not in 
manufacturing, non-manual employees not 
in manufacturing. 
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carry out an estimation over several years. However, when considering the question of 
the role of long-term unemployment, they used a national measure of long-term 
unemployment. Their support of the Layard-NIckell hypothesis is therefore in fact 
based on ten yearly observations. Graafland (1991) provides a slightly different 
analysis (for the Netherlands) which contradicts the same hypothesis. Using the rate of 
long-term unemployment rather than the proportion of long-term unemployment in 
total unemployment, he finds a negative coefficient on long-term unemployment in a 
wage equation. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) report results using the same data as 
Blackaby and Manning (1990a), but over a larger number of years. They do not find 
evidence in favour of the Layard-Nickell hypothesis. However, we note here that they 
use a specification including regional dummies, whereas Blackaby and Manning 
found supportive evidence for the Layard-Nickell hypothesis when using a 
specification excluding regional dummies. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) also 
estimate a wage equation for Austria in which they do not find that long-term 
unemployment had a role in wage determination in addition to total unemployment, 
but they consider only two years and could not include regional prices although using 
nominal wages. Christofides and Oswald (1992) carried out estimations for Canada. 
They used data on wage contracts over a period of seven years. In view of the 
characteristics of the Canadian labour market, they define long-term unemployment as 
a spell of unemployment of six months or one year and at the level of the province. 
They again found no support for the Layard-Nickell hypothesis. 
in their study of the US, Partridge and Rickman (1997) used the same 
and Oswald (1992). They definition of long-term unemployment as Chn 
estimate wage equations using data at the state 
level. Partiidge and Rickman use 
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4 several different methods of estimation on the same wage equation . Even though the 
results are not robust for all of those, they conclude that overall their equations 
support the Layard and Nickell idea. 
It is often argued (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) that the long-term 
elasticity5 of wage to unemployment lies around -0.1. Table 2.1 is an attempt to 
summarise recent results. It shows that the long-ten-n elasticity of wage to 
unemployment ranges from -0.21 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994b) to -0-01 
(Jackman and Savoun, 1991). More importantly, Table 2.1 shows a striking result, 
suggestive of the long-term unemployment hypothesis being correct: the great 
majority of the studies reported positive long-term elasticities of wages to the 
proportion of long-term unemployment, even though several are insignificant. The 
calculated elasticities range from -0.066 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990) to 0.250 
(Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990) and the median of this range is 0.048. 
The Layard-Nickell hypothesis seems intuitively appealing: certainly, given 
the various difficulties that the long-term unemployed go through, it seems unlikely 
that their motivation and skills stay unaffected, and that employers do not pay 
attention to the duration of unemployment when recruiting, at least in periods of 
excess labour supply. However, as has been already mentioned elsewhere (Machin 
and Manning (1999)), the evidence presented so far does not appear to be convincing. 
We have shown that the results depend on the specifications chosen, and that several 
studies actually find that the proportion of long-term unemployment has a negative 
effect on wages. Nevertheless, the elasticities presented in table 2.1 suggest that, 
although many tests are inconclusive on their own, there are reasons to take the 
4 The methods are ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares, fixed effects, and a fixed effects 
model correcting for autocorrelation. 
5 Throughout this paper, all elasticities referred to are long-term elasticities. 
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Layard-Nickell hypothesis senously. 
2.3 Data and econometric model 
In order to study the relationship between the proportion of long-term 
unemployment and wages, we have constructed a panel data set for the UK (data 
sources are in appendix B). We consider that there is sufficient variation in regional 
unemployment and wages in the UK to be able to capture such a relationship. 
Moreover, such variations do not appear to be statistically significantly reduced or 
eliminated by migration, in particular for manual workers (McCorrnIck, 1997). Such a 
panel gives us more degrees of freedom than time series analysis and provides more 
observations on unemployment than cross-section studies which use regional labour 
market vanables. The closest study to our own is that of Jackman and Savoun (1991). 
However, they did not focus on the role of long-term unemployment and the 
composition of unemployment in wage determination. 
2.3.1 Data 
The regional panel covers the period 1973-1995 and ten regions. 6 All wage 
and labour market variables are for men; there are several reasons for this. First, 
reliable wage and unemployment data for women are available over a shorter period 
of time. Second, concentrating on men enables us to avoid the problem of gender 
effect on wages; women have complex participation behaviour which has evolved 
over the period considered. 
We differentiate between manual and non-manual workers, because they are 
thought to participate in different labour markets. In particular, while non-manuals 
6 These are the following: North, Yorkshire and Humbershire, East Midlands, East Anglia, South East, 
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compete at the national level, manuals seem to be confined to their region 
(McCon-nick, 1997). We use the hourly wage because it is thought that part of the 
adjustment to changes in the tabour market situation is made through the number of 
hours worked. It is important to note that there may be underreporting of hours 
worked, as jobs with high responsibilities often entail unpaid overtime (in particular 
jobs with management responsibilities, i. e. non-manual jobs). 
In this chapter, "long-term unemployment" means (except where otherwise 
stated) the proportion of long-term unemployment in total unemployment; it includes 
all men who have been unemployed for 12 months or more. Unemployment (and 
long-term unemployment) include all men whatever their occupation; we should take 
this into account when interpreting the results. House prices and building societies 
advances are respectively the average dwelling price and the average advance in 
pounds for all dwellings. Consumer prices relate to total consumer expenditures less 
housing. This represents the living costs for people who are not moving (taxation and 
compulsory state deductions are not included). The Reward Group reports the amount 
spent by each income standard in pounds. Each income standard is given a weight 
which we used to calculate total consumer expenditures (Cost of Living Report). 
2.3.2 The general model 
In the light of previous work, a two-way error component model seems the 
most appropnate specification to use in such a study. The time 
dummies take care of 
the influences that national variables could have in such a model. 
The region dummies 
catch the influence of other time invariant regional characteristics. 
The model consists 
of a reduced form equation: 
South West, West Midlands, North West, Wales and 
Scotland. 
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e is an N-dimensional vector of ones, and uO is an N-dimensional vector of constants 
(a). 
The subscript i (=1, ... N) stands for the region and t (= 1,... T) for the year. 
The dependent variable, y, is the nominal hourly wage (for manual and non- 
manual workers separately). The vector of regressors (X) includes lagged dependent 
variables. The usual bias (Nickell, 1981; Hsiao, 1986) implied by the presence of such 
variables is deemed not important as it is of order I/T and the number of time periods 
(T = 23) is considered sufficiently large. We therefore estimate models using ordinary 
least squares and instrumental variable approaches where appropriate. X also contains 
unemployment and long-term unemployment. According to the theory, we should use 
the real wage in such equations. We prefer to include year dummies in order to adjust 
for this because it is not clear which price index should be used to deflate regional 
nominal wages. We will show that this specification is sufficient for our purpose. 
Following the idea that regional prices are also relevant when studying the 
determination of wages at the regional level (see Blackaby and Manning, 1990a), we 
will add regional prices in order to check whether they have an additional influence. 
Other regional variables will be included as independent variables in order to verify 
that no other influences are omitted. The same estimations will then be carried out 
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C) using data on weekly wages of skilled and unskilled occupations. The separation 
between skilled and unskilled occupations is deemed interesting because it is more 
relevant to current labour market issues. 
2.4 Results of the estimations and analysis 
This section presents the results of estimating different specifications, which 
are all based on the general model above. The issues discussed in section 2.2 will be 
dealt with in turn. In particular we present results for manual and for non-manual 
workers (and we distinguish between wages including overtime and wages excluding 
overtime). Results for average hourly wages (for all occupations) are presented in 
table C. 2.2 (appendix Q for reference. 
2.4.1 The simple model 
We begin by estimating a "simple model" in which only the nominal hourly 
wage (w), the unemployment rate (u) and the proportion of long-term unemployment 
(1tu) are included in the equation, as well as the regional and time dummies. The time 
dummies can be thought of as adjusting from nominal to real wages. In carrying out 
the initial estimations, we found evidence of serial correlation. One apparent solution 
was to introduce lagged variables (up to t-2). Note here that wage data are taken from 
April statistics while the unemployment and the proportion of long-term 
unemployment variables are from July statistics. Because wage determination depends 
on observed, current unemployment rate, we consider that using unemployment and 
long-term unemployment measured in the previous year is more appropriate. The 
labour market variables are therefore included with a lag. The first wage equation to 
be estimated has the following form: 
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The results obtained for model I (see table C. 2.1 in appendix Q show that 
several variables have insignificant coefficients. We will not give any economic 
interpretation of these results but directly turn to a more parsimonious specification. 
The lagged wage variables have strongly significant coefficients so they are kept. The 
second lag of long-term unemployment is always insignificant and is therefore 
dropped. Although both lags of unemployment have badly determined coefficients, we 
keep the first lag as such an equation would not make economic sense without an 
unemployment vanable. We arfive at the following form: 7 
Model 2: 
In wi, ::: a0+a, +yt+P, In wi, + 82 
InWit-2 +A In uit-, + (51n ltui, -, + vit 
Table 2.3 illustrates the main finding of the paper: long-term unemployment 
dampens the negative influence that unemployment has on wages. This is shown with 
strongly significant coefficients (respectively negative for unemployment and positive 
for long-term unemployment). In this basic model, for manual workers, there is no 
difference in the unemployment elasticity of wages whether we consider wages 
including overtime or not. It is around -0.16. For non-manual workers, the elasticity is 
7 No satisfactory variables were found to be used as instruments for unemployment. It is difficult to find 
a good instrument for unemployment and it has been argued that the use of weak instruments can lead 
to biased coefficients (Bound et al., 1995). Bound et al. show that using instruments which are only 
weakly correlated with the endogenous variable can lead to large inconsistencies in the IV estimates. 
Previous studies tend to use lagged values of unemployment; we estimated wage equations with such 
instruments, but the only effect was to make the unemployment variable statistically insignificant. Given 
the potential serial correlation in the error term, lagged unemployment may fail to be independent of the 
disturbance. We therefore settled for the second best solution of using no instrument. 
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greater than for manuals and it is greater in absolute value for the equations using 
wages including overtime (respectively -0.178 and -0.226). The elasticity of wages 
with respect to the proportion of long-term unemployment is positive and always 
greater than the unemployment elasticity of wages in absolute value. It is higher for 
non-manual workers than for manual workers. For manuals, it is slightly greater for 
wages including overtime, while the opposite is true for non-manuals. A doubling in 
the unemployment rate is estimated to lead, ceteris paribus, to a decrease in wages of 
16% for manuals and of 18-23 % (depending on the measure of wages used) for non- 
manuals. The same increase in the proportion of long-term unemployment leads to a 
rise of manual wages by 22-24% and by 35% for non-manual wages. These are large 
estimated effects; 8 from table 2.1 we can see that our elasti 11 icities are larger (in absolute 
value) than most previous results. 
Given that wages seem to be more responsive to the proportion of long-term 
unemployment than to unemployment, we can see that in order to keep wages constant 
in the long-run, the unemployment rate will have to more than double if the proportion 
of long-term unemployment doubles. 9 Table 2.1 shows that there is no consensus from 
previous studies about the relative absolute value of the elasticities. Wages have 
previously been found to be less or more sensitive to long-term unemployment than to 
unemployment. 
The results are only slightly sensitive to the measure of wages used. 
Comparing the elasticity of wages to the proportion of long-term unemployment for 
8 In table 2C, column (1) shows that the elasticities are very high when taking the average wage (-0.316 
and 0.515 for unemployment and long-term unemployment respectively). 
9 We assume constant returns to scale in the economy. For a given unemployment rate, an increase in 
the proportion of long-term unemployment induces an increase in wages at each level of 
unemployment. The long-run adjustments sufficient to bring wages back to their initial level necessitate 
an increase in unemployment. 
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wages including overtime and for wages excluding overtime, we can see that they are 
very close to each other. The elasticity of wages to unemployment is also very similar 
across both measures of manuals'wages, but it is slightly higher when comparing the 
two measures of non-manual wages. 10 Also, there is no systematic direction in the 
differences. It can be concluded that the measure of wages used does not alter the 
main findings. 
2.4.2 Sensitivity of results to the functional form 
2.4.2.1 Introducing long-term unemployment in level 
Usually, studies investigating the role of long-term unemployment in the 
determination of wages or introducing long-term unemployment in wage equations 
choose to introduce the variable in levels rather than logarithms. They generally add 
the proportion of long-term unemployment in total unemployment as an independent 
variable in the wage equation in order to check whether there is a composition effect. 
To compare our results with these studies, we re-estimate the same specifications 
using the proportion of long-terin unemployment without logarithms. Table 2.3C 
shows that the main result is not affected. The elasticities found are similar to those 
previously estimated. Compared to earlier studies (see table 2.1), the unemployment 
elasticity of wages which we find is on the upper side of the range of previous results. 
Moreover, contrary to what we find here, when a separation is made between manual 
workers and non-manual workers it has usually been found that the unemployment 
elasticity of wages is higher for manuals. This result will be investigated further once 
additional specifications have been estimated. 
Concerning the long-term unemployment coefficient, we observe that our 
10 The difference (in absolute value) between the elasticities is always lower than 0.017, except for the 
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coefficient (around 0.001) is smaller than most previous estimates (except when they 
are negative). However, contrary to what these studies find, our coefficient is 
consistently positive and statistically significant. Our specification therefore brings 
additional support to the Layard and Nickell hypothesis. Moreover, for the previous 
studies for which the wage - long-term unemployment elasticity is calculated (see 
table 2.1), we observe that ours is always greater. We find evidence not only that the 
Layard and Nickell effect exists but also that it is greater than estimated up to now. II 
We also note that for a proportion of long-term unemployment of 40% (the 
UK long-term unemployment proportion in 1994), wages (for non-manuals and 
manuals) are 4% higher than they would be with no long-term unemployment. These 
findings are similar to Partridge and Rickman's results (1997) for the US (in their two- 
stage-least squares estimation). Given that the long-term unemployment semi- 
elasticity is found to be roughly the same for the US and for the UK, but the average 
proportion of long-term unemployment is much higher in the latter, the elasticities 
found for the UK are significantly higher than for the US. This result suggests that a 
decrease in the proportion of long-term unemployment reduces wage pressure on the 
labour market. This is a justification for the use of policies targeted at long-term 
unemployment, as it means that there are no inflationary risks in reducing such 
unemployment. 
Considenng the choice between equations with all vanables in loganthms and 
equations with long-term unemployment in levels, we find that the residual sum of 
squares is always lower in estimations using logarithms. It seems therefore that the 
latter has more explanatory power. This has motivated our focus on the loganthm of 
unemployment elasticity of non-manual s' wages for which the difference is around 0.05. 
11 Column (5) in table 2C shows that the result also holds for average hourly wages. Again, the 
elasticities found are very high (-0.417 and 
0.486). 
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the proportion of long-term unemployment. 
2.4.2.2 The effect of adding non-linear terms 
The next experiment is to introduce non-linear terms. Following the idea of 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), the relationship between wages and unemployment 
could be highly non-linear, in which case the long-term unemployment variable might 
become redundant. We therefore introduce first the square of log unemployment, then 
the cube of the same variable. From table C. 2.4 (see appendix Q, we can see that, as 
far as manual workers are concerned, the non-linear terms are not statistically 
significant. Moreover, the elasticities are not affected. For non-manual workers, the 
non-linear terms are not significant either, but their inclusion in the equation drives 
the coefficient on log unemployment to insignificance. We calculate the elasticities 
anyway and find that they are not affected (the only exception being when the square 
is included in the equation where the measure of hourly wages excludes overtime). 
We can see that the additional variables have some degree of significance for non- 
manual wages excluding overtime (at the 10% level). It is also noticeable that the 
coefficient on log unemployment is affected by their inclusion (in size and in 
significance). The important result to note here is that the coefficient on long-term 
unemployment is never affected by the inclusion of non-linear terms. Columns (3) and 
(4) in table C. 2.1 show similar estimations for the average hourly wage. 
2.4.3 Sensitivity of the results to the specification: including other regional 
variables 
The next step is to check whether other regional variables have an additional 
influence not captured by the dummies already introduced and whether the omission 
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of these variables was leading to biased results. 
The first idea is that the employment structure of the region may have an effect 
on the distribution of wages across regions (table C-2.5). There is indeed evidence of 
inter-industry wage differentials not explained by any differences between the 
workers, but linked to the profitability of each industry (Krueger and Summers (1988), 
Oswald (1996)). The industrial structure of each region may therefore have a part in 
explaining regional wage differences. In order to take this into account, we have 
chosen to introduce the share of employment in manufacturing as an additional 
regressor. However, this variable was not found to have any statistically significant 
additional influence. This leads us to think that the potential industrial structure effect 
is taken into account by the regional dummies. It may also be that the regressor chosen 
is not sufficient to take into account possible rent-shanng effects. 
The level of education of an individual has often been identified as a 
significant determinant of that individual's wage. Aggregating at the regional level, it 
can be argued that the average level of education in the region will influence the 
average regional wage. We attempt to control for this by including the average 
number of years of schooling in the region (table C. 2.6). Unfortunately, the data are 
available only for both sexes and until 1990. Moreover, table 2.2 shows that there is 
little variation in the number of years at school. The results show that the new variable 
has a significant coefficient for manual workers. The results do not appear consistent 
with the theory. Across the range of values for the years of schooling, the return to an 
additional year is close to zero. Given the limitations of the data, we do not retain the 
schooling variable. 
We introduce the growth in the share of employment in manufacturing as an 
additional regressor in order to test whether the 
decline in manufacturing in a certain 
24 
region has had an effect on wages (table C. 2.7). We observe that again the added 
regressor has no significant influence on wages, except for manual wages including 
overtime. It can be thought that manuals would be the most affected by the decline in 
manufacturing as they have fewer alternatives in the labour market than non-manual 
workers. Also, manual workers, who probably have training more specific to the firm 
than non-manual workers have, are less flexible and less easily retrained. Moreover, 
the fact that only manual wages including overtime seem to be sensitive to a change in 
the share of employment in manufacturing could be explained by the fact that 
overtime pay of manual workers would be the first element of pay to be affected by 
such a change. Firms that need less labour have an interest in decreasing incentives to 
work longer hours. Because we want to keep consistent models for all wage measures, 
we keep this vanable in the subsequent specifications. 
The next experiment concerns regional prices (table 2.4). We have seen in 
section 2.2 that previous results have typically been sensitive to whether regional 
prices are included or not and to which measure of prices is used. 12 In particular they 
were sensitive to whether prices included housing costs or not. We want to check the 
respective influences of house and consumer prices and their overall relevance in such 
equations, so we choose here to include them both as individual variables. 13 Given 
12 The theoretical argument behind their inclusion in such equation is the following. The determination 
of wages may take place at the level of the firm; workers therefore take local prices into consideration 
when forming their wage claims. Wages can also be determined at the national level, but with some 
regional adjustment. For example, there is an allowance for people working in London. 
13 The current value of consumer prices is included as it is thought that workers are affected by and 
concerned about them on a day to day basis. As this variable is possibly endogenous, we will instrument 
it with its first lag. The first lag of house prices is used as the purchase of a house is a medium to long- 
term process and workers are probably less quickly aware of their level. As house prices may also be 
considered endogenous, we use building societies advances as an instrument. The amount given to 
buyers by building societies is expected to be closely related to the amount the buyers have to pay. 
Following the suggestion of Bound et a]. (1995), we used an F test on the instruments to check how 
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that region and time dummies are already included in the equation, only the additional 
influences of regional prices will appear, so that the coefficients may have a small 
economic size. 
Our results were affected by the inclusion of prices. As far as manual workers 
are concerned, we observe that the influence of prices is not statistically significant 
except for the effect of house prices on wages including overtime. Using the same 
specification for non-manual workers, we find that house prices are statistically 
significant while consumer prices are not. It can be that manual workers are less 
mobile than non-manual workers so that house prices are an important factor in the 
detem-fination of non-manual wages, while they are not for manual wages. It is also 
important to note that, for non-manuals, the coefficient on the log of unemployment 
becomes insignificant and changes sign. This result will be studied further below. 
2.4.4 Real wage 
It has been assumed in this chapter that the current specification, controlling 
for time and region dummies, implicitly controls for national prices and therefore that 
the coefficients are valid estimates of the effect of unemployment and real wages. It 
can be argued however that prices and unemployment interact and that the coefficient 
may be affected if we had the real wage as a dependent variable. We follow Blackaby 
et al. (1991) and use the following model: 
Let the real wage be determined in the following way: 
In( 
wR)= 
FO 
strongly correlated were the instruments with the endogenous variables. We find that advances are 
es, but that lagged consumer prices are only weakly correlated with strongly correlated with house pr c 
consumer prices. The latter is due to the inclusion of year dummies, which capture most of the 
correlation. 
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withWRthe regional nominal wage and Q the relevant price level. The latter 
can be considered to be determined partly by national prices (PN) and partly by 
regional prices C (PR)- 
Q=R°° (4) 
with 0: 50: 51. The regional prices can in turn be considered to be a function of 
house and consumer prices: 
P, = HP, " CP'- " 
with 0:! ýoc-<I. Replacing (4) and (5) in (3) we get: 
In( 
wR)= 
F(. ) + a0 In(HP )+ (1 - a)0 In(CPR ) PN P" P" 
We use the national retail price index (including all items) as a measure of 
national prices and we transform our house prices and consumer prices into indexes. 14 
The results are shown in table C. 2.8; we can see that they are not affected by the use 
of this specification. This provides evidence that including time dummies seems 
sufficient to capture the effect of the price level. We therefore continue to use the 
previous specification. 
2.4.5 Summary 
From the results so far, in particular those summansed in table 2.4, we see that 
the elasticity of wages to long-term unemployment is found to be positive and always 
significant for manual workers. Numerically, it is larger for manual workers (0.2-0.3) 
than for non-manual workers (around 0.06). We therefore find elasticities consistent 
with the idea that manuals'wages are more sensitive to the state of the labour market 
than non-manuals' wages (see for example Jackman and Savoun, 1991). Manuals' 
14 All indexes are equal to I in 1987. 
27 
wages are also found to be more sensitive to the proportion of long-term 
unemployment than to the unemployment rate. 
The coefficient of unemployment is not significantly different from zero for 
non-manual workers. This could mean that the Layard-Nickell hypothesis does not 
hold for non-manuals (or that the specification does not properly take it into account). 
It could also be that aggregate unemployment has no statistically significant effect on 
non-manual wages. Another possible explanation could be that the relationship 
between unemployment and non-manuals' wages does not occur at the level of the 
region and cannot be captured in regional wage equations. 
Comparing with previous studies, we find that the elasticity of wages to 
unemployment (for manual workers) is within the range of values previously 
estimated, while the elasticity of wages to long-term unemployment is greater than 
previous findings. Nickell (1987), for example, found that for manual workers the 
elasticity of wages to the proportion of long-term unemployment was 0.048 and the 
elasticity of wages to unemployment was -0.106. 
2.5 Robustness of the specirication 
2.5.1 Difference between manual and non-manual workers. 
Table C. 2.9 shows that when we include non-manual and manual wages in the 
same estimation and include dummies to identify non-manual workers we 
find that the 
two statistically significant differences between non-manual and manuals are 
house 
prIces and the growth in the share of manufacturing. House pnces 
have a larger and 
more statistically significant effect on non-manual wages. 
Growth in the share of 
manufacturing is found to have a positive effect on manual wages and a negative 
effect on non-manual wages. 
The difference is statistically significant for wages 
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including overtime. These results provide justification for the distinction between 
manuals and non-manuals. 
2.5.2 The unemployment measure 
The use of the proportion of long-term unemployed among the people 
currently unemployed has been criticised on two grounds. First, it suffers from a 
potential collinearity problem as it is strongly correlated with the level of 
unemployment. Second, some authors (Thomas, 2000) have argued that the "correct" 
measure of the long-term unemployment proportion is the number of long-term 
unemployed this period divided by the number unemployed a year earlier. These are 
strong criticisms and this section is devoted to addressing them. 
We separate our unemployment measure between long-term unemployment 
rate and short-term unemployment rate (table C. 2.10). The results show that the long- 
term unemployment rate is positively and statistically significantly related to regional 
wages. The effect of the short-term unemployment rate is found to be negative in all 
cases but very close to zero and statistically insignificant for non-manuals. The 
elasticity of wages to the rate of long-term unemployment is smaller than what was 
found for the proportion of long-term unemployment. As opposed to Graafland 
(1991), we do find a specific long-term unemployment effect. 
Machin and Manning (1999) suggest that the proportion of long-term 
unemployment is, after controlling for the level of unemployment, correlated with the 
change in unemployment. They think the latter captures the composition effect. We 
therefore introduce the change in unemployment into our specification in order to 
check whether such a variable drives the coefficient of long-term unemployment to 
insignificance (see table C. 2.11). 
Our results show that the new variable has a small 
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influence on wages and is statistically significant only for manual wages including 
overtime. However, the influence of long-term unemployment remains strong and 
statistically significant; the wage-long-term unemployment elasticities remain the 
same. Our results seem therefore robust to such a test. 
We then replaced our measure of the proportion of long-term unemployment 
with the "correct" variable suggested above. The interpretation is slightly different 
here: the new variable represents the number of people who are long-term 
unemployed over the population at nsk of becoming long-term unemployed (i. e. those 
unemployed one year earlier). It represents the proportion of people who have been 
the least competitive on the labour market and have not been able to find a job a year 
later, while the previous long-term unemployment variable measured the proportion of 
the current unemployed who have been unemployed for more than a year. We suffer 
from a loss of degrees of freedom due to the availability of the data. Table C. 2.12 in 
appendix C shows that the new variable is statistically insignificant except for manual 
wages excluding overtime. Comparing with results in table 2.4, we find that the 
coefficient on "true" long-term unemployment becomes very close to zero for non- 
manuals. For manuals, only the statistical significance of the coefficients is affected. 
The coefficient on unemployment loses some significance but becomes larger. 
Overall, the direction of our findings is not contradicted by these results. Wherever 
unemployment is statistically significant, we find a statistically significant and 
opposite long-term unemployment effect on wages. 
2.5.3 Parameters' constancy 
In order to test the robustness of our findings over time we separated the 
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sample in two periods: 15 1973-1986 and 1987-1995 (see table C-2.13). All economic 
vana es as well as region dummies are tested. Individual coefficients seem quite 
robust; few of the "break variables" are statistically significant and none are 
statistically significant at 5 percent. We can note that the consumer prices effect on 
non-manual wages increases over the period. Taking the "break variables" jointly, it 
appears that only the specification for manual wages excluding overtime is robust over 
time. Overall, it appears that specifications with wages excluding overtime are more 
stable. This is a justification for preferring the use of the latter measure of wages. 
2.6 Test of the hypothesis using wages of skilled and unskilled people. 
Traditionally the distinction between manual and non-manual occupations has 
been associated with the distinction between skilled and unskilled occupations. Given 
the recent transformations of the labour market and in particular the development of 
precarious unskilled jobs in the services sector, we think that it is important to 
distinguish occupations according to their skill content. In order to see the issue from 
this new point of view, we collected data on wages by occupation. 
We selected occupations for which data were available over the whole period 
considered. 16 Table 2.5 indicates how we classified occupations according to skill 
level. 17 
We proceed to the same estimations as before. Tables 2.6 
18 and 2.7 show the 
15 1986 corresponds to the peak of unemployment in the Britain in the period considered. 
16 Wages are measured weekly (including overtime). These were the only data available for several 
occupations. The average wage for skilled and unskilled occupations was calculated by summing the 
product of the average wage and the number of persons interviewed for each occupation and 
dividing 
this sum by the total number of people interviewed (see table 2 for summary statistics). 
17 Note that from 1991, a common classification (SOC classification) was adopted. Before that, the 
New Earnings Survey used the "Key Occupations for Statistical Purposes" classification. 
18 Some serial correlation was found when estimating the equations for skilled occupations. This was 
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results for skilled and unskilled occupations respectively. In table 2.6, columns I to 3 
we can see that the elasticity of skilled wages to long-term unemployment is always 
positive and significant. For the main results in column 2 (corresponding to table 2.4 tD 
for manual/non-manual wages'); we estimate the elasticity to be 0.262. The 
unemployment rate does not have a statistically significant effect on wages of skilled 
occupations (except in the basic model of column 1). The elasticity of wages to 
unemployment is always negative but vanes across the first three columns. A possible 
explanation for these results could be that the wages of skilled people are really not 
linked to the state of the general labour market (in particular to aggregate 
unemployment), but there exists an unobservable variable which influences both 
skilled occupations' wages and aggregate long-term unemployment. Such a variable 
could be, for example, the well-documented shift in demand away from unskilled 
people and towards skilled workers; this will tend to increase the wages of the skilled 
(because of shortages on their job market) and lead to greater long-term 
unemployment among the unskilled (who have few altematives). This shift could be 
omitted in our specification and the time and region dummies may not capture it. At 
the same time, lower regional unemployment does not appear to increase skilled 
regional wages. 
Unemployment does appear to have a negative influence on unskilled wages 
(the elasticity of wages to unemployment being between -0.043 and -0.1); this is 
consistent with previous results. Furthermore, the elasticity of wages to 
long-term 
partly solved by the inclusion of the second lag of 
long-term unemployment as well as the first lag, and 
the second lag of house prices instead of the first 
lag. To keep the specification consistent for both 
skilled and unskilled wages, we adopted the same variables in 
both equations. 
19 Note that in the specifications of columns I to 4 in tables 2.6 and 2.7, the model is 
improved by the 
exclusion of consumer prices. 
This does not affect the results, so they are dropped for simplification. 
32 
20 unemployment is found positive and statistically significant at 0.03 . We can 
conclude that the Layard-Nickell hypothesis appears to be verified for unskilled 
workers. 
We should note that we find a positive and significant influence on the part of 
house prices for skilled occupations only. However, if we use the first lag of house 
pnces instead of the second lag, we find a positive and statistically significant (at II 
percent) effect for unskilled workers as well (see last column of table 2.7). This is 
different from what we found for manual workers. This suggests that unskilled 
occupations do not overlap completely with manual occupations. Moreover, this 
indicates that unskilled people may have specific charactenstics that will not be taken 
into account when considering manual workers. 
The last column of tables 2.6 and 2.7 shows the test for the constancy of 
parameters over time. It appears that the relationship between wages and 
unemployment evolved over time, in particular for skilled workers. Overall, it appears 
that the specification using skilled wages is less robust than the specification using 
unskilled wages. A 11MItation of this study is that we use overall unemployment and 
long-term unemployment, a more appropriate measure would be specific to each of 
the two groups. 
Table C. 2.14 shows that the difference between skilled and unskilled 
occupations is more statistically significant than the difference between manuals and 
non-manuals and that the distinction between the two is justified. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the Layard and Nickell hypothesis, which states 
20 The small elasticity may be found because we have included the second lag of long-term 
unemployment. 
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that a higher proportion of long-term unemployment In total unemployment means 
less downward pressure on wages. The current empirical evidence has been found to 
be weak by several authors (e. g. Machin and Manning, 1999). We provide a critical 
summary of the evidence to identify its main weaknesses. We then attempt to address 
these issues and test the hypothesis. 
We have identified a need to differentiate between different types of workers. 
We chose to distinguish between manuals and non-manuals and between skilled and 
unskilled workers. These distinctions appear to be critical for the results. We find 
some evidence that, as would be expected, wages excluding overtime is a more 
appropriate measure to use. We find an important role for house prices. Finally, 
several econometric problems identified in previous studies (in particular the lack of 
degrees of freedom and the spurious regression problems identified by Moulton, 1990) 
are taken care here with panel data analysis and the use of regional data. 
The chapter provides what is perhaps some of the strongest available evidence 
for the Layard-Nickell hypothesis. In most specifications, in particular those for 
manual or unskilled workers, the coefficient on the proportion of long-term 
unemployment in total unemployment is positive and significantly different from zero. 
The results are not affected over time. 
The long-term elasticities of wages to unemployment and to long-term 
unemployment are estimated to be respectively around -0.17 and 0.25 for manual 
workers. As far as non-manual workers are concerned, unemployment and long-term 
unemployment do not appear to have a statistically significant effect on wages except 
in the basic model. The size of the unemployment elasticity of wages is within the 
range of previous studies' results, while the size of the long-term unemployment 
elasticity is greater than that found in most previous work. 
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For manual workers, these results give support to the Layard and Nickell 
hypothesis. However, it seems that the influences at work in the determination of 
skilled and non-manuals' wages are more complex than captured by our 
specifications. 
The results for skilled workers are similar to the results obtained for non- 
manual workers: mostly insignificant except in the basic model. For unskilled people, 
the elasticities are lower than for manual workers, but all have signs and significance 
consistent with the Layard-Nickell hypothesis (they are equal to -0.06 and 0.13 
respectively for unemployment and long-term unemployment). 
Our results suggest there may be different markets within the aggregate market 
for labour and that they may have different "rules". Overall, the results show that the 
proportion of long-term unemployment appears to have a specific and fairly strong 
effect on wages, even when we control for other influences. Given that we study the 
relationship at the regional level, it appears logical that we find strong results for 
manual, or unskilled workers. They may face a more regional labour market than non- 
manuals or skilled workers who have been found to be more mobile and to participate 
in a national labour market. Moreover, the strength of our results compared to those in 
previous studies may be due to the fact that we have more observations on the 
variables of interest (unemployment and long-term unemployment) and that we are 
able to capture an additional level of variation: across region. 
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Table 2.1: The evidence from previous studies: long-term elastiticities. a 
Long-term Long-term Comments 
elasticity of elasticity of 
wages to wages to the 
unemployment proportion of 
long-term 
unemployment 
Nickell (1987) 
-0.104* 0.048* Unemployment and long-term 
unemployment variables are at the 
national level. Blanchflower and Oswald -0.057* -0.066 (logU)3 is also included. (1990)(1), 
b B-0 (1990) (2) -0.200* 0.049 (logU)3 is also included. B-O (1990) (3)b -0.117* 0.073 (logU)3 is also included. Blackaby and Manning 
' -0.115* 
0.079** Include regional required income prices' (1990a) ('75) 
B-M (1990a) ('82)' -0.167* 0.242. y. * Include regional required income prices Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) -0-100* 0.2504. * Wage is at the level of the firm. 
Unemployment and long-term 
unemployment are at the national level. 
Log unemployment at the industry level 
is also included. 
Blackaby et al (1991) -0.103* 0.106* Include regional required income prices Blackaby et a] (1991) -0.043* -0.016 Include regional required income prices 
and regional dummies 
Jackman and Savoun (199 1) -0.070 0.1364. * All regional variables expressed as 
AE d deviation from their national value. 
Include consumer prices, house prices 
and regional dunuriies. 
J-S (1991) NMd -0.010 0.0464 Same as above 
J-S (199 1) Md 
-0.090* 0.0424. Same as above 
J-S (1991) AE d -0.050* 0.1114. * Same plus activity rate 
J-S (1991) NMd -0.010 0.0434 Same as above 
J_S (1991) Md -0.070* -0.0044 Same as above 
Christofides and Oswald -0.058* -0.010 Canadian data (the proportion of long- 
(1992) term unemployment is at the national 
level) 
C-0 (1992) -0.002 Same but log unemployment is not 
included 
Blanchflower and Oswald -0.093* 0.058 Include regional dummies 
(I 994a) 
B-0 (I 994a) -0.077* 0.053 Include regional dummies and consumer 
prices 
B-O (1994a) -0.045 0.022 Include regional dunuTýes and required 
income prices 
B-0 (1994a) -0.061 0.037 Include regional dummies and first lag of 
required income prices 
B-0 (1994b) -0.152* Austrian data, no region dummies 
B-0 (1994b) -0.213 Same, 8 region durnrnies 
1 Partridge and Rickman (1997) 1 -0.117* 1 0.065* 1 US data, 2SLS estimation. 
a) The long-term unemployment elasticities of wages are calculated by multiplying the coefficients of 
the proportion of long-term unemployment variable by the average proportion of long-term 
unemployment during the relevant period. The latter is either given in the studies or our own 
estimation (indicated by a . 7. ). A* indicates that the regression coefficients used to calculate the 
elasticities were significantly different from 0 at the 5% level of significance. 
b) The numbers in parentheses refer to different data sets. (1) refers to the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey of 1980; (2) refers to the National Child Development Study of 1981 and (3) 
refers to the British Social Attitude Survey of 1983-87. 
C) These numbers refer to the years in which the data were taken from the General Household Survey. 
d) The following abbreviations AE, NM and M mean all employees, non-manuals and manuals 
respectively. 
e) Required income prices are 
defined as cost of living including housing costs. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics (1976-1995) 
Variable Mean Std * Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Log wage (manuals excluding overtime) 1.235 0.463 0.266 1.895 
Log wage (manuals including overtime) 1.257 0.466 0.285 1.921 
Log wage (non-manuals excluding overtime) 1.692 0.522 0.664 2.569 
Log wage (non-manuals including overtime) 1.589 0.469 0.661 2.409 
Log wage (all occupations) 1.443 0.515 0.425 2.357 
Long-term unemployment (% of total 34-965 9.252 14.200 52.60 
unemployment) 
Log unemployment 2.241 0.428 1.131 2.907 
Log long-term unemployment 3.515 0.287 2.653 3.963 
Log consumer prices 10-910 0.370 10.131 11.455 
Log house prices (1975-1994) 10.238 0.582 9.111 11.319 
Share of employment in manufacturing 27.056 6.385 12.333 45-186 
Years of schooling (1973-1990) 10.364 0.224 9.885 10.877 
Log wage (skilled) 5.268 0.510 4.241 6.157 
Log wage (unskilled) 5.010 0.464 4.054 5.702 
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Table 2.3: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. Britain 1976-95: Model 2. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
including 
overtime Constant 0.203** 0.195** 0.225** 0.254** 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.032) (0.033) 
Log wage (A) ZD 0.570** 0.576** 0.502** 0.505** 
(0.070) (0.069) (0-074) (0.076) 
Log wage (-2) 0.250** 0.255** 0.332** 0.358** 
(0.061) (0.060) (0.068) (0.071) 
Log unemployment (A) -0.028** -0.026** -0.029** -0.031** (0.007) (0.006) (0-008) (0.009) 
Log of proportion of long-term 0.040** 0.040** 0.058** 0.047** 
unemployment (-1) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0-012) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to -0.155 -0.157 -0.178 -0.226 
unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the 
proportion of long-term unemployment 0.222 0.239 0.351 0.343 
Test for first-order serial correlation -0.967 -0.407 0.983 0.687 
Test for second-order serial correlation -1.549 -1.651 -1.177 -0.722 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.011 0.024 0.023 
Total sum of squares 42.628 43.310 54.212 43.749 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 4) 614.482 736.392 512.796 437.183 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 1250.868 1755.239 1095.509 2180.744 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 33.927 33.884 30.923 23.150 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 1746.265 2831.743 1369.482 2640.947 
Notes for all statistical tables: 
(1) A* indicates a coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
A ** indicates a coefficient significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
(2) Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors and test statistics are consistent in the presence 
of general heteroscedasticity (Arellano and Bond, 1988). 
(3) The test for serial correlation follows the standard normal distribution under the null of no serial 
correlation. The 5% level of significance is 1.6449 (values in bold indicate the presence of serial 
correlation). 
(4) The Wald tests follow a X2 distribution under the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to 
zero. A number in bold indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 2.4: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. 
Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. 
Britain 1976-95: adding regional prices and growth in share of manufacturing. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant 0.785 -0-617 -9-794 -7-128 
(3.811) (2.443) (10.328) (7.125) 
Loo, wage (-1) 0.570** 0.552** 0.349** 0.386** 
(0.085) (0.075) (0.130) (0.101) 
Log wage (-2) Z:, 0.269** 0.271** 0.248** 0.320** 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.114) (0.091) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment 4: ) Zý 0.043** 0.039** 0.025 0.018 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.032) (0.025) 
Log unemployment rate (- 1) -0.025** -0.018* 0.031 0.017 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.040) (0.029) 
Loo, house prices (-1) Z. ý 0.012 0.021* 0.110** 0.087** 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.050) (0.033) 
Log consumer prices -0.069 0.061 0.899 0.657 
(0.369) (0.235) (0.996) (0.692) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.066* 0.082** -0.029 -0.032 
(0.038) (0.032) (0.054) (0.044) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to -0-155 -0.102 0.077 0.058 
unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the proportion 0.267 0.220 0.062 0.061 
of long-term unemployment 
First-order serial correlation -0.946 -0.200 1.037 0.522 
Second-order serial correlation -1.410 -0.910 0.794 0.360 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.010 0.044 0.033 
Total sum of square 42.628 43.310 54.212 43.749 
Wald test of joint significance (df 7) 691.564 920.668 457.621 460.795 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df 19) 1197.163 
1456.389 553.436 1102.544 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 
24.288 23.839 17.802 15.653 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 
1686.673 2620.463 1023.532 2387.351 
Durbin-Hu-Hausman test 0.020 0.410 5.900 3.970 
Notes (additional to notes on table 2.1): 
(1) Instruments used are Log wage (-1), Log wage (-2), Log proportion of 
long-term unemployment 
1), Log unemployment (4), Log advances (4), Log consumer prices 
(4), Growth of share of 
manufacturing, time and region dummies. 
(2) The Durbin-Hu-Hausman test checks the need for IV estimation. Under the null hypothesis, the 
OLS estimator is consistent and efficient and the IV estimator is consistent 
but inefficient, under 
the alternative only the IV estimation is consistent. 
The F statistics are shown, a number in bold 
indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 2.5: Skilled and unskilled occupations classification 
Skilled occupations Unskilled occupations 
1973-1990 1973-1990 
Professional and related in science Clerical and related 
engineering, technology and similar fields 
Managerial (excluding general management) Farming fishing and related 
Materials processing (excluding metals) Painting, repetitive assembling, product 
inspecting, packaging and related 
Making and repairing (excluding metal and Transport operating, materials moving and 
electrical) storing and related 
Processing, making and repairing and related 
(metal and electrical) 
1991-1995 1991-1995 
Managers and administrators Clerical occupations 
Professional occupations Personal and protective service occupations 
Associate professional and technical Plants and machine operatives 
occupations 
Craft and related occupations Other occupations 
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Table 2.6: Panel estimation of regional wage equation. Britain 1976-95. Dependent variable: lot! nominal weekly wage for men. Skilled occuvations. 
Simple Adding regional Real wage Constancy 
model prices and of 
t C 
manufacturing 
_parameters ons ant 1.245** 0.973** 1.851 1.936** 
(0.269) (0.292) (0.409) (0.611) 
Log Nvage (-1) 0.368** 0.296** 0.296** -0.140 
(0.114) (0.104) (0.104) (0.162) 
Log waae Z:, 0.343** 0.304** 0.304** 0.033 
(0.111) (0.104) (0.104) (0-132) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment (- 1) 0.052** 0.061 0.061 Oý064 
(0.018) (0-018) (0.018) (0.042) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment (-2) Z, 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.213** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.097) 
Log unemployment rate (- 1) -0.022** -0.004 -0.004 0.206** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.096) 
Log house prices (-2) 0.074** 0.074** 0.348** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.160) 
Growth of share of manufacturing -0.069 -0.069 0.038 
(0-078) (0.078) (0.092) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dununies yes yes yes yes 
(B) Log wage (4) 0.324* 
(0.195) 
(B) Log wage (-2) 0.203 
(0.155) 
(B) Log proportion of long-term unemployment (4) -0-034 
(0.046) 
(B) Log proportion of long-term unemployment (-2) -0.213* 
(0.099) 
(B) Log unemployment rate (- 1) -0.276** 
(0.098) 
(B) Log house prices (-2) -0.267 
(0-166) 
(B) Growth of share of manufacturing -0.107 
(0.167) 
(B) Region dummies yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to unemployment -0.076 -0.01 
Long-term elasticity of wage to long-term unemployment 0.346 0.262 
First-order serial correlation -1.458 -0.895 -0.895 
Second-order serial correlation -1.966 -1.674 -1.674 
Residual sum of squares 0.053 0.051 0.051 
Total sum of square 51.820 51.820 3.600 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 5,7,7) 204.410 298.130 298.130 
Wald test - jt sig of time durns (df = 19) 420.973 427.481 352.189 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 25.706 33.192 36.096 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 581.993 620.770 867-385 
Wald test on break variables (B) (df = 16) 54.835 
Wald test on (B) economic variables (df = 7) 20.306 
Wald test on (B) region dununies (df = 9) 33.718 
Note: Instruments for columns 2 to 4 are log wage (- 1) and (-2), log proportion of long-term unemployment (- 1) 
and (-2), log unemployment rate (A), log advances (-2), growth of shre in manufacturing, region and time 
dummies. 
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Table 2-7: Panel estimation of regional w age equ ation. Brit ain 197 6-95. Dependent variable: lop no mal weekly age fo r men. Un skilled o ccupatio ns. 
Simple Adding prices Real wage Constancy Same 
model and of specification 
Con t 
manufacturing parameters as manuals s ant 1.662** 1.569** 1.940** 1.837** 3.781 
(0.220) (0.225) (0.344) (0.496) (4.428) 
Log wage (A) 0.333** 0.329** 0.329** 0.294** 0.340** 
(0-068) (0.076) (0.076) (0.131) (0.096) 
Log wa-e 0.295** 0.279** 0.279** -0.219** 0.238** 
(0-061) (0-060) (0.060) (0-105) (0.083) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment 1) 0.086** 0.090** 0.090** 0.037 0.055** 
(0.014) (0-014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment (-2) 4n 4ý -0-038** -0.040** -0.040** -0.023 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) 
Log unemployment rate (-1) -0.044** -0.041 ** -0.041 ** -0.086** -0.025* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.030) (0-015) 
Log house prices (-2) 0.018 0.018 -0.084 0.051 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.069) (0.032) 
Log consumer prices 
-0.244 
(0.453) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.062 0.062 0.221 0.073* 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.041) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
(13) Log wage (4) -0.148 
(0.178) 
(B) Log wage (-2) 0.434** 
(0.128) 
(13) Log proportion of long-term unemployment (-1) 0.050 
(0-032) 
(13) Log proportion of long-term unemployment (-2) -0.023 
(0.030) 
(B) Log unemployment rate (- 1) 0.021 
(0-033) 
(13) Log house prices (-2) 0.186** 
(0.078) 
(13) Growth of share of manufacturing -0.220** 
(0.093) 
(B) Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to unemployment -0.118 -0.104 -0.058 
Long-term elasticity of wage to long-ten-n unemployment 0.027 0.025 0.132 
First-order serial correlation -1.691 -1.527 -1.527 -0.162 
Second-order serial correlation -1.444 -1.452 -1.452 -0.742 
Residual sum of squares 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.022 
Total sum of square 42.893 42.893 1.379 42.893 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 5,7,7) 285.806 321.255 321.251 277.334 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 752-008 740.191 713.721 500.431 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums Of = 9) 44.904 40.686 39.023 29.917 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums Of = 28) 
935.604 968.627 945.287 990.182 
Wald test on break variables (13) (df = 16) 57.287 
Wald test on (13) economic variables (df = 7) 32.121 
Wald test on (13) region durmiiies (df = 9) 45.737 
42 
-4.4 
9.9 ai 
(/) 
ct 
Q) -J: ý 
0 0 > 
Ln 
41 
a) 
4ý 
ct 
cn 
c r- , - -0 6, 
rA 
- ýl 5 tý- cl . u C'3 u E - ý rZ 
03 
C14 uo 4ý C) C) 
" > 4ý cn 
. 4ý M (A 
u 
ct 
m -I- 
CA 
>% 0 = E 
C14 
ct =1 Z C7, > 
A a) >-, ; 1 
4- 
04 C', ;, 1. 
) 
4- 
*= 
4ý 
4ý 
(A 
cl $- CI 1 ct 
V (/) " '4ý C13 C) - - Q-4 0 bb CF >, +. 
E 
E- ý-o 
r- 
>-, 0 - u 0 - 0 0 cn o - > cl: S - 
cn 
= 'i ýý 
C: L, Ln CL 
-. 
0 0 = cn Cý. X: , a) (/) cl, ý: C's u 0 .. E E 4 E 
ct . - 
- 
4--1 C, 3 E - U) U C/) Ull) ý -0 > z M 4ý . C u " 4ý = M =3 7ý - CA . - 91. - 
1 $" 0 r- =3 > r- 
r- 
a) (1) V) CA C) 1 a os G . - 4- .. 
> C) 
0.4 M 
ýE 
;_ r r- cl. a) " C. ) P = 
ý 
C) E r- = - - 0 0 - 
a) bz 
a 
a) 
'a 
- ct (/) bb 
" 
= a) = 
ý, - = -, 1. ) - - = 0 C. - --ý, a) a) 
4ý 
m 
0 
-- E 
4. ý 
t 
C) 
* = u cn a) COO " 0 1. 
- 
't cn E 0 , ct cn CL4 
u 
m 
0 
. - u = tz 
0 
ý- C: ý4 ý. C: L, 
ý- ý - -0 
0 0 CY, u C) r- , 
- m a C., 0 a-) > 
0 -C 
E -2 CID 4- U) ca, .> 
0) -a CI 
o3 =s 
4ý 
= 
ý: 
C) 
0 
0 
C14 U 
- 
CL C, 3 
= 
U m 
> 
U = (L) 
v 
"Cý -I a) > -0 M vý U (1) 1.. a) 
a) 
ci 24 " 0 
E 
cr 
cl > 
; - 
bz 
00 ct U 
ý. C) 1 - E a) - 
0 tý 
E cn 
C 
4 
E E C) ý; 
C/) C) 
CA 
cI 
E Cý V) 73 4 - ct Cý4 4- 0 ,3 '04 
C) 
CIS E 11 " 0 0 
>-. a) Cý 0 
E . -0 
C3 
ý'-) ýD ýý c P, 
00 
E 
ýi 
C) 
" 
u 
-6 
v 
u Z *= C: -0 . Ln m 
. *ý 
cn 
u 
C. " 0 . ý-4 
CL4 
ct 
cn 
E 
E 
41 
u 
4-. ) cn 
ý Oý. = 1 0 0 
r 4- 
- .0 
V 
r 
CIO 
(+ý C-- 0 .= E E 
0 ct u r- 0 >N C 
Cý3 C) V) a) (/) 
. - 
-C 
(:, 3 
(1) Q4 
E 
1 
E 't 
to 2 E q-) a a a 
V 71 4- 
E 0 
;. cn 
cn C) a) , cl C) q) u U -z o = - bj) (1) U. >, > (U 
r- c3 
M 
IZ cn (5 4- E 
cn 
> C) 0 a) 
0 C) 
4L 
0 M-4 
-0 :Z : Z) ý; 
U) I 
U 
;.. --, - 1---4 
V 
> 16ý 
;_ 
) 
1 ) :: 
ý 
ý2 * 
ý: ý, ) Z I u 4 - a) ; -ý : -5 , - 
(Ij 
u 
= 
>< "I , >, 
c4f) a 
-3 ý< - :6 m C) COD 
>, cl 
cn 
= . 
CLý -, U 
U 
CIS 
4- 
4J 
m 
Oo 
C)C) 
>, C3 
4 o - 2 C, ý "o ý >, -I- -, lrý CL > , ýý cn = >, 
C) 
- = .- 
>, 
4Z. 4 
cI cn Ct = 
cn 
u 
o 
4- C, 
-, 
> 00 ý: 
Cw 
cI 
4- 
a) 
/ ý 
" 
(1) Cý C)., 
cl 
a) m= 
C) CýL4 
v3 U 
C) 
ci 
= C) - 
It 
'Itt 
l= 
ýý_b zi 
- 
Z ý5 -E 
-C'. 
c- = 
rA ul -0 A-i M ý 
u u 0 4- E z CD Q) , +. - - l' 
42 
U 
4- 
= Mw r. c) Q) 1 = u >-% 
j . u 
c) 0 
CD X ce 4ý 02 ci a) 
> 
i (D 'lý 
CD 
- 
72 
- 
C) 
" " Q) 
"Zi 
C) 
Iv = 
. 
ý- 
- - ý Z 0 u > : -. u E u 4--4 13 r U C CZ (n Q) u 
= 
A.. i 
Q) . - 
(D 
.- 
_ " 2 C 
Z: C) '-, 
U vý CL4 J-- r- ýn ce ; -4 
u CD ce 4- cz 
(1) CL4 Q) .s Z: E- > 7 
ce ce 17- r- C) -Z 
> 4- 4- 
C) 4- C) u ýý ý- 
cz 
- ýl- '= r- (Z 
C 
r_ 
"C 
4ý 
E 
ý 
Z 
v) 
u Z vý r- C) cý$ CD u CD 4ý CD - r ZZ 
:, 
c) -- CD . - CD - CD 
tzý cl 
4ý , 0 (D 
-Z 0 M CD Z- jý 
. - cn 4-1 
" i 
- -- E - - ce u - >ý 4- CD., ce u 0 Z Q) bio , ýz 4 CD > LZ 
4-- cn > -0 
ý: 
_c S. ý 1 ri ý- c7, cn = J-- >-ý > 
= . 
9.1 ce 
2 
4ý 
r- 
ý 
-Ici Z., 
3 = 'jý -ý Z 
r- =-- E týO 
cn rz = - _C 0 -6. - vý 
Q) - 
ce 
. .V 
1) 
C) 
-0 
"2 c 
C) 
öü 
u 
rz 
Z 
CD >ý E 
Ei -c Ö, 0 4 Z , -2 
> 
Z -- 
0 
ý2 CD 
cn U m ý. 
ce 
M 
A- 
(D 
- c: L 
(D . . 
ý j - - C, 2 
> . E r. Z - r- - ý2 
ce 
r 
4 
c: '-*" 
ce 
> 
c: 
C. 
zi 
Z: 
-2 
;.. 
b 
- ý: = 
- C) 
0 
-- Z: 
= 
; 
- 
Z ýc ý :i CD 
, --Z, Q) * 7- E r ce 
CD 
r- 
= 
Q) 
ce 
ýc 
ý 
C, 2 
r5, 
(D = E- . CD ce z > cz Z. 4ý ;ý 1. 4ý 
E 
> 1) cli C) 4ý 
4- 
CD Q) Z., 7: 3 'lý . = UD u r_ C = > = c2 (D Q) ý. 0 .ý 
-5 n' Z-. e) tü > E "- . -- " C >, >, CD > , ce r ". C) Q) r- CD Z CD :t 
- > 
E 
Z ý: LD E. -, ý E ID -- CJ ý: .5 
Q) :. - 5: vý C) . ý4-, >, C) E Z :2 rr (A U C, 2 4- 4- CD b .- CD 
- CD 
i CD 
(D C Z 
, l) 
- 
CD 
. - .- Z ý 
, Cn .- ýZ: j cn cz -zi Z, - ý, 
- 
ýý Ö, 0 C) 
.- 
r 
C> 
.- 
ce ý- (D FD .- 
9 
.- 
a) cz -- - 
Q) 
Q) 
4- 
"C 
.- 
cn 
*J 
ý - 
Z 
- 
E 
10 
:2 
. - 
"0 b - ý- U ce c t-O U . cýW a r- u .- c) ý > UD D 
E 
ý- 
, E "0 - ;ý -cj Z., 
ü 
ce 4- 
C) a) ii 9 ýý 1- 
- .- ( Z . ' Z u ý: 
ce clý E - - r- ý- :ý ý: -- > 4ýý rz 0 gi E -ý, ' ", ;-- U Z- 0U -2 
73 
zi m c: Ld u 
Z 
-ci 
>, -0 :., E ýý 
c--1 ýN r. r. c) - >< CD u C) c14 c: CA 0 C? -- c 1) .- ýý :e (L) U "0 
> ce 
c2 r Z U 4ý E = "E - . , ce _ ý 
ý. 
'1 
t4- 
CD 
>, 
C) 
e b r- Cd 
(A ýZ (D u - ; -4 >, 
5 
c24 
r. co ,ü o pý .- -ci E u E-. 4 9. -4 C) Q) r- L ý-- 1) (D -; 
ý 
cli 
00 E 
 
1) 4ý -zi 
"Ir:. ' (V J-- 1.0 -j-- 4ý 
"e a) 
, < cn - E r '; 4ý ' 
cn 
'ýý ; - 4-w w a> .2 UÜ ,, i 
:. - Q) vý -4 :e 
ý 
4ý a) C, 2 
- 
(1) 
CA 
- 
Q) 
4ý ; 
Z. 
VD 1-- . ý "m - 
ýý +.. 
1) 1%0 cn 
4 
r- C: Ld N ýý u -0 CD 1) 
--0 cle 
4ý x < 1) 
CL4 N 
ce : 
4 Q) =, cý c) öü Z 2 Z- (D pý EL 4 Z. Er c c) w 
Z ýD Z 2) . 
-0 
CZ$ -1 ce ý. --ý rý 4ý 
Cd 
Z 72 
CD 
l= 
.c 
cn 4ý 
- ý, 
X 
LZ. ' r. C) . ce cn 
Q) 
0 
. - m CA - ý4-J U 
C LZ 
J - - 
Z 
U C, 2 
- 
m 
Z - E 0 J- 4-1 ;_ 4, 
c e a) 
4-4 
42), 
4- 
cz 
CD 
. c) ID -zi cn -c _c 
.I Z _c ý 4 
> 
(1) CD ýý ce - 
-0 
. - 
ý. _i 
ýdý (D ce ýä- E 
CD 
> 
> CD 
tü 
r- cn - b. 0 r. 
> -a . 4- ý ce > =s E , 
Z Q) * 7- 
0 
u U 0 
CD 
C, 2 CD 
CD ýý 
4ý 
ce -ö - 11 
r. 
Cd ý 
r-,. 
-- Cd Z: ný - 7, ý *ý 1-. Z-- -b-i 
1) 
U (A 
4- 
. czý (D a C) c. ;. Z CD 
2 > ri 
r- 9 E 
e 
-ý r- ý7. 
- (D 
C) 
*m 
(L) 
c 
r. 
-- -4ý Z 3 - r- 1) Z- 4ý = c,: j Z -- , 
JD 
E 
(1. ) :, 
-z E 
CD z3 
C O >, 
= 
CD 
0 
-c - U 
Q) = = Z-. CD r- C) 
0 
n 
cn 
Z 
c) 
> E 
E C, 2 -- 4 u pý x u r- 
-cý 
= , lq CT' 
> 
- 
Q) 
4ý 
4 
C, 2 
> 
ý_, ýc - 1) :J li 
c 
-ý 
Q) 
" ce 
cn, E Z -= U 
4- 
C -a Q) 
L 1, 
C 
-Z2 
x - 
-= 
1) 
- 
= 
- l 
'- U 
U 4-1 ce r- Q) 
-4 
l u " 
Q) >, 
4- 
CD - 
CD 
me 
CA 
< 
a) cn 
:b 
g ý czý 
C/) 
U Z . -ZJ 
(D 
ý = 4- CD.. d C 0 
Ce \Z Q) Z -0 cn ;ý c14 
X (:: ý 4-ý 
CD 
CD -4 
- c: Ld t- . 
r. ; -, 0 0 
C 
CD 
- Z :i - CD 
ce 
cz 
C) 
.ý 4- 
- 1-- 1-- rn a) 
(n cle 
Z c) - Q) 
Gn 
&- Z V-ý ý, 0 
1. ) 
13 ce 
. ýc Z) CD 0. ) - ý. Q) > 
CD ce (D _C V) C) C) (D Ce j- --4 
Z 
4-4 
cn 
C 1. ) 
- E 13 
"Z: ) 
>ý r. cd 
-0 c12 
> 
ce C: 
1-40 
Itt 
Q) Z: 
c) 
-CJ E 4ý 't E r- x ýz r. -0 1, 
0 C) CD ýzz ý-ý ;Z CD 1) Q) CD -, 4 -4 (: 2 Q) -ci -ci 4ý 4- 4-4 4- U 1. ) >, uU -CJ C 4- LZ C) 
r- 'lý =u. = CD (A CD C) mm C> u Q) 
C) CD 
c) uu iý , Q) 5 4Z, 4.. 75 Q) C) ce Q) u 
-Z: 2 4- CD 
C) 
CD 4, >ý 
CD 12-- 4 
: -. ýZ .- C) 
"Zi -ý4 
C) c) C) 4m- 4ý C, 2 ce 
CD (D CD ce cn CD 
CD -, N 
-ci -- C) U CZ 4.. 1 -U= 1) ýý cn - c2. n. Z-- Q) 1 4- :j C) 42 
4- 
Z-- 5==oZ0 m. 5 1: 3 25 
-4-4 CA 
ýý C) ce M Q) .-.. to Z 1) r- CD ; -:: u. t. - ce Z :2 Q) CD ' CD c r. Z >ý 
tü - CA .- ce 0 
ru 
CD CD. -c 4-- 0 CD . x C) tü U 
CD (: e Q) ce > :j C) 4ý c) ei 2u e) uu >b (A c CD ,m 
- ce tü - C) 
-Z ý: -ZJ cn r- U e) CD b c) 
tz (U C. r- cý$ (A 1) -ý 
ýZ Cý 
CD --e J-- ;. Zuc, c) ce ýE (ii uE5 Z, c2. >-. r-'- . 42 b- Q) 0 :3 clzt , Z) Z: t 0 Z: - Q) r- cn ý-4 (: e ce 
cz ce ce 
zz CD =u>>- ce .-r. r. 
1- + 4-1 Q) = -= = 1,13 cd :i ý- ce ce 
C r_ -U 
4ý 
.--, 
Z r- E E- , N 41 J-- C) Q) E ci zz -5 4--1 C ýi jj Q) Ij , Z: C) cn U Z-. ', ý_, 
uu= Q) C) 
Z -r- C) Q) A ý, öz r.., ce -CJ ýu 1) r. r_ 0 ý- .- 42 0Z EU -5- -6- E -ýI - r- i -- >ý E u1 ý- 1 
ö, 0 ýNZ., ce C) .- cý :, 4- 
> 
C C) (1) --u 
. 
i- r_ .- ce 
CD .-, Z, EZE-ut. 
- ce cý (ýn 4- 
44 ;. 
"Zi x EL uC C) 
-ý; >, >ý ce ze Q) C-E -cý, 
> 
53 1) - Z: .-Z-- c: Lý 1-, -4 E CD 0E C zi Z 
4- kn ju UE 
C'. Z- c) 
'U 4ý - Q) = öz rý 11 >= ce "> C) =$ cl. u "t ý. E cle ce ý- +u .- ý-4 1) . r- -, 'C2 CL, .- CD = ý: ý- m- E CD., ý-4 - 
4ý cn 1 A-i u C) 4ý ce ;. Z. - >, C) r- -4- C 1- 
C) cle 
4- 
(2 
4, a) == r- --, (V 
ce b-i Z >C 
4ý 
C rý (V uu0 r- . rd (ii C) >> Q) C> 
Clý C) CD E 4- u (A 
ýý E.. 
u Z-. zi 
, e- (1) rz >b ý. ný l) cn öo w >, .=Uuw0 (D -ci 4ý 
> 
C, 2 ý: r- = 
Cý - Q) Z r- cn 4- ý-4 (1) -- tý, 
E 1-- C ce 
-CJ Z cý 
CZ (U C) ch -0 
Q) 12 (3 00 cn >, Gn -0 
:2C (V -ci cn CD 
Gn Z 
zj ý: >, u Z. Zr*ý C 4ý r. c14 cn _C '-, Z2Z Z -- m, D C) C) clý 
9 Cd a) =4 -z: i - ý5 E 1. ) - r- >ý C) 4ý 42 . C> C) CD C) > 
ce ce 5 .- 
.-e. ) CD u 
4-; 
4J 
t24 ýz N tü ce .u 1) :e CD Uu>E ý2 e ce 1) Z ce r24 Z P-Ozý Z 
.2j -0 ON 
N 
-zi ý >, 
Zu- 
A Q) 
lý 
E E E >, 
= 
E = 
C 
(Z 
, 
. -jý - r- 
4ý 
CD 
Z CD ý ce U 
CD 
= 
M ý. (L) ý_i 
ý. 
Q) Idý 
ý. 
ii 4-ý 
C Q) 
Q) 
,' 
ý 
r. . 
. 
1, -, - r - 1 r 1 60 1 = *Z 1 tz 
u u 
(1) 
zi >, .2 C) , 4ý Q) ' r. j- , - Q) r- 
. c) r. = (A -- l i 
Z.. -ci CD ' u --, - Q) '-, "e m u m CD CD - ce CD Q) :Z n, cD cn 
ce 
ch CD G; cn C'. 0 4.. ' ce ci -0 9-. r- C: L -4 Q) 
> 
- CD , 
J-- 4-1 - E, Q) c2.4 ýZ -CJ C) vi - > cd Z C) Q) Aý j 
c Z. - 
r 
Q) 4 
. Z. ' ý 
4ý u CD - C) 
CD 
> -ci CD 
C) -CJ CD 0 
CD 
cn 
c14 m E ý: u u u Q) cn -ci r. 
4 Z 
22 
>, 55 (D i l 
C, 2 i-- 
- c) 
= 
C, 2 
U 
-ci 
Q) 
ý 
C) 
- 
c: Ld 
C) C ce U 
CD-4 
CD 
- 
t24 
4ý 
ce 
--CJ 
Q) -0 
zý 
Q) 
m 
u 
r 
CA CD 
a 
Lr. 
-- ce 
u 
:i E 
ý E . - E 1) . - 
- 
4-1 u 
, 1 
Z - ce E ý ý-4 E - 1.4 r- = Q) - U (D C) (U 1 r- u Q) bü ce 
E 
. - E m 4ý 1) 4--, 
txü 
Z. - 
C) Q) 
r 
Z 
;:: ýz 9 
. 
Z . 
c) 0 
'11 Z cl 
4 
CD CD 
ce 
4ý 
r - 11 , . C. 
x Q) 
ý -ý4 u -0 '-, .- 
:. 
CD + + 'o r. 11) - "Zi b cn 
c"i 
CD 
. - Z 
W) + 
- Z Q) ý 
u C =$ 
, >ý 
cn o r- ii ' 1- CD -0 00 
Clý C CD Q) CD 
(n 
CD 
ii cn C. 
U C) 
> c) 
4- x 12 CD u - . 
-2 ; 
M$ E -ci 
N 
- 
+ - CD cn c) 
CD cl 4- >, CD c) CD 
E , -ci > 1 cn 
21 E 
tü 4. ý 5 t 11 r_ E ý E .. Z$ :2 
' U V Z ce Z 
C 
4-ý 
CD 
:J 
-CJ 
C C) 1) r- 
:b -ci r_ 
C) 
> 
r_ CD 
ce - ý_i 
cz cd 
cn IC-ý -CJ > 
-ci 73 cn 0 CD 
CD- 
>b 
CD 
C C) CD 
- D 
>-. 
0 4ý 
öz 
C -4 E 
- 
- 
, C) 
,2 E I., Q) 
CJ 
C) 
U ýdý 
(A -CJ 44 2 c 
ý2 
r. r- -- 7a 
E- C) 
u >, 
ý- 
ce 
r 
i> -cj Cd - CD.. 4 
CD 
- C, 2 (D 
5:: 
Z 
c"i 00 cn 
CD 
ý C) 
U bü 4Z c> CD Ch Q) 
2 V c4 
4-- 
CD 
(I 
00 
It 
(Z 
= -a 0 -0 
r- 
a) 
ct 
cz M 
E ct 
En 
ct 
n , Z5 - -0 
=0 
>, ý1. 
-ý ýý 
U 
"'0 
C: L, a) 
E _r_ 
=1 
0 
p 
C' Z, I , - 
.z 
cr + 
CIA 
C'A + 
7 
00 
+ 
-0 
fJ 
- 
03 
,, 3 -0 
ct -0 
U >-ý ý6 
ct 
7; 
Q 
cl 
4- 
C 
ct 
ýz + (1) a 
+ + 
x 
CD QC). pol 
6b 
t QZ.. 00 QZý 
+ + C3 a) 4Q 
-Cý u -. 0 --, 
0. 
C3 
CL 
"0 CIA ct 
.E 
V) 
(14 
=U0 -0 N 
C- . - Lr) 
7; 4- 
V) 
ct 
-0 
C/) 
7; 
00 
op 
bio 
E-4 - 
cj (A 16.. 1 4- 
Z 9.1 ZJ ;. cn - c42 rA CD CZ 
C'2 
Cý, u C) 1) C4 tý --C9.1 CD 44 CD ý. C) 
ce 
Q) 
> >ý -lb r- 10 4Z - .- -0 (: e Q) (U 
u ;.. ý g-:: 
U- 6ý ci 
E r- r- 
ý c: 
ý --. Ce 
S-J .uZ ý_, 
Q) 0 S--4 .-Z CD , "2 Im- cn r Q) (U 
- ce l. =1Zr. Q) ýI, -UM 
Q) 
CD > Q) - A-i Q) > 
N0 CD C) Q) m :. c) cý4 CD rz ö. 0 4 
Q) 
Z 
(n - 
C) J-- 
CD tz, ce CD cz c2 -CJ C) 4- (1) CD CD Z., 4ý " cý ' ýA cl c2, - Q) ;. UE cn (D C: L, (1) Q) M 1. ) Q) 1: 2-d CD r. Cý, (D 4ý 
. 4. -3 
1- --. Q) 
ý>NC, 2 C) 
-CQJ) 
- 
c-) 
L) E ýZ. - m ýý- u 
Q) t-r. 
. 
ýý 
U bü .2-. Q) 4- 
ý: 
4. Z., m N. (Z 
E :1 -0 2 
-, - 
421 u 
li, * 
_J 
* 1; 2 
cli :iu 
C) 
ce 4m- a) 
4-1 0 -ci Q) *> cn r_ cn Z pý cri (D $.. cn _CM CD -CJ E coý ýc CL4 ýýl4 0 
CD 
:b L) e 
r. x 
u C. ) 
.- 
C) U CD CD CD 
rU 
bü 
'Cr 
b' r- > -12 -4 - u" CD ý: r- -ci cn " :j;.. Q) CD 
CD -cj = + CD "E -Z - 9.1 CD >, ce --0 0C cz CD C) CD --4.. ' -Z Q) - cn ZS ;.. -2 Q) Q) -c 0 c: Lý cn Ei c2. U CD 0 r- cr, -u ce Cý, ö. 0 CD CD tü uM CD 44 . - E - Z-- ý: u-i. ý- r- Q) > +> Q) tr, cn .U 4ý uu -tý ý- ,=-> 
öü C/) klý 7: ý a, 11 -0 .- li: i = Q) --0 ''E ce - Q) cn 
-u1. ) -Z -0 c:,., >, cz ce 
,- tü ce ri CZ Z1 cz (1) -ý r_ Q) , ý-, cn Q) -ý -ci cd = Z: ce :. .-E $- c) ;.. E (iý u "5 ce 
.- lzý ;ý c2, cn .. 2 ce ;ý 5--ý ci clz CD > C, 2 (U c2. > J-- ce u -ci > (V cn Zý 
cn cn -, 1 Cý$ - ýI. > cn "E:,:: - 15 E E- CL) t, EE 
'ý ý: ' 
c) b 4- Z) CD 0 --, 1 -ýý ci, = -ci c) c) u -D u cn Q) 4. -1 4ý UD U "a $- C) 
cz ce 4Z > bio vEE c) ce .-2' ce u bü - a) ý 
ýý7 - ce .2 Q) Q) c-, j ý. -ZJ X< (2) Z=u Q) Z ý-. Z: Z. ' cl ; -, - r. 9.1 ce 1- c) m c: L, Z> _c CD-4 cz >> h---4 CD-4 
"Zi 1) 44 
112 cn C) Uu1 
1. ) tü 
>Z CD -CJ -- 
J-- E. '-, 5, -0 ý- u 1) "CJ - >, u -= " _C Z 1., :1 (D ce ' rý , 
cn 4, , 
(1) > 
"c) -- ,u 
ýý Z cr r_ CD c> 
CY 
u ce .-e CD CD -CJ ;- ýc Cý CA 1- cý M 4ý cn rA cý Q) :d "1: J Z. - 4-. e (D Z -1 72 =--Xo 44 (U ; --0 -ci cd >u 4ý (Z u "0 U r- C ce . Z: (Z pý x -z. 
Z CD Zu4 r- r) >, Cý, »-EC 
C) CY r. -ci -ci CD uU 
cn C, 2 
ý 
CD 
.2ý: Z: t. Ei c: Li Q) ý Z, ZUr, u oo -i cý -, , Q) Q) - ;.. (D (V 
-0 ZZ 
C: 14 (D CJ 
-c cd ce l= e cq 
Ch 
c -CJ 
LZ 
C) 72 
Z 
li ce (A 
CD 
l= 
ý4-b 
JD 
>, ý 84 E 15 E ý ,A E = 0 E C . C) 2 
CU 
; - (1) 1) . 73 a) ; - q. C-11 
C) 
C) 4ý 
C) 
bb 
C) . 
C) ýý 0 11 , 
= Cý, =1 0 7ý 
q) = > r. 
tz 'I) -ý C, 3 
E) 2 E C) 
ýn 6. U 0 0 u 42) r- ol -0 
cl 
(U > 
- 
4- 1. ) 
Cý3 
:3 
CA 0 
a 41 M = ct ;. 
4ý 
o 
ct 
- 
E E .0 ct C) -C ct 
u 
M M cn Q4 C) :3 
Cý$ C. ) cý -a (n ýý - =s E (1) b, O - r- r = un u =1 r r a) 
a) 
- .= 
= 
= 
(L) 
E 
C, 3 
ý: a) 
- (1) a) L ýý 1) - -- 
- J-- 
4- 
ct 
E 
M > 
0 
C) 0 U 44. os 
" 
4-1 C14 
U 
bz E E U u 
4- 
5 = 1. ) = CL4 
ý 
bb 
M 
ct 
ct 4- 
C) u 
u 
(n 
Z3 ct 
ct 
0 
C" U ct 71 > 
> 
C's c: 
, r -ZI 0 x 
u 7: 3 0 - > - 
cl a) C) 7ý , 9. " 
a) 
L 
1.4 
0 
" as 
03 
0 
E 
* = V, - E :E -:: -. 5 -z E 15 E >-, 
4 I r- Ct rA >, 
býo 
Lt 
= 
p" 
>-. 
C) , 
-"-- u 
>ý E >1 
0 u ý 0 u - (A m u ct C: w 
> - , a) 71 := , 
4- > ; E C3 .- > a) , M. E "- E = 0 (j; -g 
ýj 
ý 
> q-) ct 4-ý cl M u 
CII 
E C, 3 
a) ý ;.. 
C: 
ý r- -0 0 E 4 E 
1 -. 0 = = ý: 
L, :3 o 2 71 11 = = - 0 
: 
> 0 -ý-j I b D 
C'ý 
0 . - , - I t, O 
:3 > E CL4 r- cl 
-Cý 
1 
a) 
- -ý, cn 
b 
-. 6 
0 
M. C) +. I ýD 
. - 
Aý 
ct 
' r- . 
. 
--C) 
a. ) 
- 
ýc 
C', 
E 
a) - C: - - 
=1 
M aj 
0 
. - 
C14 
. - 
:3 
u a) 
= 
0 
"-Cý 
C) 
= 
-ý 
0 u 
C) a) -0 C) U to C, 3 *- 4ý cL4 - 0 
4ý 
un 
C7, 
u 
75 
4- 
0 . Z 
> 
> ct E un E E 
M 
C) U 7: ) -0 to C14 = (1) .. >, E c, ý z 
CY, u liý 
' a) -. 0 0 - = (1) -cl -, = cz Cl, U -= CO ,ý 0) ct --. ý U =1 C . u C 03 
ý a E ý4.1 Lý7 0 bJo C = M :3 E E) (1) 0 $ 4 . - 
u 
= 
'-0 
= 
>1 
a) a) 
> 
= CL4 
a. ) 
-- 
;.. 4 
t 
U = 7ý m C 
- 
1. ) ý-o 
ct 
cv = C) cl CI u c 71 b o 3 u) 1 - 3 =s > a) 1. ) . - U Z - 0 q C 7 
4- = 
0 -3 
a) 4- 
a) 
os 
ct 
4--1 
En 
C) 
ýc 
>., 
a) 
"r) 4- (1) , 
in. 4ý 
ct 
M It r_ M r-ý 
00 u 71 
C/) 
00 4 
1-1 
E 0 
cl - 
cn 
0 -cl 
E 
c rA 
>_1 0 ct ;" -1: 3 z ý. 4ý Cý = .. u L- ý. o ct ., ý'- 
4- 
- 
CýL4 
4ý 
- bAD Q = 
a-4 
Ct r- C/) 
C) :3 
ct 
Ct 
U 
U u 
ol C: j 
" 
Ct 
t+-, r- 71 
q) 
cl 1. ) 
4ý 
V) u (-ý 
- 
E: r- 
aj . 
I-- 
ý 
cz 
> 
U) 
. ýl "s 
ý 
= 
4-, 
-! ý 
a) 
E 
0 
-; - M ,* a) 
= 
:ý 0 
a 
. - 
00 
I: t 
= 
=3 ý E 
(1) 
E 
(D 
E U ;.. o U ý 7 t+- C: ) ct "., 4 U . - I >ý, " (D E ý::: ý: E. ý6 E o >, >, 1 .. cn E a) ý C) - P. .2 4ý 
1 
a) 0 .- -= 0 0 a) 4- 0 - 0 - cn 
m s 0 
64 
a ) 
m 4ý 
0 
CýL4 
ý = a) 4ý c7 - = E . u E b-0 Cl) 1 CL, C) 'Cý m , 
a) t ý cu 
=3 0 00 C) 4-4 = 
cl 
c') C) u C) 
C., 
71 
ct 
ct 
cn m 
0 al. 
---q in 
Appendix B: Data sources 
The data are a panel of 10 standard UK regions over 23 years (1973-1995). 
Wages (nominal regional hourly wage calculated by dividing weekly wage by 
weekly hours), the share of employment in manufacturing and long-term 
unemployment for the period 1973-1983 come from Regional Trends. 
Male unemployment rate and long-term unemployment proportion (for 1984- 
1995) have been taken out of the NOMIS database. ' 
The Department of the Environment provided house prices and building societies 
advances. 
* The consumer prices have been obtained from the Reward Group publication. 
Years of schooling have been calculated from the General Household Survey by 
David Blanchflower. 
Weekly wages for skilled and unskilled occupations were found in the New 
Earnings Survey. 
9 National retail price index (all items) from Office of National Statistics. 
1 Data kindly provided by Anne Green, Institute for Employment Research, 
University of Warwick 
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Appendix C: Tables of secondary results 
Table C. 2.1: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-1995. 
Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. 
Model 1. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant 0.179** 0.190** 0.188** 0.243** 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.052) (0.052) 
Log unemployment (-1) t) -0.014 -0.017 -0.012 -0.025 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) 
Log unemployment (-2) -0.032* -0.027 -0.034 -0.013 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) 
Loc, wage (-1) _ 1 
0.554** 0.554** 0.486** 0.500** 
Z _ 
Z- ) 
(0.071) (0.070) (0.073) (0.075) 
Log wage (-2) _ 0.240** 0.254** 0.321** 0.352** 4 :ý 
(0.061) (0.062) (0.071) (0.073) 
Log long-term unemployment (-1) 0.081** 0.082** 0.095** 0.062** 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.028) (0.027) 
Loc, long-term unemployment (-2) Z: ) -0.022* -0.027** -0.013 -0.007 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Region dummies Z: ý yes yes 
yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to -0.227 -0.228 -0.239 -0.256 
unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the 0.286 0.283 0.424 0.375 
proportion of long-term unemployment 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -1.278 -0.822 0.980 . 
825 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -1.488 -1.467 -1.263 -0.788 
Residual sum of squares 0.012 0.011 0.024 0.023 
Total sum of squares 42.628 43.310 54.212 
43.749 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 6) 707.306 861.239 518.093 438.925 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 
861.216 1325-391 952.886 1907.242 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df 
36.544 39.732 30.751 19-516 
9) 
Wald test -jt sig of both dums (df = 
28) 1622.187 3185.259 1216.675 1 2288.357 
See notes on table 2.3. 
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Table C. 2.2: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. All occupations. 
- 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0 213** -3.208 0.198** 0.206** 0.312** 
(0.029) (4.112) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) 
Log wage (- 1) 0.520** 0.436** 0.515** 0.516** 0.583** 
(0.081) (0.102) (0.080) (0.080) (0.083) 
Log wage (-2) Z-D 0.385** 0.392** 0.381** 0.382** 0.345** 
(0.076) (0.083) (0.074) (0-074) (0.078) 
Loo, unemployment (-1) -0.030** -0.005 -0.003 -0.017* -0.030** (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) 
Log proportion of long-term 
unemployment (A) 0.049** 0.037** 0.046** 0.046** 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log house prices (-1) tn 0.056** 
(0.018) 
Log consumer prices 0.288 
(0-396) 
(Log unemployment (-1 ))2 -0.006* 
(0.003) 
(Log unemployment (- 1))3 -0.001* 
(0.0006) 
Long-term unemployment (-1) 0.001** 
(0-0003) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to unem. -0.316 -0.029 -0.144 -0.314 -0.417 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the 
proportion of long-term unemployment 0.515 0.215 0.442 0.451 0.486 
First-order serial correlation -0.966 -1-178 -1.028 -1.049 -0.959 
Second-order serial correlation -1.441 -0.680 -1.572 -1.569 -0.644 
Residual sum of squares 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 
Total sum of square 52.799 52.799 52.799 52.799 52.799 
Wald test of joint significance 1212.791 1370.317 1329.824 1320.145 998.806 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 2038.395 1184.745 2108.688 2106.881 2061.937 
Wald test -it sig of region dums (df 32.261 25.641 36-705 36.125 21-970 
9) 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 2342.927 2467.052 2432.064 2427.489 2293.043 
See notes on table 2.3. 
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Table C. 2.3: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. 
Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. 
Replacing log of the proportion of long-term unemployment with the proportion 
of long-term unemployment. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant 0.285** 0.274** 0.347** 0.357** 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0-030) 
Log unemployment (A) -0.029** -0.026** -0.031** -0.030** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
Log wage (A) 0.620** 0.638** 0.547** 0.535** 
(0.067) (0.064) (0.076) (0.078) 
Log wage (-2) t7l Z: > 0.219** 0.214** 0.315** 0.338** 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.071) (0.073) 
Long-term unemployment (A) Cý 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
(0-0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Realon dummies Z: ) yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to Z: ) -0.181 -0.178 -0.222 -0.238 
unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the 0.250 0.266 0.393 0.302 
proportion of long-term unemployment 2-: 1 
Test for first-order serial correlation -1.583 -1.102 1.057 0.713 
Test for second-order serial correlation -1.254 -1.322 -0.654 -0.440 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.011 0.025 0.024 
Total sum of squares 42.628 43.310 54.212 43.749 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 4) 559.207 634.343 453.304 386-302 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 1314.267 1723.759 1077.489 1982.479 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 28-33 29.51 20-905 18.497 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 1801.263 2796.574 1268.683 2375.148 
See notes on table 2.3. 
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Table C-2.4: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-1995. Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. Introduction of non-linear terms. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
including 
overtime 
Introduction of (log unemployment)2 
Constant 0.206** 0.193** 0.202** 0.237** 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.033) (0.080) 
Log wage (-1) rý tn' 0.570** 0.575** 0.504** 0.509** 
(0.159) (0.069) (0.072) (0-076) 
Log wage (-2) 0.254** 0.253** 0.322** 0.356** 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.068) (0.071) 
Log unemployment (-1) Z_: ý -0.035** -0.021 0.013 -0.004 
(0.016) (0-013) (0.024) (0.023) 
Log of proportion of long-term unemployment 0.041** 0.039** 0.053** 0.044** 
1) (0-008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.01) 
[Log unemployment (_1)12 0.001 -0.001 -0.010* -0.006 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Unemployment elasticity of wages -0.182 -0.138 0.042 -0.127 
Long-term unemployment elasticity of wages 0.235 0.230 0.306 0.326 
No serial correlation 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.011 0.023 0.023 
Total sum of squares 42.628 43.310 54.212 43.749 
Introduction of (log unemployment)3 
Constant 0.205** 0.195** 0.215** 0.245** 
(0.021) (0.020) (0-031) (0.033) 
Log wage (-1) 0.570** 0.575** 0.505** 0.510** 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.072) (0.076) 
Log wage (-2) 0.255** 0.253** 0.324** 0.357** 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.068) (0.071) 
Log unemployment (-1) -0.032** -0.024** -0.009 -0.018 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) 
Log of proportion of long-term unemployment 0.041** 0.040** 0.053** 0.044** 
1) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
[Log unemployment (_ 1)]3 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.001* -0.0009 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Unemployment elasticity of wages -0.161 -0.156 -0.189 -0.248 
Long-term unemployment elasticity of wages 0.236 0.232 0.314 0.332 
No serial correlation 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.011 0.023 0.023 
Total sum of squares 42.628 1111, M) 54.212 43.749 
See notes on table 2.3. 
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Table C-2-5: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. The Effect of the Share of Manufacturing in Regional Employment. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
including 
overtime Constant 0.186** 0.163** 0.262** 0.313** 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.050) (0-054) 
Log unemployment (-1) -0.027** -0.024** -0-032** -0-034** (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log wage (- 1) ZD 0.570** 0.572** 0.494** 0.488** 
(0.070) (0.067) (0.075) (0.078) 
Log wage (-2) 0.251** 0.260** 0.333** 0.359** 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.068) (0.071) 
Loc, lona-term unemployment (-1) 0.041** 0.042** 0.057** 0.044** 
(0-008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Share of manufacturing in employment 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0007 -0.001 (0-008) (0.0005) (0-0007) (0-0007) 
Region dummies Cý yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to -0-155 -0.147 -0.184 -0.225 
unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the 0.231 0.253 0.328 0.294 
proportion of long-term unemployment 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -0.931 -0.319 1.014 0.681 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -1.457 -1.530 -1.170 -0.677 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.011 0.024 0.023 
Total sum of squares 42.628 43.310 54.212 43.749 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 5) 646.209 761.594 520.329 434.261 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 1237.045 1726-144 1116.278 2208.754 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df 24.733 32.429 25.244 20.653 
9) 
Wald test - Jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 1712.400 2838.880 1356.007 2666.359 
See notes on table 2.3. 
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Table C. 2.6: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. The Effect of years of schooling. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant 2.344 2.178 6.575** 5.597** 
(1-825) (1.688) (2-968) (2.562) 
Loc, wage (A) zlý C) 0.523** 0.543** 0.410** 0.413** 
(0-082) (0.078) (0-088) (0-096) 
Log wage (-2) Z__ Z:, 0.257** 0.253** 0.307** 0.294** 
(0-065) (0.066) (0.092) (0.092) 
Log proportion of long-term 0.037** 0.038** 0.060** 0.045** 
unemployment (- 1) 
(0.011) (0.011) (0-015) (0.014) 
Loo, unemployment rate (A) r__ -0.039** -0.037** -0.025** -0.026* 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) 
Years of schoolino, t) -0.383 -0.356 -1.221** -1.015** 
(0.349) (0.322) (0.576) (0.495) 
Years of schooling squared 0.017 0.016 0.059** 0.049** 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.024) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to -0.177 -0.181 -0.117 -0.089 
unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the 2_ý 0.168 0.186 0.212 0.153 
proportion of long-term unemployment 
First-order serial correlation -1.517 -0.916 0.693 0.855 
Second-order serial correlation -0.683 -0.579 -1.731 -1.243 
Residual sum of squares 0.009 0.008 0.019 0.017 
Total sum of square 23.221 23.762 29.662 22.231 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 8) 429.901 577.859 260.268 156.122 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 880.115 1328.541 737.926 1621.825 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 30.210 30.354 25.216 22.001 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 1129.827 1952.371 1089.546 2340.902 
See notes on table 2.3. 
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Table C-2.7: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. 
Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. 
The Effect of the Growth of the Share of Manufacturiniz in Re6onal 
Employment. 
CY 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant 0.199** 0.190** 0.232** 0.263** 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.032) (0.034) 
Log wage (A) t:, Z: ) 0.571** 0.573** 0.493** 0.492** 
(0.069) (0.068) (0.074) (0.076) 
Loc, waoe (-2) 0.269** 0.285** 0.330** 0.358** 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.070) 
Loc, proportion of long-term unemployment (-1) C, Z: > 0.043** 0.044** 0.057** 0.046** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Loo, unemployment rate (-1) -0.029** -0.026** -0.030** -0-03 1 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.060 0.080** -0-068 -0.069 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.053) (0.046) 
Realon dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to unemployment -0.181 -0.183 -0.169 -0.207 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the proportion C, 0.269 0.310 0.322 0.307 
of long-term unemployment 
First-order serial correlation -0.923 -0.281 0.778 0.377 
Second-order serial correlation -1.353 -1.457 -1.228 -0.830 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.011 0.024 0.023 
Total sum of square 42.628 43.310 54.212 43.749 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 5) 677.399 805.183 523.851 449.777 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 1279.145 1829.353 1141.624 2196.880 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 34.630 35.596 32.959 25.017 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 1707.031 2708.625 1373.752 2592.500 
See notes on table 2.3. 
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Table C. 2.8: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. Dependent variable: log real hourly wage for men. Model with prices and manufacturing. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
including 
overtime Constant 0.164* 0.170** 0.465** 0.368** 
(0-088) (0.067) (0.230) (0.151) 
Loo, real wage (4) C, In 0.570** 0.552** 0.349** 0.386** 
(0.085) (0-075) (0-130) (0.101) 
Log real wage (-2) 0.269** 0.271** 0.248** 0.320** 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.114) (0-091) 
0.043** 0.039** 0.025 0.018 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment (A) z: 1 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.032) (0.025) 
Loo, unemployment rate (-1) -0.025* -0.018* 0.031 0.017 
(0-013) (0.010) (0.040) (0.029) 
Log house prices/RPI (- 1) 0.012 0.021* 0.110** 0.087** 
(0-017) (0.013) (0.050) (0.033) 
Log consumer prices/RPI -0.069 0.061 0.899 0.657 
(0.369) (0.235) (0.996) (0.692) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.066* 0.082** -0.029 -0.032 
(0-038) (0.032) (0.054) (0.044) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
First-order serial correlation -0.946 -0.200 1.037 0.522 
Second-order serial correlation -1.410 -0.910 0.794 0.360 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.010 0.044 0.033 
Total sum of square 1.255 1.345 4.070 2.097 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 7) 691.566 920.668 457.621 460.795 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 1599.689 1848.036 535.098 1386.823 
Wald test - jt sig of region durns (df = 9) 36.928 41.694 31.643 33.961 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 1804.172 2109.323 799.713 2224.102 
See notes on table 2.3. 
Instruments: log real wage (4) and (-2), log proportion of long-term unemployment (4), log 
unemployment rate (-I), log advances/RPI (4), log consumer prices/RPI (-I), growth in the share of 
manufacturing. 
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Table C. 2.9: Panel estimation of regional wage equations: Britain 1976-95. 
Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. 
Difference between manuals and non-manuals. 
Excluding 
overtime 
Including 
overtime 
Constant 0.783 -0.625 
(3.829) (2.454) 
Log wage (A) Cý In 0.570** 0.552** 
(0.085) (0.075) 
Log wage (-2) 0.269** 0.271** 
(0.062) (0.060) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment (A) 0.043** 0.039** 
(0.014) (0.011) 
Log unemployment rate (-1) -0.025 * -0.018* 
(0.013) (0-010) 
Loo, house prices (-1) 0.012 0.021* 
(0.017) (0.013) 
Log consumer prices -0.069 0.061 
(0.369) (0.235) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.066* 0.082** 
(0.038) (0.032) 
Region dummies yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes 
(NM) Constant -10.599 -6.524 
(11.047) (7.560) 
(NM) Log wage -0.221 -0.166 
(0.155) (0.125) 
(NM) Log wage (-2) -0.021 0.049 
(0.130) (0-109) 
(NM) Log proportion of long-term unemployment -0.017 -0.021 
1) 
(0.035) (0.028) 
(NM) Log unemployment rate (- 1) 0.056 0.035 
(0.043) (0.030) 
(NM) Log house prices (-1) 0.098* 0.066** 
(0.053) (0.036) 
(NM) Log consumer prices 0.968 0.596 
(1.062) (0.731) 
(NM) Growth of share of manufacturing -0.095 -0.114** 
(0.066) (0.054) 
(NM) Region dummies yes yes 
(NM) Time dummies yes yes 
Wald test on (NM) economic variables (df 8) 17.399 31.906 
Wald test on (NM) region dummies (df = 9) 5.903 3.740 
Wald test on (NM) time dummies (df 19) 93.326 
783.067 
See notes on table 2.3 and note I on table 2.4. 
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Table C. 2.10: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. 
Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. 
Composition effect. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant -0.067 -1.269 -9.256 -6.943 
(3.044) (2.236) (8.968) (6.357) 
LoCF wage (A) 0.581** 0.569** 0.345** 0.385** 
(0.083) (0.077) (0.127) (0.099) 
LoO wa(ye (-2) 0.247** 0.247** 0.259** 0.323** 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.102) (0.086) 
Log long-term unemployment rate 1) 0.020** 0.020** 0.029** 0.019* 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) 
Log short-term unemployment rate (- 1) -0.041** -0-034** -0.003 -0.003 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.042) (0.032) 
Log house prices (- 1) 0.021 0.029** 0.108** 0.087** 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.040) (0.027) 
Log, consumer prices 0.021 0.131 0.860 0.648 
(0.294) (0.214) (0.863) (0.616) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.054 0.072** -0.029 -0.032 
(0.038) (0.032) (0.055) (0.045) 
Realon dummies Z: ) yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to short- -0.238 -0.185 -7.576E-3 -0.010 
term unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to long-term 0.116 0.109 0.073 0.065 
unemployment 
First-order serial correlation -1.320 -0.551 1.127 
0.548 
Second-order serial correlation -1.107 -0.417 0.866 
0.383 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.011 0.042 
0.032 
Total sum of square 42.628 43.310 
54.212 43.749 
Wald test of joint significance Of 7) 703.286 911.189 452.149 
211.984 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df 19) 
1227.489 1460.398 540.032 640.367 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 
9) 22.129 21.922 19.297 12.710 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 
28) 1868.043 2686.285 1026.942 1327-846 
See notes on table 2.3. 
Instruments: log wage (-1) and (-2), log long-term unemployment rate 
(4), log short-term 
unemployment rate (4), log advances (4), 
log consumer prices (4), growth in the share of 
manufacturing. 
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Table C. 2.11: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. Adding the change in the unemployment rate. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant 0.824 -0.516 -9.857 -7.165 
(3.788) (2.372) (10.455) (7.117) 
Logy wage (-1) 0.573** 0.557** 0.345** 0.377** 
(0.084) (0.073) (0.136) (0.101) 
Loc, waoe (-2) C) Z: ý 0.279** 0.292** 0.246** 0.317** 
(0.060) (0.056) (0-117) (0.091) 
Log proportion of long-term 1-1) 0.039** 0.033** 0.026 0.020 
unemployment (- 1) 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.031) (0.026) 
Log, unemployment rate (-1) -0.025* -0.018* 0.031 0.017 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.041) (0.029) 
Loo, house prices (-1) 0.017 0.029** 0.109** 0.085** 
(0.019) (0.013) (0.051) (0.035) 
Loo, consumer prices t: ) -0.076 0.047 0.906 0.663 
(0.366) (0.228) (1.009) (0.691) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.059 0.071** -0.026 -0.026 
(0.040) (0.035) (0.054) (0.043) 
Change in unemployment rate Z=1 -0.002 -0.004** 0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Realon dummies 4: 1 yes yes yes yes Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the C, 0.263 0.218 0.063 0.065 
proportion of long-term unemployment 
First-order serial correlation -0.559 0.017 1.079 0.581 
Second-order serial correlation -1.382 -0.980 0.800 0.401 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.010 0.044 0.033 
Total sum of square 42.628 43.310 54.212 43.749 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 8) 682.682 673.824 459.128 210.578 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 1085.373 822.874 561.486 653.683 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 25.212 21.898 15.597 11.796 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 1618.637 1189.421 1020.968 1237.360 
See notes on table 2.3. 
Instruments: log wage (4) and (-2), log propotion of long-term unemployment (4), log unemployment 
rate (4), log advances (4), log consumer prices (4), growth in the share of manufacturing, change in 
unemployment rate. 
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Table C-2-12: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1978-95. Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. Using the proportion of long-term unemployment in population at risk. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant 0.676 -0.672 -11.622 -7.699 
(3.704) (2.821) (14.169) (9.122) 
Log wage (-1) 0.570** 0.573** 0.434** 0.458** 
(0.098) (0.091) (0.145) (0.104) 
Log wage (-2) z: 1 0.204** 0.188** 0.154* 0.273** 
(0.077) (0-075) (0.092) (0.078) 
Log "true"proportion of long-term 0.056* 0.039 -0.001 -0.018 unemployment (- 1) 
(0.031) (0.025) (0.112) (0.081) 
Log unemployment rate (A) -0.044* -0.026 0.041 0.027 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.095) (0.064) 
Log house prices (- 1) 0.012 0.023* 0.112* 0.087** 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.066) (0.041) 
Log consumer prices -0.063 0.060 1.062 0.703 
(0-354) (0.269) (1.354) (0.876) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.036 0.051 -0.026 -0.029 
(0-036) (0-033) (0.061) (0-050) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Long-term elasticity of wage to -0.195 -0.109 0.100 0.100 
unemployment 
Long-term elasticity of wage to the 0.248 0.163 -2.427E-3 -0.067 
proportion of long-term unemployment 
First-order serial correlation 0.400 -0-171 0.036 -0.252 
Second-order serial correlation -1.958 -1.270 0.774 0.374 
Residual sum of squares 0.013 0.010 0.050 0.031 
Total sum of square 26.411 26.798 34.640 28.045 
Wald test of joint significance (df = 8) 357.763 421.223 262.937 341.101 
Wald test - jt sig of time dums (df = 19) 376.041 531.463 319.930 957.749 
Wald test - jt sig of region dums (df = 9) 29.963 32.924 20.714 18.523 
Wald test - jt sig of both dums (df = 28) 993.227 1769.905 824.255 2390.708 
See notes on table 2.3. 
Instruments: log wage (A) and (-2), log "true" propotion of long-term unemployment (A), log 
unemployment rate (A), log advances (A), log consumer prices (A), growth in the share of 
manufacturing. 
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Table C. 2.13: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. 
Dependent variable: log nominal hourly wage for men. 
Checking for Parameters Constancy. 
Manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Manuals 
including 
overtime 
Non- 
manuals 
excluding 
overtime 
Non-manuals 
including 
overtime 
Constant -11.288 -13.839** -10.244 -5.241 
(8.124) (7.012) (7.035) (6.233) 
Log wage (4) 0.122 0.020 0.393** 0.437** 
(0.186) (0.187) (0-117) (0.113) 
Log wage (-2) -0.027 0.096 0.138** 0.216** 
(0.166) (0.153) (0.089) (0.104) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment 0.033* 0.043** 0.043** 0.033* 
1) 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) 
Log unemployment rate 1) -0.084 -0.077* 0.002 -0.006 
(0.057) (0.045) (0.029) (0.027) 
Loc, house prices (- 1) -0.134 -0.116 0.058 0.055 
(0.107) (0.082) (0.056) (0.054) 
Log consumer prices 0.790 0.952** 0.668 0.333 
(0.563) (0.468) (0.523) (0.480) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.110** 0.101** 0.019 -0.014 
(0.054) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050) 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
(B) Log wage (-1) 0.106 0.180 -0.323 -0-341* 
(0.282) (0.277) (0.207) (0.179) 
(B) Log wage (-2) 0.122 0.0002 0.056 -0.042 
(0.187) (0.202) (0.138) (0.141) 
(B) Log proportion of long-term unemployment -0-018 -0.025 -0.007 -0.010 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) 
(B) Log unemployment rate (-1) 0.101 0.107 0.061 0.044 
(0.078) (0.066) (0.066) (0-059) 
(B) Log house prices (- 1) 0.333 0.366* 0.119 0.021 
(0.207) (0.191) (0.147) (0.123) 
(B) Log consumer prices 0.172 0.215 0.225* 0.164* 
(0-161) (0.166) (0.125) (0-088) 
(B) Growth of share of manufacturing -0.158* -0.106 -0.076 0.031 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.098) (0.085) 
(B) Region dummies yes yes yes yes 
First-order serial correlation 0.186 -0-309 -0.331 
0.193 
Second-order serial correlation -0.553 -0.531 -1.197 -1.249 
Wald test on break variables (B) (df = 16) 25.530 32.235 
55.582 61.274 
Wald test on (B) economic variables (df = 7) 12.304 14.212 
7.104 14.219 
Wald test on (B) region dummies (df = 9) 17.072 21.564 
9.700 18.530 
See notes on table 2.3. 
Instruments: log wage (A) and (-2), log propotion of long-term unemployment 
(-1), log unemployment 
rate (4), log advances (-1), log consumer prices 
(4), growth in the share of manufacturing. 
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Table C-2.14: Panel estimation of regional wage equations. Britain 1976-95. Dependent variable: log nominal weekly wage for men. Difference between skilled and unskilled occupations. 
Coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Constant 1.561 ** 
(0.223) 
Loo, wage (A) Z__ 0.329** 
(0-076) 
Loo, wage (-2) 0.279** 
(0.060) 
Log proportion of long-term unemployment (4) 0.090** 
(0.014) 
Loo, proportion of long-term unemployment (-2) -0.040** 
(0.014) 
Log unemployment rate (4) Z: ý -0.041** 
(0.008) 
Log house prices (-2) 0.018 
(0.014) 
Growth of share of manufacturing 0.062 
(0.041) 
Realon dummies yes 
Time dummies yes 
(Skilled) Constant 
-0.571 
(0.371) 
(Skilled) Log wage (4) -0.033 
(0.129) 
(Skilled) Log wage (-2) 0.025 
(0.120) 
(Skilled) Log proportion of long-term -0.029 
unemployment (4) 
(0.022) 
(Skilled) Log proportion of long-term 0.061 
unemployment (-2) 
(0-033) 
(Skilled) Log unemployment rate (- 1) 0.038** 
(0.016) 
(Skilled) Log house prices (-2) 0.057** 
(0.023) 
(Skilled) Growth of share of manufacturing -0.131 
(0.088) 
(Skilled) Region dummies yes 
(Skilled) Time dummies yes 
Wald test on (Skilled) economic variables (df 8) 59.137 
Wald test on (Skilled) region dummies (df = 9) 24.615 
Wald test on (Skilled) time dummies (df = 19) 106.543 
See notes on tables 2.3 and 2.6. 
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Chapter three 
The Flexibility of Unemployed People during Job Search 
67 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is interested in determining empirically how unemployed 
people's characteristics may influence the way they carry out their job search (i. e. 
their flexibility) and consequently the length of an unemployment spell. We assume 
that decisions taken during job search (such as mobility and level of pay) influence 
the duration of unemployment and we look at the determinants of these decisions. We 
are particularly interested in the determinants of mobility. Recent papers have singled 
out certain factors such as housing tenure as its main determinants. It has, however, 
been pointed out that factors such as the family structure or psychological factors also 
influence decisions on mobility. We use the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS) data set which contains a number of variables which are not readily available 
in other data sets and measure these other factors. Moreover, we consider that the 
mobility decision is made in conjunction with other choices which have to be made 
when looking for a job. This issue has not been looked at before. It is therefore 
potentially interesting to study whether results concerning the determinants of job 
search behaviour are affected by such a hypothesis. 
This chapter studies the determinants of the willingness of unemployed people 
to move (i. e. change house) to take a new job, to accept a lower level of pay than in 
their previous job and to accept a lower skill content in their new job. We find that 
these three decisions are significantly related. Models which take this into account are 
therefore more efficient that those that do not. We find evidence that people who have 
experienced past unemployment are more willing to move. Skilled manuals are found 
to be constrained in moving. Women who have a partner are less likely to consider 
Moving, while men are not and are even more likely to consider 
it if their partner does 
not work. 
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Section 3.2 reviews related studies, section 3.3 introduces the data and the 
econometric model, section 3.4 provides the analysis of the results, and section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.2 Review of related literature 
Within the literature on Job search, theoretical models analyse choices that 
employed and/or unemployed individuals make to maximise the expected value of 
their job search. We consider three choices. First, individuals select a reservation 
wage. This is the most obvious choice variable, and it has been studied extensively 
(see, among others, Thomas, 1998). Second, individuals decide on the location of the 
job, in other words whether they are prepared to move and/or migrate. A strand of the 
literature on job search has been interested in this issue (see for example Hey and 
McKenna, 1979). Third, individuals make a decision on the type of job they would 
accept. For example, they consider the level of responsibility involved, the working 
conditions, the type of skills required, etc. This latter choice variable has been studied 
under the generic term of job or firm "characteristics" (Kahn and Low, 1988). We 
review below studies which aim to identify the deten-ninants of these choices. 
Compared to these studies, which generally analyse one or two choices, we will study 
the determinants of three simultaneous decisions. 
3.2.1 Mobility decisions and intentions 
Actual residential mobility (measured as migration between regions), 
associated with job search, has been extensively studied in the theoretical literature. 
The determinants of workers' mobility can be identified in a basic human capital 
model (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991). In this model, voluntary mobility is considered 
an investment. The decision to move 
is therefore taken by measuring the present value 
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of net benefits of the move. The individual will choose to move if the present value of 
the benefits exceeds the monetary and psychic costs of moving. Human capital theory 
suggests that the young are more mobile. They have a greater number of years from Z) 
which to benefit after a move and are liable to have lower psychic costs. The more 
educated are more mobile as they face less risk of subsequent unemployment (in the 
destination area) and they face more national labour markets, hence lower search 
costs for greater distances. Unemployment benefits have also been identified as 
influencing mobility decisions. There are various ways in which benefits can affect 
mobility. A move may be associated with the loss of benefits, in which case the costs 
of moving are greater (for example, housing benefits are administered by the local 
authority, or people need to register at a new job centre). Benefits may also be used to 
search for a job for a longer period of time; this may reduce mobility as individuals 
will have more time to look for a local job, but it may also induce mobility as 
individuals have more money to finance a move. 
Hey and McKenna (1979) study the case where it is costly to change jobs (or 
take up a job) but costless to search for them. In their model accepting a job means 
moving. Their model suggests that higher-paid workers need less relative 
inducements to move than lower-paid workers. Because after changing they have a 
higher probability of getting another wage offer that would have been preferred before 
changing, the lower-paid workers must have a higher relative reservation wage. They 
also find that a worker becomes choosier as the cost of moving and the probability of 
getting a job offer increase. 
At the level of the household, theoretical models of the influence of family on 
individual decisions have been developed in particular by Becker (1993). 
They show 
that individual decisions which affect households' income and utility are influenced 
by the situation of the other members of the family. Once an individual 
is a member 
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of a family, his or her decisions cannot be studied separately from his or her family 
situation. Mincer (1978) studies households' migration decisions; he finds that 
households with several persons are less likely to move than single persons and that 
unemployment tends to be positively related to migration. Moreover, two-eamer 
households are less likely to migrate than single-earner families. Theories on 
households' behaviour suggest that an econometric model of mobility should include 
family characteristics. 
Nfigration behaviour, in particular the determinants of actual migration, has 
been a topic of interest for empirical economists for many years (see the literature 
survey of Greenwood, 1975). However, most of the empirical evidence concerns the 
United States. Recent empirical literature has tested the hypothesis that relative 
earnings and relative employment prospects are strong determinants of mobility. 
Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) found such effects for the UK, and McCormick 
(1997) found evidence that non-manual labour flows to the region with the lowest 
unemployment rate, while manuals tend to be immobile. Cameron and Muellbauer 
(1998) also found strong evidence of the influence of the housing market, especially 
for contiguous region migration. Their results show that high relative house prices 
discourage net migration to a region. Expected house price rises, by reducing the user 
cost of housing, can however provide a temporary offset. Herzog et al. (1993) provide 
a review of the main empirical findings concerning migration considered as spatial 
job-search. Even though in this chapter we study expressed willingness to move and 
not actual mobility, this type of interpretation is very relevant to our study because we 
consider the decision of moving within job search. Herzog et al. report that there 
seems to be a consensus for the positive effect of unemployment on migration, 
although this effect vanes with the individuals' characteristics (race, gender, 
occupation, prior geographic mobility and nativity). They also find that this effect 
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diminishes with unemployment duration and increases with mean distance of potential 
moves, union membership and severity of cyclical downturns within one's local 
labour market. For the UK, contrary to the United States, they report that local rates of 
unemployment do not affect individuals' migration. 
B6heim and Taylor (1999), using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 
find that a desire to move house because of work-related reasons has the largest 
impact on the probability of moving between regions. Gardner et al. (2000) use the 
BBPS and the National Child Development Study (NCDS) to study the determinants 
of moves for job reasons. They find evidence that, ceteris paribus, private renters are 
more mobile than other types of tenants and than homeowners. They also identify 
significant partner's effects. Men tend to be more mobile when their partner is not 
employed, while. women tend to be more mobile when they are single. Further 
evidence shows that women tend to follow their partners when these need to move for 
job-related reasons. 
A few articles have been interested in the determinants of mobility intentions. 
Oswald (1997) finds cross-tabulation evidence that private renters are more likely to 
say they are willing to move to find an acceptable job. This is true of both 
unemployed people, and employed people faced with the hypothetical situation of 
becoming unemployed. Hughes and McCormick (1985) study actual and intended' 
migration and movement for households with employed, self-employed and 
unemployed heads. Their explanatory variables include housing tenure, educational 
attainment, age, occupation, sector of employment, length of residence, and region of 
residence. When they include a dummy for an unemployed head of household, they 
The analysis of movement/migration intentions uses answers given to a stream of questions in a 
section of the interview initiated by an enquiry as to whether "any member of the household is 
seriously thinking of moving from their present address". For one year, they also identify potential 
movers who also intend to migrate. 
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find that these households are more likely to intend to migrate because of a general 
increase in the propensity to move (not because of an increase in the propensi ity to 
migrate conditional on movement). 2 They also attempt to interact this unemployment 
dummy with various personal characteristics and they find that this effect of 
unemployment on migration is restricted to non-manuals. In terms of moving 
intentions, they find no difference between unemployed manuals and non-manuals. 
They also find that potential migration and movement both increase with the length of 
unemployment. Hughes and McCormick have weak evidence that unemployed people 
are more likely to consider migration if they are in a high unemployment rate region, 
especially if they were already considering moving. Finally, they find that length of 
unemployment matters only for potential movement; households whose heads have 
been unemployed for less than three months are less likely to intend to move than 
those whose heads have been unemployed for at least three months. 
Faini et al. (1997) study mobility in Italy. They use data from the Italian 
Labour Force Survey. They use a multinomial logit to model the willingness of 
respondents to take a job in one of these locations: only in their own town, in a 
neighbouring town, or anywhere. Their specification contains the following 
explanatory variables: gender, educational qualification, age, regional dummies, the 
percentage of household members who are either employed or receiving a State 
pension. The latter variable is expected to capture the impact of household support 
and government transfers. The authors find that males and more educated people are 
more likely to be willing to take a job anywhere compared to moving 
to a 
neighbouring town or staying in their town. They are also more 
likely to take a job in 
a neighbouring town compared to staying in their 
hometown. Consistently with 
theory, younger people are more likely to be willing to move compared to staying in 
2 The author distinguishes between changing region 
(migration) and changing house (movement). 
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their own town. Contrary to the idea that household income is used to finance 
unemployment, Faini et al. find that a higher percentage of employed or retired 
members of the households is associated with higher willingness to move. Finally, 
after regressing the estimated regional fixed effects on regional unemployment, they 
conclude that the latter is associated with higher long-distance mobility but 
discourages short-distance migration. This is consistent with theory. 
Ahn et al. (1999) study the determinants of the willingness to move for work. 
The variable is obtained from answers to the question: would you accept a job offer 
which required a change of residence? This question was asked of unemployed people 
only. 3 Consistently with what would be expected, they find that willingness to move 
increases significantly with education level and decreases for teenagers and the over 
50s. In addition, they find that unmarried sons are twice as willing to move as heads 
of households. Married women with working husbands are less willing to move than 
female heads or unmarried daughters. Unemployment benefits and the regional 
unemployment rate do not appear to affect willingness to move. Willingness to 
migrate is not found to change with unemployment duration. Reaching the end of 
unemployment benefits represents one of the main reasons for changing attitude 
towards mobility. Higher house prices in the region of residence appear to decrease 
willingness to move. Ahn et al. also estimate an ordered probit model of duration of 
unemployment. They use a bivariate probit model to control for endogeneity of 
migration attitude. To identify their model, they include moving costs (proxied by 
regional average house prices and real wages) and household situation variables (such 
as the presence of children and the number of workers and unemployed In the 
household). They find that male unemployed workers with a positive attitude towards 
mobility find jobs more quickly than other males. 
3 This is very similar to the data we use. 
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In addition to the willingness to move for work, we argue that job search and 
therefore the flexibility of unemployed people also depend on the type of job 
individuals are willing to accept. 
3.2.2 Pay and skill content decisions 
The skill content of a job often deten-nines the level of pay. The decisions 
concerning what level of pay and of skill are acceptable are therefore strongly related. 
The literature on the reservation wage can provide useful evidence on the 
determinants of the wage expectation of unemployed people. We therefore review 
findings relevant to our study. Expectations regarding skills are considered to 
represent the choosiness of unemployed people regarding the quality of their future 
job. They are likely to be determined by similar factors to those which influence the 
reservation wage. 
The economic (financial) and psychological costs of unemployment are 
expected to influence the level of the reservation wage (Jones, 1989a). Jones estimates 
ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares models of the dependence of 
reservation wages on the costs of unemployment and other controls. He finds a strong 
negative coefficient for the variable measuring the psychological costs of 
4 
unemployment. The influence of these costs is likely to depend on the household 
situation of individuals. For example, the income of other members may enable a 
longer job search and therefore a higher reservation wage and a lower willingness to 
accept lower skill content, as the individuals have more time to look for a good match. 
4 Unemployment's psychological costs are measured by the answers to the question: "How likely is it 
you would accept a job if it involved each of these things: a different type of work, a 
longer journey to 
work, a job that involved moving house to another area, a 
job with longer hours, a job at a lower level 
of skill or qualifications? ". 
75 
Past unemployment expenence can also be thought of as influencing the 
expectations of unemployed peopled. This idea is associated with the empincal 
finding that unemployment may be "scarring" and affect future employment prospects CN 
(Arulampalarn et al., 2000). People who often expenence unemployment may be 
more likely to decrease their wage expectation and accept low quality, therefore 
precanous, jobs. Expectations conceming the level of pay and the quality of the job 
are also likely to be influenced by the reason why the individual became unemployed. 
Jones (1989a) finds that unemployment benefits are significantly and positively 
related to reservation wages for job-leavers, while they have an insignificant and 
negative sign for job-losers. The psychological costs have negative effects on the 
reservation wages of both groups, but are statistically significant only for job-losers. 
People who chose to leave their job probably did so because they were not satisfied 
with their previous employment and they are not likely to be willing to accept a worse 
job. 
3.3 Data and econometric model 
3.3.1 The data set 
We use the British National Child Development Study (NCDS). This data set 
is based on a sample of children bom in Great Britain between 3 and 9 March 1958. 
Five surveys have been undertaken at ages 7,11,16,23 and 33. We use data on 
people unemployed at the interview of the fourth sweep (age 23). The estimations use 
data on 1160 individuals who reported that they were unemployed and wanting work 
in 1981. We are interested in studying the determinants of the choices that these 
individuals make. In particular, we consider here that the 
decisions concerning the 
wage offered, the level of skill required and the 
location of the job are the main choice 
variables during job search. 
We look at ex ante flexibility of young unemployed 
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people. We define flexibility as the willingness to make trade-offs in order to get a 
job. We should note that, from the previous literature review, young people are 
expected to be one of the most flexible groups of people. 
3.3.2 Job search flexibility and its determinants 
Flexibility of the unemployed is represented by three conscious or 
unconscious decisions that they face when looking for a job. These are whether "they 
have considered applying for a job which would mean moving house", 5 whether "they 
have considered applying for a job with less take home pay than their last job" and 
whether "they have considered applying for a job which involved a lower level of 
skill or qualification than their last job". We do not study the determinants of actual 
moves or job acceptances. This is due to the limitation of the data; although we know 
whether people who have been unemployed have made one of these decisions, we do 
not know when they were unemployed, and therefore we do not have precise 
information on their situation at the time of their spell of unemployment. We do, 
however, use the information which is available in a simple cross-tabulation analysis 
(see table 3.2 and section 3.4.2). 
We focus on intentions because they can infonn policy decisions. While actual 
events (such as a move) are dependent on controllable factors (such as the ones we 
include in our specifications), they are also a product of luck, random opportunities, 
etc. On the contrary, intentions are the outcomes of individuals analysing their current 
situation and maximising their utility (optimising their job search) given their 
characteristics and opportunities. This is particularly true 
here given the way the 
questions are asked; people are expected to have thought about the question and 
to 
5 We should note here that there does not need to 
be migration to another region. The decision concerns 
the move to another house. 
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behave accordingly with their decision. For example, if they have decided not to 
consider jobs which involve moving house, they effectively restrict their search to 
local jobs. This matters for policy because analyses of the probability that events 
occur may ignore or underestimate the importance of certain factors which may be 
relevant in explaining mobility and flexibility. 
We should note that, because of the nature of the data, we do not consider the 
labour demand side. We therefore do not take into account the behaviour of 
employers in looking for workers. We do, however, control for the external 
environment (in particular, unemployment in the area). 
It is interesting to note that our approach is different from that of Jones 
(1989a). We consider that accepting a lower wage than before (i. e. a reservation wage 
ratio below one in Jones terminology) and accepting a move or a job-skill reduction 
are simultaneous decisions. Jones, on the other hand, considers that willingness to 
move and to accept a job with lower skill content are determinants of the reservation 
wage. 
We suggest that these decisions are taken simultaneously and are probably 
inter-related. As simple intuition and cross-section analysis (Jones, 1989b) show, they 
are directly related to job search intensity and therefore to the duration of 
unemployment spells. 6 
Economic theory and previous empirical findings give us an indication of 
which factors may influence such flexibility. We aim to determine which are the most 
relevant and the relative size of their effects. They can be divided in three groups: 
family structure and characteristics, personal characteristics, and environment. All 
these have been found to affect job search. To characterise family structure, we have a 
6 For data reasons, we are not interested here in determining the extent to which it is true that the 
decisions influence the duration of unemployment. We assume that this is the case. 
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dummy for partnership status. We also interact this dummy with gender because 
partnership status is expected not to have the same influence on men's and women's 
decisions. We include a variable indicating whether the individual has living children 
or has to take care of children. We also include the type of housing tenure. We control 
for regional factors through region dummies and we include at a lower level of spatial 
disaggregation the Local Authority unemployment and sickness rate. We take into 
account family income: we include measures of partner's wage, cohort member wage 
in previous job and whether any unemployment benefits are received in the family. 
The personal characteristics, which are used to control for individual effects, are the 
following: leaving school age, whether they contact employment services such as job 
centres, whether they voluntarily left their previous job (if they had one), the number 
7 
of times they were unemployed , whether they are looking for a full-time job, scores 
of tests taken at 7 years old, and gender. Finally, we include local unemployment as 
an indication of the state of the labour market in the Local Authority where they live. 
From the discussion in section 3.2, one could argue that an important variable 
is missing from our specification, namely the duration of unemployment. It is possible 
that the various decisions are influenced by the length of the current spell of 
unemployment. Looking at the last rows of table 3.1, we see that as the duration of 
unemployment increases, individuals are found to be less likely to have considered 
moving, while their willingness to accept lower pay and skill content initially 
increases then decreases. The direction of causality is not identified in such a simple 
analysis. After estimating specifications including unemployment duration and 
7 One might argue that this variable might be endogenous as willingness to move may be considered to 
be a determinant of unemployment. However, we argue here that the 
decisions on mobility, pay and 
skills are not constant over time and are taken with respect to the current situation. 
We conclude that 
they do not affect past spells of unemployment. We also checked that excluding the unemployment 
variable did not alter the results. 
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finding it statistically insignificant, we decided to exclude it. It appears that the 
number of previous spells of unemployment is sufficient to capture the unemployment 
effect. 
3.3.3 Econometric models 
We first estimate separate probit equations of each of the three decisions, i. e. 
assuming that they are independent. 
We use a probit model of the fon-n: 
Pr(y, = 1) = G(xi, 8) (1) 
where y is equal to one if the answer is positive and zero otherwise, x is the vector of 
explanatory variables and G is the unit Normal cumulative distribution function: 
Iz 
G(z) = VT2; T 
ýexp(-u' / 2)du (2) 
Assuming a random sample, we maximise the following likelihood function: 
L=IIG(xi'ß)"[1-G(xi , 
i=I 
We interpret the results by looking at the marginal effects. For continuous 
variables, these are calculated as the derivative of the predicted probability with 
respect to the variable of interest, keeping all the other variables at their means: 
aG 
axi 
(4) 
with g(. ) the normal density function. For dummy variables, the marginal effect is the 
discrete change in predicted probability when the dummy changes 
from 0 to 1, 
keeping all other variables at their means. 
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In addition we carry out several diagnostic tests to check for model 
misspecification (homoscedasticity, normality, and functional form). The tests are 
computed using moment residuals following Chesher and Irish (1987). They are 
reported in the last rows of each table. 
In order to take into account the fact that the three decisions are made 
simultaneously we use a multivanate probit model of the following form: 
Yi. *x im +E im ým=1,2, 
where the latent variables y* indicate the flexibility of unemployed people when 
looking for a job. These are not observable and only the variables y (defined as in the 
probit) are observed: 
=I if y,,, *>0, and 0 otherwise. (6) 
E, m are distributed as multivanate normal with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix R 
with diagonal elements equal to 1. Each individual equation is a standard probit 
model. In our case, this type of model involves the estimation of a trivariate normal 
integral, which is difficult to estimate directly. Recent literature suggests that a 
successful methodology to approximate multivariate normal cumulative distribution 
functions is the GHK simulator (Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane). 8 
3.4 Analysis of search behaviour 
3.4.1 Sample analysis 
Table B. 3.1 in appendix B shows summary statistics for our variables both in 
the whole data set and in our estimation sample (the latter includes those unemployed 
in 1981 and who had a job before). Comparing the means of our sample with the 
means of the whole data set can give us some interesting insights. We see that 
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compared to the data set means, a lower proportion of our sample left school after 18. 
They also have lower average scores in maths and reading tests. They seem to have 
had a higher number of unemployment spells beforehand. They are much less likely Z: ) 
to be professionals and more likely to be manuals. The individuals are less likely to 
have a partner, but only slightly less likely to have children. They are slightly less 
likely to be private renters or owners, but more likely to be sharing with relatives. 
Finally, they are much less likely to live in Greater London. This descriptive analysis 
shows that people who were unemployed at the time of the interview in 1981 seem to 
be in a worse economic and social situation than the average person. 
3.4.2 Cross-tabulations 
Before turning to more elaborate econometric techniques, it is interesting to 
look at the raw patterns in the data. Using the full sample of 1160 unemployed people, 
we observe that 37 percent would consider applying for jobs which involve moving 
house. If we restrict the sample to those who previously had a job, the proportion 
slightly falls to 35 percent. The latter is much smaller than the proportion of people 
who would accept a job with less pay or lower qualifications (51 percent and 57 
percent respectively). If we check the actual behaviour of these people (by looking at 
whether they moved for job reasons in the next year and a half after the interview), we 
see that among those expressing willingness to move while unemployed, 9.3 percent 
actually moved, while 4.2 percent of those unwilling to do so did move. Two main 
observations can be made. First, only a small proportion of those who expressed a 
willingness to move actually did so. Second, the difference in the two mentioned 
8 We used the multivariate probit routine built in Limclep 7 (Greene, 1998). Details on the GHK 
methodology can be found in chapter 5 of 
Greene (1997). 
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proportions is statistically significant and is consistent with the idea that willingness 
to move is a good predictor of future moves. 
Table 3.1 shows the proportions of people willing to move (column 1), to 
accept lower pay (column 2), and to accept a job requiring lower skills (column 3) 
according to various characteristics. We can see that compared to those with no 
qualification, those who have a degree will be more likely to be willing to move or to 
accept lower wage but less likely to accept a less demanding job. Those who have a 
partner are less willing to move and to accept lower pay compared to single people, 
but they are more likely to accept lower skill. If we consider men and women 
separately (results not shown), we find the same result. People who have contacts 
with job centres seem to be more flexible than those who do not. Finally, men seem to 
be more flexible than women, especially about moving house. 
Table 3.2 shows cross-tabulations for people who were employed in 1981 but 
had been unemployed and looking for work in the past. In general, as would be 
expected, the proportions of those who had to accept one of the outcomes are lower 
than those willing to make these decisions. The first row indicates that among the 
three decisions, accepting a job with lower pay is the most likely to be made. An 
interesting result shows that, although we found a large gender difference in the 
willingness to move, it is much reduced and is in the opposite direction for actual 
moves. Those with a degree remain much more likely to move than those without 
qualification. Consistently with expectations, they are also less likely to have accepted 
a job with lower pay or a lower skill content. In both tables we can see that 
individuals with different characteristics vary mostly in their attitude to moving 
house. 
9 We should note that because only moves 
for own job or partner's job reason were recorded, we do 
not have a perfect measure of the 
individual's actual move. 
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3.4.3 Separate probits as if decisions were independent of each other 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the estimations of separate probit models for 
each of our dependent variables. 10 We can see from the pseudo R-squared that we are 
better able to explain decisions on mobility and pay compared to decisions on skills. 
Column I shows the results concerning the determinants of the decision on 
mobility. A higher number of spells of unemployment in addition to the current spell 
is associated with a higher probability of accepting to move; an extra spell increases 
the probability of being willing to move by 4.5 percentage points. This result is 
consistent with the consensus reached in the literature (Herzog et al. 1993). Women 
who have a partner are less likely to be willing to move compared to those who are 
single. For men, we see that they are more likely to be willing to move when they 
have a partner who does not work. They are only slightly less likely to want to move 
if their partner works. This is interesting because it shows how job search is affected 
by being in a partnership. Even controlling for the partner's wage, men tend to lead 
the way, and women tend to restrict their search to jobs which do not entail moving. 
These results are consistent with men being the main breadwinners; they are also 
consistent with the gender differences identified in the theoretical model of Mincer 
(1978) and the empirical findings of Gardner et al. (2000). We find that council 
tenants are less willing to move than owners while private tenants and people sharing 
with relatives are more willing (although these effects are not statistically significant). 
This is consistent with findings that private tenants tend to be more willing to move 
(as in Oswald, 1997). 
10 We also have additional results for the decision on mobility in table C. 3.1 (appendix Q where we 
include those who never had a job before their unemployment spell. 
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People who left school after the age of 18 are more likely to be willing to 
move, so are those who voluntarily left their previous job (as opposed to being 
sacked, made redundant, etc. ). The former education effect is consistent with previous 
empirical findings on actual mobility (see for example Faini et al., 1997) and with 
basic theoretical models (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991). The presence of children 
decreases mobility willingness, but this result is statistically significant only at around 
20 percent. Over the range of possible wages, the wage in the previous job has a flat 
inverse U-shaped association with the willingness to move. As their previous wage 
increases, individuals are more and more willing to move. At higher wages (above 
E127 a week 1981 prices), they become less and less willing. Partner's wage and 
unemployment benefits are not statistically significant. 
We do not find the distinction usually made in current empirical evidence 
between (mobile) non-manuals and (immobile) manuals (McCormick, 1997). On the 
contrary, we find that skilled manuals are apparently more likely to be willing to 
move than non-manuals. This result may show that manuals are less able to go 
through with their move although they seem more willing to do so. This would also be 
consistent with the findings of tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Individuals who live in Yorkshire & Humberside and the North-West are 
statistically significantly more likely to be willing to move for work compared to 
those who live in the South-East. This may be due to the lack of opportunities in the 
former regions, and also the lack of suitable public transport. Individuals in the 
South- 
East are likely to be able to find a job to which they can commute, so they may 
be a 
priori less willing to move. Moreover, the South-East is 
known for its tight housing 
market. Consistently with the literature (Herzog et al., 
1993), we find that local labour 
market tightness (measured by unemployment and sickness rate in 
Local Authorities) 
does not have a statistically significant effect on mobility. 
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From table C. 3.1, we see that the results are unchanged when we include 
people who never had a job before. The latter are more likely to be willing to move by 
46.6 percentage points. " This is a large effect, especially considering that the 
observed probability of moving is 56 percent. They may be more desperate to find a 
job. We can also think that, as there might be unobservable 111 effects 
influencing the time at which people join the labour market, people who tend to have 
a first job later in their life also tend to be more mobile. 
Column 2 of table 3.3 shows results concerning acceptance of a lower wage. 
We find that past unemployment spells do not have a statistically significant effect on 
the willingness to accept lower pay. This is contrary to the idea that people who often 
experience unemployment adjust their expectations downwards, although the 
direction of the effect is as was expected. Wage in the previous job has an inverse-U 
shaped relation with willingness to accept a lower wage. For higher previous wages, 
the willingness to accept lower pay in a future job increases at a decreasing rate. At 
wages above E162 per week, people become less and less likely to be willing to 
accept lower pay. When they become unemployed, individuals may adjust their pay 
expectations and decrease their reservation wage, while high wage earners may have 
enough resources to afford to be more choosy. A higher local unemployment rate is 
associated with a lower willingness to accept a lower wage. This may be because the 
wage of the previous job may have been already quite low (in an area of high 
unemployment). At higher rates, wage expectations appear to be revised downwards, 
although the effect is not statistically significant. Those whose wage was covered by 
Trade Union negotiations are significantly more likely to accept a lower pay (by 13 
11 This group represents 6 percent (40 observations) of the sample; it is similar in size to the 
professionals and intermediate occupations group. 
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percentage points). This is consistent with them reallsIng the existence of a Union 
waore premium. 
People who stayed longer at school and those who voluntarily left their 
previous job are less willing to accept a lower wage, but only the latter effect is 
statistically significant. Women are more likely to accept a pay cut when they have a 
partner, so are men when their partner works but not when their partner does not 
work. Men whose partner does not work may potentially be the only breadwinner in 
the household and wish to have a relatively high income because of that. Although 
these effects are not statistically significant, they seem to be consistent with women 
relying more on their partner's wage. 12 Partner's wage forms a flat inverse U-shaped 
relationship with willingness to accept a lower wage. However, this effect is not 
statistically significant. Only people living in the North are statistically significantly 
different from those in other regions: they are more likely to be willing to accept a 
lower wage. We do not find a statistically significant effect for children, and the 
coefficient itself is close to zero. 
Column 3 shows the results for the last variable of interest here, the 
willingness to accept a job which requires lower skills or qualifications. Higher 
previous wage is associated with higher willingness to accept a lower skill content 
(the squared term is not statistically significant). If we count the effect of the squared 
term, we observe a decrease in the willingness to accept a job with a lower skill 
content at wages higher than E135 per week. As for the previous dependent variable, 
we do not find that people who have been unemployed in the past adjust their 
expectations on the quality of their future jobs downwards. Here, the coefficient on 
12 As could be expected, the average wage of women's partners is s1gn1ficantly higher than the average 
wage of men is partners (f-94 and 
f-54 per week respectively). 
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unemployment spells is very close to zero and has a negative sign (i. e. different from 
what was expected). 
As would be expected, individuals who stay on at school and who left their 
previous job are less likely to be willing to accept lower skill content. Having invested 
more in their human capital, they have a higher (financial and psychological) 
opportunity cost of considering applying for lower quality jobs. For both men and 
women, having a partner (who works or not) increases the likelihood of applying for a 
job with lower skill content. This may show that individuals who are in partnerships 
are more pressed to find a job. If the partner works, it may be a psychological pressure 
to find a job even if it does not pay a lot. If the partner does not work, they may be 
financially forced to find any job so that the family gets some income. Partner's wage 
has a U-shaped relationship with the willingness to accept lower skill content; this is 
inconsistent with them relying on their partner's income while unemployed. 
Unemployment benefits do not have a statistically significant effect, but its direction 
is consistent with expectations; at low levels of benefits, the relationship is quite flat, 
then higher benefits decrease the willingness to accept lower skills at an increasing 
rate. 
It is important to take into account the likelihood that unobserved factors 
linked to these decisions may be related. We do this in the following section. 
3.4.4 Multivariate probit taking into account the fact that the error terms 
might be correlated across equations 
We consider that these three decisions are jointly determined. 
Mobility is 
considered in terms of a spatial job-search 
framework, as in Herzog et al. (1993), but 
search is also determined by decisions on pay and skill content. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
show results for a more parsimonious specification, namely we 
drop variables which 
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are not of interest and which have t-ratios below 1.2. Table 3.4 shows results for the 
multivanate probit model and table 3.5 shows the separate probits estimated with the 
same sample and specification as the multivanate model. 
Comparing tables 3.3 and 3.5, we find that the results are essentially 
unchancred in the parsimonious specification. Most coefficients keep their sign and 
size-, the few which do not were not statistically significant and stay insignificant. The 
main differences are the following: contact with employment services becomes 
statistically significant for all three decisions, and partner's work becomes statistically 
significant for decisions concerning pay and skill content. 
The first interesting result shown in the last rows of table 3.4 is that the 
coefficients of correlation between our dependent variables are statistically 
significant. This justifies the use of such a specification. The new estimates will be 
more efficient (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). All the coefficients of correlation 
are positive, which means that unemployed people adapt their job search: they are 
overall more flexible, i. e. faced with an exogenous event, they do not make trade-offs 
such as accepting a lower wage in order to be able to stay in the area. Pay and skills 
are strongly related to each other. This can be explained as wage and skills are 
generally linked to each other anyway; lower skilled jobs will pay less. These two 
decisions seem correlated to the same degree with the decision to move. In a way, this 
result is consistent with Jones' (1989a) findings that the willingness to move and the 
willingness to accept lower skills are good determinants of the reservation wage. We 
prefer our specification to his, however, as we consider that these decisions are 
simultaneously determined and that a causal effect is therefore impossible to identify. 
We now compare corresponding columns of table 3.4 (showing the 
multivanate probit model) and table 3.5 (showing the separate probIt models). 
From 
the first column of each table, we see that most of the statistically significant 
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coefficients are unchanged. Several coefficients (own wage squared, female partner 
does not work, and living in West Midlands) become statistically insignificant. From 
the second column, being skilled manual becomes statistically significant and larger. 
The partner effect becomes insignificant, so do living in the North and the Local 
Authority unemployment and sickness rate (although the latter is statistically 
significant at 10.5 percent). Finally in the third column, we find that the partner's 
work and wage effects lose statistical significance. 
The main results can be summansed as follows. We find evidence that people 
who have had several experiences of unemployment by the age of 23 are more willing 
to move by around 3 percentage points, but do not adjust their expectations 
concerning pay and skills. This is surpnsing, as we would expect them to become 
more flexible to be able to find a job. One may think that these young people are 
jumping from one job to the next in the view to find a better job each time. In this 
case, unemployment does not appear to be scarring but to be a way of improving the 
match between the worker and the job. 
Skilled manuals are found to be constrained in moving; although they are 
likely to consider jobs which imply moving (with a probability higher by 13 
percentage points compared to non-manuals), they are unlikely to actually move for 
job reasons. This shows that there are some impediments to their move which are 
external to their wishes (and for which we do not control). One possible impediment 
may be the lack of information about potential jobs in other places. 
The wage earned in the job preceding the unemployment spell has a similar 
effect on all decisions. At low pay levels, any increase in the wage is associated with a 
higher willingness to consider applying for a job which implies moving, a lower wage 
or a lower skill content. At higher wages, individuals become less and 
less willing. It 
appears that people are flexible around the average wage, 
but that people with high 
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:D wages (i. e. above E130-EI60) are less flexible. This is consistent with the idea that 
t) 
high waoe eamers are likely to be more choosy (higher wages could be associated 
with higher psychic costs). 
There is an asymmetry between men and women concerning the partner effect 
on the moving decision. This is consistent with previous findings on gender 
differences. The partner effects on pay and skill content decisions become imprecise 
when we account for the fact that the job search decisions are simultaneously 
deterrmned and interdependent. In terms of size, the partner variables have the largest 
marginal effects that we record. 
Consistently with theory and previous findings, we find that people with 
certain characteristics make trade-offs between decisions. More educated people tend 
to be more willing to move but less willing to accept a lower skill content, while those 
who left their previous job voluntarily are more willing to move but less willing to 
accept a job with lower pay or lower skill content. Skilled manuals are more willing to 
move but less willing to accept lower pay. For these people, moving seems to be the 
least costly decision of the three. 
Those who have contacts with employment services are found to be more 
flexible. This may be because this variable catches other unobserved characteristics 
which tend to make them more flexible, or because employment services give 
incentives to them (or no choice but) to become more flexible. 
Other results show that those who look for a full-time job are less flexible. We 
find signs consistent with a union pay premium, evidenced by the willingness of 
people whose wage was covered by a Union agreement to consider applying for a job 
with lower pay. Unemployment benefits influence job search mainly through their 
effect on expectations relative to the skill content of a job. 
At low levels, benefits 
have essentially no effect, then they tend to reduce the willingness to accept a job 
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which requires lower skills. As expected, children appear to make the decision of 
moving more costly. These costs are mostly psychological: parents may be worried 
about disrupting their children's lives too much, or may be unwilling to have them 
change school (Green, 1997). Finally, we find evidence of a North-South divide, with 
people living in the North/North West being more likely to move than those in the 
South-East. The effect of local conditions on the pay decision are weaker in the 
multivanate probit model. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has modelled job search as the product of three decisions. As was 
expected, decisions made concerning moving, wage and skills content are strongly 
positively dependent and simultaneously determined. When they are faced with an 
exogenous event, unemployed people are found not to make trade-offs between 
decisions on being mobile and decisions on pay or skills content of future jobs; they 
seem to adapt their overall expectations to the new situation. Decisions on pay and 
skills are more strongly related to each other than to the decision on moving. 
We have provided an analysis of the behaviour of young unemployed people. 
Overall, we find that young people are quite flexible: there is a probability of 38 
percent that they have considered applying for jobs which would involve moving, and 
probabilities of 56 and 58 percent that they have considered a job with lower pay or 
lower skill content respectively. The effect of unemployment benefits goes mainly 
through the decision on skill content; higher unemployment benefits decrease the 
willingness to accept a job with a lower skill content. People who use employment 
services are apparently more flexible. The results are consistent with the following 
conclusions. First, unemployment does not appear to be scarring 
for young people, as 
those who experience more unemployment are not found to alter their expectations 
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concerning wages and skill contents. Having experienced unemployment however 
gives them an incentive to be more mobile. Second, skilled manuals appear to be 
constrained in moving. Third, unemployed people appear to recognise the existence of 
a union wage premium. 
The results also show that the partner effect on the pay and skill decisions 
becomes imprecise and weaker when we take into account the inter-dependence of the 
decisions. The effects of the Local Authority unemployment and sick rate, and of 
living in the North, on the pay decision were statistically and economically 
overestimated in the separate probit models. The statistical significance of the partner 
effect was also slightly overestimated in the decisions about moving but the size of 
the effect was not. Specifications which do not take into account the simultaneity 
between the decisions taken during job search may tend to overestimate partner's and 
local conditions direct effects. These results show that considering only one of the 
many decisions taken during job search may lead to inexact findings concerning the 
determinants of job search. 
We have found that belonging to a household has an influence on the 
flexibility of the unemployed and that this effect is not the same for men and women. 
This suggests that further research related to household decisions would be useful in 
order to understand the behaviour of the unemployed but probably also of workers in 
general. In particular, it would be interesting to model joint household decisions. 
One policy implication of this chapter concerns skilled manual workers; our 
results suggest that these individuals are willing to move more than others, even 
controlling for housing, income considerations and external conditions 
(region 
dummies). Some labour market policies could be devoted to analyse, probably at the 
local level, what are the impediments to moving. A likely explanation can be the lack 
of information concerning non-local 
jobs; this could be alleviated through a better 
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diffusion of information on vacancies via employment services (as we find evidence 
that the latter have some impact on job search). 
94 
Table 3.1: Proportion of people who are willing to accept various outcomes 
[according to their characteristics (%)] 
Moving Lower wage Lower skill 
content 
All 37.7 52.6 58.7 
Male 46.7 52.4 60.6 
Female 22.3 52.9 55.5 
Has a degree 77.3 46.1 48.4 
Has no qualification 26.9 42.5 55.9 
Left school before 16 32.5 53.0 60.9 
Left school after 18 67.9 48.1 44.4 
Has a partner 24.1 49.3 61.2 
Is single 48.0 55.4 56.7 
Has contacts with employment services 39.5 54.3 61.0 
Has no contact with employment 27.8 43.3 46.0 
services 
First job was manual 38.6 52.9 60.3 
First job was non-manual 29.3 52.2 55.5 
Current spell length (0-6 months) 41.2 51.5 52.5 
Current spell length (7-12 months) 35.3 62.2 69.0 
Current spell length (13+ months) 33.6 46.9 61.7 
Note: the first column's proportions are based on 1155 persons who were unemployed and 
wanting work in 198 1. The second and third columns are based on the 1092 persons from the 
latter sample who had a job before becoming unemployed. The proportions should be interpreted 
as follows: 77.3 percent of those holding a degree were willing to move for a Job. 
Table 3.2: Proportion of people who have accepted various outcomes 
when they found a job after last being unemployed 
[according to their characteristics (%)] 
Has moved Has accepted a 
pay cut 
Has accepted a 
job with lower 
skill content 
All 14.1 40.9 26.1 
Male 12.9 40.8 24.6 
Female 16.1 41.0 28.7 
Has a degree 30.4 29.2 19.7 
Has no qualification 4.5 43.4 27.1 
Left school before 16 7.4 43.3 26.5 
Left school after 18 29.1 32.7 27.0 
Has a partner 6.7 42.9 32.5 
Is single 18.6 39.4 21.7 
First job was manual 9.8 39.2 25.6 
First job was non- 18.7 42.1 26.9 
manual 
Note: the first column's proportions are based on a sample of 835 persons who were employed in 
1981 but had had an unemployment spell in the past at the end of which they found a job. The 
second and third columns are based on the 689 persons of the 
latter sample who had a job before 
the unemployment spell. 
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Table 3.3: Separate probit equations 
Would move Would a 
lower 
ccept 
pay 
Would 
lower skil 
accept 
l content 
Coeff. M. E Coeff. M. E Coeff. M. E 
Personal characterictics and situation 
Left school at 17 or younger (base) 
Left school at 18 or older 0.778** 30.031 -0.222 -8.811 -0.43 1 -17.031 
(0.188) (0.181) (0.181) 
Has post-school qualification -0.018 -0-711 
(0.123) 
Number of unemployment spells 0.124** 4.523 0.043 1.692 -0.013 -0.526 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
Male -0.073 -2.666 -0.189 -7.404 -0.053 -2.079 
(0.168) (0.163) (0.167) 
Left previous job involuntarily (base) 
Left previous job voluntarily 0.383** 14.155 -0.199* -7.833 -0.265** -10-384 
(0.126) (0.120) (0.116) 
Above average in math test (7) 0.003 0.106 -0.079 -3-123 0.091 3.520 
(0.121) (0.120) (0.117) 
Contact with employment services 0.278 9.604 0.243 9.658 0.244 9.617 
(0.183) (0.163) (0.161) 
Look for ftill-time job 0.111 4.002 -0.423** -16.172 -0.298* -11.366 
(0.173) (0.166) (0.162) 
Firstjob social status 
Profe s sional/intermedi ate 0.337 12.866 0.151 5.848 0.330 12.275 
(0.276) (0.269) (0.282) 
Non-manual (base) 
Skilled manual 0.372** 13-851 -0.221 -8.745 0.076 2.946 
(0.173) (0.164) (0.160) 
Other manual 0.042 1.541 0.039 1.537 0.098 3.797 
(0.168) (0.153) (0.150) 
Lastjob 
Own wage (EI/10) 0.137** 5.001 0.304** 11.982 0.118** 4.618 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.058) 
Own wage squared ((own wage in f) 2 -0.540* -19.652 -0.936** -36.851 -0.438 -17.095 
divided by 10000) 
(0.283) (0.275) (0.293) 
Pay covered by union bargaining -0.006 -0.231 0.339** 13.245 -0.001 -0.040 
(0.119) (0.116) (0.114) 
Family structure and income 
No partner (base) 
Partner works -1.165 -35.398 1.106 38-818 
1.321 43.896 
(0.868) (0.741) (0.734) 
Partner does not work -0.711 -20.851 1.773 
41.561 2.534** 42.810 
(. 991) (0.980) (0.895) 
Female partner works 1.138** 42.989 -0.330 -13-104 
0.087 3.344 
(0.434) (0.399) (0.382) 
Female partner does not work 2.233** 63.456 -1.666 -50.192 -1.302 -44.791 
(1.018) (0.997) (0.967) 
Has living children or care for children -0.231 -8-173 -0.032 -1-275 -0.080 -3.113 
(0.176) (0.166) (0.163) 
Owners or buying (base) 
036 -0 296 -1 0.149 
5.813 -0.275 -10.880 Council tenants . 
(0.333) 
. (0.242) (0.239) 
312 0 11.895 -0.334 -13.275 -0.586* -23.012 Private tenants . 
(0.344) (0.329) (0.305) 
Sharing with relatives 
0.347 12.436 0.167 6.586 -0.372 -14.355 
(0.304) (0.252) (0.24 ) I 
96 
Table 3.3 (ctd. ) 
Oth er 0.335 12.763 0.094 3.678 -0.228 -9.023 
Partner's wage (f 1/10) 
(0.311) (0.259) (0.257) 
0.001 0.047 -0.206 -8.086 -0.299* -11.642 
Partner's wage squared (partner's wage in 
(0.154) 
0.232 8.454 
(0-133) 
0.845 33.250 
(0-134) 
1.184** 46 150 E)- divided by 10000 . 
(0.663) (0.558) (0.570) Weekly unemployment benefits (EI/10) -0.001 -0-037 0.081 3.182 0.052 2.032 
(0.110) (0.102) (0.101) Weekly unemployment benefits squared -0.242 -8.790 -0.224 -8.829 -0.419 -16.346 (weekly unemployment benefits in E)2 
divided by 1000 
(0.273) (0.239) (0.239) 
Local situation 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA -0.084 -3-070 -0.169** -6-648 -0.066 -2.570 (0.083) (0.078) (0-078) 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA 0.006 0.205 0.008 0.321 0.002 0.081 
squared 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
South East (Base) 
Greater London 0.038 1.396 -0.039 -1.538 -0.232 -9.170 (0.305) (0.280) (0.281) 
South West 0.317 12.087 0.308 11.680 -0.159 -6.278 (0-309) (0.278) (0.276) 
West 0.283 10.732 0.021 0.828 0.078 3.005 
(0-315) (0.297) (0.290) 
West Midlands 0.369 14.021 0.162 6.287 -0.005 -0.190 
(0.253) (0.227) (0.225) 
East Midlands 0.653** 25-351 0.256 9.799 0.121 4.647 
(0.297) (0.288) (0.285) 
East Anglia 0.048 1.751 0.114 4.424 -0.170 -6.725 
(0.473) (0.429) (0.411) 
Yorkshire Humberside 0.566** 21-883 -0.001 -0.043 0.053 2.074 
(0.286) (0.258) (0.258) 
North West 0.655** 25.138 0.006 0.229 0.171 6.576 
(0.272) (0.244) (0.231) 
North 0.447 17.089 0.440* 16.489 0.290 10.960 
(0.300) (0.265) (0.253) 
Scotland 0.361 13.711 -0-301 -11.935 -0.086 -3.368 
(0.279) (0.257) (0.251) 
Constant -1.969** -0.599 0.574 
(0.558) 
1 
(0.487) 
1 
(0.483) 
1 
Observations 618 610 605 
observed probability 0.379 0.559 0.578 
Pseudo R2 0.206 0.133 0.064 
Heteroscedasti city 
2 
X (38) = 51.459 
2 
X (38) = 52.400 X2 (39) = 55.808 
Functional form x 
2(l) 
= 3.243 x 
2(l) 
= 0.023 x 
2(j) 
= 0.106 
Normality test x2 (2) = 3.982 x2 (2) = 0.083 X2 (2) = 0.158 
Notes: 
(1) Robust standard errors in brackets. 
(2) The coefficients are statistically significant at ** 5 percent or * 10 percent. 
(3) Tests (in the last three rows) that fail at 5 percent are in bold. 
(4) M. E are marginal effects expressed in percentage points. 
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Table 3.4: Multivariate probit, parsimonious specification. 
Would 
move 
Personal characterictics and situation Left school at 17 or younger (base) 
Left school at 18 or older 0.802** 
(0.189) 
Number of unemployment spells 0.094** 
(0.042) 
Male 0.039 
(0-172) 
Left previous job involuntarily (base) 
Left previous job voluntarily 0.327* 
(0-124) 
Contact with employment services 0.300* 
(0.181) 
Look for full-time job 
Profess] onal1intermediate 
Non-manual (base) 
Skilled manual 
Other manual 
Own wage (f 1/10) 
Own wage squared ((own wage in f) 2 divided by 10000) 
Pay covered by union bargaining 
No partner (base) 
Partner works 
Firstjob social status 
0.255 
(0.291) 
0.326* 
(0.174) 
0.164 
(0.164) 
Lastjob 
0.134** 
(0-060) 
-0.492 
(0.325) 
Family structure and income 
Partner does not work 
Female partner works 
Female partner does not work 
Has living children or care for children 
Owners or buying (base) 
Council tenants 
-1.422 
(0.932) 
-1.045 
(1.272) 
1.211 ** 
(0.451) 
1.828 
(1.251) 
-0.382** 
(0.182) 
0.095 
(0.309) 
Would Would 
accept accept lower 
lower pay skill content 
-0.185 
(0-174) 
0.028 
(0.036) 
-0.191 
(0-169) 
-0.309* 
(0.168) 
0.0002 
(0-037) 
-0-056 
(0.145) 
-0.280** 
(0.112) 
0.286* 
(0.159) 
-0.454** 
(0.150) 
-0.100 
(0.248) 
-0.269* 
(0.152) 
-0-079 
(0.138) 
0.326** 
(0-070) 
-0.983** 
(0.412) 
0.257** 
(0.106) 
1.169 
(0.877) 
2.074 
(5.450) 
-0.393 
(0.347) 
-2.318 
(5.493) 
-0.007 
(0.231) 
-0.251** 
(0.110) 
0.344** 
(0.150) 
-0.342** 
(0.147) 
0.147** 
(0.052) 
-0.561** 
(0.264) 
1.325 
(0.883) 
2.570 
(6.171) 
0.073 
(0.389) 
-2.015 
(6.168) 
-0.265 
(0.225) 
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Table 3.4 (ctd. ) 
Private tenants 0.337 -0.214 -0.624** 
(0.343) (0.287) (0.281) 
Sharing with relatives 0.321 0.116 -0.444* 
(0.288) (0.250) (0.257) 
Other 0.488 -0.031 -0-363 
(0.329) (0.261) (0.272) 
Partner's wage (f 1/10) Z-- 0.055 -0.189 -0.299* 
(0-174) (0.179) (0.177) 
F)2 Partner's wage squared (partner's wage in _ divided by 10000 0.020 0.667 1.162 
(0.737) (0.873) (0.849) 
Weekly unemployment benefits (f 1/10) -0-035 0.129 0.131 
(0.133) (0.115) (0.107) 
Weekly unemployment benefits squared (weekly unemployment -0-125 -0.281 -0.483* f)2 benefits in _ divided by 1000 (0.347) (0-311) (0.290) 
Local situation 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA -0.139 
(0.085) 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA squared 0.006 
(0.006) 
West Midlands 0.260 
(0.185) 
East Midlands 0.301 
(0.292) 
Yorkshire Humberside 0.142 
(0.208) 
North West 0.438** 
(0.177) 
North 0.151 0.269 
(0.196) (0.171) 
Scotland 0.100 
(0.196) 
Constant -1.919** -0.669 0.123 
(0.448) (0.477) (0-365) 
Observations 710 
Log likelihood function -1206.401 
Correlation coefficient between columns (1) and (2) 0.272 
(0.069) 
Correlation coefficient between columns (1) and (3) 0.239 
(0.071) 
Correlation coefficient between columns (2) and (3) 0.565 
(0.052) 
Note: Each correlation coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero, with p-value of zero 
correlation equal to zero. 
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Table 3.5: Separate probits, parsimonious specification. 
Would move Would accept 
lower pay 
Would accept 
lower skill content 
Coeff. M. E Coeff. M. E Coeff. M. E 
Personal characterictics and situation 
Left school at 17 or younger (base) 
Left school at 18 or older 0.805** 31.040 -0.192 -7.610 -0.306* -12.107 
(0.175) (0.171) (0.158) 
Number of unemployment spells 0.094** 3.400 0.034 1.327 -0.001 -0.032 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) 
Male 0.019 0.705 -0.221 -8.682 -0.065 -2.537 
(0-155) (0.150) (0.140) 
Left previous job involuntarily (base) 
Left previous job voluntarily 0.326** 12.012 -0.285** -11.235 -0.252** -9.869 
(0.117) (0.108) (0.103) 
Contact with employment services 0.299* 10.273 0.295** 11.713 0.342** 13.529 
(0.169) (0.147) (0.141) 
Look for full-time job -0.433** -16.544 -0.320** -12.194 
(0.151) (0.142) 
Firstj . ob social status 
Professional/intermedi ate 0.319 12.133 0.032 1.264 
(0.270) (0.269) 
Non-manual (base) 
Skilled manual 0.363** 13.472 -0.209 -8.279 
(0.157) (0.147) 
Other manual 0.199 7.297 -0.033 -1.311 
(0.155) (0.136) 
Lastjob 
Own wage (f 1/ 10) 0.128** 4.631 0.324** 12.752 0.146** 5.698 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.052) 
E)2 Own wage squared ((own wage in -0.457* -16.572 -0.955** -37.650 -0.545** -21.296 
divided by 10000) 
(0.266) (0.255) (0.272) 
Pay covered by union bargaining 0.268** 10.513 
(0.106) 
Family structure and income 
No partner (base) 
Partner works -1.398* -40.362 1.052 37.309 1.27 1 42.610 
(0.782) (0.654) (0.656) 
Partner does not work -0.967 -25.462 1.886** 42.847 2.440** 43.039 
(1.001) (0.857) (0.851) 
Female partner works 1.238** 46.190 -0.366 -14.539 0.044 
1.726 
(0.398) (0.358) (0.331) 
Female partner does not work 1.800* 58.544 -2.066** -53.956 -1.953** -54.593 
(0.980) (0.819) (0.840) 
Has living children or care for children -0.377** -12.990 
(0.164) 
Owners or buying (base) 
Council tenants 0.100 3.666 -0.017 -0.682 -0.228 -9.017 
(0.278) (0.211) (0.210) 
Private tenants 0.323 12.295 -0.245 -9.754 -0.579** -22.739 
(0.313) (0.293) (0.277) 
Sharing with relatives 0.314 11.220 0.089 
3.509 -0.418* -16.076 
(0.274) (0.229) (0.225) 
Other 0.484 18.601 -0.047 -1.853 -0.325 -12.870 
(0.288) (0.247) (0.237) 
Partner's wage (f 1/10) 0.044 1.586 -0.170 -6.705 -0.285** -11.127 (0.136) 1 (0.119) 1 (0.121) 1 
100 
Table 3.5 (ctd. ) 
Partner's wage squared (wage in E)2 0.079 2.867 0.590 23.252 1.096** 42.833 
divided by 10000 
(0-593) (0.512) (0.522) 
Weekly unemployment benefits (f 1/10) -0.008 -0.302 0.130 5.111 0.126 4.928 
(0.100) (0-096) (0.092) 
Weekly unemployment benefits squared -0.186 -6-757 -0.280 -11.027 -0.482** -18.822 
(weekly unemployment benefits in; E)2 
divided by 1000 
(0.24-4) (0.231) (0.222) 
Local situation 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA -0-155** -6.110 
(0.068) 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA 0.006 0.252 
squared 
(0.004) 
West Midlands 0.290* 10.914 
(0.173) 
East Midlands 0.326 12.406 
(0.2118) 
Yorkshire Humberside 0.172 6.407 
(0.200) 
North West 0.443** 16.813 
(0.163) 
North 0.173 6.444 0.380** 14.405 
(0.199) (0.168) 
Scotland 0.049 1.803 
(0.177) 
Constant -1.932** -0.635 0.094 
(0.393) (0.428) 1 (0-342) 1 
Observations 710 710 710 
Observed probability 0.377 0.555 0.576 
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.132 0.052 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (29) = 39.640 X2 (27) = 60.401 ý2(20) = 21.994 
Functional form x 
2(l) 
= 1.437 x2 (1) = 0.315 x2 (1) = 0.810 
Normality test X2 (2) = 2.147 x2 (2) = 0.324 x2 (2) = 0.813 
See notes to table 3.3. 
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Appendix A: Variables' definitions 
I Chapter's description I Corresi)ondinp- auestion in data set I 
Personal characterictics and situation .......... ..... .I............. .......... ............. ................. Left school at 17 or younger (base) 
Left school at 18 or older 
........ .... . -1- .......... ............. - ............... - ............ ............. Number of unemployment spells 
Left previous job involuntarily (base) 
Left previous job voluntarily 
Above average in math test (7) z: l Above average in reading test (7) 
Contact with employment services 
Look for full-time iob 
Age at which the respondent left school. 
How many periods of unemployment have you 
had? 
...... . ........................ ........................ ......... ...... 11 ..................... _- ........... ............... 1-1.1-1 ......................... ..................... How did your last job come to an end? 
Voluntarily = left of own accord. 
Involuntarily = temporary job, firm closed 
down, were made redundant, were sacked. 
................ ......................................................... --- .................................................... ................................ . ................................... Scores from reading and arithmetic tests held 
when the child is 7. Marks go from 0 to 10 for 
arithmetics and from 0 to 30 for reading. 
.......... ................................................ I ........... ............................... ....................... .......................... ........................................ During your period of unemployment have you 
had any contact with the Job Centre, 
Government Employment Office or Professional 
and Executive Recruitment? 
............... . ................................. ............................................................... ..................... ..................... -- .............. ................ Are vou lookin2 for full-time or r)art-time work? 
First iob social status 
Never worked 
Non-manual (base), Professional/i ntermedi ate, 
Skilled manual, Other manual 
------------- - -------------------- . .... ... ................ .... . ........ ................ Last 
---------------- --- -- -- -..... . ................... . ..... .......... .... . ............. . ... Own wage (EI/10) Z: > 
f)2 Own wage squared ((own wage in _ divided by 
10000) 
Pay covered by union bargaining 
Has the respondent had any jobs since leaving 
school? If yes: 
........................................................... .......................... . .......... .............. . ........ ..... . .... ..................... ............ Occupation status 
What was your usual pay after any deductions 
for tax and NI, including overtime, bonus, 
commission or tips etc. that you usually 
received? 
.................................................... .......... . .................................................................... ..................... . ...... . ..................... . Are your wage, salary or conditions of service 
negotiated by a Trade Union or a Staff 
Association? 
Family structure anq I- 
---- .......................... ....... ................... - --- --------------- . .......... ...... ........... . ........... . ....... .......................... .............. . ........ ............... ........... . ............. ................. ...... No partner (base), Partner works, Partner does not Do you live with somebody as a couple? 
work 
I 
Female partner works 
Female partner does not work 
. ... ..... . ........... .................. . ........ - ........... .................... Has living children or care for children 
Is your partner in. paid ýTployment at present? 
.... . ..... ................... . ............... . .............. . ..... ............. ............................... ............. ..... . ...... . .......... ................ Interaction between partner variable and gender 
variable. 
............... ........................... ......... ...... ............ ................................................................. ........ .............. . ................ ...... . ........ ... Does the respondent have any living children? 
Or are there any 
adoptive/spouse's/partner's/foster children in the 
reSDondent's care? 
Owners or buying (base), Council tenants, Private 
tenants, Sharing with relatives, Other. 
.......... . ............................. ........... . ....... ....... ................................. . ..... .................... .... . ..... ...... ........ . .............. . .... Partner's wage (f 1/10) 2 Partner's wage squared (partner's wage in f) 
divided by 10000 - 
I........... -............... ......... . ............................................ . ................................... . .............................. ........ . .................. Weekly unemployment benefits (f 1/10) 
Weekly unemployment benefits squared (weekly 
f)2 
unemployment benefits in _ divided 
by 1000 
.... ... ... .......... ........ ... ............... . ... ........ ....... . ................................... ......... . ............ ...................... m .................................... ...... Local situation 
----------- ------- - ---- -------------------- I ....................... . ......................... . ...................................... . .......... . .......................................................... Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA squared 
South East (Base) 
Greater London, South West, West, West Midlands, 
East Midlands, East Anglia, Yorkshire Humberside, 
North West, North, Scotland. 
Housing tenure. 
What is your partner usual take-home pay, after 
deductions for tax and NI, but including any 
overtime, bonus, commission, tip , etc. ....... ............................................................. .............. .......................... ........... ...... . ................................ . ....... I ............. Unemployment benefit per week. 
Unemployment and sickness rate in the Local 
Authority in which the respondent lives in 1981 
(from 1971 census). 
..................................... . ................................................................................ ..... ........... .............................. ....................... Region in which the respondent lives in 198 1. 
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Appendix B: Table B. 3.1: Summary statistics 
Whole data et Parsimonious specifications 
Obs. Mean S. E Obs. Mean S. E 
Would move 1142 0.377 0.485 710 0.377 0.485 
Would accept IoNver pay 1064 0.526 0.500 710 0.555 0.497 
Would accept lower skill content 1055 0.587 0.493 710 0.576 0.495 
1 Personal characterictics and situation 
Left school at 18 or older 12467 0.198 0.399 710 0.110 0.313 
Has post-school qualification 15895 0.376 0.485 710 0,363 0.481 
Number of unemployment spells 5572 1.747 1.172 710 2.506 1.502 
Male 18483 0.517 0.500 710 0.585 0.493 
Left previous job voluntarily 3281 0.568 0.495 710 0.368 0.482 
Above average in math test (7) 13410 0.435 0.496 595 0.380 0.486 
Above average in reading test (7) 13438 0.618 0.486 596 0.529 0.500 
Contact with employment services 1152 0.847 0.360 710 0.854 0.354 
Look for full-time job 1151 0.777 0.417 710 0.751 0.433 
Firstjob social status 
Never worked 12285 0.023 0.149 - - - 
Professional/intermedi ate 12285 0.132 0.338 710 0.049 0.217 
Skilled manual 12285 0.248 0.432 710 0.314 0.464 
Other manual 12285 0.214 0.410 710 0.334 0.472 
Lastjob 
Own wage (f I/ 10) 3170 4.375 3.072 710 5.669 2.874 
Own wage square ((own wage in E)2 divided by 10000) 3170 0.286 0.678 710 0.404 0.535 
Wage covered by union bargaining 2930 0.431 0.495 710 0.458 0.499 
Family structure and income 
Partner works 12383 0.388 0.487 710 0.269 0.444 
Partner does not work 12383 0.118 0.323 710 0.017 0.129 
Female partner works 12383 0.114 0.318 710 0.066 
0.249 
Female partner does not work 12383 0.085 0.279 710 0.008 
0.092 
Has living children or care for children 12463 0.260 0.438 710 
0.245 0.430 
Council tenants 12119 0.146 0.353 710 0.149 0.357 
Private tenants 12119 0.084 0.277 710 0.061 0.239 
Sharing with relatives 12119 0.380 
0.485 710 Oý585 0.493 
Other 12119 0.094 0.292 710 0.082 0.274 
Partner's wage (f 1/10) 10288 3.277 
4.537 710 2.239 3.966 
Partner's wage square (partner's wage in j: )2 divided by 10000 10288 0.313 
0.700 710 0.207 0.480 
Weekly unemployment benefits (f I/ 10) 12462 
0.411 1.185 710 1.826 1.215 
Weekly unemployment benefits square (benef in E)2 divided by 1000 12462 
0.157 0.592 710 0.481 0.510 
Local situation 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA 12395 
5.164 2.180 710 5.898 2.499 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA squared 12395 
31.419 29.175 710 41.023 38.547 
Greater London 12437 0.125 0.331 
710 0.068 0.251 
12437 0.074 0.262 710 0.055 0.228 South West 
12437 0.053 0.224 710 0.065 0.246 West 
12437 0.096 0.295 710 0.132 0.339 West Midlands 
12437 0.068 0.252 710 0.056 0.231 East Midlands 
12437 0.033 0.179 710 0.014 0.118 East Anglia 
Yorkshire Humberside 12437 
0.089 0.285 710 0.090 0.287 
12437 0.115 0.319 710 0.165 0.371 
North West 
12437 0.064 0.244 710 0.114 0.318 
North 
12437 0.09 8 0.297 710 0.132 0.339 
Scotland 1 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix C: Additional results on mobility 
Table C. 3.1: Probit for willingness to move. 
Would move 
Coeff. M. E. 
Personal characterictics and situation 
Left school at 17 or younger (base) 
Left school at 18 or older 0.874** 33.734 
(0.186) 
Number of unemployment spells 0.123** 4.584 
(0.038) 
Male 0.075 2.778 
(0.160) 
Left previous job involuntarily (base) 
Left previous job voluntarily 0.396** 15.020 
(0.127) 
Above average in math test (7) -0.022 -0.810 
(0.131) 
Above average in reading test (7) 0.139 5.171 
(0.134) 
Contact with employment services 0.290 10.327 
(0.177) 
Look for full-time job 0.036 1.347 
(0.167) 
Firstjob social status 
Never worked 1.267** 46.599 
(0.343) 
Professional/intermediate 0.293 11.350 
(0.282) 
Non-manual (base) 
Skilled manual 0.343** 13.066 
(0.171) 
Other manual 0.029 1.082 
(0.168) 
L. astjob 
Own wage (El/10) 0.133** 4.982 
(0.058) 
f)2 Own wage squared ((own wage in _ 
divided by -0.543* -20-281 
10000) 
(0.281) 
Family structure and income 
No partner (base) 
Partner works -0.841 -27.992 
(0.821) 
Partner does not work -0.408 -13.838 
(0.966) 
Female partner works 
0.859** 33.258 
(0.407) 
Female partner does not work 
1.677 55.003 
(0.944) 
Has living children or care for children -0.242 -8.775 (0.174) 
Owners or buying (base) 
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Table C. 3.1 (ctd. ) 
Council tenants -0.197 -7.144 
(0.331) 
Private tenants 0.349 13.548 
(0.340) 
Sharing with relatives 0.212 7.826 
(0.302) 
Other 0.247 9.515 
(0-311) 
Partner's wage (f 1/10) -0.059 -2.203 
(0.147) 
Partner's wage squared (partner's wage in f)2 divided 0.441 16.451 
by 10000 
(0.636) 
Weekly unemployment benefits (EI/10) 0.028 1.046 
(0.106) 
Weekly unemployment benefits squared (weekly -0-306 -11.417 f)2 unemployment benefits in _ divided by 1000 
(0.259) 
Local situation 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA -0.089 -3.325 
(0-079) 
Proportion of unemployed and sick in LA squared 0.006 0.212 
(0.005) 
South East (Base) 
Greater London -0-010 -0.389 
(0.293) 
South West 0.074 2.800 
(0.293) 
West 0.355 13-767 
(0.282) 
West Midlands 0.360 13.922 
(0.238) 
East Midlands 0.417 16.273 
(0.293) 
East Anglia -0.103 -3.768 
(0.461) 
Yorkshire Humberside 0.590** 23.047 
(0.270) 
North West 0.643** 24.968 
(0.258) 
North 0.450* 17.464 
(0.284) 
Scotland 0.386 14.905 
(0.257) 
Constant -1.901** 
(0.547) 
Observations 669 
Observed probability 0.401 
Pseudo R2 0.229 
Heteroscedasticity 
2 
X (39) = 53.651 
Functional form x2 (1) = 3.274 
Normality test x2 (2) = 5.528 
See notes to table 3.3. 
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Chapter four 
A Micro-analysis of the Consequences of Parental Unemployment 
106 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we are interested in determining the precise contribution that 
the economic situation of parents has on the social behaviour of their children. High 
unemployment and long-term unemployment present a potential danger to social 
stability. Unemployment affects the morale of people who experience it and may lead 
to social unrest (for example an increase in racism or crime). Given this background, a 
logical step is to study how this affects the children of the unemployed in their 
education, future employment and social behaviour. This chapter is interested in the 
effects that parental unemployment and long-term unemployment have on the social 
behaviour of children. In addition to the lack of financial resources (which has an 
obvious influence on the quality of life of these children), the depressed and tense 
state of the parents may affect their children's educational development and lead to 
disturbed social behaviour. The idea is therefore to determine the extent to which 
parental unemployment leads to anti-social behaviour among children, controlling for 
other social and psychological factors which could lead to such behaviour. The effects 
of parental unemployment are likely to be more marked, and indeed might only 
appear, when that unemployment is relatively long lasting. For this reason, we are 
particularly interested in the role of long-term unemployment. 
Insofar as the family is seen as a critical site for the formation of human 
capital, the finding of negative influences from unemployment on the children's 
upbringing may have dramatic implications. We could see the emergence of a group 
of underclass citizens who are out of the society, this position being inherited from 
exclusion of previous generations. Such evolution would lead to particular 
inequalities and enhance the emergence of a dual labour market. If such a vicious 
circle were identified, there would be many policy implications. Government 
intervention could be useful, for example in giving incentives to the children of 
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disadvantaged families to integrate socially early in their development, through state 
education and through the supply of social activities. The idea would be to try to 
offset, as much as possible, the negative effects of parental unemployment and long- 
term unemployment on the development of children. This is also more generally 
related to the effect of family breakdown on the children concerned. 
We find evidence that father's unemployment, in particular when it is 
repeated, is detrimental to children's outcomes. Moreover, those who, at a young age, 
have a non-working mother living in couple fare better. Because we control for 
financial difficulties, all these effects are considered to be additional to any financial 
effects. We also find that these effects are successfully offset by good parenting 
(defined below). Other important social factors are also identified. 
Few economic studies have been undertaken on this subject. Two recent 
studies undertaken at the same time as this chapter (Gregg and Machin, 2000 and 
Hobcraft, 1998) use the same data set as us to carry out closely related analysis. 
However, our study is different in several ways. In particular, it contains a panel data 
analysis, and it contains more specific conclusions on the effects of repeated father 
unemployment and the employment of the mother. 
Other related questions have been examined in the literature and, insofar as 
they help us to develop our argument, we present their main conclusions in section 
4.2. Section 4.3 describes the data and econometric models that we use in this chapter. 
Section 4.4 presents our empirical evidence, and section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Review of the literature on the determinants of children's outcomes 
In order to understand the effect that parental unemployment and long-term 
unemployment have on children's upbringing, it is interesting to 
look briefly at the 
evidence on the way unemployed people cope with their 
idleness. Studies concerned 
108 
with the psychological effects of unemployment generally use data sets built through 0-- 
interviews. The questions relate either directly to unemployment or to the general 
state of mind of people. They outline two main factors which characterise the 
experience of unemployment: a financial loss (with associated effects) and direct 
psychological effects (boredom, feeling of failure). The financial consequences are 
the most obvious element of unemployment, although financial difficulties may not 
have the largest effects on well-being. The impact that parental unemployment has on 
children is likely to depend on the overall situation of the family. With this in mind 
we examine the specific issue of matemal employment. 
It is also interesting to review the extent to which parental attainments affect 
the achievements of children. Some empirical evidence exists about the influence that 
the educational attainment and the labour market situation of parents have on the 
education and the labour market situation of their children. We review this literature 
in order to determine how important and significant these effects are. The idea is that 
if parental economic attainment has substantial effects on children's accomplishment, 
we may think that the influence goes through psychological channels, such as altered 
work and social values, as well as through economic channels, such as the availability 
of opportunities, and genetic channels. 
We then review the literature that identifies other characteristics that are likely 
to influence the social behaviour of children. These are the family environment, as 
well as the external environment and the personal characteristics of the child. Finally, 
we show the potential consequences for the rest of the economy. 
4.2.1 The impact of parental education and labour market situation 
4.2.1.1 The rinancial effects of unemployment and long-term 
unemployment 
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Becoming unemployed represents a significant loss of income and it is often 
associated with a notable decrease in the standard of living. Nickell 11 (1982) finds 
evidence that lengthy spells of unemployment lead to a fall in occupational status. In a 
qualitative analysis, based on a survey of unemployed people, White (1991) finds that 
unemployment benefits are insufficient to cover the basic necessities for which they 
are meant. Families suffer from serious liquidity constraints. This is particularly 
significant if we consider that people affected by unemployment generally come from 
lower paid jobs, and do not have much initial savings or are already in debt when they 
become unemployed. White also finds that, in the UK, families with dependent 
children are the worst off. The benefit premium designed to cover the costs of the 
children is insufficient so that families find it difficult to renew things like clothes, 
shoes and large items for the home. When unemployment is prolonged, families may 
have to borrow money (from the bank or the extended family) or use their savings 
(when they have some). They tend to spend such money on renewing necessities (in 
particular shoes and clothes for the children). In effect, the money is not used on 
luxuries such as books or cultural activities which would enhance children's human 
capital. As unemployment continues, the family has to adapt to this lower standard of 
living. 
There is some evidence of an association between crime and delinquency and 
low social class (Hakim 1982). 1 In particular, parental unemployment, which is 
sometimes used to empirically measure parental social class, appears to be related to 
juvenile cnme. Carruth and Oswald (1991), using data on Bntish counties, find some 
evidence that the number of children in care is related to the level of unemployment in 
British counties. In particular, they find that if the unemployment rate 
doubled, the 
Hakim carries out a review of the literature concerning the social consequences of unemployment 
(poverty, health and mortality, mental health, crime and delinquency and the social 
fabric generally). 
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number of children in care of local authorities would be expected to eventually 
increase by two-thirds. The precise nature of the causal relationships is not clearly 
determined by the authors, but we can say that higher unemployment may be 
associated with lower well-being of children. 
Financial hardship and unemployment may also have direct effects on health. 
There is evidence of an association between unemployment and bad physical health, 
although there is no consensus regarding the direction of causality (Hakim, 1982; 
White, 1991). Some counter-evidence has also been found; for example 
Narendranathan et al. (1985) find no evidence in cross-section logit models that spells 
of unemployment increase the probability of future sickness. Several economists have 
been interested in the correlation between parental unemployment and children's 
health. Joyce et al. (1991)2 use vector autoregression to test the reduced form 
relationship between unemployment and low birthweight. They cannot find a 
significant relationship between the two. Others find some corroborative evidence. 
For example, Costa (1999) finds that differences in birthweights by income class 
exist, even though they have decreased over the century because of improved 
knowledge and technical change. 3 The latter decrease in differences is an example of 
how public policy aimed at improving health care as well as technical development 
can restore the balance between families. 
There is some evidence that unemployment and financial difficulties increase 
the level of stress, especially among those who have borrowed money (Eckenrode and 
Gore, 1990). Tensions develop in the family, as they do not have the financial means 
2 Joyce et al. use the percentage of low birthweight as a measure of infant health (they assume that the 
birthweight is not affected by technological change). They test whether unemployment (cyclical or 
structural) explains low birthweight (in the state of Tennessee) controlling for lagged value of low 
birthweight, seasonal dummies, and the percentage of black births. 
3 She regresses birthweight on the log of income and controls for observable genetic factors, maternal 
health and factors specific to a pregnancy among babies born after at least 37 weeks. 
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to face any crisis. It can be expected that the situation may be even worse when 
unemployment is not expected to stop, since there is no expectation that repayment 
will become easier at some future time. 
4.2.1.2 The psychological effects of unemployment and long-term 
unemployment 
Negative psychological effects can stem directly from the loss of job and from 
the financial hardship associated with unemployment. There is a large literature on the 
topic in different disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and political theory (Gill, 
1999; Jahoda, 1982; Fryer and Payne, 1986). Gill (1999) reports how these disciplines 
consider the non-pecuniary costs of unemployment to be as important to individuals' 
well-being as pecuniary costs. 
In our societies a job is associated with social status. Losing employment is 
equivalent to losing one's place in society. Hakim (1982), White (1991) and others 
report that this particular type of distress depends on the actual commitment to work. 
More stigmas may also be attached to losing a job in an activity where unemployment 
is low. For example, people who have lost a white-collar job seem to be more 
affected. However, it is also a question of pride: it may be that blue-collar workers 
will tend not to admit Missing their job. Unemployed people may have a feeling of 
failure and may also be humiliated by the judgement of other people. Akerlof and 
Yellen (1985) also find that prime age men represent the group which suffer the most 
from unemployment, 4 and this does not seem to have changed over time. 
4 They compare two measures of unemployment: one from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
which counts current unemployment, the other from the Work Experience Survey (WES), which relies 
on retrospective report of spells of unemployment. Considering that a more salient experience will 
be 
better remembered, they construct a ratio of the two series 
(Uwes/Ucps ) and study its evolution over 
time. The smaller the percentage of CPS unemployment that is remembered after one year, the 
less 
painful unemployment was. 
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As unemployment continues and people enter what we call long-term 
unemployment, the situation evolves. Things are less straightforward. On the financial 
side, nothing has changed. Long-terrn unemployment necessitates a reduced social 
life, with the consequence that a feeling of boredom may develop. Families cannot go 
on holidays, have to cut down social outings and other activities. The psychological 
effect of this depends on the habits that were prevalent before unemployment. Certain 
costless activities may still be undertaken. Children may be adversely affected if the 
family shares a lower level of social enjoyment because of financial difficulties. 
Parents are isolated from usual social encounters and children cannot participate in 
activities with others. They may associate with other children coming from a similar 
background. 5 Their social isolation (either individual or as a group) starts early in 
their life. However, having parents at home may also be an advantage for the children: 
they are more available for homework, games, etc. At the same time, if the parents are 
bored and dernotivated this may affect the children. The direction of the effect is 
therefore not clear-cut. There are, a prion, grounds to believe that the effect runs in 
both directions; in fact it depends on the situation of the individual and their capacity 
to cope. 
Using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) score, Clark and Oswald 
(1994) observe that the unemployed have a lower level of psychological health or 
"happiness', 6 than employed people. Winkelmann et al. (1998) find consistent 
evidence; in their study for Germany, 7 the non-pecuniary costs of unemployment 
5 Important effects are at work here. The external environment of the child is expected to have various 
effects, through peer group effects and through the "example" it may give. We develop the role of b 
external environment in determining children's outcome later in section 4.2.2.2. 
6 The level of happiness is measured by considering the answer to the GHQ questionnaire and summing 
the number of times the person places himself or herself in the 
fairly stressed or highly stressed 
category. This is a measure of their well-being. 
7 They use the German Socio-Economic Panel, in which there 
is the following question: How satisfied 
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exceed the pecuniary costs associated with the loss of income while unemployed. 
Being out of the labour force also reduces satisfaction but to a lesser extent than 
unemployment. 8 This evidence seems to depend on how well-beIng Is measured, for 
example Bj6rklund (1985) finds a relationship between unemployment and mental 
health9 in cross-section but it disappears in fixed effects models. However, the latter 
study is quite limited as it suffers from a lack of observations. On balance, the 
existence of an effect appears quite robust. 
In Clark and Oswald's study, long-term unemployed people show a higher 
level of happiness than people unemployed for less than a year. The authors do not 
give an explanation for this result, but several explanations are possible. Some think 
that the long-term unemployed eventually find a way of enjoying life within the limits 
of their new living standard. It is also possible that those who hate unemployment find 
jobs more quickly through more active job search. Recent evidence (Clark et al., 
1999) in this strand of the literature finds evidence of a habituation effect; they 
conclude that past experience of unemployment reduces the psychological harm of 
current unemployment. However, there is also contrary evidence; for example 
Winkelmann et al. (1998) find that the duration of unemployment does not have a 
statistically significant effect on life satisfaction; the satisfaction of the unemployed 
does not improve as they stay in unemployment for a further consecutive period. 
are you at present with your life as a whole? The answer to the question is given on an ordinal scale 
from 0 to 10. 
8 Their results are based on a fixed effects logit model, with life satisfaction as dependent variable 
(equal to I if satisfaction score is 7 or above, to 0 otherwise) and labour market status, marital status, 
age, health, duration of unemployment spell, and log of household income as explanatory variables. 
They test the robustness of their results by including interaction terms between labour market status 
and age; by using a different cut-off point for life satisfaction (namely, 
5 instead of 7); and by using a 
shorter time period in order to limit attrition of the sample. 
Their results are not affected. 
9 Mental health is measured through questions related to mental symptoms such as having difficulties 
sleeping, having nervous problems, and through questions related 
to somatic symptoms such as having 
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This idea is also developed in the sociological literature. For example, Warr 
and Jackson (1987) find that the adaptation to unemployment depends on several 
factors (such as attachment to work, financial hardship, social support, etc. ). 10 There 
is also evidence that the financial degradation does not worsen any more after one or 
two years of unemployment (White, 1991). Even though certain people will adapt 
constructively (by improving their life in some way), others will either adapt to 
unemployment with resignation (with reduced expectations, autonomy and 
competence) or enter despair. Again, we may expect these to have opposite effects on 
the children: "happier" parents will be supportive whereas resigned parents will create 
a certain unrest. There is some evidence that resigned adaptation is very common 
among 25-55 year-olds. For example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) found that the 
experience of unemployment is less memorable among young people (less than 25 
years old) and older people (more than 55 years old). This could mean that children 
are more likely to be exposed to "unhealthy" adaptation. The resignation of their 
parents towards the labour market may be transmitted to them in the form of lower 
motivation. However, this is again not an obvious effect and the exact opposite may 
happen. It is therefore essential to know the net outcome, and this can only be done 
through an empirical investigation. There is also evidence that parents employed in 
low standard jobs may be distressed and consequently give less attention to the raising 
of their children (Parcel et al., 1994). More generally, this evidence supports the idea 
that depressed parents may provide the child with a rearing of lower quality. 
stomach pains or high blood pressure. 
10 They use data obtained through interviews with unemployed people in the UK. Their sample consists 
of 222 men who had been unemployed for at least 19 months (time 
between the first and the last 
interviews). They regress variables such as the changes in psychological 111-health 
(as measured by the 
GHQ questionnaire), in reported general health, 
in non-money problems, in money problems and in 
financial strain on the following groups of independent variables: commitment to work, availability of 
money, age group, social relationships and continuing 
health condition. 
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The children of workless families may also be affected in another way. 
Eckenrode and Gore (1990) report qualitative results of interviews with couples 
facing unemployment. They find evidence of tension ansing between the partners due 
not only to financial hardship, but also to the need for a redefinition of roles within 
the family. In cases where the wife was not working, having an unemployed husband 
at home may become stressful, especially if they were not used to spending that much 
time together. Support and comfort can rapidly decline as the unemployed person 
stays idle and the partner starts wondering whether the effort made is sufficient. Such 
tensions may distress the children, and may lead to family disruption (see below for 
an analysis of its effects). 
The link with anti-social behaviour is not clear, but can be better understood 
thanks to the analysis of the sociologist Coleman (1988). He distinguishes between 
three components in "family background": the financial capital, the human capital and 
the social capital. The first component corresponds approximately to the wealth of the 
family. Parents' education measures the second component. Finally, social capital 
corresponds to the structure of the relations in the family. Coleman argues that the 
latter is as important as the former two components. In particular social capital is 
complementary to human capital; it gives children access to the human capital of their 
parents. A lack of social capital can be observed in families where one parent is 
missing, but also in families where the parents have few interactions with their 
children. This is interesting for our purpose because we argue that parental 
unemployment may affect interactions between the various family members. In 
particular, the quality of parenting may be affected by psychological 
distress 
associated with job loss. Coleman (1988) measures lack of social capital 
by means of 
the number of siblings (a higher number of siblings 
dilutes the mother's attention to 
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each one) and with the mother's expectation for her child to go to college. He finds 
that it is associated with higher school drop out rates. 
It is also important to note that the presence of children may have an effect on 
the duration of unemployment of their parents. Parents, in particular the head of the 
household, may indeed have stronger incentives to find a Job. Such evidence comes 
from the literature on the search behaviour of unemployed people (see for example 
Ahn and Ugidos-Olazabal (1995) for Spain"). Further evidence is found in the 
literature interested in well-being and unemployment. Clark et al. (1999) show that 
the "habituation to unemployment effect" which they find for men disappears if these 
men have children. We can infer that unemployed parents search harder and have 
continuous incentives to find a job. This may also lead us to think that parents who 
suffer protracted periods of unemployment are in a particularly weak position in the 
labour market. 
From the previous discussion we can say that, through their financial impact, 
unemployment and long-term unemployment may lead to anti-social behaviour. The 
psychological effects that accompany the expenence of unemployment are difficult to 
interpret in such studies. The negative psychological effects of unemployment are 
recognised by the unemployed themselves, and we argue that unemployment may 
disturb the relationships between the parents and the children and affect the quality of 
parenting. It is not clear however that they lead to anti-social behaviour on the part of 
their children. 
11 They use data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey for the second quarters of 1987,1991 and 
1993. They estimate a bivariate probit model of the participation and employment probabilities (for 
men and women aged between 16 and 21 years). In the participation equation, the explanatory 
variables include the labour market situation of the 
father and of the mother, their schooling, an age 
dummy, year dummy, and the unemployment rate. For the employment equation, they 
include the 
parents' situation, year dummies and the unemployment rate, and 
the age and schooling of the young 
persons. 
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4.2.1.3 The effect of maternal employment on children's outcomes 
It has been argued that the employment of the mother may have an adverse 
effect on children. For instance, Coleman (1988) explains that the social capital which 
exists in the parent-child relationship is weakened when the mother works outside the 
home. There is some empirical evidence that early maternal employment (in the first 
year of life) has a small negative impact on the cognitive development and the social 
behaviour of children (Han et al. 2000). 12 Later employment has sometimes been 
found to have an offsetting positive impact (Blau and Grossberg, 1992). For the UK, 
there is some evidence (Francesconi and Ermisch, 1998) that mother's employment 
during childhood is associated with favourable outcomes for her offspring during 
young adulthood. Francesconi and Ermisch find that mother's employment is 
associated with lower nsk of unemployment and distress (derived from a set of 
indicators of well-being). 13 However, no consensus has been reached in the literature 
as to the actual effect of maternal employment on the children. There are various 
hypotheses to explain how early matemal employment affects later outcomes of 
children. For example, Waldfogel et al. (2000) report five: maternal separation, lack 
of breast-feeding, low stimulation by alternative carer, type of childcare arrangement, 
and role of the father. In this thesis, we concentrate on the combined effect of the 
employment of the mother and the other characteristics of the household (father's 
labour market status, financial difficulties, marital status, etc. ) on children's 
12 They use ordinary least squares to regress test scores on a set of demographic and socio-economic 
variables and alternative sets of variables describing the mother labour market status over the child's 
early lifetime. 
13 They use the British Household Panel Study. They regress various outcomes (education, 
unemployment, leaving home, early childbearing, and health) on the proportion of months the mother 
worked during childhood, age, year of birth, sex and mother's education and economic circumstances 
of the family of origin (including family income, whether parents are homeowner, length of time at 
current parental address), all measured when the child is 16 years old. They use ordinary least squares 
and within-family fixed effects models. 
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outcomes. The literature on this topic is limited. A recent example is the US study by 
Han et al. (2000). They find that the effects of first year matemal employment on 
cognitive outcomes are larger if there is an unemployed father in the home. 
4.2.1.4 Evidence on intergenerational transfers of educational 
attainment and labour market situation of parents 
Some studies are concerned with the extent of intergenerational transfers in 
families. There has been a renewed interest in these issues recently and investigations 
have been camed out for various countries. Unfortunately, these studies rarely 
identify the channel through which such transfers occur. 
Antel (1992) finds evidence for the US that daughters coming from a family 
where the mother is dependent on welfare have a higher probability of later being on 
welfare. ffis evidence is linuted because of the data he uses (mothers'need for welfare 
is measured only for one year). 14 In particular, he is not able to detennine whether the 
transmission occurs through decreased labour market opportunities, through a 
significant change in attitude towards receiving benefits or through characteristics 
transmitted through the genes. Moreover, Antel is not able to verify whether longer 
exposure to welfare has more significant consequences. It is indeed reasonable to 
believe that only protracted periods of welfare will lead to serious changes in 
attitudes. By analogy, the duration of unemployment becomes very important as it can 
be thought that only longer periods of unemployment have an intergenerational effect 
in ten-ns of forining a certain set of work and social values. 
14 He estimates a two-equation model. The first equation represents the probability that a daughter will 
be welfare recipient; the independent variables include the welfare participation of the mother, which is 
istics such as living an endogenous variable because mother and daughter may share the same characteri II 
in the same neighbourhood or even a common attitude to work or ability. The second equation 
estimates the probability that a mother will 
be a welfare recipient. 
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Numerous studies are concerned with the effect of parental background and 
education on the educational attainment of the children. MIcklewright (1989), using 
the National Child Development Study, found that the decision of young people to 
stay on at school after the compulsory age is apparently influenced by the social class 
and the education of their parents. 15 This holds even when taking into account ability 
of the pupil and the quality of the school he or she attends. More recently, Ermisch et 
al. (1997) found that the mother's educational attainment is significantly correlated 
with the educational attainment of her children, particularly her daughters. More 
generally, it seems that there may be evidence of a link between parental and 
children's educational attainment. 
Ahn and Ugidos (1996) also find evidence of a link between parental situation 
in the labour market and the educational achievement of children. ' 6 They find that 
having unemployed parents is generally associated with a lower educational 
attainment. Their results also show that children whose father is employed in the 
public sector have improved educational opportunities. Although they cannot explain 
why they find this latter result, it is useful to note that father's occupation is a relevant 
determinant of children's educational attainment. 
Other studies analyse the link between parental labour market situation and 
children's labour market situation. Various mechanisms are at work here. Having 
long-term unemployed parents may create a need for their children to start working 
15 He uses a logit model to estimate the probability of leaving school at 16. The explanatory variables 
he uses are the following: father (mother) stayed on at school beyond minimum age, father's social 
class, mother's social class, number of siblings, net household income (or financial trouble in 
family), 
type of school, control if living in Wales and in London or South East, maths and comprehension 
scores. 
16 They study the determinants of individual outcomes of young people aged between 16 and 
21. These 
outcomes are the following: to be enrolled at school versus participating 
in the labour market and being 
employed versus being unemployed. 
They consider that young individuals who are enrolled at school 
have more education opportunities than others. 
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early instead of taking further education (Ermisch et al., 1997). Evidence seems to 
CID t) I suggest that having unemployed parents generally increases the risk of unemployment 
of their children (Ahn and Ugidos, 1996). As we have seen above, the type of job held 
by parents Is also important. The results obtained by Ahn and Ugidos for Spain (1996) 
indicate that a self-employed father decreases the probability of unemployment of his 
children. For the UK, Dearden et al. (1997) also found clear links between fathers and 
their children concerning their labour market earnings and years of schooling. 17 They 
also identify some intergenerational mobility: some upward mobility from the bottom 
of the distribution of earnings and some downward mobility from the top. This means, 
among other things, that parents or public authorities may have some power in 
influencing the future of less favoured children. 
4.2.2 Other factors influencing the social behaviour of children 
4.2.2.1 Household composition and situation 
The conditions in which the child lives are thought to have an impact on his or 
her behaviour towards others. We saw earlier that the social capital transmitted to 
children may be affected by family disruption (Coleman, 1988), and that 
unemployment may also be one of its causes. This leads us to consider the effects of 
farmly disruption on the children (in particular the effect of divorce). 
There is evidence that family disruption has a negative effect on the 
educational and employment achievement of children as well as on their behaviour 
18 
with respect to the family they form themselves (Kiernan, 1992). Family disruption, 
17 As in this chapter, they use the National Child Development Study. They estimate the degree of 
intergenerational mobility (of income) with a log-linear regression and with a transition matrix. 
18 Kiernan, using data from the National Child Development Study, provides the following statistical 
analysis: she regresses early adulthood behaviour variables 
(such as forming a partnership before 20, 
having a child by 20 and extra-marital birth) on the 
family situation at 16 and background 
characteristiCS- 
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in Particular divorce, has effects similar to those of unemployment on adults. Clark 
and Oswald (1994) found that, in a cross-section, divorce has a strongly negative 
coefficient in well-being equations. Although the effect of divorce may not be causal, 
the result shows that family disruption is associated with lower well-being. There is 
also evidence from sociology that the well-being of children in step-families is less 
than that of children in two-bi ological -parent families and no better than the well- 
being of children in single-parent families, even though on average the latter are more 
likely to be in poverty (Cherlin et al., 1994). From the economic literature, Case et al. 
(1999a) find, for the United States and South Africa, that the presence of the 
biological mother appears to increase expenditure on food. 19 For South Africa, they 
can further say that it increases expenditure on healthy food, particularly in 
households where the biological mother is head or spouse's head of the family. As far 
as the consequences for the children's behaviour are concerned, again two types of 
effects may be inferred. 
First, the psychological effect of family disruption may also lead to a disrupted 
social behaviour. For example, Kiernan (1992) finds some evidence that young people 
living in step-families are more likely to leave home because of frictions than those 
from intact families. One wel I -established result of the sociology literature is that 
children in step-families, in particular girls, leave their households at an earlier age 
than do children in single-parent or two-parent households (Cherlin et al., 1994). 
Children raised in step-farnilies have been found to have academic problems, to 
exhibit behavioural problems, to be less socially responsible and competent and to 
have lower self-esteem than children in intact families (Cherlin et al., 1994; 
Hetherington et al., 1998). Several reasons have been given for these findings. Step- 
19 They regress food expenditure at home on various controls notably the number of children and the 
household's income, the explanatory variables of interest are the number of children with step- 
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children may be psychology scarred by the experience of divorce, parenting may be of 
lesser quality if step-families which suffer more from stress and conflict 
(Hetherington et al., 1998). Step-families may choose to invest less in children 
because parents may expect less future contacts with non-biological children, and less 
money transfers (for a literature review see Bergstrom, 1997). Step-parents may also 
be less interested in sustaining someone else's genetic line. Duncan et al. (1994) find 
for the United States that the social behaviour of the children is likely to be affected 
by the transition to a single-parent household; even controlling for the income effect 
they find that children living in single-parent households have a greater probability of 
having behaviour problems. 
Second, family disruption may lead to financial hardship, especially when the 
family is reduced to a one-adult household. Ermisch et al. (1997), using the British 
Household Panel Study's data in ordered logit statistical models, 20 find evidence of a 
small negative association between single parenthood and the educational attainment 
of the children (in particular sons), this effect occurring mainly through reduced 
economic resources. Duncan et al. (1994) also find that, through the income effect, 
test scores at five years old are lower for children living in single-parent household. 
Other family characteristics may have an effect, having a large number of 
siblings has been shown to reduce the amount of schooling received (Micklewright, 
1989 and Coleman, 1988). We think that such a variable could therefore also affect 
the social behaviour of the child. More generally, the behaviour of the parents towards 
their child - i. e. the interest of the parents in their child's achievement - 
has potential 
effects on his or her behaviour. The type of accommodation tenure has been 
found to 
mother/father, with adoptive mother/father, and so on 
for different types of family structures. 
20 They analyse the effects of family background variables on the educational outcome, which 
is 
represented by four educational categories 
(in ascending order: no qualification, CSE and 0 level, A- 
level, higher qualifications). 
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have a significant influence on children. Using four different US data sets, Green and 
White (1994) found that children who have parents who own their home are more 
likely to stay on at school (even when controlling for self-selection effects), and they 
also find that they are less likely to be arrested. 21 
Other characteristics of the (extended) family background have been found to 
have significant impacts on the children's social outcome by Case and Katz (1991). In 
particular, they show that children tend to reproduce the behaviour of their parents. 22 
For example, having a family member who has been in jail is strongly related to youth 
criminal activity. Gregg and Machin (2000) find, in a study similar to that carried out 
in this chapter, 23 that children with parents who stayed on at school after 15, who did 
not have financial difficulties or children who never lived in a lone mother family, 
have better school attendance and tend to stay on at school. Finally, children who 
have spent time in care are found more likely to be in contact with the police. 
Hobcraft (1998) cames out an extensive study of various childhood characteristics on 
children's outcomes. Among his findings, we note that educational failure is found to 
be increased by lack of parental interest in schooling and childhood poverty or for 
children of lower social classes. 
4.2.2.2 External environment 
21 They estimate probit models with the following dependent variables: youth still at school at 17 or 
have graduated, youth have a child at 18, youth have been arrested. The independent variables include 
various controls (depending on the data set). They also estimate a bivariate probit model to check 
whether there is a selection bias (i. e. the effect of the homeowner variable is due to the fact that 
homeowners are different from the others, not because of homeowning as such). They found no support 
for the selection bias hypothesis. 
22 Genetic heritage cannot be ruled out as an explanation here. 
23 They regress outcomes at age 16 (school attendance, contact with the police and staying on at school) 
on individual characteristics, family structure, and parents' characteristics. They use a tobit model for 
school attendance and a probit model for the other outcomes. 
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The environment in which the child lives is considered to influence their 
behaviour. There has been a marked interest in this question in the literature. The 
external environment has generally been found to have an effect in addition to family 
background variables. 
For a child, the area in which he lives and the school he attends defines the 
external environment. Often, because of the system of catchment area for school, the 
friends made at school will be the same as in the area of residence of the child. The 
external environment may be thought of as setting an example for the child; living in 
a depressed area will give a certain image of life. Glaeser et al. (1996) show in a study 
of US data the importance of social interactions (i. e. positive covariance across 
agents' decisions about crime) in determining criminal behaviour, especially among 
young offenders. The external environment influence also goes through the friends of 
the child. For example, there may be a peer group effect whereby the child will 
behave according to what he thinks is expected by the group to which he belongs. 
Case and Katz (1991) found that peer behaviours (defined as the young neighbours' 
observed behaviour) have substantial and significant effects on youth involvement in 
crime, drug use, church attendance, alcohol use and idleness. 
4.2.2.3 Personal characteristics 
Even if the behaviour of the child is in part determined by the influence of his 
family and of his environment, the personality of the child also plays a role in the 
outcome. In the same way as their individual characteristics may protect them, or 
24 
worsen the consequences of divorce for children , their reaction to their 
father's 
unemployment may be deten-nined by their personality. A large part of these 
characteristics are not measurable or observable. However, one can observe the 
24 See Hetherington et al. (1998) for a review of literature on this topic. 
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manifestations of this personality. For example, the ability of the child at school may 
be a good indicator. Success at school may indicate a good integration In the school 
system, and therefore in society as a whole. For instance, Gregg and Machin (2000) 
find that better reading ability (for boys) and maths ability (for girls) is associated 
with less contact with the police. Personal characteristics also include factors such as 
the ethnic group and any physical or mental handicaps. 
4.2.3 The consequences for the labour market and the economy 
Although the only way for workless families to improve their situation is to 
obtain employment, certain means of financial relief are denied to them; they fall in 
the poverty trap. In cases where the father is unemployed, the mother often has no 
incentive to work because of means tested benefits (the additional revenue from her 
work would not compensate for the induced loss in benefits). There may also be other 
psychological and practical reasons for the partner of an unemployed person not to 
work. These have been observed in France: Beno^it-Guilbot and Clemenqon (1994) 
cite the French saying "Qui se ressemble s'assemble" which suggests the partners 
generally come from the same social and educational background. They probably both 
face a depressed labour market. Moreover, they may share a negative attitude towards 
work and decreased network of relations. Also, their social network may be reduced 
to other unemployed people so that there is no clear means of breaking unemployment 
through social contacts. 25 
What is described in the previous paragraph could partly explain the 
employment patterns discussed by Gregg and Wadsworth (1996). They study 
employment and non-employment rates at the household level in 13 
OECD countries. 
25 Social contacts with employed people and potential employers are generally acknowledged 
to play a 
significant role in the finding of a 
job (see for example Ahn and Ugidos 0 996) or Benoit-Guilbot and 
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For these countries they observe an increase in the percentage of households where all 
working age persons are not working and a decrease in the percentage of "mixed" 
householdS26 (over the 1983-1994 period). For seven of these countries (including the 
UK), they observe what they call employment polansation, in other words a 
simultaneous increase in the proportion of households where all adults work and the 
proportion of households where no adult work. They also suggest that better labour 
market performance would not necessarily solve the issue. They indeed observe that 
in the UK, where employment has increased, it was not sufficient to offset this 
phenomenon. For each type of household (two-adult and three-adult), the presence of 
dependent children appears to decrease the workless rate, except for one-parent 
households where this is reversed, especially for Ireland and the UK. 
Given this evidence, the question of whether parental unemployment and 
long-term unemployment have negative effects not only on the labour market 
situation of their children but also on their social behaviour, notably their tendency to 
crime, becomes crucial. Given that unemployment and long-term unemployment are 
concentrated among certain families where all adults are unemployed (in particular 
single parent families), the finding of a strong impact would indicate further 
polarisation not only in the labour market but also in the economy and society in 
general. Moreover, if there were evidence that this impact has long-term 
consequences (i. e. the negative effects persist throughout the child's life), this would 
mean the emergence of a group of 64 secondary citizens". The seriousness of these 
consequences will depend on the size of the effects we have reported and also on their 
persistence. The next chapter is interested in the latter question. 
C]6menqon (1994)). 
26 Where there is a mix of working and non-working adults. 
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The economic and social costs are potentially important. The social costs 
come from the huge inequality which would exist (and already exists to a certain 
extent) between people coming from less favoured families and the rest of the 
population. This situation would potentially lead to social unrest and social instability, 
which is evidenced by the effects of unemployment in certain suburbs or inner cities. 
The economic costs are linked to the activities of these "secondary citizens". The rest 
of the economy would suffer direct financial costs due to a higher level of crime and 
indirect costs due to lower human capital and foregone revenue from tax. The 
economy would potentially suffer lower growth and/or higher insecurity. A current 
and important example can be found in the United States. Although the US has a low 
administrative unemployment rate, the generations of people segregated from society 
are very costly, with 2 percent of men of working age in jail according to Freeman 
(1996). The problem is so acute that certain economists have pointed to the need for 
policy targeted at preventing the children from entering crime, in addition to 
incarceration of criminals. The American public seems ready to see the authorities 
spend billions of dollars on policies with such designs (Greenwood et al., 1996). 
4.3 Data and model 
4.3.1 Data 
We use the Bntish National Child Development Study (NCDS). This data set 
is based on a sample of children bom between 3 and 9 March 1958. Five surveys 
have 
been undertaken at ages 7,11,16,23 and 33. The first three waves will 
be used in this 
chapter and estimations will be carried out for males and 
females separately. The first 
two waves consist of an interview with the parents, questionnaires completed 
by the 
school, results from a medical examination conducted 
by the school's health service 
and tests of ability of the subjects 
themselves. The third wave is basically the same, 
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with the addition of an interview of the cohort members. The variables used are 
descnbed in appendix. 
4.3.2 Models and method of estimation 
We use limited dependent variable models. In order to take advantage of 
different aspects of the data set, two types of model will be used to address several 
issues. The first is a panel data model which is used to study the relationship between 
family and external environments and the social behaviour of children aged between 7 
and 16. These types of models enable us to control for individual effects that may 
interfere with the relationships we want to outline. For example, children who have 
bad outcomes after their father become unemployed or their parents divorce may have 
specific characteristics (such as a difficult temperament) which prevent them from 
adjusting positively to the new situation (Hetherington et al., 1998). The second 
model is a cross-section model, which is used to study the relationship between past 
personal characteristics, family background and external environment and the 
probability of facing particular events at sixteen. These events are the following: 
being in contact with the police, being referred to an agency, and having a bad 
behaviour. In these cross-section models, we use the vast personal information 
available in the data set to try and control for individual effects. Our specifications 
take into account a large range of possible factors, but there may still exist further 
unobserved characteristics. Our models are limited in that sense. 
Before continuing, we should note that we do not assume that the causality 
between the explanatory and the dependent variables has been proven, although for 
simplicity of exposition, we might talk about "effects". In part, the aim is to identify 
associations between these variables. 
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4.3.2.1 Panel data model 
An unbalanced panel data mode, 27 is suitable for analysing variables measured 
consistently in each of the first three sweeps. The dependent variable is discrete and 
takes the value one when the event occurs and zero otherwise. We run a fixed effects 
logit model which uses conditional maximum likelihood estimation. It enables us to 
control for individuals' heterogeneity. The fixed effects model has an advantage over 
the random effects model because the latter assumes that the error terms are 
uncorrelated with the regressors (something which is likely to be untrue when dealing 
with data on individuals). The random effects model also assumes that the correlation 
between two observations of a group is always the same over time. 28 
The probability of facing an outcome conditional on exogenous factors in the 
fixed effects logit model can be wntten as: 
Pr(y,, = 11 x,, ) =F (a, + xi,, 6) 
where F is the cumulative logistic distribution: 
F(z) - 
exp( -, 7) 
1+ exp(z) 
and i=1,2, ..., n 
denotes the individuals and t=1,2, ..., Tj 
denotes the observations 
for the ith individual. 
The method of estimation consists of maximising the following conditional 
log-likelihood function (Chamberlain, 1980): 
n 
Ti 
I YO 
This means that the likelihood for each set of T observations is conditioned on 
the number of ones in the set. The estimator of the vector of coefficients of 
the 
27 The data are unbalanced because some variables are missing in one or 
two years. 
28 Given that the time period between any two observations varies 
in our data set, the correlation 
between two observations may vary over time. 
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explanatory variables will be consistent even for small n, provided that the usual 
regulanty conditions are satisfied. tn 
We tested the assumption of heterogeneity imbedded in the fixed effects 
model with a Hausman test (see page 900 in Greene, 1997). We used a simple logit 
model (with a constant tenn common to all individuals) as altemative and we find that 
the tests reject the hypothesis of homogeneity in all the specifications. 
In order to interpret the coefficients given in these estimations, we will refer to 
the odds ratio . 
29These are the exponential of the coefficients. They correspond to the 
ratio of the odds evaluated at one place to the odds evaluated at another place, the 
odds being equal to the probability of an event occurring divided by one minus this 
probability. For example, the odds ratio for x, is: 
odds ratio= 
o(b. + b. (x, + 1) + b., x, +... +b li xn) 
o(b. + b, x, + b, x, +... + bx) 
the odds o(. ) can be expressed as: 
o(xi, b)= 
P 
=exp(x,, b) 1-p 
with the probability p written as: 
exp(xi, b) 
1+ exp(xib) 
Finally, combining (4) and (5) the odds ratio is written as: 
odds ratio= exp(b, ) (7) 
(4) 
In other words, the ratio of the odds for a one-unit increase in xi (or a change 
from 
zero to one for dummy variables) is exp(bi). 
The weakness of this type of model is that individuals who have a constant 
behaviour across time are not taken into account. For our purpose, we want to 
be able 
29 Marginal effects and predicted probabilities can not 
be calculated here because the individual fixed 
effects are not estimated. 
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to account for these people as well. We therefore also estimate a random effects probit 
mo el. 10 The latter enables us to include time-invariant variables. It therefore brings 
us more information concerning these variables, although we run the risk of omitting 
some relevant and unobservable variables. 
The model can be expressed in the following way: 
x,, 8 (8) 
with E, - N[0,1] and Ft = vit + iti, t=1, ..., Ti 
I if > 0, and 0 otherwise. Y il I 
We then have: 
Pr(y,, )=(D[q,, (x, ',, 8)], where qit = 2yit - 1, and (D is the Non-nal cumulative 
distribution function. The contribution of group i to the likelihood for the sample iS: 31 
L, = Pr(y,, 9 Yi2 "'" YiTj 
) (10) 
This likelihood function presents some computational difficulties. Butler and 
Moffitt (1982) and Greene (1997) show a simplification which enables us to 
maximise the likelihood function. The routine has been built in Stata (StataCorp, 
1999) and we will use it to compute our estimates. A test of no cross-period 
correlation is carried out and reported at the bottom of the relevant tables. 
For dummy explanatory variables, marginal effects can be calculated as the 
difference in predicted probabilities: 
Pr(y,, l D=I)-Pr(y,, l D=O)=(D[q,, (z,,, 8+0)1-4)[q,, (z,,, 8)I (11) 
30 Because we did not find a reliable statistical test, we do not carry out a formal test to choose between 
the two models. We consider and compare the results of both models. 
31 See Butler and Moffitt (1982) and Greene (1997) for the full derivation of the likelihood function. 
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where z- if the set of explanatory variables minus the dummy D, and 0 Is the 
coefficient associated with the dummy. Note that when the dummy is part of a set of 
categories (for example a region), the other categories are set equal to zero. 
When the explanatory variable is a continuous variable, the marginal effect is 
calculated as follows (Arulampalam, 1999): 32 
ax 
This is interpreted as the change in the predicted probability for a marginal change in 
pt- 
4.3.2.2 Cross-section model 
In this model, the discrete dependent variables are taken from the third sweep 
of NCDS (when the child is 16). The explanatory variables are taken from the first 
three waves. This type of model enables us to study additional dependent variables, as 
a lot of interesting data are available in the third sweep only. We use a probit model as 
described in the previous chapter. 
4.4 The link between the employment situation of parents and their children's 
social behaviour 
The data set enables us to investigate several possible ways in which the 
labour market situation of parents can affect their children. The primary aim of all 
these estimations is to check whether the unemployment experience of the parents has 
a significant effect when other factors are taken into account. In particular, it Is 
32 We should note here that, as we do not compare these results with a pooled probit or other 
specifications, we do not feel it is necessary to carry out the adjustment advocated 
by Arulampalarn 
(1999). This adjustment consists in multiplying each coefficient by the scalar 
V1 being the 
estimated coefficient of correlation 
between two successive error terms for the same individual. 
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interesting to see whether repeated periods of parental unemployment have an effect 
on children's outcomes once financial difficulties as well as social and psychological 
factors have been taken into account. 
4.4.1 Investigation using panel data 
4.4.1.1 Specirication 
The specifications for the fixed effects logit and the random effects probit are 
similar. The first idea is to investigate the factors influencing the social behaviour of 
the children, in particular those that can trigger bad behaviour. We construct an index 
that defines being badly behaved (as reported by the mother) as adopting any of the 
following behaviours: being irritable, fighting with others, being destructive and being 
disobedient. 
We distinguish between two groups of explanatory variables which are 
believed to have a significant influence on the social behaviour of the child: the 
family background (economic and social) variables and the external environment 
variables (school and regional variables). The family background variables include 
the joint labour market situation of the parents (or father and mother figures), for 
example whether they are both unemployed, both working, etc. This is the main 
variable of interest. We also control for the social class of the father or male head and 
for whether the family has suffered from financial difficulties. The latter is the only 
variable related to parental income which is consistently observed in all the 
interviews 
during the cohort member's childhood. The social family controls consist of variables 
indicating the family structure, such as the number of children younger than 21 living 
in the household, or the presence of any family break-up. We also 
include housing 
tenure; in particular we are interested in knowing whether children of 
homeowners are 
better behaved (as suggested by Green and White, 1997). Finally, we control 
for the 
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interest that the parents have in their children's achievements at school, namely 
whether they think they should stay on at school. The school variable consists of a 
dummy indicating whether the child attends a school maintained by a Local Education 
Authority of the UK as opposed to independent schools, special schools for 
handicapped children and other schools. The regional controls are simply dummies 
for the eleven standard regions. In addition, in the random effects probit, we add 
seven time-invariant variables which may be relevant in explaining the children's 
outcomes. These are the following: the age of the mother at the child's birth, the age 
at which the mother and father left school, and several characteristics of the child 
when he/she was 7 years old (scores at math and reading tests, time to settle in class, 
and emotional maladjustment). 
Around fifty percent of the children are reported to have a bad behaviour (as 
defined here). This may capture a type of behaviour that is insufficiently unusual for 
our purpose. We therefore define an "extreme bad behaviour" discrete variable which 
is equal to one if the children have been reported to have, sometimes or more often, at 
least half of the behaviours just mentioned. Around 8 percent of boys and girls exhibit 
such extreme bad behaviour. 
Having investigated factors influencing our indices of bad behaviour, we then 
examine whether the same factors affect an alternative measure of social difficulties: 
whether the children have been referred to an agency 33 because of difficulties which 
have affected their educational progress or behaviour. We should note here that this 
measure also includes children who have difficulties because of health problems. We 
33 The agencies are the following: 
Sweep 1: School health services, child guidance clinic, school psychological service, education welfare 
services or school attendance officer, children's department, private specialist. 
Sweep 2: Same as sweep I plus doctor and probation officer. 
Sweep 3: Social services or social work department (including children's department), educational 
welfare department, police or probation department, child guidance clinic. 
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will take that into account in our econometric analysis by checking whether child's 
health variables are statistically significant. The same explanatory variables will be 
used and they are thought to influence this new dependent variable in the same way as 
the bad behaviour indices. Before turning to the results of the estimations, it is useful 
to look at the pattern of the data, in particular to see whether the economic situation in 
the past has an effect on future outcomes. 
Tables 4.1a and 4.1b show some cross-tabulations for boys and girls 
respectively. The tables show that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between past family difficulties and children's future anti-social behaviour or 
difficulties. The proportions of boys and girls with various difficulties at sixteen years 
of age are significantly higher in the farnilies that suffered from unemployment or 
financial difficulties than in the others. For example, among the boys coming from a 
family experiencing unemployment difficulties when they were seven, 28.6 percent 
were reported to have an extreme bad behaviour, while only 7.2 percent were reported 
to have such a behaviour among the boys coming from families with no 
unemployment difficulties. The relationship between having a mother who works and 
extreme bad behaviour or being referred to a social agency appears less strong (and 
insignificant according to the statistical test). A slightly greater proportion of 7- and 
11-year-old children having a mother who works have an anti-social behaviour at 
sixteen, compared to those who do not have a working mother at these ages. 
4.4.1.2 Estimation results 
Table 4.2a shows the results of fixed effects logit for boys. The first column 
shows that the parental labour market situation has a statistically significant 
contemporaneous effect on the probability that the mother reports her child to be 
badly behaved. Compared to a situation where both parents are working, any other 
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working arrangement leads to a higher probability of bad behaviour. The odds of 
being reported are multiplied by around two. Because the coefficients are quite close 
to each other, we test whether, given that the mother does not work, the 
unemployment of the father makes a statistically significant difference and find that it 
does not. We also test whether the employment of the mother makes a statistically 
significant difference if the father is unemployed and we also find that it does not. 
Given that we control for financial difficulties, this detrimental effect is in addition to 
any financial effects. One can infer that an unemployed father will not take advantage 
of his idleness to take care of his children and might instead have a negative 
behaviour which may be detrimental to the children. In particular, it may worsen the 
relations between father and children. In addition, in a situation where only the 
mother works, she may be obliged to work and cannot take care of her children as she 
would like to. On the contrary, in a situation where she does not work, she may be 
frustrated. Parents at home, because they spend more time with their children, may 
also be more receptive to their children's behaviour and be more likely to report them 
as badly behaved. 
Other results are important to note here. We observe that children of 
homeowners are less likely to be reported to be badly behaved by their mother. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Green and White (1997). Living with both 
natural parents (as opposed to coming from a broken family) actually increases the 
probability of being reported. This effect is the largest reported in this column; it 
increases the odds fifteen times. Step-parents might be less likely to report bad 
behaviour, a situation that could bring under-reporting from broken families. This 
result might also come from the fact that natural parents may be more stnngent with 
their children, spend more time with them and expect more from them. This result is 
consistent with evidence which suggests that biological ties between parents and 
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children are important for the quality of child rearing (Case et al., 1999ab). As 
expected, a higher number of children living in the household has an unfavourable 
effect on the study child's behaviour. The results show that those who have a father 
who holds a professional or intermediate professional occupation are significantly less 
likely to be reported badly behaved by their parents. This could also show that 
children from more educated families are better behaved or that relationships between 
parents and children in more favoured families are improved. It is interesting to note 
that there might be an overlap between parental occupation and ambition. Controlling 
for occupation, parents who want their child to stay on at school are more likely to 
report them. Such parents might expect more and be stricter with their children and 
have a tendency to report them more. Finally, children going to a school maintained 
by Local Education Authorities seem to be less well behaved. This may be due to a 
less stringent discipline. 
The second column of table 4.2a is concerned with reports (by the mother) of 
extreme bad behaviour. We can see that the parental labour market situation still has a 
statistically significant impact on the behaviour of the children. However, the 
big 
impact of having a father or male head unemployed has disappeared. Instead, the 
presence or absence of the mother in the home seems to have the most significant 
effect. The likelihood that a mother will report their child as 
being extremely badly 
behaved appears to be increased when the mother does not work; the odds are 
multiplied by around two. The two statistically significant coefficients are 
found not 
to be statistically different from each other, so that in the case where 
the mother does 
not work, the employment of the father 
does not make any difference to the likelihood 
of being reported. This result may 
be related to the fact that the mother will devote 
more time to her children. 
She will therefore be more likely to interact with them and 
to be n-iore aware of their behaviour. 
Moreover, she might be more concerned by their 
138 
behaviour as it is her job. At the same time, it appears that the employment of the 
father (i. e. having a father at home or not) does not make much difference. The other 
results are similar to those in the first column, in particular, living in an intact family 
has the largest effect. The relation between extreme bad behaviour and the occupation 
of the father has the same pattern as in the first column, but all the coefficients are 
statistically significant. Namely, having a white-collar father decreases the probability 
of being reported while having no father or male head increases it. 
The third column shows that the effect of the parental labour market situation 
on the probability of being in contact with a social agency is different from what has 
just been said. The children who are most likely to be referred to a social agency are 
those whose father did not suffer from unemployment and whose mother works. 
Indeed, the presence of the mother in the home reduces the likelihood of referral to an 
agency. The difference between the first and second coefficient is not statistically 
significant. The odds of being referred are decreased by about half when the mother 
does not work compared to a situation where both parents work. Most of the other 
coefficients have also opposite signs compared to the first two columns. The largest 
effect is that having parents who own their house increases the odds of being referred 
by more than three times. This result is difficult to interpret; it shows that the effect of 
having parents who are home-owners is not straightforward. 
Overall, these results suggest that anti-social behaviour and referral measure 
slightly different types of issues. The relations between parents and children may 
deteriorate without the children being more likely to be referred for behaviour 
problems. We assume here that referral to an agency is an 
"objective" judgement 
compared with the ". subjective" measure of bad 
behaviour. 
The results of the random effects probit for boys are reported in table 
4.2b. We 
find again that any situation compared to when 
both parents work is detrimental, but 
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the coefficient on the variable indicating that both parents are unemployed is not 
statistically significant. Compared to having both parents working, having an 
unemployed father increases the predicted probability of being reported for bad 
behaviour by 13 percentage points, while having a non-working mother increases this 
probability by only 6 percentage points. The former effect is larger that any labour 
market effect, and in particular it is much larger than having two non-working parents 
(which is not statistically significant). Financial difficulties are statistically significant 
and are associated with a 4-percentage-point higher probability of being reported 
badly behaved. The rest of the results are similar to what was found in the fixed 
effects logit; a larger number of children in the family, going to a school maintained 
by a Local Education Authority are both associated with a higher probability, while 
having a father in a white-collar (non-manual or professional) occupation or parents 
who are homeowners are "beneficial" to the child, although the latter two effects are 
not statistically significant. The main difference between the two specifications is that 
family structure becomes statistically insignificant. 
For extreme bad behaviour (column 2), we observe similar results as in table 
4.2a (as far as the direction of the correlation is concerned) and as just mentioned. The 
two main differences between the two tables are: financial difficulties change sign (so 
that their presence is associated with a 4-percentage-point higher probability of being 
reported) and become statistically significant, and family structure becomes 
statistically insignificant. Compared to a base child whose parents are working and 
have not had financial difficulties, having both parents unemployed increases the 
predicted probability of being reported by 8.2 percentage points, while having had 
financial difficulties increases only by 3.8 percentage points. Controlling for financial 
difficulties, unemployment is shown to have a large effect on extreme behaviour. 
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The last column of table 4.2b shows similar results to the last column of table 
4.2a. Having both parents working is no longer the "best" situation, although this time 
having both parents unemployed is not statistically significantly better. Financial 
difficulties are statistically significantly associated with higher probability of referral 
to a social agency. It appears that the residual effect of unemployment (i. e. the effect 
not related to financial difficulties, for example the presence of either parent at home) 
is beneficial for the children. Contrary to what was found for bad behaviour and 
extreme bad behaviour, parental ambition and going to a school maintained by a 
Local Education Authority are associated with lower risk of referral and a larger 
number of children in the family is associated with higher risks. 
The seven time-invariant variables give additional information; having a good 
score in math and settling quickly in class at 7 are statistically significantly associated 
I ional maladjustment with lower probability of facing any of the outcomes, while emoti 
has the inverse effect. The latter variable has a large effect on all outcome (from 
around 8 to 15 percentage points change in predicted probabilities), and in particular 
on the probability of referral to a social agency. Having a mother younger than 20 at 
birth is associated with a higher probability of (general and extreme) bad behaviour, 
by around 5 to 7 percentage points. Having a good score in reading at 7 years old is 
associated with a lower probability of referral to an agency, by 14 percentage points. 
The latter is very large given that the average predicted probability of referral is equal 
to 0.16. 
Before drawing conclusions from these results, we briefly turn to those for 
girls. Columns I and 2 in table 4.3a show that the results 
for girls are quite similar to 
what was found for boys. In particular, 
in the first column the results are exactly the 
same: any labour market situation is worse than 
having both parents employed and the 
odds ratios are similar to what was 
found for boys. In the second column, given a 
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situation where the mother does not work, having an unemployed father is statistically 
significantly worse. As for boys, financial difficulties do not have a statistically 
significant effect independently of unemployment. The absence of a father figure is 
detrimental to boys' behaviour but not to girls'. Having a father in a white-collar 
occupation is correlated with lower probability of extreme bad behaviour only. 
Finally, as for boys but to a lesser extent, homeownership is related to better 
behaviour, and living in publicly provided accommodation reduces the likelihood of 
extreme bad behaviour. 
The last column shows that the parental labour market situation does not have 
a significant effect on the probability of girls' being referred to a social agency. As for 
boys, corMng from a broken family appears to be associated with significant increases 
in the probability of referral, while a larger number of siblings and greater parental 
ambition are associated with a lower probability. As in the case of boys, girls with 
public tenant parents are more likely to be referred to an agency, but the effect of 
homeownership is not statistically significant. 
In table 4.3b, columns 1 and 2 again show very similar results. Compared with 
the fixed effects model, the results on parental labour market are exactly the same. 
Two main differences can be noted compared to table 4.3a: financial difficulties are 
now statistically significant in the extreme bad behaviour case, and have a positive 
association with bad behaviour in both columns, and having no father or male head is 
now associated with a lower probability of extreme bad behaviour. Coming from an 
intact family does not appear to have additional statistically significant effects on 
extreme bad behaviour. Compared to a base child whose parents are working and 
have 
not had financial difficulties, having both parents unemployed increases the 
probability of being reported by around 13 percentage points. 
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The last column of table 4.3b shows very similar results to what was found in 
the fixed effects logit model, except financial difficulties are now statistically 
significant and a larger number of children is associated with higher probability of 
referral. Overall, all results for girls are similar to those for boys. 
Out of the seven time-invanant variables, having a young mother at birth and 
emotional maladjustment increase the probabilities of general and extreme bad 
behaviour, respectively by 7 and 4 percentage points. A good score in reading 
decreases these by around 3-4 percentage points. All the time-invanant variables have 
a statistically significant and expected association with probability of referral to an 
agency (last column), except mother's age at birth and leaving school age, which are 
not statistically significant. The largest effect comes, as for boys, from emotional 
maladjustment (between 9- and 12-percentage-point change in the probabilities) 
Overall, it appears that children who have either or both parents unemployed 
have a worsened relationship with them. On the contrary, boys whose mother does not 
work have a lower probability of being referred, while parental labour market 
situation does not affect girls. Children who have more ambitious parents and large 
families are found to be less well-behaved at home. Children who have a white-collar 
father or whose parents are homeowners are better behaved. It is more difficult to 
interpret the role of these social factors in determining the probability of referral to a 
social agency. We see however that children from broken or single-parent families are 
more likely to be referred and that parental ambition is beneficial, decreasing this 
probability. Children who have more educated parents have better outcomes than 
others. In addition, early factors, which we observe at seven years old, have 
ramifications for later outcomes. In particular, children who demonstrate higher 
ability and who tend to be more adaptable at a young age have 
better outcomes. 
The next section provides additional insight into the role of parental factors. 
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4.4.2 Investigation using cross-section data 
4.4.2.1 Specification 34 
The idea is to investigate whether the child's past behaviour and experiences 
have an effect on outcomes at age sixteen. The outcomes are the following: whether 
the child has been in contact with the police (due to unlawful activity), whether the 
child has been referred to a social agency (defined as previously) and whether the 
child behaves "badly". The latter outcome is measured through two variables each 
diffenng somewhat from the measure used in the previous section: bad behaviour 
observed at and reported by the school, and bad behaviour observed at home (and 
reported by the mother). The latter measure considers that the child has a bad 
behaviour if he or she presents any of the following behaviours: irritable, fighting 
with others, destructive with his own and others' belongings, disobedient, lying, 
bullying other children. Bad behaviour noticed at school includes the same behaviours 
plus the following ones: truant from school, stealing, and resentful or aggressive when 
corrected. 
The fact of being in contact with the police is due to the combination of two 
events: first the child decides to offend, second he gets caught. We assume that the 
more serious is the offence, the more likely is the child to be caught. Consequently, 
the probability that a child is in contact with the police at sixteen is thought to depend 
on three groups of factors: personal characteristics and behaviour, external 
environment (including social interactions as well as police force), and family 
economic and social background. We should note here that this measure of contact 
with the police is obtained from reports of the parents and the school; the data may 
therefore suffer from under-reporting. 
34 In all the following specifications, certain statistically insignificant variables have been dropped to 
improve the econometric model. Moreover, no satisfactory model was found to explain extreme anti- 
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We consider that being referred to an agency and exhibiting bad behaviour are 
affected by the same groups of factors. The explanatory variables of particular interest 
are the labour market and financial situations of the parents. We choose to introduce 
the recurrence of father or male head unemployment as four dummies indicating the 
number of times unemployment was reported in the interviews, from no 
unemployment to repeated spells of unemployment. In order to increase the number 
of observations, we also include missing responses in our measures of financial 
difficulties and unemployment. Details are provided in appendix. Although the data 
set contains actual parental income when the child is 16, we prefer to use repeated 
financial difficulties. It has been shown that longer-term measure of income are more 
relevant in such specifications than income in one given year (Mayer, 1997). This is 
because, a low income in one year may be temporary and have no significant effects 
on the farmly, while persistent financial difficulties are more likely to affect family 
members' life. Employment of the mother is considered to have a different effect 
depending on when it occurs, and on the marital status of the mother. We therefore 
have dummies for each situation and at each of the three interviews (unless otherwise 
stated). 
The personal characteristics of the child include measures of ability through 
test scores at 7 and reports of the school on children's general knowledge at 7 and 11. 
We control for whether the children have been in care; this catches the (social) effects 
of family disruption as well as a peer group effect, which is expected to lead to a 
higher probability of a bad outcome. The family background variables capture any 
influences which could affect the children's behaviour, such as the interest the parents 
have in their success, which is expected to be beneficial; the number of children in the 
family, which is expected to be detrimental. The structure of the 
family is also 
social behaviour of girls. 
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expected to have an effect, in particular family disruption is expected to be 
disadvantageous. We include housing tenure for the same reason as before, as well as Z-: ) 
an indicator of the number of times the family moved since the child's birth. 
Numerous house moves are expected to bring instability in the child's life and this 
may affect them in a negative way. We consider that parental characteristics, such as 
leaving school age or age of the mother at birth, should also be included in these 
specifications. They might be indicative of a specific way of raising children and of 
passing certain values on. We are able to control for various school characteristics 
such as the number of pupils expelled in a year and the teachers/pupils ratio. Region 
dummies are again included to control for local circumstances - for example, the size 
or financial means of the police force. 
The results presented pass all the tests for functional form, normality and 
heteroscedasti city (the tests statistics are reported in the last rows of the tables). 
Variables which are ornitted (such as child's health variables, or father's social class) 
were not found to be statistically significant. The models were improved by not 
including them. 
Tables 4.4a and 4.4b show cross-tabulations for the economic factors of 
interest here (for boys and girls respectively). We can see that the results concerning 
unemployment and financial difficulties are consistent with what we expected. The 
proportion of boys who have anti-social behaviour or who have been in contact with 
the authorities is, in all cases except one, significantly greater among children from 
disadvantaged families. For example, 32.5 percent of boys having an unemployed or 
sick father (35.6 percent of those in families reporting unemployment difficulties) are 
in contact with the police at sixteen, while only 15.6 percent of the others are 
in 
contact with the police. As far as girls are concerned, we can see from table 
4.4b that 
a significantly higher proportion of those who 
have bad behaviour or faced the 
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authorities comes from families with unemployment and financial difficulties. For 
girls, the presence of a male head or the fact of having a working mother do not seem 
to be significantly related to being in contact with the police at sixteen, and having a 
working mother is not significantly related to bad social behaviour reported by the 
parents or the school. 
We can also note that significantly fewer girls than boys are in contact with 
the police at sixteen, regardless of the type of family they come from: in the whole 
sample, only 5.7 percent of the girls were in contact with the police at sixteen, 
whereas 16.7 percent of the boys were. In the whole sample, which is considered to be 
representative of the population, we also found that a significantly smaller proportion 
of girls had been referred to an agency (9.5 percent versus 14.9 percent for boys). The 
proportion of girls reported (to be badly behaved) by the school was 33.8 percent 
compared to 40.8 percent for boys, and those reported by their parents represented 
52.3 percent compared to 50.2 percent for boys. The proportions of boys and girls 
reported to have an extreme bad behaviour were not significantly different (they lie 
around 8 percent). 
4.4.2.2 Economic factors 
Tables 4.5(a and b) and 4.6(a and b) show the results obtained for the probit 
models for boys and girls respectively. The first two columns of table 4.5a show that 
unemployment of the father as well as its recurrence do not have statistically 
significant effects on parental reports of bad behaviour or extreme bad behaviour. 
Moreover, the marginal effects are close to zero. As far as the employment and 
marital status of the mother is concerned, it is important to note that only the 
coefficients on having, at 11, a non-working mother 
living in couple in the first 
column and on having, at 11, a lone non-working mother in the 
third column are 
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statistica ly significant. These variables are associated with a lower probability of 
being reported. Financial difficulties appear somewhat more relevant in explaining 
reports of bad behaviour, and in particular we observe an incremental effect when 
such difficulties are recurrently observed during childhood; the marginal effects are 
typically bigger as the number of times financial difficulties are observed increases. 
We have to keep in mind that the reports of bad behaviour are probably not wholly a 
representation of the behaviour of the child, but partly an indication of the relation 
between the parents and the child. 
The last column offers a more objective, although perhaps not free of bias, 
view on the child: behaviour reported by the school. Here, the labour market situation 
of the parents seems slightly more significantly correlated with the social behaviour of 
the child. We see that when unemployment is observed in the family, the probability 
that the children exhibit bad behaviour at school increases. Children whose father has 
had some experience of unemployment are 12 percentage points more likely to be 
reported. However, this effect does not statistically significantly increase as 
unemployment is observed more often. Again, only one coefficient among the 
mother's employment and mantal status variables (on having a non-working mother 
in couple at 7 years old) is statistically significant. It shows that having a non-working 
mother at a young age is beneficial compared to have both parents living in couple 
and working. The presence of financial difficulties as opposed to no difficulties is 
associated with a significant and quite big increase in the probability of bad behaviour 
(an increase of 8 percentage points), but additional reports of financial difficulties are 
not associated with a further increase in probability. 
The first column of table 4.5b shows the results concerning an even more 
objective measure of bad behaviour: whether the child 
has been in contact with the 
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police. 5 We find that father's unemployment does have a statistically significant 
relationship with being in contact with the police. Recurrent unemployment of the 
father, in particular when observed twice or more across the three sweeps, seems to be 
associated with a higher probability that the children are in contact with the police. 
This is contrary to Gregg and Machin's (2000) findings: they did not find any 
statistically significant effect from father's unemployment on contacts with the police. 
As we expected, we find that recurrent unemployment is more relevant when looking 
at the consequences for children, Gregg and Machin did not catch this effect because 
they were using unemployment at given points in time. Turning to the status of the 
mother, we observe that having a non-working mother when young (i. e. 7 years old) 
is statistically significantly associated with lower probability of being in contact with 
the police when the mother lives in couple. The presence of financial difficulties has 
an insignificant effect. The coefficient has however the expected positive sign and 
size (around 3 percentage points), as found by Gregg and Machin (2000), although 
they found it to be statistically significant. 
Finally, the last column of table 4.5b reports results concerning the probability 
of being in contact with a social agency. We can see that recurrent spells of father's 
unemployment do have the expected effect: recurrent unemployment appears to be 
associated with higher probability of such contacts. In particular, children who have a 
father unemployed twice or more across the sweeps have a probability higher by 13 
percentage points compared to those whose father was never unemployed. As in the 
previous columns, having a non-working mother in couple when young (i. e. 7 years 
old) is statistically significantly associated with lower probability of referral. In 
addition, it appears that the detrimental effect of having a lone mother at 16 years old 
35 Although this measure may still suffer from report bias since it is based on parents and school's 
reports. 
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is significant. Finally, only when financial difficulties are observed often during Z: ý 
childhood do we find a significantly higher probability (a change of around 10 
percentage points when they are observed repeatedly). t) 
Turning to the results for girls in table 4.6a, we can see from the first column 
that, as for boys, the labour market situation of the father does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the probability of parental reports of bad behaviour. The marginal 
effects are however bigger than in the boys' case (up to 12 percentage points for 
repeated unemployment). As for boys, only the coefficient on having a non-working 
mother living in couple at II years old is statistically significant and negative. The 
correlation between financial difficulties and these reports is strongly statistically 
significant and has the expected positive sign. The probability of being reported badly 
behaved increases as financial difficulties are more frequently suffered by the family. 
Girls who come from a fanuly who repeatedly suffered from financial difficulties are 
more than 12 percentage points more likely to be reported for bad behaviour. 
The last column shows that children who have a father unemployed have a 
higher probability of being reported by the school. Moreover, there is an increasing 
effect of repeated unemployment. Girls whose father was repeatedly unemployed 
have a 20-percentage-point higher probability of being reported by the school. 
Financial difficulties have a similar effect. Repeated financial difficulties with an 11 - 
percentage-point increase in the probability. Mother's status appears to have the same 
effect as mentioned in relation to the previous column, in addition having a lone 
working mother at II and a working mother living in couple at 16 are associated with 
a lower probability that girls are reported by the school. 
Given the small percentage of girls having been in contact with the police, it is 
important to treat the results in column (1) of table 4.6b with caution. Unemployment 
of the father has a statistically significant effect, raising the probability of being in 
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contact with the police by 2 percentage po' I ints. Repeated spells are not statistically 
Z7, significant, but have the expected positive sign. Financial difficulties have the 
expected sign but their coefficients are close to zero and they are not statistically 
significant. Mother's status is measured in a slightly different way here because some 
categories were empty of observations. It appears that 11-year-old girls who have a 
mother who works have a greater probability of being in contact with the police when 
they are 16. 
Finally, we report results concerning girls' referral to a social agency in the 
last column of table 4.6b. Having an unemployed father increases the probability of 
being in contact with any social agency (by about 3 percentage points), but the 
incremental effect of repeated unemployment does not appear statistically significant 
here. Financial difficulties have the expected (statistically significant) effect, 
increasing with the number of times they are observed (some financial difficulties 
increase the probability by 3 percentage points and repeated financial difficulties by 9 
percentage points). Mother's status does not appear to be statistically significant. Only 
living with a lone working mother at II years old appears to have a statistically 
significant and beneficial effect, decreasing the probability by 4 percentage points. 
To summarise, spells and especially repeated spells of unemployment are 
associated with a higher probability that almost any bad outcome (except reports by 
the parents) subsequently occurs. Looking only at statistically significant effects for 
boys, having a non-working mother in couple at 7 appears to be associated with lower 
probability that any bad outcome (except reports by the parents) subsequently occurs 
and having a lone mother at 16 appears to be associated with a greater likelihood to be 
referred to a social agency. For girls, having a non-working mother in couple at II is 
associated with a lower probability of being reported by the parents or school, while 
having a lone working mother at II decreases the probability of being reported by the 
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school and being referred. Contacts with the police are more likely for girls whose 
mother was working when they were 11. Overall, taking all the coefficients (including 
those statistically insignificant) into account, there is evidence that when having both 
parents living together, having a non-working mother at 7 or II is beneficial for boys. 
The effect of having a lone mother is varied depending on whether the mother works 
and the age of the child, but is definitely detrimental for boys when it occurs when 
they are 16 years old. For girls, having a working mother at II years old is 
detrimental, unless the mother is a single parent. There is also some evidence that 16- 
year-old girls who have a non-working mother living in couple are better off. 
4.4.2.3 Social factors 
From tables 4.5a and 4.5b we can also review the main social factors that are 
relevant (in other words statistically significant) in explaining children's outcomes at 
sixteen. We consistently find that a larger number of children in the family is 
associated with a higher probability of bad behaviour and/or contact with the 
authorities (with a change of about 2 to 3 percentage points in the predicted 
probabilities). Current (i. e. when the child is sixteen) parental ambition with respect to 
their child's schooling is associated with a lower probability that the bad outcomes 
occur. The largest effect is a 17-percentage-point decrease in the probability that the 
child is reported by the school. However, previous ambition (i. e. when the child is 7 
or 11) does not seem to have such an effect, as the significance and the signs of the 
coefficients seem to vary according to the specification. Some effects are consistent 
across only some types of bad outcome. For example, the fact that the mother left 
school after the compulsory age seems negatively associated only with bad behaviour 
reported by the parents and being in contact with social services. Having been in care 
is significantly positively correlated with being in contact with the police or a social 
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agency and with having an extremely bad behaviour (with changes In predicted 
probabilities of between 12 and 16 percentage points). Having parents who repeatedly 
take the initiative to meet the teachers is negatively associated with the former two 
outcomes (with changes in probabilities of the order of 5 percentage points). Boys 
who have a mother younger than 20 at birth have an 8-percentage-points-higher 
probability of being reported by the school, a 2-percentage-points-higher probability 
of being extremely badly behaved, a 6-percentage-points-higher probability of being 
in contact with the police and a 4-percentage-points-higher probability of being in 
contact with a social agency. Children who are reported to be of above average 
general ability have generally a lower probability of having any of the negative 
outcomes considered here (a change in predicted probability of 4 to II percentages 
points). Children who have received help at school when they were II years old are 
more likely to be reported to have an extremely bad behaviour, a bad behaviour at 
school or to have contacts with social agencies. 
As far as girls are concerned, the results are only slightly different (tables 4.6a 
and 4.6b). The probability of being in contact with the police proved hard to explain, 
and the model is quite parsimonious. We find that a larger number of children in the 
family is associated with a higher probability of any outcome occurring in particular 
reports of anti-social behaviour by the parents (except contacts with the police). 
Current parental ambition with respect to their child's schooling is associated with a 
lower probability that the bad outcomes occur. The largest effect is an 11 -percentage- 
point decrease in the probability that the child is reported by the school. However, 
previous ambition does not have a statistically significant effect, although it is mainly 
associated with a lower probability of a bad outcome occurring. Contrary to what was 
found for boys, the fact that the mother left school after the compulsory age, and 
having been in care are never statistically significant. Having parents who repeatedly 
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take the initiative to meet the teachers is negatively associated with the probability of 
being reported by the school (with a change in probability of 7 percentage points). 
Having a mother younger than 20 at birth does not have a statistically significant 
effect. Girls who are reported to be of above average general ability have generally a 
lower probability of having any of the negative outcomes considered here, although 
these coefficients are not statistically significant. Children who have received help at 
school when they were 11 years old are more likely to be reported to have a bad 
behaviour at school or to have contacts with social agencies. 
It is interesting to complete the analysis by studying the extent to which 
parental interest in the progress of their children can offset the negative effects of 
father's unemployment and of living in a non-intact family. Predicted probabilities are 
reported in tables 4.7a and 4.7b for boys and girls respectively. The results show that 
parental interest can successfully and significantly offset the negative effects that we 
have seen so far. For example, by calculating average predicted probabilities, we can 
see that a base boy whose father never experienced unemployment and whose parents 
never supported or took initiative to meet the teachers has a 19 percent probability of 
having been in contact with the police at 16. This probability is increased by about 12 
percentage points for a boy whose father had repeated spells of unemployment, if we 
now set this child to have parents who always wanted him to stay on at school, the 
probability is then reduced by about 8 percentage points, if we further suppose that 
the parents of this child took the initiative to meet the teachers twice, the probability is 
further reduced by around 7 points. In the same way, compared to boys who come 
from a non-intact family (with parents figures who never had ambition and never took 
the initiative to go and see the teachers), those whose parents show ambition during 
the whole childhood have a 8-point-lower predicted probability of having been in 
contact with the police at 16, the probability is decreased by a further 6 points for 
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those whose parents took repeatedly the initiative to see the teachers. If we now look 
at what happens when the mother works when the child is young (7 and 11), we see 
that the predicted probabilities are higher than when the mother does not work 
(whether the parents are interested in their child's achievements or not). Parental 
interest in their child does decrease the probabilities. The same pattern is repeated for 
the other outcomes and for girls. 
4.4.2.4 The effect of adding Local Authority variables 
Although we consider that the regional dummies capture the effects of the 
environment on the children's outcomes, one might argue that they are too 
aggregated. Children may indeed be influenced by the particular environment in their 
locality as well. It is interesting to see whether the relationship between the family 
economic situation and children's outcome is affected by the inclusion of these 
variables. We consider five variables of interest: 36 the unemployment and sick rate, 
the proportion of council tenants, of new Commonwealth immigrants, of non- 
manuals, of married women working, and the number of persons per room. They are 
introduced as a dummy equal to one if the proportion is higher than the average across 
all the Local Authorities and to zero if the proportion is below the average. For most 
of the vanables, the value of one is indicative of a less favoured Local Authonty, 
except for the proportion of non-manuals and of married women working which 
should be associated with richer areas. 37 
36 We found meaningful Local Authority variables only for the specifications with bad behaviour as a 
dependent variable. For example, we would need information on police force in the Local Authority for 
the "contacts with the police" variable, or information on the degree to which social agencies are active 
in the Local Authority for the "contacts with agencies" variable. Other peer group effects are already 
captured by the school variables. 
37 The data are part of the NCDS data set. They were calculated from the 1971 
Census. 
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The findings are reported in tables 4.8 and 4.9 for boys and girls respectively. 
Few Local Authority variables are statistically significant; surprisingly an above 
average proportion of non-manuals is associated with higher probability that the boys 
are reported badly behaved at school. A higher than average proportion of new 
immigrants is associated with a higher probability that the girls are reported badly 
behaved at school. 
The results concerning the family economic situation do not contradict what 
was found before, although they are affected by the inclusion of the Local Authority 
variables. Repeated spells of unemployment are associated with a 23- and 26- 
percentage-point higher probability that girls are reported by the parents and the 
school respectively. Boys whose father experienced some unemployment are more 
likely to be reported by their parents by 11 percentage points. For boys, having a non- 
working mother at 11 decreases the probability of being reported by their parents at 
16, unless their mother is a single parent. We find the same for girls for both 
outcomes, but the coefficient on lone working mother is not statistically significant. 
Looking at the last two columns of table 4.9, we used slightly different categories 
(because of lack of observations), we lose information with this specification, but it 
appears that 16-year-old girls are less likely to be reported badly behaved at school if 
their mother does not work. Finally, financial difficulties seem overall to be 
associated with higher probabilities of bad outcomes, although additional financial 
difficulties do not have further effects, and although the coefficients are not 
statistically significant in the first column of table 4.8. 
Overall, it appears that the inclusion of Local Authority variables has some 
effect on the size and significance of our variables of interest, but our main 
conclusions remain. The relationships between the Local Authority variables and the 
economic situation of the parents is likely to be very complex, and our specification 
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as well as the data available do not enable us to disentangle these. In addition, the 
family economic situation variables appear to be statistically significant, while the 
Local Authority variables are not. For these reasons, we consider that the 
specifications used in tables 4.5a to 4.6b are sufficient to expose the effect of family 
background on children's outcomes. It is not absolutely clear here whether the local 
environment influences the children, or whether the family's characteristics are 
strongly correlated with the local environment and ultimately determine the children's 
outcomes. From our results, we would however favour the latter idea. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has been interested in determining the factors associated with the 
probability that children have an anti-social behaviour. First, our results show that 
having an unemployed father is associated with detrimental outcomes. Because we 
control for the presence of financial difficulties, we consider that these unemployment 
effects are additional to the impact of the financial difficulties that may be associated 
with unemployment. The result that repeated periods of unemployment have 
additional effects conforms to the idea that there may be a cumulative unemployment 
effect. Second, we find some evidence consistent with the idea that having a mother 
employed early in life may be damaging. These results are detailed as follows. 
The panel data results concerning the parental reports of anti-social behaviour 
show that the relations between parents and children deteriorate in any situation 
compared to when both parents work. This is consistent with the idea that 
unemployment may affect the relationship between the parents and the children. 
Moreover, for those whose mother does not work, the unemployment of the father 
does not make a difference. In cross-sections, 11 -year-old boys and girls who have a 
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mother who does not work and lives in a couple are less likely to be reported at 16, by 
7 and 5 percentage points respectively. 
The presence of past spells of father's unemployment increases the probability 
that the boys and girls are reported to be badly behaved at school at 16, respectively 
by 12 and 10 percentage points. For girls, repeated spells of unemployment (as 
measured here) are associated with further increases in this probability, by about 20 
percentage points. 7-year-old boys and 11- and 16-year-old girls who have a mother 
who does not work and lives in couple are less likely to be reported at 16. 
Boys whose father suffered from unemployment repeatedly are more likely to 
be in contact with the police, by 10 percentage points. This is also the case for girls 
whose father experienced some unemployment (the change in probability is only of 2 
percentage points), but repeated spells of father's unemployment do not have 
additional effects. 7-year-old boys whose mother does not work and lives in couple 
are less likely to have had contacts with the police at 16, while II -year-old girls who 
have a working mother are more likely to have at 16. 
From the panel data analysis, parental unemployment does not increase the 
probability of referral to a social agency. On the contrary, boys who have their mother 
at home are less likely to be referred. From the cross-section analysis, father's 
unemployment is associated with a higher probability of future referral, repeated 
spells have an additional effect for boys only. This may show that spells of father's 
unemployment have effects in the longer term. It seems that in a two-adult household, 
having a mother who works is somewhat associated to a higher probability of referral 
at 16 years old, especially if this occurs when the child is younger. 
The marital and labour market status of the mother appears to have a complex 
relationship with children's outcomes. Overall, the results seem to indicate that those 
who, at a young age, had a non-working mother living in couple are better off 
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compared to others. These results are consistent with the idea that mother's 
employment is associated with detrimental outcomes. With our data, it was not 
possible to point out the reasons for this association. We lack information such as the 
detailed timing of maternal employment, the number of hours worked, or child care 
arrangements. 
There is some evidence that having no father or male head at 16 years old is 
detrimental in particular for boys, being associated with a higher probability of 
occurrence of most bad outcomes. For girls, it appears that living with a lone working 
mother at 11 is somewhat beneficial. This is consistent with findings that pre- 
adolescent girls have close relationship with their mother (Hetherington at al, 1998). 
Other notable results show that characteristics at birth (such as the age of the 
mother) and at a young age (such as sociability as measured by the time children take 
to settle in class) are indicative of later outcomes in life. This could be worrying, but it 
also appears that parental inputs, such as their ambition for their children or their 
interest shown through them visiting the teachers, are overall associated with 
improved outcomes. This is true although we find some evidence in the panel data 
analysis that parental ambition can have a perverse effect on parents-child 
relationships. The school variables, such as the teacher-pupils ratio or the number of 
expelled pupils do not seem to be statistically significant in influencing children's 
outcomes. We can tentatively infer that it would be more appropriate to try to improve 
children's outcomes through their parents rather than at school. Such measures as 
meeting with the parents and making them aware of what they need to do to help 
(such as parenting classes) and support their children could be particularly beneficial. 
Family structure also appears to matter. In particular single parent and broken 
families seem to be associated with worse outcomes. This is particularly worrying 
since government intervention is not meant to 
dictate people's way of living. Again, 
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our results suggest that giving incentives and help to parents to support their children 
(or step-children) could be a way of alleviating these negative effects. 
The environment in which the children live is also a factor in their outcomes. 
No precise conclusions can be drawn here because of data availability and this was 
not the main focus of this chapter. We find evidence consistent with the idea that 
children in less favoured areas have worse outcomes. 
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Table 4.1a: Proportion of boys facing problems at 16, by past family difficulties 
Antisocial 
behaviour at 16 
(reported by 
parents) 
Extreme 
antisocial 
behaviour at 16 
(reported by 
parents) 
Antisocial 
behaviour at 
16 (reported 
by school) 
Referred 
at 16 
Unemployment difficulties (at 7) 70.8 28.6 69.6 38.8 
No unemployment difficulties 
............................... I-....................... . ............. .......... ............................ 
50.1 
........... ............ 
7.2 39.2 14 
Unemployment difficulties (at ......... . ........ 60.9 ..... ................................................ ............... 16.3 .................................. ..................................... 65.4 ....... ...................................... 28.7 
No unemployment difficulties 
................. ....................... ..................... I ................... ..................................................... 
50.3 
................................. .......... ............... ... . . 
7.9 38.2 13.3 
Financial difficulties (at 7) . . .......... 66.7 ........................................ - .............. 21.5 ........................................................... ....... 64.2 ............................................... 34 
No financial difficulties (at 7) 
...... .............. ........................... . ................ ............... .............................................. 
49.5 
. .................... ... .. 
6.8 38.4 13.4 
Financial difficulties (at 11) . ..... 66.1 .................. ..................................................... 18.4 - ....................... - ............ I ................................ 59 ................................. ... 29.6 
No financial difficulties (at 11) 
....... ......... ............. . ...... . ............................. . ........................................................... - .......... 
48.7 
... . ................ .............. .............. - 
6.9 37.7 12.8 
Male head unemployed or sick 64.6 ................. .................. ............................................ 23.6 .......................................................................... 73.7 .............................................. 37.4 
Male head not unemployed nor 
......... ...................... ......... ..... ........... ............... - ................ . ... ........................ 
50.4 
........... ............ .. -. - ................. ........... .. . 
7.4 39.2 14.2 
Male head unemployed or sick . ...... 64.6 .................................................................................. 23.6 ... .................................... ..... . ................... I. 64.8 ...................... ........................ 35.1 
Male head not unemployed nor 
--------- . ................ ........ ................. ............... - ... . ......... . ....................... . ...... . ........ 
50 
................ . .... . .................. .............................. . 
7.6 39 14 
Mother works when child is 7 ... 52.6 ........... . ..................................................... 7.8 ............. ...................... . ....... . ............. ........ 44.5 ......................... ........... ....... 16.9 
Mother does not work when 
............. .... ....... . .... ........... .... ................ . .......... . ........... ............ ................ 
48.6 
....... ........ ....... .......................... .. . . 
7.8 35.9 12.6 
Mother works when child is 11 . . ....... .......... 52.2 I ..................... . ................................ . ....................... 8 .................................... . ....................... ............ 41.1 .......... ............ . ............... ...... 14.8 
Mother does not work when 47.8 8.2 37.6 14.5 
Table 4.1b: Proportion of girls facing problems at 16, by past family difficulties 
Antisocial 
behaviour at 
16 (reported 
by parents) 
Extreme 
antisocial 
behaviour at 16 
(reported by 
parents) 
Antisocial 
behaviour at 
16 (reported 
by school) 
Referred 
at 16 
Unemployment difficulties (at 7) 67.9 20.1 61 28.8 
No unemployment difficulties (at 7) 
....... .... .... ............. ........... 
51.8 
...................... . .......... ..... 
7.4 
..................... * ................... .......... 
32.3 
................. . ...... * ... . ...... . ............. .. 
8.9 
.. Unemployment difficulties (at 11) 70.1 18.2 .. 56.9 . 19.8 
No unemployment difficulties (at 11) 
. .... ............................ ...... .... 
50.8 
* ..... ...... 
6.9 
- --- -- ---------- **.......... 
31.5 
............. * **"* ..... ....... .. 
8.4 
... ........ - Financial difficulties (at 7) ----- . . . 63.6 15.3 56.9 -, --**, --""", *"* 24.6 
No financial difficulties (at 7) 
. .... ........... .. ... .. .. . 
51.4 
........ . .... . ................... . .... ................ . ..... 
7.3 
...... . ........ .......... . ....... .................... ............... .... 
31.4 
.................................................... . .... ............... 
8.3 
.............................. . .............. ...... .... . ................ .......................... ................. ..................... .. .. . . . . . ... Financial difficulties (at 11) .. .. 65.4 18.7 52.9 21.1 
No financial difficulties (at 11) 50.2 
.............. ........... . ... . ................. . . .. .. 
6.2 
............. . ............................................................... 
31 
................................... ...................................... 
7.9 
.............................................. ....... . ........................ . ........ . ....... . ..... ..................... . ................. . ......................... ....... .............. Male head unemployed or sick (at 7) ... ........... ... . . 63.5 14.4 58.7 25.7 
Male head not unemployed nor sick 52 
...... ..................... . .. . .. . 
7.7 
........... . ................................................................ 
32.5 
............................................ . ............... . ............ 
9.1 
.............................................. ........................... ...... .......... ............................... .......... . ............................................. ...... Male head unemployed or sick (at ..... ............................ ... . . . 67.8 18.1 58.2 24 
Male head not unemployed nor sick 51.5 
. . . . ... . 
7.2 
. .... .. .................................. I ................... 
32.8 
................... . .... . ....... ..................... ... 
9 
............. ............................ ........ ......... ......... .................. ............ .............. -. - ............ I ....... . ..................... . .... --- ----- .... Mother works when child is 7 
..... .................. . ........................... . . ... .. . .. 54.5 . . . 8.8 37.4 10.3 
Mother does not work when child is 
............ I ................ . .... . ............. 
50.5 
... ..................................... . ............................... 
6.9 
............ . ...... ................................ . ..... ........... 
28.7 
..................................... .................................... 
8.6 
...................................... . ...... ............................. . ............... ................................... . .......... Mother works when child is 11 53.4 7.5 35.2 9.2 
Mother does not work when child is 49.2 7.6 30.4 10 
Note to tables 4.1 a and 4.1 b: 
(1) Pearson X2 statistical tests were carried out to check the significance of the relationships. Numbers 
in bold and italics indicate that the relationship is significant at the 1% level, numbers in bold only 
indicate that it is significant at the 5% level, while underlined numbers indicate that it is significant 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.2a: Conditional logit estimations for boys 
Bad behaviour Extreme bad 
behaviour 
Referred to a social 
agen y 
Coeff. Odds Coeff. Odds Coeff. Odds 
ratio ratio ratio Parental labour market situation No father unemployment + mother works Base 
No father unemployment + mother does not work 0.633** 1.884 0.674** 1.961 -0.225** 0.798 (0.074) (0-066) (0.113) Father unemployment + mother works 1.039** 2.826 0.121 1.129 -0.418 0.658 (0.301) (0.208) (0.296) Father unemployment + mother does not work 0.736** 2.087 0.562** 1.754 -0.658** 0.518 (0.291) (0.221) (0.279) Family has financial difficulties 0.115 1.122 -0.025 0.976 0.206 1.228 
(0.144) (0.111) (0.158) 
Father's occupation 
Manual father or male head Base 
Non-manual father or male head -0.101 0.904 -0.292** 0.746 -0-00006 1.000 (0.143) (0-127) (0.211) 
Professional (intermediate group) father or male head -0.504** 0.604 -0-673** 0.510 0.012 1.013 
(0-131) (0-118) (0.204) 
No father or male head 0.311 1.365 0.667** 1.948 0.524 1.689 
(0.374) (0.299) (0.434) 
Family structure 
No natural parents Base 
One natural parent 0.728 2.070 1.255 3.507 0.181 1.198 
(1.211) (1.141) (1.028) 
Both natural parents 2.724** 15.247 3.576** 35.731 -1.870* 0.154 
(1.181) (1.122) (0.959) 
Number of children 0.503** 1.654 0.365** 1.441 -0.329** 0.719 
(0.043) (0-037) (0-058) 
Parents' housing tenure 
Parents have accommodation tied to occupation or Base 
other situation 
Parents are public tenants -0.104 0.901 -0.600** 0.549 1.000** 2.718 
(0.214) (0.184) (0-342) 
Parents are private tenants 0.331 1.393 0.275 1.317 0.435 1.545 
(0.222) (0.195) (0.353) 
Parents are owners or buying -0.949** 0.387 -1.216** 0.296 1.292** 3.638 
(0.215) (0.191) (0-360) 
Parents' ambition 
Have ambition 1.034** 2.812 1.076** 2.934 -1 . 016** 0.362 (0.080) (0.070) (0.110) 
School 
School is maintained by a Local Education Authority 1.140** 3.127 0.928** 2.530 -0-031 0.970 
(0.209) (0.196) (0-360) 
Region 
Scotland Base 
North western -0.385 0.681 -0.424 0.655 0.392 1.479 
(0.696) (0.635) (2.258) 
Northern 0.055 1.056 -0.200 0.819 -0-332 0.717 
(0.705) (0.554) (2.077) 
East and west Riding 1.033 2.809 0.143 1.154 0.080 1.084 
(0.723) (0.627) (2.152) 
North Midlands 0.653 1.920 -0.057 0.945 -0.496 0.609 
(0.705) (0.610) (1.702) 
Eastern -0.262 0.769 -0.496 0.609 0.413 1.512 
(0.654) (0.586) (1.779) 
London and South eastern -0.448 0.639 -0.197 0.821 0.044 1.045 
(0.625) (0.594) (1.770) 
Southern -1.283* 0.277 -1.607** 0.200 0.928 2.530 
(0.689) (0.632) (1.865) 
South West -1.517** 0.219 - 1.182* 0.307 -0.050 0.951 
(0.704) (0.635) (1.845) 
Midlands -0.128 0.880 -0.804 0.448 -0.874 0.417 
(0.695) (0.647) (1.730) 
Wales -0.279 0.756 0.064 1.066 0.435 1.545 
(0.833) (0.889) (1.982) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1630 0.1569 0.1537 
Observations 6547 8498 2799 
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Notes to tables 4.2a (and 4.3a): 
(1) Standard errors in parentheses. 
(2) The models are estimated using unbalanced panels which count a maximum of three observations C, 
per individual. 
(3) "Bad" social behaviour (in each sweep) is equal to I if the child is found to have shown (often 
and/or sometimes) any of the following behaviours: irritable, fighting with others, destructive with his 
own and others' belongings, disobedient. It is equal to 0 if the child never shows any of these z: 1 
characteristics. "Extremely bad" social behaviour is equal to I if the child is found to have (often 
and/or sometimes) shown at least half of the behaviours just mentioned. It is equal to 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4.2b: Random effects probit for boys. 
Bad behaviour Extreme bad 
behaviour 
Referred to a 
social agency 
Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. 
Parental labour market situation 
No father unemployment + mother works 
No father unemployment + mother does not work 0.194** 5.878 0.19 1 ** 7.060 -0.148** -3-033 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.041) 
Father unemployment + mother works 0.497** 13,459 0.079 2.867 -0.330** -6.236 
(0.155) (0.114) (0.149) 
Father unemployment + mother does not work 0.138 4.253 0.223** 8.266 -0.064 -1-364 
(0.131) (0.106) (0-131) 
Family has financial difficulties 0.151** 4.418 0.105** 4.000 0.319** 7.452 
(0.062) (0.052) (0.069) 
Father's occupation 
Manual father or male head 
Non-manual father or male head -0.099 -3.042 -0.08 1* -2.972 -0.204** -3-954 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.068) 
Professional (intermediate group) father or male head -0.120 -3.705 -0.183 ** -6.633 -0-084 -1-732 
(0-042) (0.040) (0.063) 
No father or male head -0.159 -4.967 0.033 1.239 0.592** 15-808 
(0.117) (0.111) (0.153) 
Family structure 
Child does not live with natural parents 
Child lives with one natural parent -0.197 -6.005 -0.175 -6.223 -0.417** -12.253 
(0.143) (0.129) (0.172) 
Child lives with both natural parents -0.088 -2.594 0.013 0.468 -0.718** -19.209 
(0.124) (0.110) (0.142) 
Number of children 0.107** 3.257 0.086** 3.150 0.031** 1.771 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) 
Parents' housing tenure 
Accommodation tied to occupation or other situation 
Public tenants 0.118* 3.546 -0.055 -2-051 0.070 1.368 
(0-070) (0.063) (0.093) 
Private tenants 0.238** 6.835 0.131* 5.003 0.081 1.592 
(0-084) (0.075) (0.108) 
Owners or buying -0.083 -2.656 -0.199** 7.326 0.135 2.703 
(0.069) (0.063) (0.094) 
Parents' ambition 
Have ambition 0.315** 9.987 0.329** 12.300 -0.738** -18.708 
(0-034) (0.032) (0.045) 
School 
School is maintained by a Local Authority 0.256** 8.337 0.186** 6.900 -0.074 -1.583 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.131) 
Region 
Scotland 
North western 0.102* 3.284 0.163** 5.794 -0.201** -4.243 
(0.062) (0.056) (0.082) 
Northern 0.187** 5.882 0.193** 6.896 -0.177** -3.791 
(0.066) (0.059) (0.087) 
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Table 4.2b (ctd. ) 
East and west Riding 0.14'** 4.569 0.202** 7.219 -0.054 -1.208 
(0.068) (0.061) (0.088) 
North Midlands 0.248** 7.676 0.216** 7.722 -0.144 -3.125 
(0.069) (0.062) (0.090) 
Eastern 0.247** 7.640 0.198** 7.070 -0.173** -3.708 
(0,065) (0.059) (0.087) 
London and South eastern 0.166** 5.267 0.233** 8.367 -0.231** -4.814 
(0.059) (0.053) (0.079) 
Southern 0.177** 5.578 0.194** 6.923 -0.158 -3.413 
(0.073) (0.066) (0.098) 
South West 0.101 3.250 0.186** 6.632 -0-081 -1.792 
(0.072) (0.066) (0.095) 
Midlands 0.188** 5.911 0.198** 7.074 -0.178** -3.798 
(0.063) (0.057) (0.083) 
Wales 0.178** 5.628 0.190** 6.760 0.095 2.270 
(0.075) (0.068) (0.097) 
Time-invariant characteristics 
Teenage mother 0.181** 5.271 0.189** 7.200 0.016 0.328 
(0.054) (0.046) (0.065) 
Mother left school at 16 or older -0.076* -2.361 -0.020 -0.700 -0.067 -1-366 
(0.042) (0.038) (0.061) 
Father left school at 16 or older -0.029 -0.890 -0.014 -0.520 -0.028 -0.584 
(0.045) (0.041) (0.066) 
Above average score (reading) -0.119 -3.482 -0.015 -0.560 -0.552** -14.141 
(0.091) (0.076) (0.095) 
Above average score (math) -0.110** -3.250 -0.084** -3.203 -0.288** -6.558 
(0.046) (0.040) (0.054) 
Quick to settle in class -0.079** -2.376 -0.134** -5.133 -0.256** -5.557 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.042) 
Emotional maladjustment 0.239** 6.762 0.254** 9.749 0.575** 14.704 
(0.070) (0.059) (0.079) 
Constant 0.023 -0.937** 1.170** 
(0.190) (0.173) (0.241) 
Rho (cross-period correlation) 0.141 0.090 0.157 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.033) 
LR test, rho =0 (X2(1)) 50.08 
24.43 22.60 
Pseudo R-squared 0.037 0.033 0.117 
Predicted probability 0.748 0.384 0.160 
Observations 11282 11282 8122 
Note: M. E are marginal effects; they are calculated as the difference between the average predicted 
probability when the dummy is equal to I and the average predicted probability when it is is equal to 
0. 
For categorical dummies, the other categories are set to 0. For continuous variables (number of children) 
the marginal effect is the average of the Standard Normal densities of the predicted values multiplied 
by 
the coefficient of the variable (see Arulampalam, 1999 and Arulampalam et al., 2000). 
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Table 4.3a: Conditional logit estimations for girls 
Bad behaviour Extreme bad 
behaviour 
Referred to a social 
age cy 
Coeff. Odds Coeff. Odds Coeff. Odds 
ratio ratio ratio Parental labour market situation 
No father unemployment + mother works Base 
No father unemployment + mother does not work 0.420** 1.523 0.699** 2.011 0.062 1.064 
(0.072) (0.073) (0.139) 
Father unemployment + mother works 0.645** 1.907 0.186 1.205 -0.466 0.628 
(0.290) (0.221) (0.323) 
Father unemployment + mother does not work 0.93)2" 2.540 0.347 1.415 -0.303 0.738 
(0.301) (0.239) (0.374) 
Family has financial difficulties -0.074 0.929 -0.061 0.941 0.190 1.209 
(0.129) (0-117) (0.177) 
Father's occupation 
Manual father or male head Base 
Non-manual father or male head 0.052 1.053 -0.247* 0.781 -0-078 0.925 
(0.134) (0.137) (0.284) 
Professional (intermediate group) father or male head -0.079 0.924 -0.707** 0.493 0.384 1.469 
(0.122) (0-131) (0.273) 
No father or male head 0.105 1.110 0.067 1.069 0.919* 2.508 
(0.252) (0.272) (0.547) 
Family structure 
No natural parents Base 
One natural parent -0.249 0.780 0.562 1.754 -1.101 0.333 
(0.567) (0.648) (0.889) 
Both natural parents 0.719 2.052 2.169** 8.746 -2-985** 0.051 
(0-591) (0.688) (0.958) 
Number of children 0.291 ** 1.338 0.251 ** 1.285 -0-323** 0.724 
(0-038) (0.038) (0.064) 
Parents' housing tenure 
Accommodation tied to occupation or other situation Base 
Public tenants 0.014 1.014 -0-443** 0.642 0.850* 2.341 
(0.207) (0.198) (0.377) 
Private tenants 0.279 1.321 0.326 1.385 0.451 1.569 
(0.218) (0.209) (0.388) 
Owners or buying -0.620** 0.538 -0.876** 0.417 0.551 1.735 
(0.210) (0.200) (0.386) 
Parents' ambition 
Have ambition 0.406** 1.501 0.653** 1.920 -0.763** 0.466 
(0.076) (0.073) (0.125) 
School 
School is maintained by a Local Education Authority 0.283 1.327 0.587** 1.799 -0.891 0.410 
(0-189) (0.223) (0-684) 
Region 
Scotland Base 
North western 0.536 1.709 -0.019 0.981 1.330 3.781 
(0.561) (0.548) (1.238) 
Northern 0.625 1.868 0.944 2.569 3.115** 22.542 
(0.568) (0.618) (1.579) 
East and west Riding 0.590 1.804 0.015 1.015 2.398 11.004 
(0.624) (0.583) (1.691) 
North Midlands 1.388** 4.008 0.532 1.702 1.028 2.796 
(0.624) (0.607) (1-318) 
Eastern 0.409 1.505 -0.191 0.827 2.388* 10.895 
(0-562) (0.590) (1.354) 
London and South eastern 0.537 1.711 -0.067 0.935 1.600 4.952 
(0.545) (0.544) (1.274) 
Southern 0.142 1.153 0.004 1.004 1.275 3.578 
(0.602) (0.575) (1.402) 
South West 0.156 1.169 0.277 1.319 1.690 5.417 
(0.704) (0.568) (1.478) 
Midlands 0.319 1.376 0.345 1.412 0.920 2.510 
(0.619) (0.563) (1.224) 
Wales 0.071 1.074 -0.561 0.570 0.366 1.442 
(0.781) 
- 
(0.739) (1.765) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0574 1 0.1011 1 0.1354 
Observations 6161 6541 
_ 
187 
Fseudo X-sqi 
Observations 
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Table 4.3b: Random effects probit for girls. 
Bad behaviour Extreme bad 
behaviour 
Referred to a 
social a), ency 
Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. 
Parental labour market situation 
No father unemployment + mother works 
No father unemployment + mother does not work 0.082** 2.705 0.183** 5.875 -0.069 -1.045 
(0.034) (0.032) (0.048) 
Father unemployment + mother works 0.301** 9.316 0.171 5.472 -0.161 -2.322 
(0.147) (0.121) (0.157) 
Father unemployment + mother does not work 0.430** 12.751 0.140 4.427 0.009 0.139 
(0.153) (0.118) (0.141) 
Family has financial difficulties 0.099 3.194 0.103* 3.348 0.240** 4.114 
(0.068) (0.060) (0.079) 
Father's occupation 
Manual father or male head 
Non-manual father or male head -0.062 -2.034 -0.027 -0.876 -0.065 -0.946 
(0.055) (0.050) (0.080) 
Professional (inter-mediate group) father or male head -0.178** -6.001 -0.234** -7.199 0.067 1.055 
(0.048) (0.046) (0.071) 
No father or male head -0.163 -5.468 -0.230* -7.089 0.311* 5.578 
(0.126) (0.125) (0.171) 
Family structure 
No natural parents 
One natural parent -0.316* -10.511 -0.024 -0.700 -0.166 -4.348 
(0.188) (0.174) (0.207) 
Both natural parents -0.125 -3.964 0.146 4.471 -0.681** -14.423 
(0.173) (0.159) (0.187) 
Number of children 0.088** 2.836 0.080** 2.607 0.031** 1.314 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
Parents' housing tenure 
Accommodation tied to occupation or other situation 
Public tenants 0.0001 0.002 -0.070 -2.359 0.168 2.483 
(0.080) (0.072) (0.108) 
Private tenants 0.184* 5.559 0.235** 8.423 0.084 1.177 
(0.096) (0.085) (0.127) 
Owners or buying -0.17 1 ** -5.747 -0.244** -7.805 0.069 
0.962 
(0.080) (0.072) (0.110) 
Parents' ambition 
Have ambition 0.142** 4.765 0.210** 6.463 -0.469** -8.272 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.051) 
School 
School is maintained by a Local Authority 0.319** 11.232 0.177** 
5.350 0.154 2.157 
(0.087) (0.090) (0.170) 
Region 
Scotland 
North western 0.192** 
6.269 0.074 2.411 0.160* 2.585 
(0.071) (0.062) (0.089) 
Northern 0.094 3.150 0.067 2.169 0.191** 
3.143 
(0.079) (0.069) (0.097) 
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Table 4.3b (ctd. ) 
East and west Riding 0.075 2.525 -0.015 -0.464 -0.025 -0.361 
(0.084) (0.074) (0.109) 
North Midlands 0.16 1 ** 5.296 -0.060 -1.870 0.039 0.585 
(0.082) (0.072) (0.103) 
Eastern 0.159** 5.241 0.078 2.543 -0.019 -0.283 
(0.080) (0.070) (0.104) 
London and South eastern 0.077 2.597 -0.009 -0.288 -0.125 -1.704 
(0.070) (0.062) (0.094) 
Southern 0.011 0.390 -0.010 -0.318 -0.064 -0.911 
(0.084) (0.075) (0.110) 
South West 0.044 1.503 0.022 0.706 -0.033 -0.483 
(0.085) (0.075) (0.112) 
Midlands -0.029 -0.994 -0.101 -3.121 0.077 1.181 
(0.076) (0.068) (0.096) 
Wales 0.044 1.489 -0.075 -2.318 0.150 2.411 
(0.093) (0-082) (0-115) 
Time-invariant characteristics 
Teenage mother 0.228** 7.143 0.127** 4.146 -0-050 -0.743 
(0.066) (0.054) (0.076) 
Mother left school at 16 or older -0.011 -. 0350 0.0002 0.007 -0-003 -0.039 
(0.049) (0.045) (0.068) 
Father left school at 16 or older -0.062 -2.067 -0.012 -0.369 -0.169** -2.417 
(0.053) (0.048) (0.077) 
Above average score (reading) -0-093** -3.055 -0.130** -4.207 -0.33 1 ** -5.338 
(0.043) (0-037) (0.052) 
Above average score (math) 0.017 -0.554 -0.040 -1.267 -0.250** -3.860 
(0.039) (0.034) (0.049) 
Quick to settle in class -0.013 -0.415 -0.081** -2.587 -0.136** -2.150 
(0.042) (0-037) (0.051) 
Emotional maladjustment 0.417** 12.212 0.341** 11.714 0.456** 8.749 
(0.101) (0.079) (0-098) 
Constant 0.064 -1.074** -0.314 
(0.219) (0.205) (0.285) 
Rho (cross-penod correlation) 0.336** 0.204 0.170 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.041) 
LR test, rho =0 (X2(1)) 332.87 107.43 17.88 
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.033 0.098 
Predicted probability 0.706 0.274 0.099 
Observations 10823 10823 7565 
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Table 4.4a: Percentage of boys facing various outcomes according to their family 
background (whole sample). 
Has been in Referred Bad Extreme Bad 
contact with to a social behaviour bad behaviour 
the police agency (reported behaviour (reported 
by (reported by school) 
parents) by parents) 
Father unemployed or sick 32.5 32.6 58.3 18.6 57.9 
Father not unemployed nor sick 
I ........................ ....... ........ ......... . ....................... .......................... 
15.6 
............................................... - 
14 
.-.............................. . ....... .......... 
49.9 
......... ....... ....... 
7.4 38.4 
Financial difficulties 31.9 34.8 . - ........................... 69.6 ...................................... I ................. 21.3 ............ ............................. .............. 60.4 
No financial difficulties 
... . ..... .................... . ........ . ................................................................. . ............................ 
14.5 
......... ........... ............. . 
12.5 
..... -- ............................. - ............... 
48.0 
..................... .- 
6.4 36.9 
Unemployment difficulties 35.6 27.8 . ............... 58.4 ......................................................... 18.8 .............. . .... . ..... ............................. 54.7 
No unemployment difficulties 
I ........ ........... ........... ................. ............ . ....... . .............................. .. 
16.0 
- ....................... ..................... .......... -- 
14.5 
................ ......................... . ......... 
50.1 
.............................. ... . . 
7.7 38.9 
Mother works 15.6 13.3 . ........ . ....... 49.6 ......................................................... 6.7 ...... ...................... -- .............. .. 38.1 
Mother does not work 
-. - ...................... .... .... . ......... --- ---- . ..................... ............... . ...... . ............................ 
17.8 
................. ............................................. 
17.3 
....... - ........................... .. 
51.4 
....... . ...... ....... . ......................... 
10.1 
....... . ..... ... .. 
41.1 
No male head 26.1 31.6 61.4 . . ................................. . . 12.4 ............................................ . ........... 55.6 
_Male 
head 15.6 13.4 49.5 7.6 38 
_ 
Table 4.4b: Percentage of girls facing various outcomes according to their family 
background (whole sample) 
Has been 
in contact 
with the 
police 
Referred 
to a social 
agency 
Bad 
behaviour 
(reported 
by parents) 
Extreme bad 
behaviour 
(reported by 
parents) 
Bad 
behaviour 
(reported by 
school) 
Father unemployed or sick 9.4 25.2 62.9 17.5 53.1 
Father not unemployed nor 5.8 8.7 51.8 7.5 31.2 
sick 
.......... ... ............ ....... . ............ . ... ... ..................... . ....... ....................... ......................................................... .... . ... .................................................... ......... ........... . ......... ........ ............. _.. _ . ---- -- ------------- -------- ... .......... ........... Financial difficulties 12.4 25.6 70.6 19.7 51.5 
No financial difficulties 5.2 
......... ......... .......... 
7.6 
............ .... .................... 
50.2 
............ . ............................... . ... . ..... 
6.7 
........... . ...... . .......... . ...................... ..... 
29.9 
............. . ..... ................... . ...... . ........... ..... ..... .................................. Unemployment difficulties ... ....... 14.6 31.1 74.3 23.8 67.4 
No unemployment difficulties 
-- ---- - ------- . ......... -- -- - 
5.8 
----------- ---- I ......... ......... ........ ........ 
9.1 
...... .... . ..................... . ... 
51.9 
............. ........... . ........................ 
7.7 
....... ....... . ...................................... . .... 
31.5 
.............. . ................ . ...... . ... ......... ... Mother works 5.9 8.3 52.6 7.3 31.9 
Mother does not work 5.7 ... ............ . .... . 
10.9 51.8 
..................................... 
9.4 
........................................... . ... ........ . .... 
32.1 
................. ............................... . .......... . ........ ........................... . ... No male head .......... . .... . .. .. 7.6 18.8 57.3 11.1 43.9 
Male head 5.7 8.5 51.8 7.6 31 
Notes to tables 4.4a and 4.4b: 
(2) Pearson X2 statistical tests were carried out to check the significance of the relationships. Numbers 
in bold and italics indicate that the relationship is significant at the 1% level, in numbers bold only 
indicate that it is significant at the 5% level, while underlined numbers indicate that it is significant 
at the 10% level. 
(3) All variables are measured when the child is sixteen years of age. 
(4) The numbers represent the proportion of children facing a particular outcome according to their 
family background. For example, 9.4% of girls with a father unemployed or sick have been in 
contact with the police. 
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Table 4.5a: Cross-section (probit) estimations for boys. Part 1. 
Bad behaviour 
(reported by parents) 
Extreme bad 
behaviour 
b parents) 
Bad behaviour 
(reported by school) 
Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. 
Father's unemployment 
No experience of unemployment 
Possible experience of unemployment -0.017 -0.664 -0.263* -2.251 -0.059 -2.186 (0.085) (0.142) (0.095) 
Some experience of unemployment 0.053 2.115 -0-018 -0.184 0.315** 12.178 
(0-097) (0.140) (0.100) 
Repeated experiences of unemployment 0.131 5.199 -0.016 -0.164 0.258 9.976 
(0.210) (0.243) (0.235) 
Mother's employment 
Working mother in couple (7) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) -0.054 -2.170 -0.064 -0.649 -0.147** -5.512 
(0.058) (0.088) (0-061) 
Lone working mother (7) 0.138 5.501 0.423 5.929 0.199 7.668 
(0.290) (0.333) (0.284) 
Lone non-working mother (7) -0.415 -1.610 0.007 0.074 0.520 20-391 
(0.454) (0.514) (0.466) 
Working mother in couple (11) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) zn -0.182** -7.251 -0.086 -0.853 -0.053 -1.982 
(0.061) (0.092) (0-066) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.297 -1-170 -0.294 -2.342 0.024 0.887 
(0.272) (0.340) (0.277) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.092 -3-675 -0.865** -4-358 -0-108 -3.948 
(0-337) (0.415) (0.324) 
Workin t, mother 
in couple (16) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.047 1.885 0.086 0.896 0.012 0.442 
(0.063) (0.091) (0.066) 
Lone working mother (16) 0.011 0.433 0.130 1.449 0.255 9.864 
(0.208) (0.249) (0.213) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 4D 0.141 5.608 0465 6.714 0.293 11.382 
(0.258) (0.303) (0.281) 
Financial difficulties 
No financial difficulties 
Possible financial difficulties -0.013 -0.519 0.342 4.530 0.568** 22.267 
(0.252) (0.310) (0.249) 
Some financial difficulties 0.146* 5.806 0.074 0.787 0.209** 8.005 
(0.084) (0.122) (0-089) 
Repeated financial difficulties 0.185 7.328 0.549** 8.234 -0.014 -5.246 
(0.152) (0.171) (0.153) 
Personal characteristics 
Quick to settle in class -0.111 -4.421 -0.060 -2.267 
(0.057) (0.060) 
Above average score (math) -0.240** -9.523 -0.060 -2.260 
(0.079) (0.083) 
Above average score (reading) 0.313** 0.123 0.569** 3.684 -0.204 -7.836 
(0.163) (0.244) (0.161) 
Emotional maladjustment 0.295** 1.161 0.455** 6.383 1.42E-5 0.0005 
(0.123) (0.150) (0.125) 
Child has been in care 0.293 0.116 0.717** 12.225 0.146 5.570 
(0.182) (0.191) (0-180) 
Reported once above average knowledge -0.142** -5.666 -0.165 -6.065 
(0.067) (0.071) 
Reported twice above average knowledge -0.170** -6.767 -0.296** -10.620 
(0.080) (0-087) 
Help in school 0.321 12.604 0.456** 6.567 0.148** 5.657 
(0.246) (0.247) (0.263) 
Familysocial characteristics 
Number of moves since the child's birth 0.043** 1.714 0.029 0.293 -0.001 -0.024 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) 
No natural parents 
Broken farnily -0.347 -13.638 -0.199 -1.755 -0.120 -4.382 
(0.302) (0.363) (0.292) 
170 
Table 4.5a (ctd. ) 
Int tf il ac am y -0.512* -19.804 -0.478 -6.556 -0.411 -15-975 
' 
(0.275) (0.322) (0.263) Parents initiative once 0.003 0.116 0.170 1.784 -0.064 -2.375 
' 
(0.070) (0.106) (0-073) Parents initiative twice 
-0.043 -1.722 -0.049 -0.493 -0.101 -3.760 
' 
(0.074) (0.118) (0.076) Parents ambition 1 -0.122 -4.857 -0.125 -1.364 0.081 0.300 
(0.078) (0.108) (0.082) Parents' ambition -0.031 -1.245 -0.059 -0.609 -0.009 -0.348 
' 
(0.069) (0.098) (0-073) 
Parents ambition 3 -0.182** -7.268 -0.222** -2.307 -0-446** -16.755 (0.060) (0.091) (0-063) 
Parents were never owners in three sweeps 
Parents were owners once in three sweeps -0.073 -2.923 -0.231 -1.985 -0-086 -3.160 (0.102) (0.158) (0.107) 
Parents were owners twice in three sweeps -0.092 -3.649 -0.273 -2.279 0.013 0.501 
(0.103) (0.170) (0.108) 
Parents were owners three times in three sweeps -0.111** -4.438 -0.158 -1.555 -0.179** -6.644 (0.065) (0-103) (0.069) 
Number of children 0.085** 3.372 0.147** 1.485 0.090** 3.383 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.021) 
Teenage mother 0.070 2.790 0.160** 1.795 0.211 ** 8.078 
(0.092) (0.124) (0.098) 
Mother left school at 16 or older -0.170** -6.750 -0-117 -1.121 -0.030 -1.111 (0.074) (0.127) (0.079) 
Father left school at 16 or older 0.134* 5.322 0.0004 0.004 0.001 0.052 
(0.076) (0.131) (0.082) 
School and regions when child is 16 
Teacher/pupils ratio (%) 0.035 1.386 0.037 0.369 -0.016 -0.606 
(0.024) (0.031) (0.029) 
Pupils expelled -0.120* -4.794 0.019 0.190 0.062 2.294 
(0.070) (0.110) (0.075) 
Lives in North Western region -0.137 -5.448 -0.179 -6.491 
(0.114) (0.124) 
Lives in Nor-them region 0.027 1.081 0.073 0.773 0.205 7.845 
(0.115) (0.153) (0.122) 
Lives in East and West Riding region 0.020 0.791 -0.178 -1.586 -0.077* -2.853 
(0.121) (0.190) (0.128) 
Lives in North Midlands region 0.185 7.352 0.340** 4.355 0.022 0.822 
(0.121) (0.148) (0.129) 
Lives in Eastern region 0.158 6.302 -0.094 -0.888 -0.019 -0.723 
(0.111) (0.163) (0.119) 
Lives in London or South Eastern region 0.059 2.342 0.361 ** 4.529 0.011 0.416 
(0.102) (0.120) (0.109) 
Lives in Southern region -0.077 -3.068 0.030 1.144 
(0.124) (0.134) 
Lives in South West region -0.147 -5.847 0.252 3.043 0.005 0.184 
(0.124) (0.162) (0.132) 
Lives in Midlands region 0.100 3.967 0.037 1.377 
(0.111) (0.118) 
Lives in Wales 0.002 0.783 0.106 1.158 -0.035 -1.303 
(0.128) (0.190) (0.135) 
Lives in Scotland 
Constant 0.440 -2.196** 0.547 
(0.386) (0.474) (0.395) 
Number of observations 2561 2592 2455 
Pseudo R square 0.0651 0.1614 0.1087 
RESET X2(l) = 5.81 E-6 X 
2(l) 
= 0.071 X 
2(j) 
= 0.147 
Heteroscedasti city X2 (50) = 55.832 X2 (43) = 56.760 X2 (50) = 55.386 
Normality X2 (2) = 1.821 X2 (2) = 1.826 X2 (2) = 1.114 
obs. P 0.498 0.072 0.372 
pred. P (at x-bar) 0.500 0.049 0.359 
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Table 4.5b: Cross-section (probit) estimations for boys. Part 11. 
No experience of unemployment 
Possible expenence of unemployment 
Some experience of unemployment 
Repeated experiences of unemployment 
Working mother in couple (7) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 
Lone working mother (7) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 
Working mother in couple (11) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) Z" 
Lone working mother (11) 4D 
Lone non-working mother (11) 
Working mother in couple (16) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 
Lone working mother (16) 
Lone non-working mother 0 6) 
No financial difficulties 
Possible financial difficulties 
Some financial difficulties 
Repeated financial difficulties 
No financial difficulties 
Some or repeated financial difficulties 
Quick to settle in class 
Above average score (math) 
Above average score (reading) 
Emotional maladjustment 
Child has been in care 
Reported once above average knowledge 
Reported twice above average knowledge 
Help in school 
Number moves since the child's birth 
No natural parents 
Broken family 
Father's unemployment 
Mother's employment 
Financial difficulties 
Personal characteristics 
Family social characteristics 
Contact with the 
police 
- eff. I M. E. 
Refeff ed to a social 
agency 
Coeff. I M. E. 
0.113 2.458 0.0002 -. 003 
(0.113) (0.114) 
0.055 1.161 0.182* 3.719 
(0.111) (0.103) 
0.404* 10.237 0.524** 12.897 
(0.208) (0.200) 
-0.219** -4.549 -0.193** -3.608 
(0.078) (0.072) 
0.391 9.868 0.376 8.634 
(0.288) (0.266) 
-0.146 -2.775 -0.609 -7.622 
(0.501) (0.440) 
-0.047 -0.965 -0.042 -0.771 
(0.083) (0.077) 
0.057 1.212 0.002 0.039 
(0.292) (0.285) 
0.072 1.561 0.557 14.001 
(0.352) (0.358) 
-0.045 -0.930 -0.042 -0.783 
(0.081) (0.077) 
0.254 5.985 0.426** 9.973 
(0.225) (0.214) 
0.303 7.339 0.555** 13.896 
(0.287) (0.265) 
-0.578 -7.422 
(0.446) 
0.109 2.126 
(0.091) 
0.419** 9.703 
(0.148) 
0.130 2.820 
(0.090) 
-0.170** -3.651 -0.162** -3.134 
(0.073) (0.068) 
-0.116 -2.521 -0.080 -1.541 
(0.091) (0.087) 
0.027 0.548 -0.196 -4.067 
(0.176) (0.158) 
0.097 2.102 0.074 1.445 
(0.143) (0.139) 
0.532** 14.210 0.635** 16.373 
(0.191) (0.173) 
-0.324** -6.049 -0.331 ** -5.529 
(0.098) (0.092) 
0.021 0.443 -0.255** -4.286 
(0.116) (0.114) 
0.076 1.650 0.503** 1.290 
(0.281) (0.221) 
-0.004 -0.079 -0.005 -0.093 
(0.022) (0.021) 
-0.089 -1.776 0.088 1.716 
(0.362) (0.335) 
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Table 4.5b (ctd. ) 
Intact family 
-0.286 -6.674 -0.155 -3.105 
(0.336) (0.314) 
Parents' initiative once -0.130 -2.650 -0.130 -2.370 
(0.084) (0.079) 
Parents' initiative twice 
-0.261 ** -5.234 -0.246** -4.459 
(0-093) (0.088) 
Parents' ambition 1 0.210** 3.991 0.088 1.584 
(0.098) (0.085) 
Parents' ambition 2 -0.100 -2.123 -0.156** -3.062 
(0.083) (0.078) 
Parents' ambition 3 -0.378** -0.801 -0.335** -6.443 
(0.078) (0,073) 
Parents were never owners In three interviews 
Parents were owners once in three interviews -0.041 -0.841 0.038 0.718 
(0.128) (0-116) 
Parents were owners twice in three interviews -0.059 -1.184 -0.079 -1.416 
(0.136) (0.125) 
Parents were owners three times in three interviews -0.028 -0.579 -0.154* -2.809 
(0.086) (0.083) 
Number of children 0.111 ** 2.306 0.096** 1.796 
(0.023) (0.022) 
Teenage mother 0.269** 6.272 0.203** 4.185 
(0.111) (0.103) 
Mother left school at 16 or older -0.094 -1.880 -0.196* -3.395 
(0.101) (0.101) 
Father left school at 16 or older -0.067 -1-349 -0.013 -0.245 
(0.110) (0-103) 
School and regions when child is 16 
Teacher/pupils ratio when -0.044 -0.909 
(0.032) 
Pupils expelled -0.108 -2.337 0.068 1.232 
(0.089) (0.088) 
Lives in North Western region -0.171 -3.264 0.109 2.138 
(0.146) (0.121) 
Lives in Northern region -0-005 -0.109 0.074 1.435 
(0.143) (0.124) 
Lives in East and West Riding region 0.041 0.859 0.371 ** 8.283 
(0.146) (0.120) 
Lives in North Midlands region -0.194 -3.639 0.057 1.085 
(0.152) (0.137) 
Lives in Eastern region -0.149 -2.883 0.177 3.603 
(0.147) (0.120) 
Lives in London or South Eastern region -0.202 -3.825 0.116 2.271 
(0.138) (0.113) 
Lives in Southern region -0.263 -4.758 
(0.173) 
Lives in South West region -0.203 -3.798 
(0.166) 
Lives in Midlands region -0.206 -3.877 0.183 3.720 
(0.144) (0.119) 
Lives in Wales -0.086 -1.696 0.162 3.286 
(0.167) (0.143) 
Lives in Scotland 
Constant -0.103 -0.536 
(0.455) (0.388) 
Number of observations 2317 2849 
Pseudo R square 0.1371 0.1968 
RESET X2(l) = 0.306 X 
2(j) 
= 0.674 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (48) = 61.829 X2 (47) = 62.005 
Normality X2 (2) = 0.816 j2(2) = 2.649 
obs. P 0.157 0.151 
_pred. 
P (at x-bar) 0.126 0.109 
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Table 4.6a: Cross-section (probit) estimations for girls. Part I. 
Bad behaviour 
(report db parents) 
Bad behaviour 
(repo ed y school) 
Coeff. M. Eý Coeff. M. E. 
Father's unemployment 
No experience of unemployment 
Possible experience of unemployment 0.088 3.507 0.139 4.879 
(0.084) (0.096) 
Some expefience of unemployment -0.073 -2.900 0.285** 10.326 
(0.092) (0.100) 
Repeated experiences of unemployment 0.311 12.123 0.522** 19.714 
(0.223) (0.230) 
Mother's employment 
Working mother in couple (7) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.047 1.882 -0.027 -0.908 
(0.057) (0.064) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.155 -6.155 0.241 8.706 
(0.216) (0.246) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.185 7.312 -0.017 -0.594 
(0.495) (0.607) 
Working mother in couple (11) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.130** -5.194 -0.154** -5.191 
(0.062) (0.069) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.256 -10.166 -0.702** -18.827 
(0.217) (0.260) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.068 -2.730 -0.197 -6.348 
(0.296) (0.326) 
Working mother in couple (16) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) -0.074 -2.963 -0.161 -5.405 
(0.061) (0.069) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.174 -6.911 0.125 4.410 
(0.184) (0.207) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.193 -7.671 0.177 6.334 
(0.231) (0.243) 
Financial difficulties 
No financial difficulties Base 
Possible financial difficulties 0.326 12.011 
(0.268) 
Some financial difficulties 0.331 ** 12.016 
(0.089) 
Repeated financial difficulties 0.314** 11.484 
(0.153) 
No or possible financial difficulties Base 
Some financial difficulties 0.232** 9.171 
(0.086) 
Repeated financial difficulties 0.321** 12.521 
(0.142) 
Personal characteristics 
Quick to settle in class 0.022 0.879 -0.055 -1.903 
(0.058) (0.065) 
Above average score (math) 0.076 
2.598 
(0.061) 
Above average score (reading) -0.005 -0.212 -0.121 
* -4.206 
(0.060) (0.067) 
Emotional maladjustment 0.465** 17.812 
0.082 2.881 
(0.134) (0.136) 
Child has been in care 
0.151 5.377 
(0.231) 
Reported once above average knowledge -0.095 -3.771 -0.215** -7.114 
(0.066) (0.077) 
Reported twice above average knowledge -0.097 -3.875 -0.058 -1.978 
(0.086) (0.100) 
Help in school 0.209 
8.226 0.727* 27.887 
(0.322) (0.408) 
Family social characteristics 
Number of moves since the child's birth 
0.023 0.781 
(0.019) 
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Table 4.6a (ctd) 
No natural parents 
Broken family 0.217 8.563 0.710 26.800 
Intact family 
(0,326) (0.451) 
0.072 2.879 0.494 14.818 
' 
(0.310) (0.438) Parents initiative once -0,032 -1.289 -0.100 -3.411 
' 
(0.068) (0.074) Parents initiative twice 
-0.100 -3.981 -0.206** -6.950 (0,071) (0.079) 
Parents' ambition 1 -0-030 -1.199 -0.002 -0.065 (0.071) (0.077) 
Parents' ambition 2 -0.142** -5.643 -0-069 -2.383 (0.065) (0.070) 
Parents' ambition 33 -0.116* -4.598 -0.329** -11.470 (0.059) (0-065) 
Parents were never owners in three sweeps 
Parents were owners once in three sweeps 0.105 4.171 -0.072 -2.435 (0.092) (0.106) 
Parents were owners twice in three sweeps 0.070 2.792 -0.062 -2.107 
(0.102) (0.116) 
Parents were owners three times in three sweeps -0.042 -1.663 -0.097 -3.306 (0.063) (0.072) 
Number of children 0.277** 11-052 0.035** 1.191 
(0.053) (0.020) 
Number of children squared -0.030** -1.190 
(0.007) 
Teenage mother 0.047 1.638 
(0.101) 
Mother left school at 16 or older 0.015 0.618 -0.100 -3-361 
(0-068) (0.080) 
Father left school at 16 or older -0.116* -4,633 0.012 0.404 
(0.071) (0.082) 
School and regions when child is 16 
Teacher/pupils ratio (%) 0.032 1.258 0.056* 1.924 
(0.027) (0.030) 
Pupils expelled 0.104 4.152 -0.005 -0.183 
(0.072) (0.083) 
Lives in North Western region 0.082 3.273 0.013 0.434 
(0.092) (0.116) 
Lives in Northern region 0.150 5.930 -0.016 -0.555 
(0.102) (0.126) 
Lives in East and West Riding region -0.061 -2.443 -0.053 -1.777 
(0.112) (0.142) 
Lives in North Midlands region 0.148 5.868 -0.041 -1.401 
(0-105) (0.129) 
Lives in Eastern region -0.102 -3.423 
(0.126) 
Lives in London or South Eastern region 0.108 4.300 0.027 0.924 
(0.086) (0-113) 
Lives in Southern region -0.017 -0.680 -0.022 -0.737 
(0.106) (0.135) 
Lives in South West region -0.002 -0.067 0.209 7.472 
(0.103) (0.128) 
Lives in Midlands region -0.050 -1.977 0.108 3.793 
(0.094) (0.117) 
Lives in Wales 0.073 2.914 0.164 5.824 
(0.121) (0.141) 
Lives in Scotland 
Constant -0.529 -0.959* 
(0.379) (0.492) 
Number of observations 2723 2487 
Pseudo R square 0.0441 0.0965 
RESET X 
2(l) 
= 2.612 X 
2(j) 
= 0.913 
Heteroscedasti city X2 (45) = 56.812 X2 (50) = 41-348 
Normality X2 (2) = 2.667 X2 (2) = 1.827 
obs. P 0.516 0.306 
pred. P (at x-bar) 0.517 0.290 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4.6b: Cross-section (probit) estimations for girls. Part 11. 
Contact wit the police Referred to a social agency 
Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. 
Father's uneniployinent 
No experience of unemployment 
Possible experience of unemployment 0.223* 2.238 0.002 0.0260 
(0.140) (0.135) 
Some experience of unemployment 0.226* 2.298 0.263** 3.568 
(0.134) (0.121) 
Repeated experiences of unemployment 0.463 5.850 0.210 2.822 
(0.261) (0.215) 
Mother's epnployment 
Working mother in couple (7) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) -0.078 -0.897 
(0.086) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.366 -3.162 
(0.285) 
Lone non-working mother (7) tý 0.539 9.181 
(0.574) 
Working mother in couple (11) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.035 -0.398 
(0.093) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.491 * -3.881 
(0.293) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.618 -4.363 
(0.391) 
Working mother in couple (16) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) -0.055 -0.622 
(0.090) 
Lone working mother (16) 0.040 0.478 
(0.240) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 0.158 2.049 
(0.267) 
Mother works (7) -0.089 -0.777 
(0.095) 
Mother works (11) 0.367* 2.953 
(0.111) 
Mother works (16) 0.130 1.083 
(0.107) 
No father or male head (7) -0.203 -1.488 
(0-388) 
No father or male head (11) -0.423 -2.607 
(0.346) 
No father or male head (16) 0.246 2.584 
(0.218) 
Financial difficulties 
No or possible financial difficulties 
Some financial difficulties 0.005 0.039 0.230** 3.029 
(0.134) (0.106) 
Repeated financial difficulties 0.117 1.119 0.567** 9.527 
(0.193) (0.159) 
Personal characteristics 
Quick to settle in class -0.063 -0.566 -0.010 -0.118 
(0.097) (0.086) 
Above average score (math) -0.142 -1.256 
(0.087) 
Above average score (reading) -0.216** -2.644 
(0.082) 
Emotional maladjustment 0.064 0.588 0.253 
3.476 
(0.208) (0.162) 
Child has been in care 0.022 
0.256 
(0.246) 
Reported once above average knowledge -0.045 -0.508 (0.112) 
Reported twice above average knowledge -0.199 -2.027 (0.166) 
Help in school 
0.858** 17.741 
(0.322) 
176 
Table 4.6b (ctd) 
Fainil-Y social characteristics 
Number of moves since the child's birth 0.025 0.218 -0.010 -0.111 
(0.026) (0.025) 
No natural parents 
Broken family 0.209 2.728 
(0.539) 
Intact family -0.272 -3.697 
(0.519) 
Parents' initiative once 0.012 0.143 
(0.093) 
Parents' initiative twice -0.038 -0.436 
(0.102) 
Parents' ambition 1 -0.090 -0.826 -0.080 -0.956 
(0.105) (0.094) 
Parents' ambition 2 0.084 0.702 0.113 1.241 
(0.103) (0.090) 
Parents' ambition 3 -0.306** -2.848 -0.264** -3.196 
(0.095) (0.082) 
Parents were never owners in three sweeps 
Parents were owners once in three sweeps -0.101 -1.082 
(0.134) 
Parents were owners twice in three sweeps 0.071 0.858 
(0.153) 
Parents were owners three times in three sweeps -0.238** -2.628 
(0.100) 
Number of children 0.032 0.281 0.059** 0.683 
(0.030) (0.026) 
Number of children squared 
Teenage mother 0.079 0.960 
(0.121) 
Mother left school at 16 or older -0.178 -1.890 
(0.125) 
Father left school at 16 or older -0.189 -1.495 -0.245* -2.525 
(0.134) (0.138) 
School and regions when child is 16 
Teacher/pupils ratio 0.091** 0.787 
(0.035) 
Pupils expelled -0.054 -0.488 -0.167* -2.105 
(0.122) (0.100) 
Lives in North Western region 0.070 0.836 
(0.126) 
Lives in Northern region 
Lives in East and West Riding region 0.217 2.883 
(0.153) 
Lives in North Midlands region 0.429** 5.089 0.408** 6.100 
(0.132) (0.131) 
Lives in Eastern region 0.123 1.525 (0.147) 
Lives in London or South Eastern region 0.245** 3.254 (0.121) 
Lives in Southern region 
Lives in South West region 
Lives in Midlands region 0.118 1.458 (0.129) 
Lives in Wales 
Lives in Scotland 
Constant -2.376** -0.950* 
(0.309) (0.550) 
Number of observations 2632 
2764 
Pseudo R square 0.0716 
0.1435 
RESET X 
2(l) 
= 0.183 X 
2(j) 
= 0.414 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (23) = 29.246 
X2 (43) = 54.092 
Normality )e(2) = 1.819 X2 (2) = 3.869 
obs. P 
0.051 0.084 
pred. P (at x-bar) 
0.040 0.057 
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Table 4.7a: Average predicted probabilities for boys. 
Bad behaviour Bad behaviour Contacts with Referral 
(parents) (school) police Base person 1 0.590 0.456 0.194 0.214 Base person I but father has had repeated 0.637 0.552 0.312 0.371 
experiences of unemployment 
Above situation + parents always wanted 0.513 0.413 0.231 0.246 
child to stay on at school 
Above situation + parents took twice the 0.497 0.377 0.164 0.183 
initiative to meet the teachers 
Base person 2 0.749 0.603 0.273 0.259 
Base person 2+ parents always wanted 0.637 0.464 0.197 0.159 
child to stay on at school 
Above situation + parents took twice the 0.622 0.426 0.137 0.113 
initiative to meet the teachers 
Base person 3 0.629 0.500 0.233 0.250 
Base person 3 but mother lives in couple 0.542 0.426 0.165 0.189 
and does not work when child is 7 and II 
Above situation but parents were interested 0.400 0.264 0.072 0.075 
in child's achievements 
Base person 3 but parents were interested 0.488 0.329 0.112 0.108 
in child's achievements 
IN otes: 
(1) Predicted probabilities are calculated for each individual and then averaged over all the Individuals. 
(2) Base person 1: father never unemployed, parents never wished the child to stay on at school, and never took the initiative to 
meet the teachers. All other variables at their actual values. 
(3) Base person 2: child is in a non-intact family, parents never wished the child to stay on at school, and never took the 
initiative to meet the teachers. All other variables at their actual values. 
(4) Base person 3: mother lives in couple and works when child is 7 and 11, parents were not interested in child's achievements 
(i. e. parents never wanted child to stay on at school and never took the initiative to meet the teachers). 
(5) Parents were interested in child's achievements means that they always wanted child to stay on at school and took twice the 
initiative to meet the teachers 
Table 4.7b: Average predicted probabilities for girls. 
Bad behaviour Bad behaviour Contacts with Referral 
(parents) (school) police 
(2) 
Base person 1 0.611 0.416 0.060 0.093 
Base person I but father has had repeated 0.720 0.612 0.134 0.128 
experiences of unemployment 
Above situation + parents always wanted 0.620 0.462 0.080 0.090 
child to stay on at school 
Above situation + parents took twice the 0.582 0.385 0.084 
initiative to meet the teachers 
Base person 2 0.590 0.284 0.141 
Base person 2+ parents always wanted 0.480 0.175 0.100 
child to stay on at school 
Above situation + parents took twice the 0.442 0.132 0.094 
initiative to meet the teachers 
Base person 3 0.627 0.466 0.113 
Base person 3 but mother lives in couple 0.596 0.399 0.095 
and does not work when child is 7 and II 
Above situation but parents were interested 0.447 0.205 0.061 
in child's achievements 
Base person 3 but parents were interested 0.479 0.256 0.073 
in child's achievements 
Notes: 
(1) See notes on table 4-7a. 
(2) For contacts with the police, base person I is the following: father never unemployed, parents never wished the child to stay 
on at school. All other variables at their actual values. 
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Table 4-8: Cross-section (probit) estimations with Local Authority variables for 
boys. 
Bad behavio r (parents) Bad behaviour (school) 
Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. 
Father's unemployment 
No experience of unemployment 
Possible experience of unemployment 0.222* 8.773 0.054 1.999 
(0.125) (0.141) 
Some expefience of unemployment 0.292** 11.483 0.149 5.619 
(0.139) (0.143) 
Repeated expefiences of unemployment 0.377 14.618 0.169 6.433 
(0.303) (0.320) 
Mother's employment 
Working mother in couple (7) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) -0.087 -3.464 0.057 2.110 
(0.085) (0.089) 
Lone working mother (7) ZIP 0.278 10.907 -0.337 -11.515 
(0.472) (0.443) 
Lone non-working mother (7) -0.192 -7.648 0.984 37.548 
(0.608) (0.643) 
Working mother in couple (11) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.158* -6.302 -0.149 -5.461 
(0.089) (0.096) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.761 ** -28.096 0.209 8.003 
(0.382) (0.371) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.389 15.061 -0.491 -15.997 
(0.534) (0.563) 
Working mother in couple (16) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) -0.079 -3-163 -0.051 -1.866 
(0.090) (0.097) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.497** -19.244 0.047 1.753 
(0.275) (0.278) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.107 -4.247 0.397 15.440 
(0.362) (0.361) 
Financial difi Jqculties 
No financial difficulties 
Possible financial difficulties 0.025 1.006 0.608* 23.780 
(0.349) (0-340) 
Some financial difficulties 0.025 1.015 0.318** 12.214 
(0.125) (0.134) 
Repeated financial difficulties 0.254 10.006 -0.069 -2.506 
(0.227) (0.222) 
Personal characteristics 
Quick to settle in class -0.174** -6.899 0.008 0.304 
(0.084) (0.089) 
Above average score (math) -0.243** -9.579 -0.136 -5.119 
(0.120) (0.122) 
Above average score (reading) 0.621 ** 23.594 -0.180 -6.851 
(0.229) (0.236) 
Emotional maladjustment 0.467** 17.943 0.158 6.012 
(0.183) (0.181) 
Child has been in care 0.146 5.588 0.093 3.517 
(0.259) (0.242) 
Reported once above average knowledge -0.086 -3.424 -0.207* -7.481 
(0.098) (0.106) 
Reported twice above average knowledge -0.203* -8.076 -0.152 -5.507 
(0.113) (0.122) 
Help in school 0.915** 31.704 
0.069 2.585 
(0.432) (0.402) 
Family social characteristics 
Number of moves since the child's birth 0.061 
2.439 -0.007 -0.247 
(0.025) (0.026) 
No natural parents 
Broken farnily -0-039 -1.554 0.225 8.558 
(0.440) (0.415) 
Intact family -0.162 -6.415 0.006 0.217 
(0.411) (0.382) 
Parents' initiative once -0-059 -2.334 -0.074 -2.716 
(0.101) (0.105) 
Parents' initiative twice 0.0004 0.014 -0.152 -5.611 
(0.107) (0.112) 1 
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Table 4.8 (ctd. ) 
Parents' ambition 1 -0.111 -4.416 0.113 4.115 
(0.113) (0-118) 
Parents' ambition 2 0.030 1.197 0.028 1.019 
(0.101) (0.107) 
Parents' ambition 3 -0.125 -4.971 -0.410** -15.314 
(0.087) (0-093) 
Parents were never owners in three sweeps 
Parents were owners once in three sweeps 0.042 1.678 0.046 1.705 
(0-135) (0.143) 
Parents were owners twice in three sweeps -0.164 -6.512 0.079 2.949 
(0.150) (0.157) 
Parents were owners three times in three sweeps -0-072 -2.872 -0.339** -12.326 
(0.099) (0.101) 
Number of children 0.099** 3.949 0.063** 2.316 
(0.029) (0.031) 
Teenage mother 4n 0.005 0.202 0.216 8.232 
(0.125) (0.134) 
Mother left school at 16 or older -0ý232** -9.248 -0.104 -3.796 
(0.106) (0.116) 
Father left school at 16 or older 0.054 2.143 -0.106 -3-892 
(0.108) (0.118) 
School and regions when child is 16 
Teacher/pupils ratio (%) 0.032 1.280 -0.074** -2.756 
(0-033) (0.040) 
Pupils expelled -0.232** -9.164 -0.046 -1.698 
(0.102) (0.110) 
Lives in North Western region 0.132 5.231 -0.024 -0-872 
(0.190) (0.172) 
Lives in Northern region -0.019 -0.775 0.312 11.988 
(0.166) (0.158) 
Lives in East and West Riding region 0.232 9.151 -0.018 -0.647 
(0.196) (0.181) 
Lives in North Midlands region 0.380* 14.801 0.140 5.301 
(0.216) (0.179) 
Lives in Eastern region 0.222 8.786 -0.002 -0.088 
(0-178) (0.159) 
Lives in London or South Eastern region 0.036 1.425 -0.071 -2.607 
(0.185) (0.166) 
Lives in Southern region 0.024 0.963 -0.021 -0.757 
(0.196) (0.179) 
Lives in South West region -0.046 -1.833 -0.001 -0-036 
(0-197) (0.165) 
Lives in Midlands region 0.152 6.045 0.184 6.980 
(0.187) (0.173) 
Lives in Wales 0.217 8.561 
(0.217) 
Lives in Scotland 
Local Authority characteristics 
Unemployment and sick rate above average -0.065 -2.604 
(0.099) 
Proportion of married women working above average 0.035 1.411 -0.128 -4.712 
(0.095) (0.093) 
Proportion of council tenants above average -0.065 -2.572 
(0.101) 
Proportion of new Commonwealth immigrants above average 0.040 1.607 0.147 5.510 
(0.104) (0.110) 
Proportion of non-manuals above average 0.054 2.161 0.185* 6.852 
(0.087) (0.090) 
Number of persons per room above average 0.148 5.890 
(0.111) 
Constant -0.282 0.495 
(0.574) (0.554) 
Number of observations 1277 1215 
Pseudo R square 0.0784 
X2(1) = 0.131 2 
0.1203 
X (1) = 0.009 RESET 
Heteroscedasticity )? (56) = 66.489 X2(56) = 64.226 
Normality X2 (2) = 4.639 X2 (2) = 4.600 
obs. P 
0.509 0.367 
r)red. P (at x-bar) 1 
0.513 1 0.350 
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Table 4.9: Cross-section (probit) estimations with Local Authority variables for 
girls. 
Bad behaviour 
(reported by arents) 
Bad behaviour 
(reported by school) 
Coeff. M. E. Coeff. M. E. 
Father's unemployment 
Possible experience of unemployment 0.146 5.808 0.049 1.702 
(0.101) (0.115) 
Some experience of unemployment 0.055 2.204 0.280** 10.219 
(0.115) (0.122) 
Repeated experiences of unemployment 0.637** 23.545 0.681 ** 26.136 
(0.282) (0.282) 
Mother's employment 
Non-working mother in couple (7) -0.053 -2.125 -0.054 -1.886 
(0.070) (0.076) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.692** -26.026 
(0.281) 
Lone non-working mother (7) -0.170 -6.775 
(0.550) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.146** -5.810 -0.200** -6,804 
(0.076) (0.084) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.166 -6.612 
(0.279) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.160 6.340 
(0.391) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) -0.015 -0.588 -0.145** -4.927 
(0.075) (0.084) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.261 -10.365 
(0.239) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.389 -15.282 
(0.296) 
Lone (working or not) mother works (7) -0.050 -1.697 
(0.294) 
Lone (working or not) mother works (11) -0.409 -12.538 
(0.279) 
Lone (working or not) mother works (16) 0.066 2.319 
(0.221) 
Financial difficulties 
Possible financial difficulties 0.234 8.559 
(0-346) 
Some financial difficulties 0.203* 8.030 0.289** 10.507 
(0.104) (0.106) 
Repeated financial difficulties 0.126 5.009 0.226 8.212 
(0.177) (0-187) 
Personal characteristics 
Quick to settle in class -0.002 -0.070 0.008 0.260 
(0-073) (0-079) 
Above average score (math) 0.143* 
4.906 
(0-074) 
Above average score (reading) 0.065 2.603 -0.128 -4.489 
(0.074) (0.082) 
Emotional maladjustment 0.607** 22.644 
0.151 5.409 
(0.174) (0-172) 
Child has been in care 0.055 
1.946 
(0.251) 
Reported once above average knowledge -0.181 -7.222 -0.267** -8.857 
(0.082) (0.094) 
Repoted twice above average knowledge -0.151 -6.022 -0.082 -2.792 
(0.104) (0.120) 
Help in school -0.047 -1.872 
0.964* 36.971 
(0.383) (0.512) 
Family social characteristics 
Number of moves since the child's birth 
0.027 0.939 
(0.022) 
No natural parents -0.852* -21.562 (0.514) 
Broken family 0.226 8.922 
0.241 8.752 
(0.358) (0-165) 
Intact family 0.008 
0.305 
(0.336) 
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Table 4.9 (ctd. ) 
Parents' initiative once -0.026 -1.054 -0-017 -0.600 
(0.084) (0.088) Parents' initiative twice 
-0.069 -2.731 -0.136 -4.657 
' 
(0.089) (0.095) Parents ambition 1 -0.005 -0.216 -0.045 -1.585 (0-087) (0.092) 
Parents' ambition -0.222** -8.781 -0.056 -1.944 (0.080) (0-086) 
Parents' ambition 3 -0.042 -1.673 -0.296** -10.409 (0-072) (0.078) 
Parents were owners once in three sweeps 0.141 5.598 -0.123 -4.159 (0-113) (0.127) 
Parents were owners twice in three sweeps 0.106 4.194 -0-140 -4.676 (0.128) (0.140) 
Parents were owners three times in three sweeps 0.001 0.029 -0.099 -3.414 (0.078) (0-084) 
Number of children 0.264** 10.509 0.039 1.347 
(0-065) (0.024) 
Number of children squared -0,029** -1.143 
(0.009) 
Teenage mother 0.077 2.717 
(0.119) 
Mother left school at 16 or older -0.067 -2.659 -0.095 -3.251 
(0.084) (0.094) 
Father left school at 16 or older 0.002 0.064 0.082 2.891 
(0.087) (0.096) 
School and regions when child is 16 
Teacher/pupils ratio -0-017 -0.665 0.017 0.590 
(0-031) (0.034) 
Pupils expelled 0-150* 5.977 0.012 0.403 
(0.088) (0.097) 
Lives in North Western region -0.007 -0.267 
(0.126) 
Lives in Northern region 0.024 0.940 
(0.127) 
Lives in East and West Riding region -0.177 -7.029 
(0.146) 
Lives in North Midlands region 0.103 4.099 
(0.143) 
Lives in London or South Eastern region -0.007 -0.268 
(0.123) 
Lives in Southern region 0.023 0.933 
(0-139) 
Lives in South West region 0.021 0.820 0.295** 10.820 
(0.136) (0.125) 
Lives in Midlands region -0.132 -5.243 
(0.129) 
Lives in Wales -0.115 -4.595 0.318** 11.723 
(OA61) (0.145) 
Local Authority characteristics 
Unemployment and sick rate above average 0.117 4.647 0.112 3.899 
(0.079) (0.075) 
Proportion of married women working above average -0.015 -0.612 -0.029 -1.008 
(0.076) (0.077) 
Proportion of council tenants above average 0.130 5.187 
(0.088) 
Proportion of new Commonwealth immigrants above average 0.008 0.332 0.172** 6.099 
(0.084) (0.086) 
Proportion of non-manuals above average 0.066 2.616 
(0.074) 
Number of persons per room above average -0.109 -4.362 
(0.091) 
Constant -0.240 -0.431 
(0.431) (0.271) 
Number of observations 1822 1694 
Pseudo R square 0.0516 0.101 
RESET X 
2(l) 
= 2.067 
2(l) 
= 3.596 
Heteroscedasticity X 
2(5 1) = 68.747 X2 (42) = 55ý503 
Normality X2 (2) = 3.446 X2 (2) = 4.348 
obs. P 0.517 0.315 
pred. P (at x-bar) 1 0.519 1 0.298 
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Appendix: Variables' definitions 
Panel estimations (variables are observed when the child is 7,11, and 16) 
Paper's denomination Base category Definition 
Bad behaviour (reported by the parents) Index of social behaviour in each sweep. It is equal 
to I if the child is found to have (often and/or 
sometimes) shown any of the following behaviours: 
irritable, fighting with others, destructive with his 
own and others' belongings, disobedient. It is equal 
to 0 if the child never shows any of these 
characteristics. 
Extreme bad behaviour (reported by the Index of social behaviour in each sweep. It is equal 
parents) to I if the child is found to have (often and/or 
sometimes) shown at least half of the following 
behaviours: irritable, fighting with others, 
destructive with his own and others' belongings, 
disobedient. It is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Referred It is equal to 0 if the child was not referred to an 
agency (because of difficulties which have affected 
their educational progress or behaviour) or to I if 
she/he was. List of agencies: 
Sweep 1: School health services, child guidance 
clinic, school psychological service, education 
welfare services or school attendance officer, 
children's department, private specialist. 
Sweep 2: Same as sweep I plus doctor and 
probation officer. 
Sweep 3: Social services or social work department 
(incl. children's department), educational welfare 
department, police or probation department, child 
guidance clinic. 
Parental labour market situation 
No father unemployment + mother does not No father Father unemployment: The family faces 
work unemployment + unemployment difficulties. Sweep 1: View of the 
Father unemployment + mother works mother works interviewer. Sweep 2 and 3: father or male head has 
Father unemployment + mother does not work been unemployed for more than 6 weeks over the 
past 12 months. 
Mother work: Sweep 1: Any paid work since child's 
birth (before and/or after the child started school). 
Sweep 2: Any paid work outside home since child 
was 7. Sweep 3: Does the mother do paid work? 
Family has financial difficulties Does not Sweep 1: View of the interviewer. Sweeps 2 and 3: 
Question to the parents (Have you had any financial 
difficulties over the past 12 months? ). 
Father's occupation 
Non-manual father or male head Manual father or Male head or father's occupation combined with 
Professional (intermediate group) father or male male head whether a male head is living in the 
household. 
head, No father or male head 
Family structure 
One natural parent, both natural parents No natural Does the child 
live with his/her own mother 
parents (father)? (Answers combined) 
Number of children 
Number of children aged less than 21 years old 
living in the household. 
Parents' housing tenure 
Public tenants Accommodation There are 
four types of tenure; "owned or being 
Private tenants tied to occupation bought", 
"privately rented", "rented from the public 
" 
Owners or buying or other situation . sector", and 
"rent free, tied to occupation, other 
Parents' ambition 
Have ambition 
Do not Do the parents want the child to stay on at school 
(i. e. have ambition)? 
Sweep 1: parents want child to stay on at secondary 
school when the child is 7 
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Sweep 2: parents want child to stay on longer at 
school when the child is II 
Sweep 3: parents want child to stay in some form of 
full time education beyond minimum leaving age 
when the child is 16. 
School 
School is maintained by a Local Authority Is not 
I 
Region 
Titne-invariant characteristics 
Teenage mother 
Mother (father) left school at 16 or older 
Above average score (reading) 
Above average score (math) 
Quick to settle in class 
Emotional maladjustment 
Asked to the headmaster of the school. 
Scotland LiVe in North western, Northern, East and west 
Riding, North Midlands, Eastern, London and South 
eastern, Southern, South West, Midlands, Wales. 
Older than 20 Mother younger than 20 at child's birth 
15 or younger Age father/father (mother) figure left full time 
education. 
Below average Scores from reading and arithmetic tests held when 
the child is 7. Marks go from 0 to 10 for arithmetics 
and from 0 to 30 for reading. Simple averages 
calculated for each sex. 
Not quick The child adapted to being in class within one 
month when they started school at 7 years old. 
Information obtained from the school. 
No Child reported by the medical officer to be 
emotionally maladjusted at 7. 
184 
Cross-section estimations 
Paper's denomination Base category Definition 
, Bad behaviour (reported by the parents) Index of social behaviour when the child is 
sixteen. It is equal to I if the child is found to 
have (often and/or sometimes) shown any of the 
following behaviours: irritable, fighting with 
others, destructive with his own and others' 
belongings, disobedient, ties, bullies other 
children. It is equal to 0 if the child never shows 
any of these characteristics. 
Extreme bad behaviour (reported by the Index of social behaviour when the child is 
parents) sixteen. It is equal to I if the child is found to 
have (often and/or sometimes) shown at least 
half of the following behaviours: irritable, 
fighting with others, destructive with his own and 
others' belongings, disobedient, lies, bullies other 
children. It is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Bad behaviour (reported by the school): Index of social behaviour when the child is 
sixteen. It is equal to I if the child is found to 
have (often and/or sometimes) shown any of the 
following behaviours: irritable, fighting with 
others, destructive with his own and others' 
belongings, disobedient, lies, bullies other 
children, truant from school, has stolen on one or 
more occasions in the past twelve months, 
resentful or aggressive when corrected. It is equal 
to 0 if the child never shows any of these 
characteristics. 
Referred It is equal to 0 if the child was not referred to an 
agency (because of difficulties which have 
affected their educational progress or behaviour) 
or to I if she/he was. List of agencies: 
Social services or social work department (incl. 
children's department), educational welfare 
department, police or probation department, child 
guidance clinic. 
Contacts with the police Has the child been in contact with the police? 
We 
combined the information obtained from the 
school and the parents. 
Father's unemployment 
Possible experience of unemployment No experience Based on same questions as in previous table. 
Some experience of unemployment of No experience of unemployment: 
father was 
Repeated experiences of unemployment unemployment never said to be unemployed 
Possible experience of unemployment: father was 
never said to be unemployed + missing responses 
Some experience of unemployment: father was 
said once to be unemployed 
Repeated experiences of unemployment: father 
was said twice to be unemployed + Missing 
responses 
Mother work 
Non-working mother in couple Working Based on same questions as above 
table, 
Lone working mother mother in combined with whether a male 
head lives in the 
Lone non-working mother couple 
household. Each variable is observed when child 
is 7,11, and 16 years old 
Financial difficulties 
Possible financial difficulties No financial Based on same questions as 
in previous table. 
Some financial difficulties difficulties No finanical 
difficulties: family never said that it 
Repeated financial difficulties 
had financial difficulties 
Possible financial difficulties: family never said 
that it had financial difficulties + missing 
responses 
Some financial difficulties: family said once that 
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it had financial difficulties 
Repeated financial difficulties: family said twice 
that it had financial difficulties + missing 
responses 
Personal characteristics 
Quick to settled in class No Same as in previous table Above average score (math) Below 
Above average score (reading) Below 
Emotional maladjustment No 
Child has been in care No Has the child ever been in care with a Local 
Authority or a Voluntary Society during his or 
herchildhood? 
Reported once above average knowledge Never The teacher thinks the child has an exceptional or Reported twice average knowledge above average general knowledge (recorded at 
ages 7 and II only). Help in school No The child receives help in school because of 
behaviour difficulties (or should do) when aged 
Family social characteristics 
Number of moves since the child's birth None Number of times family has moved since the 
child's birth. 0=0, ..., 9=9 times or more. Broken family No natural No natural parents: both natural parents have Intact family parents always been missing. 
Broken family: one natural parent was missing at 
some point. 
Intact family: both natural parents were always 
present. 
Parents' initiative once Never Initiative once: parents were reported once to 
Parents' initiative twice take the initiative to meet the teachers. 
Initiative twice: parents were reported twice to 
take the initiative to meet the teachers (when 
child is 7 and 11). 
Parents' ambition 1,2,3 Never Parents' ambition 1: parents want child to stay on 
at secondary school when the child is 7 (sweep 1) 
Parents' ambition 2: parents want child to stay on 
longer at school when the child is II (sweep 2) 
Parents' ambition 3: parents want child to stay in 
some form of full time education beyond 
minimum leaving age when the child is 16 
(sweep 3) 
Parents were owners once in three sweeps Parents were Based on housing tenure questions (see previous 
Parents were owners twice in three sweeps never owners table) 
Parents were owners three times in three in three 
sweeps sweeps 
Number of children Number of children (including study child) aged 
less than 21 years old living in the family when 
the child is 16. 
Teenage mother Older than 20 Same as in previous table 
Mother left school at 16 or older 15 of younger 
Father left school at 16 or older 
School and regions when child is 16 
Teacher/pupils ratio When child is 16 years old. 
Pupils expelled Based on number of pupils expelled from school 
last year. Child is 16 years old. Variable is equal 
to 0 if none were expelled and to I otherwise. 
Regions Scotland Lives in North western, Northern, East and west 
Riding, North Midlands, Eastern, London and 
South eastern, Southern, South West, Midlands, 
Wales 
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Chapter five 
Childhood Experiences and Social Exclusion in Adult Life 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we found that the economic situation of the parents 
has some effect on their children (in terms of their social behaviour and the likelihood 
that they come in contact with the authorities). We need to determine whether this 
effect has long-term consequences on the children's future achievements. We intend 
to study this question through an analysis of whether disturbed social behaviour and 
farmly difficulties during youth impair the future integration of these individuals in 
society. 
The question of social integration and exclusion is at the forefront of most 
European social policies. In view of the increase in social unrest, the importance of 
social cohesion has been outlined by national and European authorities. Given that 
unemployment and long-term unemployment rates have been persistently high in the 
past 25 years or so, the most obvious side to social exclusion in Europe is exclusion 
from the labour market. However, social exclusion may occur in other circumstances. 
We define the concept of social exclusion as an extension to the concept of financial 
poverty. We construct a composite index in order to measure the extent to which 
particular individuals are affected by social exclusion. 
We find evidence that anti-social behaviour during teenage life is associated 
with longer-term difficulties, especially for men. The unemployment of the father is 
also found to be related to future difficulties for men but not for women. The labour 
market and marital situations of the mother do not have statistically significant 
coefficients in our specification; we can only show that women who 
had a mother 
who was living in couple and working when they were II years old are 
less likely to 
be socially excluded. Educational attainment and 
forming a partnership are factors 
which offset these negative influences. 
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Section 5.2 reviews the literature that deals with the relationships between 
childhood characteristics and various outcomes in adult life. Section 5.3 shows how 
we define and measure social exclusion, section 5.4 details the econometric model to 
be used, section 5.5 presents the specifications and provides an analysis of the results 
obtained, and section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Evidence on the impact of past difficulties on future economic and social 
ac ivities 
5.2.1 Behaviour during adolescence and later life 
Few econornic studies have been concemed with the extent to which anti- 
social behaviour during youth has an impact on future social behaviour. Burgess and 
Propper (1998) analyse the link between early anti-social behaviour and future 
outcomes in life (such as earnings, earnings growth, labour supply and poverty rates). 
They use a US longitudinal survey in which young people (aged 14-22) were asked 
questions conceming anti-social activities they might be doing. They find' that, 
controlling for personal characteristics and family background, earnings and labour 
market participation for men in their late twenties are negatively affected by several 
behaviours in their adolescence: violent behaviour, extreme violence, running away 
from home and heavy substance use. By contrast, they find that light substance use 
and under-age alcohol consumption do not affect later earnings. Hobcraft (1998) uses 
the same data set as used in this chapter to study the relationship between various 
children's characteristics and future social exclusion 2 (defined with various 
I They use ordinary least squares for continuous dependent variables and logit models for discrete 
dependent variables. 
2 He carries out logistic regressions, including as many explanatory variables as possible then arriving 
at a preferred specification through backward selection. 
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outcomes 3 ). He finds evidence that anti-social behaviour 4 during teenage years is 
associated with greater risks of becoming a young mother for girls and of having 
multiple partnerships. These results suggest that there is a link between youth anti- 
social behaviour and future outcomes. 
5.2.2 Educational attainment and future employment and earnings 
There are numerous studies concerning the relationship between educational 
attainment and future earnings. Most of these are interested in the returns to schooling 
(see the work of Krueger (with Angnst, 1991 or Ashenfelter, 1994) and Taubman 
(1976) among others) or in the usefulness of public investment in education. These 
studies have shown that ability, family background, education and good school 
quality have positive influences on future earnings. More recent studies for the UK 
(e. g. Gregg and Machin, 2000) have identified an important association between 
educational attainment and future outcomes (such as earnings, unemployment, spells 
in prison, lone motherhood). Hobcraft (1998) finds that, especially for men, low 
income in adulthood is related to poor performance at school. However, there is no 
consensus about the relative size of these effects (or if some of them exist at all). This 
literature is extensive and we will not review it further here. 
Several reasons can be found for the link between employment and 
educational attainment. Numerous studies show that unskilled people have a 
comparative disadvantage in the labour market, perhaps due to the decrease in the 
demand for their labour. When considering employment and unemployment rates in 
3 These outcomes are the following: being a young parent, extra-marital birth, three or more 
partnerships, malaise (as measured in NCDS questionnaire), social 
housing, receiving benefits, 
homelessness, educational failure and income. 
4 This includes observation of whether the child frequently fought with other children, was irritable, 
was destructive and was disobedient. 
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various countries, higher qualifications seem to have a relatively protective effect 
against unemployment. One of the consequences is that young people stay longer in 
education in the hope of improving their employment prospects (Kodde, 1988). More 
generally, exogenous factors that tend to decrease educational attainments of young 
people will also have a negative impact on their future career. 
5.2.3 Criminal records and future employment and earnings 
Several arguments exist to explain the relationship between criminal activity 
and future employment and earnings. Being an ex-criminal could be used as a signal 
by employers who will hesitate to employ ex-convicts. People in jail would lose 
contact with the labour market, or see their skills decrease. The incentive to turn to 
crime could be higher than finding legal work, because of higher perceived returns for 
example. Finally, being in jail or turning to crime can be considered as similar to 
being in non-employment. This has potential long-term effects on future employment, 
even for young people. The idea is the same as for unemployment (Omori, 1997): 
being in non-employment can leave serious stigma, so that the return to legal 
employment may be difficult. 
There is no consensus in the empirical literature. While some economists find 
strong and long-term effects, others find that these effects are short-lived. Freeman 
(1991) estimates linear probability models on several US data sets, and finds a strong 
effect of having been in jail on the probability of future employment. Moreover, this 
employment effect seems to be long-term. On the contrary, Grogger (1995), using 
quarterly data on young arrested people in California, applies a fixed effects method 
of estimation on a distributed lags model. He finds that the effects of arrests and jail 
sentences are rather short lived. 
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More recently, Gregg and Machin (2000), using the NCDS data set, find 
evidence that delinquency (defined as having been in contact with the police and 
having poor school attendance records up to age 16) is associated with future 
unemployment and a lower probability of being employed (at 23), as well as a higher 
probability of being in prison for males, and a higher probability of being a lone 
mother by 23 for women. They find that, for men, there is also an association between 
delinquency and employment and earnings at age 33, while the association disappears 
for women. However, they do not control for many individual characteristics so that 
their findings may be induced by unobservable variables. Hobcraft (1998) finds that 
men who were delinquent (i. e. had contacts with the police) are more likely to be 
unemployed as adults, to have multiple relationships, to be in social housing and to 
experience educational failure. 
5.2.4 Family background and future outcomes 
Family background (defined as the labour market situation of the parents, the 
structure of the family, the educational attainment of the parents, etc. ) has been found 
in many studies to be associated with the outcomes of children during childhood and 
in adult life. Section 4.2.3 of the previous chapter showed evidence that 
disadvantageous situations are transmitted across generations. We also saw in the 
previous chapter that children's outcomes are affected by the structure of their family. 
In addition, the literature interested in the outcomes of children from step-families 
finds that adult offspring from these types of families continue to have more 
adjustment problems, are less satisfied with their lives, experience lower socio- 
economic attainment, and are more likely to be on welfare (see a review of findings in 
Hetherington et al. 1998). They are also more likely to exhibit anti-social behaviour. 
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5.3 The measurement of the children's future achievements 
In contrast to previous related papers (e. g. Hobcraft, 1998), which attempt to 
explain various adult life outcomes, we aim to outline the determinants of a composite 
index of social exclusion. We consider that social exclusion at the level of the 
individual is defined as a combination of "bad" outcomes. For example, it would be 
difficult to argue that lone mothers or unemployed people are systematically socially 
excluded. A composite index is therefore useful because it indicates the degree to 
which a particular individual is excluded; the more of these bad outcomes he or she 
faces, the more likely he or she is to be considered socially excluded. Moreover, the 
weights given to each of the components of social exclusion can be considered the 
same across individuals living in the same country. We indeed consider that the norms 
which define how much individuals are socially excluded can differ from country to 
country, but not within each country. This is because citizens of one particular 
country would be sharing the same basic rights (in terms of the judiciary system, the 
rights to receive basic education and health care) and level of economic development. 
Because the concept of social exclusion has been widely used and is sometimes quite 
vague, before constructing this index, we need to provide a rigorous and meaningful 
definition of social exclusion. 
5.3.1 The concept and its relevance 
The exclusion of certain categories of persons from being full members of our 
societies has recently been a growing concern for western policy makers, in particular 
in Europe. Social exclusion is of relevance to economic and social policy for several 
reasons. First, economic development is supposed to improve the well-being of 
people. If one finds out that more and more people are significantly excluded from 
this general improvement, one may want to find ways to alter this phenomenon. 
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Second, if the working of society (in terms of social and educational policies as well 
as the rights of citizens) creates exclusion, one may also want to change policies to 
avoid these effects. 
Because the concept of social exclusion is highly related to that of poverty and 
there are many ways to define and measure these two concepts, it is useful to first 
distinguish between the two. Economists are generally mostly concerned with 
questions of income inequality and poverty defined in terms of income or 
expenditure. Some have advocated the use of broader concepts of poverty, which 
would include a social dimension (Sen, 1992 and 1997). Sen brings the concept of 
poverty in the space of "capabilities", i. e. the opportunities to achieve full integration. 
To explain this idea Atkinson (1995) takes the example of a bike (a commodity). Its 
characteristic is "transportation" and it gives the "capability" of moving to the 
individual. This notion brings a social dimension to poverty; an individual who cannot 
afford a bike is not only excluded from owning a bike, but is also denied the 
advantages of its use. The concept of social exclusion builds on this definition of 
poverty. Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) outline three dimensions to social exclusion: 
economic, social and political. According to them, the economic approach is 
concerned with questions of income and production and access to goods and services 
from which some people are excluded. The social dimension includes questions 
related to access to social services, access to the labour market, and the opportunity of 
Social participation (i. e. relations among individuals as well as between citizens and 
the State). Finally the political dimension is concemed with the denial of human and 
political rights to certain groups of the population. 
From the literature on social exclusion and poverty (see for example Yepez del 
Castillo (1994), Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) and Atkinson (1998b)), we provide a 
Unique definition of social exclusion. For our purpose and in the context of the UK, 
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we identify three areas in which individual social exclusion can be observed at the 
level of the individual. These are the labour market, consumption and citizenship. 
These are the main aspects of society to which individuals may be denied access. We 
should note that in a democracy such as the UK, social exclusion is more likely to be 
the product of inefficiencies rather than the result of voluntary actions from the 
government: social exclusion is not an aim. In contrast, political rights or others may 
be denied to parts of the population in certain countries. Rejection from the labour 
market is the most obvious form of social exclusion currently in Europe. Paid 
employment is probably the main way to be included as work gives a status and 
idleness may be synonym for uselessness (see previous chapter for a discussion on the 
psychological and financial effects of unemployment). As far as consumption is 
concerned, we mean here access to the basic necessities for social integration in an 
industrialised country, such as housing or access to services such as a phone. Finally, 
citizenship includes political participation as well as other form of social interactions. 
The situation of individuals with respect to these three elements of social 
inclusion is the result of an interaction between them and other agents (other 
individuals, governments, employers, etc. ). Social exclusion is therefore an outcome 
which depends on some factors related to the individuals' own characteristics but also 
some completely independent from them. Government intervention may influence the 
degree of social exclusion in many ways. For example, the State can provide basic 
education and health care or not. This provision will define whether individuals are 
likely to be excluded because of a lack of public provision of some goods and 
services. Social exclusion at the individual level, as studied here, is therefore a partial 
concept because it takes as given the supply side 
5 as defined in Atkinson (1995). It is 
5 In other words, it takes as given the characteristics of the supply of goods and services: for example, 
the market structure, or the availability of different qualities of products. 
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measured relative to other ("integrated") people; there must therefore be a "non-n" of 
social integration. The norm will depend on the country or the group of countries 
studied. Moreover, social exclusion cannot be identified at one point In time only, but 
also by the trajectories of people as well as their expectations. For example, a 
precarious and badly paid job may lead to social exclusion if the worker has no future 
promotion prospects but may on the contrary simply be a stage before having a well- 
paid job. 
This analysis is helpful to construct our index of social exclusion. 
5.3.2 Data, sample and variables 
5.3.2.1 Data 
The data set used is the British National Child Development Survey. As was 
explained in the previous chapter, this longitudinal data set contains five waves of 
information on people born in a week in March 1958. In this chapter, we use all five 
waves; we have inforination on individuals at ages 7,11,16,23 and 33. The first three 
waves are described in the previous chapter; the fourth wave consists of an interview 
with the cohort member; the fifth wave also contains such an interview as well as 
questionnaires for the partner of the cohort members and for cohort members who are 
mothers. Some of the information covers the 10-year period between the ages of 23 
and 33 years old. 
5.3.2.2 The variables included in the social exclusion index 
We attempt to catch all the aspects of social exclusion that are relevant in a 
country such as the UK with various variables available in our data set. Social 
exclusion is defined through observation of outcomes at 33 years old and between 24 
and 33 years old. First, we consider that unemployment can be indicative of exclusion 
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in the labour market as it is expected to show rejection from employers or a mismatch 
between the individual and his or her job and workplace. The variable used in our 
index is a dummy that takes the value of one if the individual was in a spell of 
6 unemployment between 23 and 33 years old . In the full sample, we find that 25 
percent of people have such experience; i. e. at least one spell of unemployment 
lasting at least one month and during which the individual is unemployed and looking 
7 for a job . 
Second, we have an indication of exclusion in consumption (i. e. lack of access 
to goods or services generally needed to participate fully in social activities) thanks to 
several variables. One indicates whether the individual has ever been more than two 
months behind with rent or mortgage payments. Another variable shows whether the 
person has ever been homeless, one records whether the individual owns a car, and a 
final one whether there is a phone in the individual's home. Housing and access to 
certain services are the two main components of consumption which are indicative of 
social exclusion (Atkinson, 1998). Housing is a basic necessity; it also means having 
an address which is a requirement to receive benefits or more generally to be 
reachable. In the same way, having access to a phone enables people to be in contact 
with the external world, in particular potential employers. People without a car may 
also have difficulties gaining access to potential workplaces. The relevance of the 
latter variable depends on the availability of public transport, and we will verify 
whether our results are sensitive to its inclusion in the index. 
6 This variable may seem a crude measure of exclusion from the labour market, but we consider that it 
is suitable for our analysis. Because of recall error, individuals are likely to under-report spells of 
unemployment especially if these occurred some time before the interview (see Elias, 1996). People 
may falsely report spells' dates and duration. Our simple measure of unemployment avoids these 
issues; moreover, it is likely to capture substantial periods of unemployment. 
' Given this definition, we consider that people waiting to take up a new job would not report such a 
spell as being unemployed. Voluntary unemployed people might be included, but because this variable 
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Third, three variables indicate long-term difficulties and exclusion from usual 
social activities: whether the individual has problems writing, whether he or she could 
be identified as having drink problems during adult life and whether the person voted 
in the last General Election. For the drink problem variable, we use the CAGE 
questionnaire 8 which is included in the data set and is generally considered to be 
reliable in the health literature (Beresford et al., 1990). Although the three outcomes 
just mentioned might be initiated for very different reasons, they are considered to 
indicate difficulties in taking part in usual social activities. 
As mentioned before, although taken separately these variables may not be 
indicative of social exclusion as such, their combination in a single index may be 
considered to be. In addition, because several of those are observed over a ten-year 
period, they can perhaps be trusted to show genuine social exclusion and not just a 
snapshot. We should point out here that we do not use relative income to measure 
social exclusion. We are not interested in a raw measure of poverty through income. 
We consider that the outcomes detailed above (such as difficulties in paying rent or 
mortgage) include the concept of poverty, defined as a state preventing people from 
caffying out socially integrating activities. 
5.3.3 Construction of the social exclusion index 
We use three different methods to construct our index of social exclusion. The 
first method consists in estimating a well-being equation and the second method uses 
is combined with other measures of social exclusion this should not be too big a problem. 
8 This questionnaire consists in four questions asked in the fifth sweep when people are 33 years old: 
have you ever felt that you ought to cut down on your drinking? Have people annoyed you by 
criticising your drinking? Have you ever felt guilty about your drinking? Have you ever 
had a drink 
first thing in the morning to steady your hands or get rid of a hangover? Two or more positive answers 
to these questions are considered indicative of drinking problems. 
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the principal components analysis. We also construct a "simple" index, in which all 
the variables have equal weight, for reference. 
5.3.3.1 Well-being equation 
In order to construct the index we estimate a well-being equation with the 
explanatory variables described in section 5.3.2.2. We consider that social exclusion 
is associated with lower individual well-being. We therefore expect that all the 
variables that we include in our index are negatively related to a measure of well- 
being. If this is the case, it provides a further justification that they should be included 
in our index as well as the weight they carry in that index. 
We measure well-being through the answer of 33-year-old individuals to the 
following question: How satisfied are you with your life up to now? The index of 
well-being ranges from 0 to 10 (from completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied). 
Our dependent variable is the opposite of the latter; it goes from completely satisfied 
(score 0) to completely dissatisfied (score 10). We use an ordered probit model9 with 
this index as dependent variable and the variables just mentioned as explanatory 
vanables. 10 It is interesting to analyse the well-being equations for men and women. 
The results are reported in table B. 5.1 (appendix B). We find that all the variables 
have the expected positive sign; they are all associated with lower life satisfaction. 
The majority of the explanatory variables are statistically significant. For men, only 
not having voted in the last election and having been homeless are statistically 
insignificant, while for women two variables are also insignificant: having problems 
writing and not having access to a phone. We calculate the fitted values for the 
9 This model is described in section 5.4. 
10 These are the following: has been unemployed, has been homeless, was two months behind in paying 
rent or mortgage, does not own a car, does not 
have access to a phone, has not voted in the last General 
Election, has problems writing, and has drinking problems. 
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available sample and we use them as dependent variable (called index 1) in our 
specification. Graphs 5.1 and 5.2 show the distributions of the predicted values of the 
well-being equation for men and women respectively. We see that most people are 
concentrated in the lower tail of the distribution, indicating that they are less likely to 
be socially excluded. There are some differences between men and women in the 
distribution in the first three bands, but 75 percent of men and women are in the first 
three bands. 
5.3.3.2 Principal components analysis 
This statistical method consists in searching for the uncorrelated linear 
combinations of the original variables that capture all of the information in the 
original variables (Dunteman, 1994). The linear combinations are ordered so that the 
first few capture most of the variation in the original variables. In our case, the latter 
are the eight variables associated with social exclusion. For our purpose, we take the 
first linear combination (or component). As can be seen in table B. 5.2 (appendix B), 
the weights in this linear combination are all positive. The first component can be 
interpreted as the general level of social exclusion. The fitted values corresponding to 
this linear combination are then obtained and retransfon-ned into an index (called 
index 2). We should note that we found low correlation between the eight variables of 
interest, reflecting the fact that our concept and measure of social exclusion is quite 
broad, in other words includes very different aspects of social life, which may not be 
very correlated. Although the first component explains only around twenty per cent of 
the total variance of the eight variables, we assume that it captures enough 
information for the purpose of our index. Graphs 5.3 and 5.4 show the distribution of 
the fitted values used in the construction of index 2. We see that they are very similar 
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for men and women, now around 83 percent are in the first three bands. I' Comparing 
indices I and 2, we note that they are highly correlated (with a correlation coefficient 
of around 0.9). Econometric specifications using these indices as dependent variables 
and identical sets of independent variables are likely to give similar results. 
5.3.3.3 "Simple" index 
For this index (called index 3), we simply add up all the variables. As they 
have a value of one if indicative of a bad outcome and of zero otherwise, the sum 
provides an idea of the degree of social exclusion. We choose to have three 
categories: all variables are equal to zero, one is equal to one, and two or more are 
equal to one. 
5.4 Econometric modelling of social exclusion 
We aim to determine whether adolescent behaviour and family background are 
linked to the probability of being socially excluded and to the degree of social 
exclusion in adult life. As in the previous chapter, we identify here only associations 
between factors and social exclusion; no causality is assumed to have been identified. 
5.4.1 Model 
From the fitted values obtained as described in section 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 we 
construct new indices. The lowest category includes all the individuals who have a 
value of zero, in other words who are not socially excluded. The rest of the positive 
values are divided into groups with equal number of observations. We obtain three to 
six categories, depending on the index. The highest category is expected to represent 
the individuals with the greatest risk of being socially excluded. These categories are 
11 Note that the bands are different for indices I and 2. 
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considered to represent the intervals in which the latent variable - social exclusion - 
falls. They are naturally ordered and range from 0 to J. The appropriate model here is 
an ordered response model in which the thresholds (ps) are unobserved. Namely, we 
use an ordered probit model. The probability that the index (y) be equal to a particular 
value j is the following: 
P[yi = J] = P[A-i: 5 yi* < A] = G(A - xi'P) - G(A- I- xi'p) (1) 
with G the unit Normal cumulative distribution function and y* the latent variable, 
given by the following model: 
Yi* = Xi'ß + EI (2) 
Defining: 
yjj =I if Yj =j 
and 0 otherwise 
We maximise the following log-likelihood: 12 
ni 
LogL Y, log[(D(, Uj - Xi (D(, Uj-, -xi'P)l 
i=l j=l 
The results give us estimates of the coefficients of the explanatory variables as 
well as of the cut off points ul, ..., ýij-,. A 
is equal to -oo and uj to +oo. The set of 
explanatory variables does not contain a constant so that all the g's are identified. 
We carry out diagnostic tests to check for model misspecifications. These are 
reported in the last rows of each table. They are calculated following the formulae 
given in the appendix of the article by Machin and Stewart (1990). 
12 The models are estimated using Stata (StataCorp, 1999). 
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Because we have a large number of explanatory variables, marginal effects are 
calculated only for variables which have a statistically significant coefficient. All our 
explanatory variables are dummies. The marginal effects are therefore calculated as 
the discrete change in the predicted probability as one variable changes values while 
other variables are kept at their means. For categorical dummies (such as educational 
qualifications) the other categories are set to 0. 
5.4.2 The determinants of social exclusion 
We assume that social exclusion during adulthood is a function of five types 
of influences: childhood personal characteristics, early adulthood personal 
characteristics, childhood family background, early adulthood family background, and 
adulthood environment. Appendices A and C show the descriptive statistics and the 
definition of all the variables that we use here. All these factors are measured before 
social exclusion is observed except adult environment which is measured at the same 
time. We assume that our controls are sufficient to take into account individual 
characteristics which could influence both our explanatory and dependent variables. 
All our explanatory variables can therefore be considered as pre-determined. 
The childhood personal characteristics include the social behaviour of the 
children reported by the parents and the school when the cohort member is 16 years 
old. It also includes whether the child has been in contact with the police and whether 
he or she has been referred to a social agency at that age. These are variables of 
interest; we want to know whether anti-social behaviour during teenage years has a 
longer-term effect during adulthood. Because we are not able to fully use the 
longitudinal dimension of the data set, we aim to control for individuals' 
heterogeneity thanks to several variables (indicative of ability and early behaviour) all 
observed at an early age. Ability is measured by reports of the school on the child's 
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general knowledge and maths and reading scores of tests held when the child is 7. In 
the same way, we control for early signs of disrupted behaviour through a variable 
measuring whether they took longer than other children to settle in class when they 
first went to school. 
Because outcomes in early adulthood may determine future life developments 
and possibly offset the effects of childhood disadvantages, we control for educational 
attainment and occupation when the individual is 23 years old. These are expected to 
be correlated with the probability that an individual is socially excluded. We also 
control for the personal situation of the cohort member, because individual outcomes 
cannot be considered independently of their family situation. The family structure of 
the individual is measured by several variables: whether he or she has a partner (and 
the situation of that partner), and whether they have children. Although we observe 
these variables before observing social exclusion, they may suffer from an 
endogeneity problem: people who are more likely to have a partner may also be less 
likely to become socially excluded. We choose to attempt to control for these 
individual effects by including personal characteristics, rather than by trying to mo ei 
the probability of having a partner, which we consider hard to do in a satisfactory 
manner. In order to account for the effects of the environment in which the individual 
lives, we include dummies for the region of residence at 33. 
Several family background variables are of particular interest to us. In 
particular we want to see whether the situation at 33 is significantly related to the 
family's economic situation during childhood (namely, spells of paternal 
unemployment, periods of financial difficulties and having a working mother). These 
variables are familiar from the previous chapter, although some are measured in a 
slightly different way. We consider that the Influence of the labour market situation of 
the mother depends on whether a male head is present and on the age of the child. 
We 
204 
therefore design a variable that combines marital and labour market status and 
indicates all possible types of household. Because we are interested in the effects of 
recurrent difficulties, we enter paternal unemployment and financial difficulties 
through variables indicating the number of times the family suffered from these 
during the individual's childhood. We also control for the age at which the parents left 
school and other factors which may be thought of as having long-term effects (such as 
having a mother younger than 20 at birth, and having had a relative in prison). 
Tables 5.1a to 5.1d show the means of all the variables included in our index 
of social exclusion for various samples of men and women. We see that, among the 
characteristics reported in our tables, we always find the highest proportion of people 
with bad outcomes in cases where the individuals had been referred to a social agency 
or had contacts with the police. The third group most at risk is either people reported 
badly behaved by the school or having no father or male head at 16 years old. A 
maths score above average (i. e. higher ability) improves the voting behaviour, access 
to a car and a phone, decreases the risk of having writing problems and arrears in rent 
or mortgage payments for both men and women. In addition, for men it is associated 
with lower risk of having a spell of unemployment. Having no education the 
risk of not voting and of having writing or rent problems, it also increases the risk of 
not having a car or a phone for women and men. Having a degree seems to 
be 
beneficial for all outcomes except homelessness for both sexes, and drinking 
problems for women. The latter may be related to a lower realisation of expectations 
for educated women. Overall, these simple means are consistent with the 
idea that 
teenage anti-social behaviour is associated with future "bad" outcomes. 
This effect 
seems bigger than that of a disadvantaged 
family background (as reported in the 
tables). 
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5.5 Estimation results 
5.5.1 Sample analysis 
Before analysing the results given by the econometric models, it is useful to 
check the representativity of our estimation samples. As will be shown in the tables of 
results, these samples are quite small (around 1500 observations for men and 1700 for 
women) compared to the data set as a whole (around 5000 observations for each sex). 
This attrition is due to several phenomena. First, some cohort members or their 
parents may refuse or omit to answer. This is even more likely to be a problem for this 
data set as the first three waves include information from various sources (the parents, 
but also the school and the doctor). Second, some individuals may be missing from 
follow-up waves, either because they refuse to be further interviewed or because they 
are not located by the interviewers. The comparatively small number of observations 
in our sample is therefore due to the fact that we use all the waves and information 
from all the sources available, so that the likelihood that some observations are 
rmssing is large. 
This phenomenon is a problem for us if these missing observations are not 
random but reflect a certain kind of people. We therefore look at the sample means for 
all our variables and determine whether our sample means strongly deviate from the 
data set means. These means are in tables C. 5.1 and C. 5.2 (appendix Q. We can see 
that several variables have means which differ slightly from the whole sample means. 
They all tend to show that, with respect to these characteristics, individuals in our 
sample are on average better off. The rest of the means are reasonably close to the 
data set means. If we look at the means of the variables included in our social 
exclusion index, we can see that, for both men and women, they are about the same or 
slightly lower in our samples. 
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Given this, we probably lose information on the direct and indirect effects of 
childhood variables on the probability of being socially excluded. It is not 
straightforward to identify the direction of the bias. However, it is possible that our 
coefficients are under-esti mated. This is because our estimation samples tend to 
exclude individuals who are socially excluded and at the same time have had a 
disadvantaged family background. The effects of detrimental factors should be 
attenuated. Any effect identified as statistically significant is therefore likely to be 
stronger in the whole data set. 
5.5.2 Results from the ordered probit models 
Tables 5.2a to 5.4b show the results obtained for men for each of the three 
indices. Tables 5.2a, 5.3a and 5.4a contain four different specifications starting with 
only childhood variables then adding education, then including adulthood vanables, 
and finally combining the employment of the mother with marital status, instead of 
having them as separate variables. Tables 5.2b, 5.3b and 5.4b show the marginal 
effects corresponding to the coefficients of the statistically significant variables of the 
last column from the relevant tables. They also contain some predicted probabilities 
calculated for specific individuals. We can see from the "a" tables that the coefficients 
are only slightly affected from one index to the next. The method of computation of 
the indices therefore does not seem to affect the results. 
The variables indicative of social behaviour at age 16 are found to have a 
statistically significant relationship with future probability of social exclusion, even 
when we control for adulthood characteristics. In particular children who were 
reported badly behaved by the school are more likely to be socially excluded, with a 
5-percentage-point-higher probability of being in the highest category of index 1. 
Across the three indices, they have a probability of being integrated (in other words, 
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of being in the 0 category of the indices) around 5- to 7-percentage-points lower. 
Individuals who were referred to an agency when they were 16 years old suffer the 
same change in probability; specifically the probability of being integrated is 
decreased by 7 percentage points across the three indices. Those observed to have bad 
relations with their parents at 16 are around 4 percentage points less likely to be 
socially included. We should also note that, contrary to what we found in tables 5.1a 
and 5.1b, contacts with the police do not have a statistically significant coefficient, the 
latter being much smaller than the coefficients on the other behaviour variables 
(numerically, individuals are only I to 2 percentage points less likely to be 
integrated). This result is consistent with Gregg and Machin's (2000) findings; they 
find that the coefficient on contacts with the police (defined in the same way as here) 
is not statistically significant in specifications having for dependent variable the 
individual wage or the probability of employment at 33 years old. 
Having a lone non-working mother at 7 is associated with a higher probability 
of social exclusion. The other variables representing employment of the mother and 
her marital status during the cohort member's childhood do not have statistically 
significant coefficients. We find that having a father who experienced unemployment 
is statistically significant and is associated with a9 to 10 percentage points decrease 
in the probability of being integrated compared to having a father who never 
experienced unemployment. 
Other statistically significant results concerning the childhood variables show 
that having a mother younger than 20 at birth decreases the probability of social 
exclusion. The size of this effect is slightly bigger than that of 
bad behaviour at 
school. This shows that when we control for other aspects of young motherhood such 
as the possibility of financial difficulties, we find it 
does not have a disadvantageous 
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effect. Early observation of lower ability is indicative of future social exclusion, with 
a4 to 7 percentage points decrease in the probability of social integration. 
As we noted before, the effects just mentioned are robust to the inclusion of 
adulthood variables. Education variables (see columns 3 and 4) appear statistically 
significant and with the expected sign. Having any qualification decreases the 
probability of social exclusion compared to having none. Looking at the changes in 
predicted probability, we see that qualifications are particularly important in 
preventing C4 extreme") cases of social exclusion. For index I for example, they all 
decrease probability of being in the highest category of social exclusion by around 5 
percentage points compared to having no qualification. 
We find that those who have a partner who works when they are 23 years old 
are less likely to be socially excluded in the following years. Manual workers (except 
skilled manuals) are more at risk of social exclusion than others, so are those who 
have living children by the age of 23 years old. These results indicate that even 
controlling for financial difficulties and education, people from lower classes are 
more likely to be socially excluded; once one has a bad start in adult life one seems 
more likely to drift further. Finally, men coming from London appear to be more at 
risk of social exclusion; they are more than 10 percentage points less likely to be 
integrated compared to men living in the South-East. 
Tables 5.5a to 5.7b show the equivalent specifications for women. We again 
find very similar results across the three indices. In the most parsimonious 
specification the behavioural variables are all statistically significant and indicate a 
higher probability of social exclusion (except for index 3 for which only referral to an 
agency is statistically significant). All of these, except referral to an agency, lose their 
statistical significance once we add the education variables. Referral then 
loses 
significance when we add adulthood characteristics, except 
for index 1. As for men, 
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having had contacts with the police at 16 years old is not statistically significant. The 
employment of the mother during an individual's childhood appears to be statistically 
significant for women while it was not for men. There is some evidence (columns I to 
3) that I 1-year-old girls who have a working mother have a higher probability of 
being socially excluded in adulthood. The effect disappears when the child is 16 years 
old. There is also evidence that having no father or male head in the household 
decreases the probability of social exclusion. The combined variables (column 4) 
show that for indices 2 and 3, having a working single mother at II decreases this 
probability, compared to a household with two working parents, such a family 
situation increases the probability of being socially integrated by around 15-18 
percentage points. Education variables are statistically significant; we observe that 0 
levels become insignificant once we introduce the adulthood variables, all the other 
qualifications keep their significance. Finally, contrary to what we found for men, 
having had an unemployed father does not appear to be statistically significant. 
Several additional determinants are found to be statistically significant 
compared to what we found for men. Women who were in intact families for the 
whole of their childhood are less likely to be socially excluded (with a9 to 13 
percentage points increase in the probability of being integrated depending on the 
index). Those who have a relative who had contacts with the authonties are more 
likely to be. The change in the probability of being integrated is quite big (from 17 to 
23 percentage points depending on the index), but this result is 
based on very few 
observations (only 19 women were in that situation). 
Among the adulthood variables, having children by the age of 23 is found to 
increase the probability of social exclusion but is statistically insignificant except 
for 
index 2. This may be explained by the fact that women are in general in partnerships 
with older men, who may already 
have a good social status. In the whole data set, we 
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indeed observe that the average age of the partner at the last birthday is older for 
women (26.3 years) than for men (22.5 years). In the same way, we find that, as for 
men, having a partner who works is beneficial (increasing the probability of being 
integrated by 5 to 6 percentage points), but also that having a partner out of the labour 
force or unemployed increases the risk of social exclusion (decreasing the probability 
of integration by 9 to 13 percentage points). This may show that women who have a 
partner in that situation are in disadvantaged households, while it is more common for 
men to have a partner out of the labour force (in our estimation samples, while 14 
percent of men have a partner who is not employed, only 4 percent of women do). As 
for men, unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers are more at risk of social 
exclusion. Finally, women's outcomes are more sensitive to the region in which they 
live. Women in the East Nfidlands, London and Scotland appear to be more at risk of 
social exclusion (more than 10 percentage points less likely to be integrated) 
compared to those living in the South East. 
It is useful at this stage to summanse the main results. First, we find that the 
method of computation of the indices does not affect the main results. Second, anti- 
social behaviour at 16 years old is statistically significantly related to future social 
exclusion, in particular for men for whom the coefficients remain statistically 
significant even when we include early adulthood characteristics. Individuals who 
have been referred to an agency because of difficulties which have affected their 
educational progress or behaviour are also more likely to be socially excluded during 
their adulthood. The experience of having an unemployed father is associated with 
statistically significant higher probability of social exclusion only for men. For 
women, it appears that those who had a non-working mother living in couple or a 
working lone mother when they were II years old are less likely to be socially 
excluded. Education is statistically significant for women and men and appears to 
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offset such effects as those of bad social behaviour earlier in life. Having a working 
partner as opposed to no partner "protects" from future exclusion for both men and 
women, while having a partner unemployed or out of the labour force is detrimental 
only for women. Finally, people living in London are much more at risk of being 
socially excluded. 
The questions which interest us here are the extent to which family 
background and adolescent anti-social behaviour affect the probability of becoming 
socially excluded, and what other factors could offset these negative influences. If we 
look at the bottom parts of tables 5.2b, 5.3b and 5.4b, we see that having a 
unfavourable farmly background (defined as having had a father unemployed and 
financial difficulties at least once) is less damaging (in terms of social exclusion) than 
having had an anti-social behaviour (defined as having reported by the parents and the 
school, and having had contacts with the police and social agencies at 16 years old). 
The predicted probability of being integrated is more reduced for anti-social teenagers 
than for those who had an unfavourable family background. Consistently with Gregg 
and Machin (2000), we find that educational attainment has an offsetting effect. 
However, it is quite limited in our specifications. The probability of being integrated 
is increased by only 4 to 7 percentage points for those who have a degree compared to 
those who have no education. Finally, we see that those who had difficulties during 
youth are better off when they have a partner (in particular if the partner works), but 
again, this beneficial effect is quite small (of the order of about 4 percentage points 
for those whose partner works). 
For women (tables 5.5b, 5.6b and 5.7b), we see that the effect of any 
childhood difficulties is smaller than for men. Moreover, we observe the same pattern 
as what we just described for men. The only difference is that women who had 
difficulties and who have a partner who does not work are less likely to be socially 
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integrated compared to those who do not have one (the predicted probability is 
reduced by about 7 to 9 percentage points). 
5.5.3 Sensitivity of the results to the definition of the index of social 
exclusion 
It is interesting to check whether the results outlined in the previous section 
are sensitive to our definition of social exclusion. In particular, we want to see 
whether they are affected by the exclusion of two particular variables: owning a car 
and having been unemployed. The former variable may drive results such as the 
significance of regional dumrmes, while the latter may dominate the index and drive 
all the results. We re-estimate the least parsimonious specification for all three indices 
in each of these two cases. The results are shown in tables 5.8a and 5.9a for men and 
in tables 5.8b and 5.9b for women. 
Table 5.8a shows that the results are overall similar to what was found before 
for men. In particular, the London effect is not driven by the "owning a car" variable, 
although the coefficient is slightly decreased. 
For women (table 5.8b), the London effect is still statistically significant but 
the other regional dummies lose significance and become smaller. We note that 
having a working partner at 23 years old becomes statistically insignificant and has a 
coefficient close to zero. This leads us to think that living in a household which owns 
a car is very much related to the work of the partner as far as women are concerned. 
The results for women appear somewhat more affected by the exclusion of 
"owning a 
car'' than the results for men were. 
From table 5.9a, we can see that for men the coefficient on having a working 
partner becomes statistically insignificant and smaller. 
It is interesting to note that the 
labour market situation of the partner has become statistically 
insignificant; it seems 
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to be related only to the tabour market situation of the cohort member and not to other 
manifestations of social exclusion. This is consistent with the idea that men who have 
a working partner when they are 23 years old are very likely to be in secure jobs 
themselves and unlikely to suffer from unemployment. We should also note that the 
coefficient on the unemployment of the father is still statistically significant. This 
shows that parental unemployment is not only associated with higher probability of 
unemployment but also with higher probability of other social and economic 
difficulties. The effect of having a lone non-working mother at 7 becomes 
insignificant (except for index 1). 
For women (see table 5.9b), having a partner who does not work becomes 
statistically insignificant (except for index 2), while having a partner who works is 
still negative and statistically significant. It appears that the former effect is mainly 
related to the cohort member's unemployment rather than full social exclusion. The 
coefficient on having a non-working mother at II becomes statistically insignificant 
but is still negative. Father's unemployment is still statistically insignificant. 
Results for men appear robust to these sensitivity tests, while results for 
women are slightly less robust. Overall, however, the main conclusions that we drew 
from previous analysis are not contradicted by the tests. 
5.5.4 Separation of the index between poverty and cultural variables 
Given that our indices include two very different aspects of exclusion 
from 
society and that in particular they contain implicitly poverty, we may not 
be 
convinced that the determinants we have identified are really concerned with social 
exclusion and not simply with poverty. We therefore construct 
two indices; one 
includes variables indicative of economic 
difficulties and one indicative of cultural 
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difficulties. 13 The results are interesting in that they give us a better understanding of 
the determinants of social exclusion. We note that the pairwise correlation coefficients 
are higher among the variables indicative of economic difficulties than among those 
indicative of cultural exclusion. For both men and women, the first component 
explains around 30 per cent (36 per cent) of the total variance of the economic 
variables (cultural variables). 
The results are in tables 5.10a and 5.10b for men and 5.11a and 5.11b for 
women. We see that the results are similar across the three types of indices, 14 but that 
the economic and cultural indices have different determinants. Women appear to be 
less likely to be socially excluded. We calculated the predicted probabilities at the 
means of the variables, and we found that men have a 56 percent probability of being 
socially (i. e. economically and culturally) integrated, while women have a 61 percent 
probability of being economically integrated and a 76 percent probability of being 
culturally integrated. 
In table 5.10a, we observe that all the determinants that we identified in the 
previous sections are still statistically significant. However they can be separated into 
three groups: those which affect economic exclusion, those which affect cultural 
exclusion and those which affect both. The results show that economic variables, such 
as having had a father unemployed during childhood, a lone non-working mother at 7 
and having a working partner, mainly affect economic outcomes (respectively 
increasing and decreasing the probability). Similarly, social variables (for example 
mother's age at delivery or social behaviour at school) are determinants of the cultural 
13 The economic index contains having been homeless, unemployed, owning a phone, a car and having 
rent arrears. The cultural index includes the rest of the variables, namely voting behaviour, writing 
problems and drinking problems. 
14 The correlation between the indices constructed from a well-being equation and through a principal 
component analysis is again high. The correlation coefficients are around 0.93 and 0.89 for the 
economic indices (1a and 2a) and the cultural indices (Ib and 2b) respectively. 
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part of exclusion. Several findings are interesting to outline. First, boys who have a 
lone non-working mother when they are 7 are more likely to be economically 
excluded. Second, qualifications and ability (measured by test scores) seem to be 
more important, in terms of size of effect and statistical significance, for cultural 
factors. Any qualification increases the probability that people are integrated in terms 
of cultural activity. Third, having parents who do not own their house appears 
detrimental only for economic outcomes, while the opposite is true for cultural 
outcomes. This seems to show that the detrimental effects of living in rented 
accommodation do not spread to full social integration. Fourth, we find that bad social 
behaviour observed at school is correlated with future cultural exclusion while 
behaviour observed at home is linked to future economic exclusion. Fifth, unskilled 
and semi-skilled manual workers appear to be more likely to be fully (i. e. 
econornIcally and culturally) excluded compared to non-manuals. Skilled manuals are 
only more likely to be culturally excluded. Finally, having children by the age of 23 
impairs economic integration only. 
Overall, looking at the predicted probabilities (table 5.12a' 5), those who have 
had an anti-social behaviour and family difficulties see a greater decrease in the 
probability of economic integration than in the probability of cultural integration 
compared to those who did not suffer from those difficulties. Taking index I as an 
example, the former probability is decreased by 33 percentage points, while the latter 
is decreased by 13 percentage points. Education offsets these negative effects 
especially for cultural integration. For those who had difficulties, having a partner 
decreases economic exclusion compared to having no partner, even if their partner 
does not work. For them, the probability of cultural exclusion slightly 
increases if the 
partner does not work. 
" OnlY the results for index I are reported; the other indices show similar results. 
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For women (tables 5.1 la and 5.1 1b), the determinants are different from what 
we found for men. Having had a relative in contact with the police increases the 
probability of both cultural and economic exclusion, while having children by the age 
of 23 years old increase the probability of economic exclusion but decreases the 
probability of cultural exclusion. We again find that the family structure is more 
relevant for women than for men; having lived continuously with both natural parents 
is beneficial against future economic exclusion. This is consistent with findings in the 
sociological literature that girls are more affected by living in a reconstituted family 
(Hetherington et al. 1998). Having a non-working married mother at age 7 and 16 
appears detrimental for future economic integration but beneficial if it happens at age 
11. Having a lone non-working mother at 7 is detrimental to cultural integration. 
Looking at the offsetting effects of education and having a partner, we see that 
educational qualifications are associated with higher probabilities of being integrated 
econornIcally and particularly culturally. Compared to women who do not have a 
partner and had anti-social behaviour and family difficulties, those who have a non- 
working partner have a higher probability of being economically excluded and a 
slightly lower probability of being culturally excluded. For example for index 1, the 
probability that a women is in the highest economic exclusion category is increased 
by 10 percentage points, while the probability that a women is in the highest cultural 
exclusion category is decreased by 2 percentage points. Those who had dIfficulties 
during childhood and have a partner who works are less likely to be socially excluded. 
5.6 Conclusion 
We have found that anti-social behaviour and social difficulties during 
childhood are associated with later risks of social exclusion. These results 
hold when 
controlling for given personal characteristics such as ability and temperament 
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(measured by social behaviour) and for the current environment (measured by 
regional dummies). Educational qualifications appear to provide offsetting effects, 
especially for women. We have also found that outcomes in early adulthood (namely 
at age 23) are related to future social exclusion. Being in a "disadvantageous" 
situation at 23 years old appears to be associated with higher probability of social 
exclusion in the following years. What we called economic and cultural indices of 
integration are determined by slightly different factors. 
We can conclude that there is a certain degree of intergenerational transfer of 
difficulties. Social exclusion, which is generally viewed as the result of particular 
circumstances, is shown here to affect certain categories of people; in other words, 
people who suffered from social difficulties during their childhood are more at risks 
of social exclusion during adulthood. Compared with the studies of Gregg and 
Machin (2000) and Hobcraft (1998), we bring complementary results consistent with 
the idea that childhood difficulties have a persistent association with subsequent 
econonuc success in Britain. We provide the following additional insights. We study 
the effect of the employment and the marital status of the mother; we find weak 
evidence of long-term effects, and only for women. We also include an essential 
dimension to social exclusion: the partnership situation. The results show that having 
a partner is beneficial, except for women whose partner does not work. 
We provide a new composite index of social exclusion which appears to be 
quite robust to computational methods. It gives a better idea of the overall likelihood 
that individuals become socially excluded. 
In addition to the effect of financial difficulties, it appears that children who 
suffer from exclusion from social activities (through their parents' exclusion) are 
more likely to be themselves socially excluded when they are adults. 
This is 
consistent with the idea that, in addition to obvious issues of 
financial depnvation, a 
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lack of social interaction has longer-term consequences. If we apply this to the 
particular case of unemployment and long-term unemployment, there is some 
evidence that people who suffer psychologically from unemployment may pass on to 
their children characteristics which increase their probability of being socially 
excluded. Educational and work achievements as well as partnerships are found to 
offset childhood disadvantages. They do not however appear to be sufficient in 
preventing the combined detrimental effects of difficult family background and 
adolescent anti-social behaviour. For women, it appears that family structure is also 
relevant; those who have spent their childhood in an intact family fare better than 
others. This is a problematic result as more and more families are reconstituted. 
If we combine these results with those of the previous chapter, we can argue 
that unemployment has direct and indirect associations with social exclusion. The 
former have been identified for economic exclusion of men and the latter work 
through the unemployment's influence on adolescent social behaviour. Distinguishing 
between economic and cultural integration, we find that, for men, economic family 
background is indirectly linked to cultural integration and both indirectly and directly 
to economic integration. For women, economic family background influences 
economic and cultural integration both directly and indirectly, although father's 
unemployment does not have a direct effect on exclusion. Our conclusion that giving 
parenting guidance may be able to improve children's outcomes can therefore be 
extended to future (adult) outcomes. 
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220 
N<Z Iroz -\II0 ez rie Z ri ri- 
eýý rif ell'ý eip 
Table 5.1a: Childhood characteristics and social exchupdan (mim- nart 11 
No vote No Car Homeless Unem loyed 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
All 5576 0.249 5541 0.152 5585 0.036 5498 0.293 
No educational qualifications 3405 0.255 3387 0.155 3409 0.030 3347 0.293 
Degree Z: ) 530 0.170 521 0.104 530 0.042 525 0.255 
Father unemployed once 2844 0.257 2819 0.161 2848 0.039 2802 0.307 
Above average in maths 2221 0.234 2202 0.123 2223 0.038 2186 0.273 
Bad behaviour (school) 1520 0.293 1508 0.190 1521 0.053 1485 0.349 
Referred to an agency 672 0.324 668 0.265 673 0.059 650 0.418 
Contacts with police 599 0.331 598 0.256 599 0.063 582 0.435 
No father (sweep 3) 252 0.246 250 0.200 252 0.060 246 0.390 
Mother work (sweep 3) 2726 0.231 2706 0.139 2727 0.039 2689 0.289 
Table 5.1b: Childhood characteriqtic-q and --avin] -YvlviQinn tmon ---' lit, 
Pb. writing No phone Alcohol pbs. Arr ars 
All 5536 0.116 5531 0.077 5570 0.171 5555 0.079 
No educational qualifications 3379 0.135 3381 0.086 3398 0.165 3389 0.087 
Degree 530 0.036 526 0.013 531 0.156 528 0.019 
Father unemployed once 2823 0.125 2821 0.079 2839 0.180 2831 0.087 
Above averaoe in maths 2207 0.063 2201 0.051 2223 0.186 2213 0.066 
Bad behaviour (school) 1512 0.151 1501 0.113 1518 0.194 1515 0.101 
Referred to an agency 660 0.205 662 0.160 671 0.215 671 0.136 
Contacts with police 592 0.174 590 0.158 598 0.232 597 0.127 
No father (sweep 3) 248 0.141 248 0.125 253 0.194 249 0.088 
Mother work (sweep 3) 2706 0.104 2698 0.067 2722 0.173 2717 0.078, 
Table 5.1c: Childhood characteristics and social exclusion (wompn- nart fi- 
No vote No Car Homeless Unemployed 
All 5763 0.215 5721 0.150 5778 0.040 5688 0.225 
No educational qualifications 3294 0.232 3256 0.168 3303 0.039 3257 0.218 
Degree 485 0.113 486 0.086 487 0.043 482 0.224 
Father unemployed once 2907 0.217 2882 0.164 2914 0.041 2861 0.222 
Above average in maths 2787 0.189 2767 0.117 2793 0.042 2752 0.227 
Bad behaviour (school) 1386 0.259 1370 0.199 1391 0.055 1367 0.218 
Referred to an agency 477 0.273 471 0.259 482 0.062 466 0.234 
Contacts with police 228 0.289 223 0.215 228 0.088 224 0.263 
No father (sweep 3) 312 0.215 309 0.188 313 0.042 307 0.231 
Mother work (sweep 3) 2806 0.211 2783 0.130 2810 0.041 2784 0.2231 
Table 5.1d: Childhood characteristics and social exclusion (women, part 11). 
Pb. writing No phone Alcohol pbs. Arrears 
All 5744 0.061 5730 0.072 5747 0.079 5749 0.078 
No educational qualifications 3279 0.075 3281 0.089 3282 0.072 3278 0.089 
Degree 486 0.004 480 0.006 486 0.119 486 0.021 
Father unemployed once 2899 0.063 2892 0.080 2903 0.082 2905 0.085 
Above average in maths 2780 0.032 2765 0.053 2781 0.084 2781 0.065 
Bad behaviour (school) 1378 0.090 1380 0.117 1384 0.096 1384 0.112 
Referred to an agency 474 0.156 476 0.189 477 0.119 481 0.143 
Contacts with police 227 0.145 225 0.169 228 0.101 227 0.137 
No father (sweep 3) 309 0.058 310 0.106 312 0.115 310 0.103 
Mother work (sweep 3) 2796 0.055 2795 0.057 2799 0.079 2798 0.075 
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Table 5.2a: Ordered probit model with index I of social exclusion (mPn). 
Childhood only + education + adulthood Same, combined 
Childhood. tbrnily background 
Teenage mother -0-153* -0.176* -0.231 -0.223** 
(0.095) (0-096) (0.107) (0-107) 
Father left school after 15 -0.004 0.0004 0.010 0.004 
(0-071) (0.073) (0.082) (0.082) 
Mother left school after 15 -0.027 -0.017 -0.020 -0.015 
(0-069) (0.071) (0.077) (0.078) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.168 0.130 0.117 0.115 
(0.353) (0.346) (0-360) (0.362) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.120** 0.106* 0.086 0.090 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.062) (0.062) 
Some parental incentive for school 0.008 0.024 -0.022 -0.028 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.149) (0.150) 
Large parental incentive for school -0.107 -0.061 -0.072 -0-076 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.141) (0.142) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.097 -0.119 -0.070 -0-053 
(0.121) (0.119) (0.133) (0.134) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties 0.300 0.315 0.123 0.130 
(0.250) (0.246) (0.282) (0.281) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.033 0.019 0.017 0.022 
(0-081) (0.082) (0.090) (0.090) 
Father was at risk of unemployment 0.118 0.127 0.109 0.113 
(0-085) (0.087) (0.091) (0.092) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.284** 0.298** 0.321 ** 0.318** 
(0-092) (0.093) (0.104) (0.104) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.023 
(0.065) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.487 
(0.340) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.444* 
(0.242) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) 41, -0.030 
(0.068) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.022 
(0.299) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.024 
(0.393) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.019 
(0.070) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.253 
(0.237) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.260 
(0.279) 
Mother works (7) -0.015 -0.013 -0.033 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.064) 
Mother works (11) 0.017 0.009 0.032 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.067) 
Mother works (16) -0.005 -0.005 -0.021 
(0.061) (0.062) (0.069) 
Single mother (7) -0.336 -0.271 -0.227 
(0.247) (0.243) (0.257) 
Single mother 0 1) 0.126 0.082 -0.021 
(0-223) (0.224) (0.248) 
Single mother 0 6) -0.253 -0.283 -0.287 
(0-179) (0.179) (0.201) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.030 0.037 0.046 0.045 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.064) (0.064) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.071 -0.055 -0.071 -0.069 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.073) (0.073) 
Quick to settle (7) -0.039 -0.026 -0.029 -0.033 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.062) 
Reported once below average knowledge 0.036 -0.002 -0.015 -0ý018 
(0.071) (0.073) (0.080) (0.080) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.250** 0.149* 0.128 
0.128 
(0.094) (0.097) (0.104) (0.104) 
Has been in care 0.250* 0.202 
0.230 0.206 
(0.176) (0.179) (0.196) (0.200) 
Reported badly behaved by school 0 6) 0.247** 0.196** 0.213** 0.212** 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.065) (0.065) 
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Table 5.2a (ctd. ) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.097* 0.088* 0.092* 0.093* 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.058) (0.058) Refer-red to a social agency ( 16) 0.236** 0.234** 0.210* 0.210* 
(0.103) (0.105) (0.119) (0.119) 
Had contacts with the police (16) 0.054 0.043 0,064 0.068 
(0.096) (0.097) (0-106) (0.106) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 
-0-093 -0-097 
(0-099) (0.099) 
Skilled manuals 0.040 0.034 
(0-084) (0,084) 
Other manuals 0.324** 0.321 ** 
(0-104) (0.104) 
Has children 0.207* 0.204* 
(0-113) (0.114) 
Other education -0.121 -0.086 -0.081 
(0.110) (0.128) (0.128) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.308** -0.170 -0.171 
(0.107) (0-121) (0.122) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.392** -0.246** -0.242** 
(0.111) (0-125) (0.125) 
A levels -0.325** -0.192 -0.183 
(0-137) (0.159) (0.160) 
Highest vocational -0.432** -0.221 -0.218 
(0.132) (0.145) (0.145) 
Degree -0.358** -0.192 -0.186 
(0.144) (0-168) (0.168) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.171** -0.168** 
(0-067) (0-067) 
Partner unemployed or OLF -0.054 -0-043 
(0.120) (0.120) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.128 0.114 0.027 0.027 
(0.105) (0.106) (0.114) (0.114) 
North West -0.028 -0.034 -0.048 -0.055 
(0.104) (0.107) (0.117) (0,117) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.169* 0.171 * 0.154 0.152 
(0.096) (0.097) (0.104) (0.104) 
West Midlands 0.035 0.028 0.006 0.012 
(0.102) (0.104) (0.114) (0.114) 
East Midlands 0.075 0.071 0.093 0.093 
(0.107) (0.107) (0.118) (0-118) 
East Anglia -0.188 -0.215 -0.299* -0.297* 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.140) (0.140) 
South West -0-072 -0.087 -0.150 -0.147 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.111) (0.111) 
London 0.409** 0.406** 0.368** 0.360** 
(0.128) (0.131) (0.141) (0.142) 
Wales 0.227** 0.204* 0.141 0.139 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.122) (0.121) 
Scotland 0.013 0.006 0.014 0.012 
(0.099) (0.100) (0.109) (0.109) 
ýtl -0.209 -0.514 -0.385 -0.353 
(0.200) (0.218) (0.248) (0,251) 
p2 0.258 -0.045 0.111 0.143 
(0.200) (0.219) (0.249) (0.252) 
g3 0.666 0.369 0.501 0.535 
(0.200) (0.219) (0.249) (0.252) 
p4 1.306 1.013 1.139 1.173 
(0.201) (0.219) (0.249) (0.252) 
Number of observations 1872 1846 1590 1590 
Pseudo R2 0.0319 0.0365 0.0446 0.0452 
Pseudo-functional form 
2 
X (3)= 1 . 901 
j2Q)=1.205 X2 (3)=0.518 
2 
X (3)=0.692 
Normality X2 (2)=3.365 x2 (2)=3.140 x2 (2)=3.547 x2 (2)=2.797 
Heteroscedasticity 
2t, 2Q\_'2Q Q1 1 
Notes: 
(1) All childhood variables refer to the period between 7 and 16 years old unless the age 
is specified in brackets. 
(2) Coefficients with a star are statistically significant at 10% or with a ratio>1.5, at 
5% with two stars. Robust standard errors 
in brackets. 
(3) Test results in bold means the tests fail. 
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Table 5.2b: Chanims inDredicted nrobabilitips, indi-. v I (mi-n) 
Prob(index 1) 0 1 2 3 4 
social integration Max. social 
exclusion 
Childhoodfiamily background 
Teenage mother C, 9.17 0.66 -0.93 -3-15 -4.75 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) -3.95 -0.64 0.25 1.48 2.86 
Parents tenants when (16) -3-17 -0.41 0.27 1.21 2.11 
Always lived with both natural parents 1.85 0.26 -0.14 -0.70 -1.26 
Father was at risk of unemployment -4.06 -0.46 0.39 1.56 2.57 
Father was unemployed once or more -10.79 -1.82 0.61 4.01 7.99 
Couple, only male working (11) 1.07 0.14 -0.09 -0.41 -0.71 
Single mother working (11) 0.78 0.10 -0-07 -0.30 -0.52 
Single mother not working (11) -0.83 -0.12 0.06 0.31 0.57 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Reported once below average knowledge (by 11) 0.63 0.07 -0-06 -0.24 -0.40 
Reported below average knowledge at 7 and 11 -4.42 -0.69 0.29 1.67 3.15 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) -7.40 -1.04 0.57 2.81 5.07 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) -3.27 -0.42 0.28 1.25 2.17 
Referred to a social agency (16) -7.12 -1.22 0.39 2.65 5.29 
Had contacts with the police (16) -2.37 -0.34 0.18 0.90 1.63 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 3.58 0.25 -0.43 -1.39 -2.02 
Skilled manuals -1.24 -0.13 0.12 0.48 0.77 
Other manuals -10.70 -2.00 0.47 3.92 8.30 
Other qualification 2.72 0.51 -0.12 -1.01 -2,10 
Olevels/Lower vocational 5.86 0.94 -0-37 -2.20 -4.24 
5+ Olevels/Middle vocational 8.43 1.18 -0.64 -3-19 -5.78 
A levels 6.31 0.99 -0.41 -2.37 -4.52 
Highest vocational 7.56 1.11 -0.54 -2-86 -5.27 
Degree 6.40 1.00 -0.42 -2.41 -4.57 
Has children -6.96 -1.16 0.41 2.60 5.11 
Adulthoodfiamily background (at 23) 
Partner working 6.04 0.65 -0-59 -2.32 -3.78 
Partner unemployed or OLF 1.51 0.22 -0.11 -0.57 -1.04 
Region q1'residence at 33 
East Midlands -3.25 -0.45 0.25 1.24 2.21 
London -11-63 -2.50 0.26 4.14 9.73 
Scotland -0.44 -0.05 0.04 0.17 0.28 
Predicted base probability (at the means) 0.311 0.190 0.152 0.196 0.151 
Base person 1 0.430 0.196 0.136 0.150 0.089 
Base person 1, anti-social behaviour 0.224 0.173 0.155 0.227 0.221 
Base person 1, family difficulties 0.303 0.189 0.153 0.199 0.156 
Anti-social behaviour, faraily difficulties 0.136 0.138 0.143 0.249 0.334 
Base person 2 0.376 0.196 0.145 0.171 
0.113 
Base person 2, anti-social behaviour, fan-ffly difficulties 0.108 0.121 0.134 
0.25 0.387 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, degree 0.146 0.143 0.146 0.248 0.318 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, middle vocational 0.159 0.149 0.148 0.245 0.299 
Base person 3 0.412 
0.196 0.139 0.157 0.096 
Base person 3, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.126 
0.132 0.14 0.25 0.351 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partner works 0.165 0.151 0.149 0.244 0.291 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partners does not work 0.136 0.137 0.143 0.249 0.335 
See notes below 
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Table 5.3a: Ordered vrobit model with index 2 of qociql i-vehmian br", -n) 
Childhood only + education + adulthood Same, combined 
Childhoodfamily background 
Teenage mother -0.148* -0.164* -0.232** -0.219** (0.095) (0.097) (0.109) (a 109) 
Father left school after 15 -0.025 -0.019 0.008 0.002 
(0.068) (0-070) (0.080) (0.080) 
Mother left school after 15 -0.063 -0.053 -0.064 -0.057 (0,068) (0.069) (0.076) (0.076) 
Had a relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.313 0.272 0.289 0.296 
(0.388) (0-381) (0.401) (0.403) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.153** 0.138** 0.105* 0.111 * 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.062) (0.062) 
Some parental incentive for school 0.042 0.058 0.0004 -0.005 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.145) (0,145) 
Large parental incentive for school C4 -0.069 -0.023 -0.044 -0.046 
(0.122) (0,123) (0-136) (0.137) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.070 -0.096 -0.057 -0.036 
(0.119) (0.117) (0-130) (0.131) 
Family were at risk financial difficulties 0.242 0.250 0.083 0.095 
(0.253) (0.247) (0.301) (0.300) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.074 0.054 0.040 0.046 
(0.082) (0.083) (0.091) (0.091) 
Father was at risk unemployed 0.052 0.066 0.082 0.090 
(0.081) (0.083) (0.090) (0.090) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.244** 0.259** 0.301** 0.295** 
(0-092) (0.093) (0.105) (0.105) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.001 
(0.064) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.509 
(0.343) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 1: 1 0.581** 
(0.293) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) 0.014 
(0.068) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.032 
(0.321) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.342 
(0.384) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.019 
(0.070) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.219 
(0.249) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.286 
(0.290) 
Mother works (7) -0-015 -0.005 -0.012 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.064) 
Mother works (11) -0.018 -0,035 -0.014 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.068) 
Mother works (16) -0.010 -0.003 -0.020 
(0.061) (0.062) (0.068) 
Single mother (7) -0.258 -0.184 -0.210 
(0.259) (0.260) (0.265) 
Single mother (11) 0.218 0.167 0.038 
(0.234) (0.238) (0.266) 
Single mother (16) -0.253 -0.286* -0.281 
(0.188) (0.191) (0.211) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.044 0.053 0.067 
0.068 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.105 * -0.085 -0.088 -0.085 
(0.065) (0.067) (0.073) (0.073) 
Quick to settle (7) -0.067 -0.057 -0.058 -0.063 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) 
Reported once below average knowledge 0.086 0.038 
0.012 0.009 
(0-071) (0.073) (0.081) (0.081) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.366** 0.252** 0.226** 
0.226** 
(0.095) (0.098) (0.105) (0.105) 
Has been in care 0.198 0.149 
0.181 0.140 
(0.178) (0.181) (0.206) (0.209) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.209** 0.146** 0.141 ** 
0.137** 
(0-058) (0.059) (0.064) (0.065) 
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Table 5.3a (ctd. ) 
Re orted b dl b h p a y e aved by mother (16) 0.123** 0.119** 0.119** 0.119** 
Referred to a social agency (16) 
(0.052) 
0 248** 
(0.053) 
0 24 ** 
(0.057) (0.057) 
. . 7 0.186* 0.184* 
Had contacts with the police ( 16) 
(0.102) 
0 024 
(0.103) (0,116) (0.116) 
. 0.005 0.029 0.036 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.104) (0.104) Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 
-0.049 -0-053 
Skilled manuals 
(0.097) (0.097) 
0.030 0.023 
Other manuals 
(0.083) (0-083) 
0.396** 0.394** 
Has children 
(0.105) (0.105) 
0.284** 0.280** 
Other education 
-0.142 
(0.117) 
-0.169 
(0.117) 
-0.165 (0.110) (0.128) (0.128) 0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.329** -0.232* -0.238* 
(0.108) (0.123) (0.123) 5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.476** -0-373** -0.372** 
(0.109) (0,124) (0.124) 
A levels 
-0.400** -0.295* -0.288* 
(0.137) (0.159) (0.160) 
Highest vocational -0.467** -0-311 ** -0.313** 
(0.132) (0.145) (0.146) 
Degree 
-0.433** -0.357** -0-357** 
(0.139) (0.163) (0.164) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.147 -0.143 
(0.066) (0.066) 
Partner unemployed or OLF -0-089 -0.073 
(0.120) (0.120) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.144 0.129 0.045 0.044 
(0.104) (0.105) (0.115) (0.115) 
North West 0.020 -0.014 -0.005 -0.014 
(0.107) (0.110) (0.119) (0.119) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.172* 0.161 * 0.140 0.136 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.101) (0.101) 
West Midlands 0.038 0.025 -0.001 0.005 
(0.099) (0.101) (0.111) (0.111) 
East Midlands 0.181 0.176* 0.201 * 0.200* 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.120) (0.120) 
East Anglia -0.113 -0.152 -0.231 -0.229 
(0.129) (0.131) (0.145) (0.145) 
South West 4029 -0.048 -0.110 -0.109 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.109) (0.109) 
London 0.443** 0.434** 0.444** 0.434** 
(0.127) (0-130) (0.140) (0.140) 
Wales 0.195* 0.171 * 0.137 0.133 
(0.109) (0.110) (0.119) (0.119) 
Scotland 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.001 
(0.098) (0.099) (0-106) (0.107) 
-0.173 -0.538 -0.441 -0.385 
(0.198) (0.216) (0.243) (0.247) 
42 0.286 -0.073 0.040 0.097 
(0.198) (0.216) (0.243) (0.247) 
g3 0.565 0.213 0.319 0.377 
(0.198) (0.216) (0.243) (0.247) 
g4 0.944 0.599 0.695 0.753 
(0.198) (0.216) (0.242) (0.247) 
g5 1.443 1.108 1.222 1.282 
(0.198) (0.216) (0.244) (0.249) 
Observations 1872 1846 1590 1590 
Pseudo R2 0.0348 0.0407 0.0490 0.0500 
Pseudo-functional form 
2 
X (3)=2.925 
2 (3)=3.493 x 
2 (3)=1.046 x 
2 (3)=1.254 x 
Normality X2 (2)=4.716 
2 
X (2)=5.223 
2 
X (2)=9.164 
2 
X (2)=8.265 
Heteroscedasticity 
2 
x (38)=45-766 X2 (44)=50.617 X2 (50)=67.231 x2 (53)=76.141 
Notes: See table 5.2a 
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Table 5.3b: Changes in predicted probabilities index 2 (men) I 1'rob(index 2) 0 1 2 -3 -4 5 
Social Max. social integration exclusion Childhoodjbinily background 
Teenage mother 8.01 0.70 -0.49 -1.49 -2.73 -4.01 Relative in contact with police (by 11) -9.54 -2.05 -0.08 1.25 3.41 7.01 
Parents tenants when (16) -3.90 -0.53 0.14 0.66 1.37 2.25 
Always lived with both natural parents 1.27 0.18 -0.04 -0.21 -0.45 -0.75 Father ývas at risk of unemployment -3.20 -0.38 0.15 0.56 1.11 1.76 
Father was unemployed once or more -9.95 -1.73 0.15 1.50 3.53 6.50 
Couple, only male working (11) ZD -0.48 -0.06 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.28 
Single mother working (11) 1.13 0.14 -0.05 -0.20 -0.39 -0.63 Single mother not working (11) -10.90 -2.44 -0-16 1.36 3.89 8.25 
Childhoodpersonal characteristics 
Reported once below avera e knowledge (by 11) 9 t: 1 -0-33 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.18 
Reported below average knowledge at 7 and 11 -7.64 -1.33 0.11 1.16 2.71 4.98 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) -4.79 -0.68 0.16 0.80 1.69 2.83 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) -4.20 -0.57 0.16 0.71 1.47 2.42 
Referred to a social agency (16) -6.25 -1.07 0.11 0.96 2.22 4.02 
Had contacts with the police (16) -1.27 -0.18 0.04 0.21 0.45 0.75 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 1.94 0.15 -0.13 -0.37 -0.66 -0.94 
Skilled manuals -0.83 -0.08 0.05 0.15 0.29 0.43 
Other manuals -12.92 -2.56 0.00 1.78 4.59 9.12 
Other qualification 5.33 1.14 0.04 -0.71 -1.91 -3.90 
Olevels/Lower vocational 7.89 1.52 -0.04 -1-13 -2-82 -5.43 
5+ Olevels/Middle vocational 12.76 1.96 -0.32 -2.03 -4.48 -7.89 
A levels 9.66 1.72 -0.12 -1.44 -3.43 -6.39 
Highest vocational 10.57 1.81 -0.17 -1-61 -3.74 -6-85 
Degree 12.19 1.93 -0.28 -1.92 -4.29 -7.63 
Has children -9.35 -1.72 0.08 1.37 3.33 6.29 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working 5.10 0.61 -0.23 -0.89 -1.77 -2.82 
Partner unemployed or OLF 2.55 0.36 -0.09 -0.43 -0-90 -1.49 
Region of residence at 33 
East Midlands -6.85 -1.11 0.15 1.08 2.43 4.30 
London -13.77 -3-11 -0.23 1.68 4.89 10.54 
Scotland -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Predicted base probability (at the means) 0.307 0.184 0.111 0.135 0.141 0.122 
Base person 1 0.407 0.190 0.103 0.116 0.107 0.076 
Base person 1, anti-social behaviour 0.238 0.171 0.111 0.145 0.165 0.170 
Base person 1, farnily difficulties 0.283 0.180 0.111 0.139 0.149 0.138 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.146 0.138 0.102 0.149 0.196 0.270 
Base person 2 0.323 0.186 0.110 0.133 0.135 0.113 
Base person 2, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.101 0.113 0.090 0.142 0.207 0.348 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, degree 0.179 0.152 0.107 0.149 0.186 0.228 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, middle vocational 0.183 0.153 0.107 0.149 0.185 0.223 
Base person 3 0.390 0.190 0.105 0.120 0.113 0.083 
Base person 3, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.136 0.133 0.100 0.148 0.199 0.285 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partner works 0.170 0.148 0.105 0.149 0.189 0.238 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partners does not work 0.153 0.141 0.103 0.149 0.194 0.261 
See notes below 
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Table 5.4a: OrderedDrobit for index 3 of social Pxchiqinn (mm) 
Childhood only + education +- adulthood Same, combined 
ChildhoodfiarnilY background 
Teenage mother -0.213** -0.247** -0.320** -0.309** (0.098) (0.099) (0.109) (0.109) 
Father left school after 15 -0.028 -0.021 0.007 0.003 
(0-073) (0.074) (0.084) (0.085) 
Mother left school after 15 -0.087 -0.078 -0.080 -0.074 (0.072) (0.073) (0.080) (0.080) 
Had a relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.223 0.175 0.300 0.306 
(0.419) (0.410) (0.456) (0.459) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.087 0.069 0.052 0.059 
(0.059) (0.06*) (0.066) (0.066) 
Some parental incentive for school 0.040 0.043 0.010 0.006 
(0.139) (0.139) (0.154) (0.154) 
Large parental incentive for school -0.043 -0.002 0.004 0.001 
(0.128) (0.129) (0.143) (0.143) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0-127 -0-172 -0.100 -0.082 (0-132) (0.129) (0.145) (0.145) 
Family were at risk financial difficulties 0.188 0.206 0.009 0.021 
(0-238) (0.234) (0.262) (0.261) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.054 0.033 0.002 0.005 
(0-086) (0.087) (0.095) (0.095) 
Father was at risk unemployed 0.063 0.072 0.093 0.100 
(0-086) (0.087) (0.094) (0.094) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.242** 0.255** 0.273** 0.268** 
(0-099) (0.101) (0.112) (0.112) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.019 
(0-067) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.433 
(0.341) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.645 
(0.409) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) 0.026 
(0.072) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.094 
(0.300) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.255 
(0.443) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.023 
(0.073) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.225 
(0.244) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.197 
(0.236) 
Mother works (7) -0.020 -0.017 -0.029 
(0.060) (0-061) (0.067) 
Mother works (11) -0.015 -0.023 -0.026 
(0.065) (0.066) (0.071) 
Mother works (16) -0.015 -0.016 -0.028 
(0.064) (0-065) (0.072) 
Single mother (7) -0.331 -0.257 -0.185 
(0.260) (0.262) (0.275) 
Single mother (11) 0.159 0.099 -0.040 
(0.234) (0.238) (0.262) 
Single mother (16) -0.276* -0.303* -0.247 
(0.194) (0.197) (0.220) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.034 0.045 0.041 0.041 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.065) (0.065) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.154** -0.137* -0.142* -0.140* 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.076) (0.076) 
Quick to settle (7) -0.075 -0.061 -0.066 -0.065 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.066) (0.066) 
Reported once below average knowledge 0.065 0.012 -0.007 -0.009 
(0.075) (0.077) (0.084) (0.084) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.315** 0.206** 0.186* 
0.189* 
(0.100) (0.104) (0.112) (0.112) 
Has been in care 0.208 0.161 
0.120 0.083 
(0.185) (0.189) (0.205) (0.207) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.270** 0.212** 0.220** 0.219** 
(0.061) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) 
228 
Table 5.4a (ctd. ) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.121** 0.117** 0.127** 0.127** 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.060) (0.060) Referred to a social agency ( 16) 0.261 ** 0.262** 0.195 0.193* 
(0.110) (0.112) (0.123) (0.123) Had contacts with the police (16) 0.017 -0.003 0.023 0.029 
(0-102) (0.102) (0.111) (0.110) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 
-0.030 -0.032 
(0.100) (0.100) 
Skilled manuals 0.064 0.058 
(0.086) (0.086) 
Other manuals 0.379** 0.376** 
(0.109) (0.110) 
Has children 0.215* 0.213* 
(0.116) (0.116) 
Other education -0.140 -0.171 -0-166 
(0.121) (0.141) (0.141) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0-338** -0.253** -0.257** 
(0.118) (0.134) (0.135) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.467** -0.371** -0.369** 
(0.119) (0.135) (0-136) 
A levels -0.447** -0.362** -0.354** 
(0.143) (0.167) (0.168) 
Highest vocational -0.475** -0.320** -0.320** 
(0.142) (0.157) (0-158) 
Degree -0.434** -0-347** -0.344** 
(0.150) (0.176) (0.177) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.144** -0.140** 
(0-069) (0.068) 
Partner unemployed or OLF -0.029 -0.017 
(0.120) (0.120) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.148 0.131 0.023 0.022 
(0.111) (0.113) (0.121) (0.121) 
North West -0.011 -0.035 -0.039 -0.047 
(0.112) (0.115) (0.124) (0.124) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.116 0.111 0.096 0.090 
(0.097) (0.098) (0.104) (0.104) 
West Midlands -0.012 -0.024 -0.057 -0-053 
(0.104) (0.106) (0.116) (0.116) 
East Midlands 0.072 0.069 0.105 0.105 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.123) (0.123) 
East Anglia -0.113 -0.149 -0.224 -0.223 
(0-134) (0.136) (0.152) (0.152) 
South West -0.026 -0.044 -0.108 -0.107 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.115) (0.115) 
London 0.439** 0.431 ** 0.454** 0.449** 
(0.139) (0.142) (0.157) (0.157) 
Wales 0.189* 0.159 0.131 0.125 
(0.115) (0.116) (0.128) (0.128) 
Scotland 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
(0.104) (0.105) (0.114) (0.114) 
41 -0-314 -0.708 -0.549 -0.459 
(0.212) (0.236) (0.268) (0.269) 
g2 0.598 0.221 0.410 0.502 
(0.213) (0.236) (0.268) (0.269) 
Number of observations 1872 1846 1590 1590 0.0666 0.0654 0.0558 0.0470 Pseudo R2 2 2 2 2 
Pseudo-functional form X (3)=2.270 X (3)=2.31 1X (3)=0.783 X (3)=2.004 
Normality x2 (2)=6.869 x2 (2)=7.862 x2 (2)=10.447 x2 (2)=9.547 
Heteroscedasticity x2 (38)=40.079 X2 (44)--48.280 x2 (50)=57.818 x2 (53)=64.401 
Notes: See table 5.2a. 
229 
Table 5.4b: Chanp-es in Dredicted Drobabilities index 3 (men). 
Prob(index 3) 0 
Social 
integration 
2 
Max. social 
exclusion 
Childhood Jbinily background 
Teenage mother 11.53 -1.32 -10.21 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) -10.03 -1,48 11.51 
Parents tenants when ( 16) -2.09 0.01 2.08 
Always lived with both natural parents 2.89 0.07 -2.95 
Father was at risk of unemployment -3-60 0.11 3.49 
Father was unemployed once or more -9.27 -0.48 9.75 
Couple, only male working (11) -0.94 0.00 0.94 
Single mother working (11) 3.43 -0.20 -3.23 
Single mother not working (11) -8-52 -0.96 9.48 
Childhoodpersonal characteristics 
Reported once below average knowledge (by 11) Z' 0.34 -0.01 -0.33 
Reported below average knowledge at 7 and 11 Zý 41 -6.50 -0-38 6.88 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) -7.70 -0.11 7.81 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) -4.54 0.02 4.52 
Referred to a social agency (16) -6-62 -0.41 7.03 
Had contacts with the police (16) -1.02 0.00 1.03 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 1.20 -0.13 -1.07 
Skilled manuals -2.13 0.14 1.99 
Other manuals -12.72 -1.12 13.84 
Other qualification 5.45 0.81 -6.27 
Olevels/Lower vocational 8.66 0.86 -9.52 
5+ Olevels/Middle vocational 12.77 0.54 -13.31 
A levels 12.22 0.61 -12.83 
Highest vocational 10.94 0.73 -11.67 
Degree 11.84 0.65 -12.49 
Has children -7.32 -0.46 7.78 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working 5.07 -0.19 -4.88 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.60 0.01 -0-62 
Region of residence at 33 
East Midlands -3.70 -0.07 3.76 
London -14.23 -2.82 17.04 
Scotland 0.16 -0.01 -0.16 
Predicted base probability (at the means) 0.317 0.369 0.314 
Base person 1 0.420 0.356 0.224 
Base person 1, anti-social behaviour 0.221 0.355 0.425 
Base person 1, family difficulties 0.317 0.369 0.314 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.148 0.319 0.533 
Base person 2 0.331 0.369 
0.300 
Base person 2, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.101 0.275 
0.624 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, degree 0.175 0.336 0.489 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, middle vocational 0.182 0.339 0.479 
Base person 3 0.406 
0.359 0.235 
Base person 3, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.140 
0.313 0.547 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partner works 0.174 0.335 0.491 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partners does not work 0.144 0.316 
0.540 
See notes below 
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Table 5.5a: Ordered probit with index I of social exclusion (women) r- Childhood only + education + adulthood Same, combined Childhood. /arnily background 
Teenage mother -0.077 -0.069 -0.030 -0.034 (0.095) (0.096) (0.098) (0.099) Father left school after 15 0.015 0.066 0.081 0.080 
(0.072) (0-075) (0.081) (0-081) 
Mother left school after 15 0.054 0.087 0.075 0.075 
(0.072) (0-074) (0.079) (0-079) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.613** 0.641 ** 0.595** 0.550** 
(0.214) (0.222) (0.251) (0.259) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.176** 0.143** 0.117* 0.116* 
(0.057) (0-058) (0.062) (0.062) 
Some parental incentive for school -0.224* -0.230* -0.167 -0.153 (0.133) (0-134) (0.144) (0.145) 
Large parental incentive for school -0.293** -0.249** -0.186 -0.173 (0.124) (0-126) (0.136) (0-136) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.361 ** -0.359** -0.250* -0-241 * (0.123) (0.123) (0.134) (0-135) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties -0.417* -0.515* -0.301 -0.296 
(0.229) (0.254) (0.259) (0-259) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.052 0.044 0,049 0.055 
(0.080) (0-080) (0.087) (0.087) 
Father was at risk of unemployment -0.013 0.011 -0.017 -0.010 
(0.081) (0-081) (0.087) (0-087) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.051 0.086 0.028 0.021 
(0.090) (0-093) (0.099) (0.099) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.016 
(0-062) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.022 
(0-266) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.297 
(0.424) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.090 
(0.067) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.304 
(0.242) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.065 
(0.335) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.092 
(0.066) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.070 
(0.231) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 0.085 
(0.231) 
Mother works (7) -0.032 -0.034 -0.018 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.061) 
Mother works (11) 0.102* 0.092 0.083 
(0.062) (0.063) (0.067) 
Mother works (16) -0.071 -0.069 -0.096 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.065) 
Single mother (7) -0.154 -0.163 0.015 
(0.211) (0.217) (0.244) 
Single mother (11) -0.302* -0.354* -0.215 
(0.182) (0.186) (0.208) 
Single mother (16) -0.184 -0.160 -0-061 
(0.164) (0.167) (0.184) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) -0.024 0.011 0.013 
0.013 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.092 -0.049 -0.067 -0.067 
(0.064) (0.065) (0.070) (0.070) 
Settled within one month at school (7) -0.023 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.026 -0.091 -0.105 -0.105 
(0.070) (0.072) (0.077) (0.077) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.231 ** 0.156* 0.109 
0.108 
(0.090) (0.094) (0.100) (0.100) 
Has been in care 0.003 -0.022 -0-039 -0.035 
(0.189) (0.192) (0.197) (0.197) 
Reported badly behaved by school 0 6) 0.110* 0.045 0.051 
0.050 
(0.062) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068) 
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Table 5.5a (ctd. ) 
Reported badly behaved by mother at 16 0.117** 0.090* 0.061 0.058 
Referred to a social agency at 16 41 
(0-052) 
0.273** 
(0,053) 
0.248** 
(0.056) 
0.218* 
(0.056) 
0.219* 
(0-105) (0-106) (0.114) (0-114) Had contacts with the police at 16 0.144 0.113 0.095 0,099 
(0.136) (0.137) (0.145) (0.145) Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 
-0-056 -0.059 
(0.087) (0.087) Skilled manuals 0.090 0.093 
(0.102) (0-102) 
Other manuals 0.346** 0.350** 
(0.084) (0.084) 
Has children 0.084 0.082 
(0.070) (0.071) 
Other education -0.144 -0-047 -0.043 
(0-096) (0-106) (0-106) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.161 * -0.028 -0.022 
(0-097) (0-108) (0.109) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.440** -0.281 ** -0.278** 
(0-112) (0.122) (0-123) 
A levels 
-0-393** -0.152 -0,151 
(0-132) (0-150) (0.149) 
Highest vocational -0.542** -0.320** -0.313** 
(0.125) (0.149) (0.149) 
Degree -0.484** -0-371 ** -0.370** 
(0.140) (0.165) (0-165) 
Adulthoodfamiýy background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.160** -0.158** 
(0-063) (0.063) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.222* 0.23 1* 
(0-137) (0-136) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.276** 0.255** 0.142 0.144 
(0.117) (0.119) (0.127) (0.127) 
North West 0.196** 0.183* 0.106 0.105 
(0.096) (0-097) (0-103) (0-103) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.100 0.072 0.022 0.020 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.107) (0.107) 
West Midlands 0.114 0.098 0.012 0.009 
(0.101) (0.102) (0-108) (0.108) 
East Midlands 0.240** 0.236** 0.219* 0.220* 
(0.107) (0.109) (0-113) (0.113) 
East Anglia 0.197* 0.164 0.141 0.141 
(0.127) (0.128) (0-136) (0.136) 
South West -0.061 -0,071 -0-131 -0.131 
(0.098) (0.099) (0.106) (0.107) 
London 0.420** 0.421 ** 0.455** 0.453** 
(0.134) (0.135) (0.145) (0.146) 
Wales 0.118 0.103 0.010 0.004 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.124) (0.125) 
Scotland 0.357** 0.340** 0.266** 0.265** 
(0.100) (0-103) (0.112) (0.112) 
-0.440 -0.686 -0.477 -0.429 
(0.193) (0.208) (0.231) (0.234) 
p2 -0.092 -0.336 -0.129 -0.080 
(0.193) (0.208) (0.230) (0.234) 
g3 0.225 -0.017 0.187 
0.236 
(0.193) (0.208) (0.230) (0.234) 
g4 0.548 0.308 
0.519 0.569 
(0.193) (0.208) (0.231) (0.235) 
45 1.178 0.948 
1.190 1.239 
(0.196) (0.210) (0.233) (0.237 
Number of observations 1936 1920 1715 
1715 
Pseudo R2 0.0308 0.0365 0.0429 0.0431 
Pseudo-functional form X2 (3)=2.553 
2 
X (3)=3.998 
2 
X (3)=1.640 X-(3)=3.106 
Normality x2 (2)=4.877 X2 (2)=4.905 x2 (2)=4.421 X2(2)=4.220 
Heteroscedasti city X2 (38)--47.657 
X2 (44)=53-302 X2 (50)=68.647 X2 (53)=71.518 
Notes: See notes table 5.2a. 
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Table 5.5b: chanp-es inDredicted Drobabilities, indev I (wompni 
Prob(Index 1) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Social Max. 
integration social 
exclusion 
Childhood. /amily background 
Mother Nvas younger than 20 at delivery 1.36 -0.05 -0.17 -0.26 -0.50 -0.37 
A family member had been in contact with police etc. when child was 11 -20.47 -1.18 1.09 3.04 8.37 9.15 
Parents tenants when child was 16 -4.60 0.16 Oý57 0.86 1.71 1.29 
Always lived with both natural parents 9.48 -0.06 -0.99 -1.69 -3.66 -3.07 
Father was never unemployed (+ missing) 0.39 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.15 -0.11 
Fatherv,, as unemployed twice or more -0.85 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.32 0.25 
Mother does not work + male head (11) 3.58 -0.12 -0.44 -0.67 -1.33 -1.01 
Mother works + no male head (child is 11) 12.08 -0.84 -1.75 -2-36 -4.25 -2.87 
Mother does not work + no male head (11) 2.59 -0.08 -0.31 -0.48 -0.97 -0.74 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Was reported once by school to have below average knowledge (by 11) 4.19 -0.22 -0.56 -0.80 -1.52 -1.08 
Was reported by school to have below average knowledge at 7 and 11 -4.27 0.07 0.47 0.78 1.63 1.32 
Reported badly behaved by school at 16 -1.99 0.06 0.24 0.37 0.74 0.56 
Reported badly behaved by mother at 16 -2.29 0.08 0.28 0.43 0.85 0.64 
Referred to a social agency at 16 -8.62 0.04 0.89 1.53 3.34 2,81 
Had contacts with the police at 16 -3.92 0.08 0.45 0.72 1.49 1.19 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 2.37 -0.16 -0-34 -0.46 -0.84 -0.57 
Skilled manuals -3.72 0.15 0.48 0.70 1.37 1.01 
Other manuals -13.67 -0.04 1.32 2.38 5.34 4.66 
Other qualification 1.68 0.00 -0.17 -0.30 -0.65 -0.55 
Olevels/Lower vocational 0.88 0.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.34 -0.29 
5+ Olevels/Middle vocational 11.03 -0.46 -1.41 -2.08 -4.06 -3.02 
A levels 5.98 -0.12 -0.68 -1.10 -2.27 -1.81 
Highest vocational 12.43 -0.59 -1.63 -2.36 -4.54 -3.31 
Degree 14.67 -0.83 -2.01 -2-82 -5.27 -3.74 
Has children -3.24 0.10 0.39 0.60 1.22 0.93 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working 6.27 -0.24 -0.79 -1.18 -2.32 -1.74 
Partner unemployed or OLF -8-90 -0.26 0.69 1.46 3.58 3.42 
Region of residence at 33 
East Midlands -8.73 0.24 1.03 1.62 3.29 2.56 
London -17.54 -0.23 1.55 2.97 6.91 6.33 
Scotland -10.46 0.20 1.18 1.91 3.98 3.19 
Predicted base probability (at the means) 0.471 0.138 0.114 0.099 0.122 0.055 
Base person 1 0.460 0.138 0.116 0.102 0.127 
0.059 
Base person 1, anti-social behaviour 0.299 0.130 0.126 
0.126 0.192 0.127 
Base person 1, family difficulties 0.429 0.138 
0.119 0.107 0.138 0.068 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.273 0.126 0.125 0.129 0.203 0.144 
Base person 2 0.413 0.138 
0.121 0.110 0.145 0.074 
Base person 2, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.235 
0.119 0.123 0.131 0.219 0.172 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, degree 0.363 0.136 0.124 0.118 0.165 0.094 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, middle vocational 0.329 0.134 0.125 0.123 0.179 
0.111 
Base person 3 0.432 
0.138 0.119 0.107 0.137 0.068 
Base person 3, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.250 
0.122 0.124 0.131 0.213 0.160 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partner works 0,303 0.131 0.126 
0.126 0.191 0.125 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partners does not work 0.183 0.106 0.116 
0.132 0.240 0.223 
See notes below 
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Table 5.6a: OrderedDrobit with index 2 of -, nciqi wyehician 
Childhood only + education + adulthood Same, combined Childhood. fainily background 
Teenage mother -0.098 -0.091 -0-075 -0.080 (0-095) (0.096) (0.098) (0.099) Father left school after 15 0.002 0.054 0.053 0.053 
(0-072) (0-075) (0.081) (0-081) 
Mother left school after 15 0.052 0.087 0.077 0.077 
(0-072) (0.075) (0.080) (0.080) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.580** 0.642** 0.672** 0.635** 
(0.229) (0.232) (0.259) (0.268) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.186** 0.152** 0.119* 0.117* 
(0-058) (0.059) (0-063) (0.063) 
Some parental incentive for school -0-075 -0.073 0.021 0.035 
(0.131) (0.133) (0.143) (0.144) 
Large parental incentive for school 41 -0.192* -0.138 -0-039 -0.026 
(0-121) (0.124) (0-134) (0.135) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.412** -0.413** -0.320** -0.314** 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.146) (0.146) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties -0.316 -0.436* -0.224 -0.219 
(0.265) (0.288) (0.297) (0.297) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.093 0.082 0.068 0.074 
(0.082) (0.083) (0.089) (0.089) 
Father was at risk of unemployment -0.009 0.013 -0.014 -0.008 
(0-083) (0.083) (0.090) (0.089) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.036 0.069 0.034 0.028 
(0.092) (0.095) (0-102) (0.102) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.029 
(0.063) 
Lone working mother (7) 0.120 
(0.285) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.231 
(0.387) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.110* 
(0.068) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.400* 
(0.240) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.196 
(0.348) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.115* 
(0.068) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.138 
(0.234) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 0.084 
(0.258) 
Mother works (7) -0.036 -0.043 -0.029 
(0.059) (0.059) (0-063) 
Mother works (11) 0.118* 0.109* 0.102 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.067) 
Mother works (16) -0.095* -0.091 -0.121* 
(0.062) (0.063) (0.067) 
Single mother (7) -0.042 -0.047 0.123 
(0.226) (0.234) (0.258) 
Single mother (11) -0.369** -0.430** -0.317 
(0.186) (0.190) (0.210) 
Single mother (16) -0.234 -0.207 -0.104 
(0.173) (0.176) (0.195) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) -0.012 0.023 0.023 
0.024 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.121 * -0.078 -0.090 -0.090 
(0.067) (0.068) (0-073) (0.073) 
Quick to settle (7) -0.025 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 
(0.059) (0.060) (0-064) (0.064) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.023 -0.094 -0.110 -0.110 
(0.073) (0.075) (0.081) (0.081) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.242** 0.151* 0.094 0.093 
(0.093) (0.097) (0-103) (0.103) 
Has been in care -0.107 -0.139 -0.140 -0.140 
(0.192) (0.194) (0.202) (0.204) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.109* 0.039 0.046 0.045 
(0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.070) 
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Table 5.6a (ctd. ) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.105** 0.078 0.049 0.047 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058) Referred to a social agency (16) 0.250** 0.214* 0.159 0.159 
(0.110) (0-112) (0-118) (0.118) Had contacts with the police (16) 0.248* 0.225* 0.182 0.185 
(0.146) (0.147) (0.154) (0.154) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 0.031 0.027 
(0.089) (0.090) 
Skilled manuals 0.118 0.121 
(0.103) (0-103) 
Other manuals 0.354** 0.360** 
(0.087) (0-087) 
Has children 0.114* 0.110 
(0,073) (0.074) 
Other education -0.213** -0.113 -0-107 
(0.101) (0.111) (0.111) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.233** -0.111 -0.105 
(0.103) (0.114) (0.115) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.491 ** -0.341** -0.336** 
(0.117) (0.127) (0.128) 
A levels -0.466** -0.230* -0.228** 
(0.136) (0.152) (0.152) 
Highest vocational -0.615** -0.443** -0.435** 
(0.129) (0.153) (0.153) 
Degree -0.557** -0.481 ** -0.477** 
(0.143) (0.168) (0.168) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.129** -0.126 
(0.063) (0.063) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.341** 0.350** 
(0.148) (0.148) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.272** 0.249** 0.106 0.107 
(0.121) (0.123) (0.131) (0.131) 
North West 0.203** 0.191 * 0.110 0,109 
(0.097) (0.098) (0.104) (0.104) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.135 0.109 0.036 0.033 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.109) (0.109) 
West Midlands 0.121 0.107 0.012 0.010 
(0.102) (0.103) (0.110) (0.110) 
East Midlands 0.239** 0.237** 0.221 * 0.222* 
(0-108) (0.110) (0.115) (0-115) 
East Angfia 0.178 0.150 0.114 0.113 
(0.130) (0.131) (0.140) (0.140) 
South West -0.043 -0.050 -0-108 -0.109 
(0.101) (0.102) (0.111) (0.111) 
London 0.336** 0.342** 0.364** 0.362** 
(0-130) (0-130) (0.141) (0.141) 
Wales 0.189* 0.173 0.044 0.038 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.128) (0.128) 
Scotland 0.325** 0.304** 0.202* 0.202* 
(0.100) (0.103) (0.111) (0.111) 
ýLl -0.406 -0.711 -0.470 -0.407 
(0.201) (0.219) (0.244) (0.246) 
ý0 0.173 -0.128 
0.107 0.171 
(0.201) (0.219) (0.244) (0.246) 
ý0 0.746 
0.452 0.708 0.773 
(0.202) (0.219) (0.244) (0.246) 
Number of observations 1936 1920 
1715 1715 
Pseudo R2 0.0375 0.0451 0.0523 0.0526 
Pseudo-functional form 
2 
X (3)=0.431 ? X-(3)=4.521 X-(3)=4.381 X2(3)=5.223 
Normality x2 (2)=7.820 X2 (2)=7.305 x2 (2)=5.080 x2 (2)=4.890 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (38)=45.446 X2 (44)=52-294 j2(50)=67.185 X2 (53)=72.528 
Notes: See notes table 5.2a. 
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Table 5.6b: Changes in predicted probabilities index 2 (women) r- Prob(index 2) = 0 
Social 
integration 
1 21 3 
Max. social 
exclusion 
Childhoodjamily background 
Mother was younger than -10 at delivery tý 3.19 -0-35 -1.07 -1-76 
A family member had been in contact with police etc. when child was 11 -22.81 -1.81 5.70 18.93 
Parents tenants when child was 16 -4.63 0.44 1.54 2.65 
Always lived with both natural parents 12-17 -0.43 -3.78 -7.96 
Father was never unemployed (+ missing) 0.33 -0-03 -0.11 -0.19 
Father was unemployed twice or more -1.11 0.10 0.37 0.65 
Mother does not work + male head (11) 4.36 -0.40 -1-45 -2.51 
Mother works + no male head (child is 11) 15.83 -2.58 -5.49 -7.76 
Mother does not work + no male head (11) 7.77 -0.89 -2.62 -4.26 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Was reported once by school to have below average knowledge (by 11) 4.39 -0.52 -1.49 -2-38 
Was reported by school to have below average knowledge at 7 and 11 -3.64 0.24 1.18 2.22 
Reported badly behaved by school at 16 -1.79 0.16 0.59 1.04 
Reported badly behaved by mother at 16 -1.85 0.18 0.62 1.06 
Referred to a social agency at 16 -6.21 0.37 2.00 3.84 
Had contacts with the police at 16 -7.24 0.36 2.30 4.58 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -1.08 0.14 0.37 0.57 
Skilled manuals -4.79 0.52 1.61 2.66 
Other manuals -13.97 0.62 4.38 8.97 
Other qualification 4.15 -0.10 -1.28 -2.77 
Olevels/Lower vocational 4.04 -0.09 -1.24 -2.70 
5+ Olevels/Middle vocational 13.21 -1.13 -4.33 -7.75 
A levels 8.94 -0.51 -2.86 -5.56 
Highest vocational 17.14 -1.90 -5.73 -9.52 
Degree 18.83 -2.28 -6-33 -10.22 
Has children -4.33 0.37 1.43 2.54 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working 5.01 -0.52 -1-68 -2.82 
Partner unemployed or OLF -13.14 -0.38 3.71 9.80 
Region of residence at 33 
East Midlands -8.72 0.66 2.84 5.21 
London -14.01 0.53 4.36 9.12 
Scotland -7.96 0.65 2.61 4.70 
Predicted base probability (at the means) 0.453 0.224 0.178 0.144 
Base person 1 0.452 0.224 0.179 
0.145 
Base person 1, anti-social behaviour 0.289 0.220 
0.225 0.267 
Base person 1, family difficulties 0.411 
0.227 0.192 0.170 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.255 0.213 0.231 0.302 
Base person 2 
0.380 0.227 0.201 0.191 
Base person 2, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.200 
0.196 0.236 0.368 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, degree 0.357 0.227 0.208 0.208 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, middle vocational 0.306 0.222 0.221 0.251 
Base person 3 
0.433 0.226 0.185 0.156 
Base person 3, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 
0.240 0.209 0.233 0.318 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partner works 0.281 0.218 0.226 
0.275 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partners does not work 0.145 0.171 
0.233 0.451 
See notes below 
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Table 5.7a: Ordered twobit with index 3 of qovinl i-vehicinn 
Childhood only + education + adulthood Same, combined Childhood. ffirnilýy background 
Teena-e mother -0.099 -0-095 -0-068 -0.072 (0-096) (0-097) (0.099) (0.100) 
Father left school after 15 0.014 0.066 0.064 0.063 
(0.075) (0.077) (0-083) (0.083) 
Mother left school after 15 0.049 0.084 0.070 0.070 
(0-074) (0.077) (0-083) (0.082) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.502** 0.533** 0.530** 0.472* 
(0.212) (0.218) (0.245) (0.254) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.178** 0.145** 0.116** 0.113* 
(0-059) (0-060) (0.064) (0.064) 
Some parental incentive for school -0.139 -0.142 -0.053 -0.038 
(0.136) (0.138) (0.146) (0.147) 
Large parental incentive for school -0.237* -0-186 -0-097 -0.083 
(0.127) (0-130) (0-137) (0.137) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.436** -0.430** -0.350** -0.339** 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.152) (0.152) 
Fan-lily were at risk of financial difficulties -0.326 -0-428 -0.191 -0.185 
(0.260) (0.288) (0.301) (0.301) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.030 0.018 0.031 0.038 
(0-083) (0-084) (0.091) (0.091) 
Father was at risk of unemployment 0.008 0.032 0.009 0.016 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.090) (0.090) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.084 0.118 0.070 0.063 
(0.094) (0-097) (0-103) (0-103) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.033 
(0-065) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.070 
(0.272) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.427 
(0.603) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0-106 
(0-069) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.477* 
(0.247) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.260 
(0.366) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.099 
(0.069) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.080 
(0.239) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 0.175 
(0.262) 
Mother works (7) -0.046 -0.050 -0-036 
(0.060) (0.061) (0-064) 
Mother works (11) 0.110* 0.101* 0.100 
(0.064) (0-065) (0.069) 
Mother works (16) -0.086 -0.083 -0.109 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.068) 
Single mother (7) -0.111 -0.133 -0.014 
(0.222) (0.232) (0.260) 
Single mother (11) -0.441 ** -0.491 ** -0.393* 
(0.195) (0.199) (0.225) 
Single mother (16) -0.170 -0-139 -0.040 
(0.176) (0.179) (0.201) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) -0.014 0.023 0.041 
0.041 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.062) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.090 -0.048 -0.066 -0.066 
(0.068) (0.069) (0-074) (0.074) 
Settled within one month at school (7) -0.031 -0.019 -0.012 -0-013 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.065) 
Reported once below average knowledge 0.003 -0.065 -0.074 -0.074 
(0.074) (0.077) (0.083) (0.083) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.25 1 ** 0.166* 0.134 
0.133 
(0.094) (0.099) (0.105) (0-105) 
Has been in care -0.019 -0.045 -0.019 -0.010 
(0.208) (0.209) (0.219) (0.220) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.072 0.003 0.008 
0.007 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.071) (0.071) 
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Table 5.7a (ctd. ) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.076 0.050 0.021 0.017 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.059) Referred to a social agency (16) 0.237** 0.202* 0.143 0.144 
(0.112) (0-113) (0.119) (0.119) Had contacts with the police ( 16) 0.204 0.182 0.165 0.170 
(0.148) (0.149) (0.155) (0.156) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate 
-0.028 -0.031 
(0-091) (0.091) 
Skilled manuals 0.093 0.097 
(0.101) (0.102) 
Other manuals 0.340** 0.345** 
(0.088) (0.088) 
Has children 0.006 0.003 
(0.073) (0.073) 
Other education -0.177 -0.084 -0-079 
(0-103) (0-113) (0-113) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.209** -0.094 -0.087 
(0.104) (0.115) (0.115) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.464** -0.336** -0.332** 
(0.120) (0.129) (0-130) 
A levels -0.435** -0.244* -0.242* 
(0.137) (0-154) (0.154) 
Highest vocational -0.574** -0.401 ** -0.391** 
(0.133) (0.157) (0.157) 
Degree -0.543** -0.485** -0.484** 
(0.144) (0.170) (0-170) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working 4ý -0.133** -0.130** 
(0.065) (0.065) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.297** 0.309** 
(0.146) (0.145) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.285** 0.262** 0.138 0.140 
(0.121) (0.123) (0.131) (0.132) 
North West 0.181 * 0.170* 0.117 0.117 
(0.096) (0.098) (0.105) (0.105) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.126 0.101 0.043 0.040 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.110) (0.110) 
West Midlands 0.150 0.138 0.071 0.067 
(0.105) (0.106) (0.114) (0.114) 
East Midlands 0.289** 0.287** 0.282** 0.283** 
(0.114) (0.117) (0.120) (0.120) 
East Anglia 0.245* 0.220* 0.205 0.204 
(0.138) (0.139) (0.148) (0.148) 
South West 0.001 -0.004 -0.048 -0.048 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.113) (0.113) 
London 0.395** 0.404** 0.470** 0.467** 
(0.139) (0-139) (0.152) (0-152) 
Wales 0.173 0.160 0.066 0.058 
(0.118) (0.119) (0.129) (0-130) 
Scotland 0.283** 0.266** 0.205* 0.202 * 
(0.099) (0.102) (0.110) (0.110) 
ýtl -0.476 -0-748 -0.546 -0.482 
(0.207) (0.226) (0.250) (0.251) 
g2 0.485 0.219 0.422 
0.487 
(0.207) (0.225) (0-250) (0.251) 
Number of observations 1936 1920 1715 1715 
Pseudo R2 0.0379 0.0461 0.0539 0.0544 
Pseudo-functional form X-(3)=0.806 X2(3)=2.917 
2 
X (3)=4.671 X-(3)=5.061 
Normality x2 (2)=2.161 x ') (2)=2.223 X7 (2)=l . 754 x2 (2)=1.983 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (38)=43.294 X2 (44)--48.721 X2 (50)=57.776 
X2 (53)=60.888 
Notes: See notes table 5.2a. 
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Table 5.7b: Chan2es in twedicted i)robabilities index 3 (women). 
Prob(index 3) 0 
Social 
integration 
1 2 
Max. social 
exclusion 
Childhoodfiamily background 
Mother was younger than 20 at delivery 2.86 -0.89 -1.96 
A family member had been in contact with police etc. when child was 11 -17.54 2.03 15.51 
Parents tenants when child was 16 -4.49 1.32 3.17 
Always lived with both natural parents 13.06 -2.70 -10.35 
Father was never unemployed (+ missing) -0.63 0.19 0.44 
Father was unemployed twice or more -2.50 0.70 1.80 
Mother does not work + male head (11) 4.18 -1.20 -2.98 
Mother works + no male head (child is 11) 18.84 -7.53 -11.31 
Mother does not work + no male head (11) 10.34 -3.49 -6.85 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Was reported once by school to have below average knowledge (by 11) 2.95 -0.96 -1.99 
Was reported by school to have below average knowledge at 7 and 11 -5.21 1.32 3.90 
Reported badly behaved by school at 16 -0.27 0.08 0.19 
Reported badly behaved by mother at 16 -0.67 0.20 047 
Referred to a social agency at 16 -5.63 1.42 4.21 
Had contacts with the police at 16 -6.63 1.59 5.04 
Adulthood personal characteristics 
Professional & intermediate 1.23 -0.43 -0.80 
Skilled manuals -3.85 1.19 2.66 
Other manuals -13.36 2.91 10.44 
Other qualification 3.05 -0.60 -2.45 
Olevels/Lower vocational 3.35 -0.67 -2.68 
5+ Olevels/Middle vocational 13.06 -3.76 -9-30 
A levels 9.49 -2.44 -7.04 
Highest vocational 15.42 -4.73 -10.69 
Degree 19.09 -6.40 -12.69 
Has children -0.10 0.03 0.07 
Adulthoodfamily background 
Partner working 5.14 -1.56 -3.59 
Partner unemployed or OLF -11.62 1.60 
10.02 
Region 
East Midlands -11.11 2.98 8.14 
London -17.89 3.54 14.35 
Scotland -8.00 2.37 5.63 
Predicted base probability (at the means) 
0.450 0.351 0.200 
Base person 1 
0.444 0.352 0.203 
Base person 1, anti-social behaviour 
0.317 0.372 0.311 
Base person 1, fan-lily difficulties 
0.405 0.362 0.233 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 0.281 0.371 
0.348 
Base person 2 
0.378 0.367 0.255 
Base person 2, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 
0.227 0.360 0.413 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, degree 0.395 
0.364 0.241 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, middle vocational 0.338 
0.371 0.291 
Base person 3 
0.424 0.358 0.218 
Base person 3, anti-social behaviour, family difficulties 
0.265 0.369 0.367 
Anti-social behaviour, fan-lily difficulties, partner works 
0.309 0.372 0.319 
Anti-social behaviour, family difficulties, partners does not work 
0.174 
1 
0.338 0.487 
See notes below 
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Notes to tables 5.2b, 5.3b, 5.4b, 5.5b, 5.6b, and 5.7b: 
(1) Top part of tables: changes in predicted probabilities are for coefficients which 
we re statistically significant in corresponding tables a. They are all in percentage 
points. 
(2) Base person I did not have an anti-social behaviour (no reports by school or 
parents, no referral and no contacts with the police) and any family difficulties 
(father never unemployed and family never had financial difficulties) 
(3) Base person 2 is the same as base person I and had no education at 23 years old. 
All other variables at their means. 
(4) Base person 2 is the same as base person I and does not have a partner. All other 
variables at their means. 
(5) Anti-social behaviour = reports by school and parents, referral and contacts with 
the police. 
(6) Family difficulties = father unemployed once or more and family had financial 
difficulties once or more. 
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Tnhh,; Rsi. itii I uues not own a car- kmc 
Index I Index 2 Index 3 
Childhood, ffirnily 
Teenage mother -0.216** -0.218** -0.289** 
(0.105) (0-105) (0.105) 
Father left school after 15 0.020 0.012 0.015 
(0.083) (0.080) (0.086) 
Mother left school after 15 -0.021 -0.046 -0.050 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.080) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) -0.013 0.127 0.187 
(0-333) (0.382) (0.429) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.077 0.083 0.020 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.066) 
Some parental incentive for school 0.050 0.044 0.029 
(0.150) (0.147) (0-156) 
Large parental incentive for school z__ -0.036 -0.043 -0.015 
(0.142) (0.138) (0.146) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.093 -0.092 -0-090 
(0-136) (0,133) (0.142) 
Family were at fisk of financial difficulties -0.007 -0.029 -0.023 
(0.231) (0.218) (0.228) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more -0.003 0.037 -0.006 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.094) 
Father was at risk of unemployment 0.131 0.127 0.117 
(0.089) (0-091) (0.092) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.321 ** 0.291** 0.227** 
(0.101) (0.104) (0,105) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.033 0.008 0.025 
(0.065) (0-065) (0.067) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.509* -0.530* -0.446 
(0.333) (0-344) (0.334) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.780** 0.637** 0.684* 
(0.325) (0.264) (0.361) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.046 -0.021 -0.022 
(0.068) (0,068) (0.072) 
Lone working mother 0 1) -0.041 0.021 -0.129 
(0.296) (0.317) (0.292) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.250 0.327 0.248 
(0.386) (0.361) (0.434) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.030 0.044 0.048 
(0.070) (0-070) (0.073) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.248 -0.205 -0.201 
(0.235) (0.245) (0.235) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.288 -0-343 -0.113 
(0.299) (0-286) (0.227) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.038 0.036 0.025 
(0.064) (0-063) (0.065) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.078 -0.131* -0.159** 
(0.072) (0.073) (0.075) 
Settled within one month at school (7) -0-031 -0.071 -0.069 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.067) 
Reported once below average knowledge 0.008 0.025 0.012 
(0.081) (0.081) (0.084) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.154 0.254** 0.177* 
(0.103) (0.106) (0.109) 
Has been in care 0.144 0.049 0.086 
(0.193) (0.196) (0.194) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.202** 0.171** 0.225** 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.069) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.111 * 0.112* 0.118** 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.060) 
Referred to a social agency (16) 0.190* 0.243** 
0.218* 
(0.115) (0.116) (0.123) 
Had contacts with the police (16) 0.049 -0.038 -0.030 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.111) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -0.173* -0.143 -0.098 
(0.100) (0.095) (0.101) 
n). 
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Table 5.8a (ctd. ) 
Skilled manuals 0.008 0.050 0.072 
(0.085) (0.084) (0.087) 
Other manuals 0.247** 0.319** 0.325** 
(0.106) (0.105) (0.110) 
Has children 0,177* 0.200* 0.159 
(0.114) (0.119) (0.117) 
Other education -0.085 -0.099 -0.130 
(0.129) (0.128) (0.138) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.125 -0.142 -0.200* 
(0.126) (0.125) (0.133) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.215* -0.263** -0.299** 
(0.129) (0.127) (0-136) 
A levels 
-0.240 -0.273* -0.346** 
(0.163) (0.160) (0.169) 
Highest vocational -0.223 -0.262* -0.317** 
(0.151) (0.147) (0.157) 
Degree 
-0.154 -0.197 -0.265* 
(0.170) (0.164) (0.175) 
Adulthoodfiamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.156** -0.121 * -0.114* 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.069) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.039 0.043 0.069 
(0.120) (0.121) (0,121) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.054 0.060 0.019 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.116) 
North West 0.014 0.046 -0.011 
(0-119) (0.119) (0.123) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.162* 0.157* 0.105 
(0-106) (0.103) (0.105) 
West Midlands 0.027 0.031 0.000 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.116) 
East Midlands 0.109 0.211 * 0.138 
(0.116) (0.122) (0.123) 
East Anglia -0.338** -0.267* -0.249 
(0.152) (0.153) (0-164) 
South West -0.076 -0.026 -0.045 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.115) 
London 0.312** 0.305** 0.327** 
(0.143) (0.134) (0.148) 
Wales 0.150 0.162 0.126 
(0.123) (0.120) (0.128) 
Scotland 0.054 0.022 0.042 
(0.112) (0.109) (0.117) 
ý0 -0.255 -0.300 -0.373 
(0.254) (0.250) (0.269) 
p2 0.170 0.150 0.651 
(0.255) (0.250) (0.270) 
g3 0.638 0.607 
(0.256) (0.250) 
g4 1.163 0.905 
(0.256) (0.250) 
g5 1.365 
(0.251) 
Number of observations 1601 1601 1601 
Pseudo R2 0.0455 0.0519 0.0648 
Pseudo-functional forrn 
2 
X (3)=0.668 
2 
X (3)=0.753 
2 (3)= 1.904 x 
Normality ý2(2)=5.805 X'(2)=11.170 
2 
X (2)=6.539 
Heteroscedasticity x2 (53)=74.917 X2 (53)=78.164 X2(53)=78.815 
Notes: see notes table 5.2a. 
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Table 5.8b: Ordered probit with indices excluding "does not own a car" (women). 
Index I Index 2 Index 3 
Childhood. /ainily background 
Teenage mother -0.077 -0.075 -0.101 
(0-093) (0-097) (0.096) 
Father left school after 15 0.090 0.044 0.055 
(0.083) (0.080) (0.084) 
Mother left school after 15 0.068 0.036 0.052 
(0-083) (0.080) (0.084) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.625** 0.561 ** 0.583** 
(0.270) (0.268) (0.278) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.042 0.051 0.060 
(0-063) (0.063) (0.064) 
Some parental incentive for school -0.063 0.045 -0.034 
(0.136) (0.146) (0.143) 
Large parental incentive for school -0.120 -0.041 -0.113 
(0.129) (0-135) (0.133) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.286** -0.255** -0.330** 
(0.142) (0.146) (0.149) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties -0.263 -0,248 -0.232 
(0.265) (0.275) (0.272) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.100 0.088 0.036 
(0.088) (0.091) (0.091) 
Father was at risk of unemployment -0.024 -0.009 -0.026 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.089) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.032 0.057 0.051 
(0.102) (0.103) (0.103) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.018 0.017 0.035 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065) 
Lone working mother (7) 0.176 0.239 0.016 
(0.267) (0.288) (0.271) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.63 1* 0.825 0.655 
(0.410) (0.556) (0.610) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.108* -0.122* -0.096 
(0.070) (0.068) (0.070) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.592** -0.565** -0.509** 
(0.246) (0.247) (0.257) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.422 -0.417 -0.364 
(0.343) (0.378) (0.376) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.064 0.099 0.032 
(0.067) (0.069) (0.069) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.021 -0.081 -0.145 
(0.232) (0.227) (0.233) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 0.157 0.209 0.162 
(0.241) (0.260) (0.259) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.047 0.067 0.071 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.057 -0.101 -0.060 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.074) 
Settled within one month at school (7) 0.011 -0.019 -0.023 
(0.063) (0.065) (0.066) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.149* -0.121 * -0.088 
(0.078) (0.081) (0.082) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.077 0.114 0.144 
(0.099) (0.104) (0.104) 
Has been in care -0.085 -0.145 0.085 
(0.206) (0.213) (0.237) 
Reported badly behaved by school 0 6) 0.033 0.031 0.031 
(0.068) (0.071) (0.070) 
Reported badly behaved by mother 0 6) 0.058 0.040 0.017 
(0-057) (0.058) (0.059) 
Referred to a social agency (16) 0.050 0.028 
0.012 
(0.115) (0.119) (0.118) 
Had contacts with the police (16) 0.247* 0.242* 
0.25 1* 
(0-152) (0.157) (0.159) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -0.004 0.052 -0.023 
(0.091) (0.090) (0.091) 
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Table 5.8b (ctd. ) 
Skilled manuals 0.147 0.182* 0.130 
(0-102) (0.104) (0.101) Other manuals 0.299** 0.365** 0.335** 
(0-084) (0.087) (0.088) 
Has children 0.020 0.016 -0.076 
(0.070) (0.073) (0.072) 
Other education -0-166* -0.196* -0.107 
(0.101) (0.113) (0.108) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.099 -0.135 -0.046 
(0.106) (0.116) (0.111) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.270** -0.317** -0.239* 
(0.121) (0.129) (0.126) 
A levels 
-0.239* -0.286* -0.210 
(0.146) (0.150) (0.148) 
Hic, est vocational gh -0.361** -0.424** -0.292* 
(0.148) (0.156) (0.154) 
Degree 
-0-390** -0.464** -0.385** 
(0.169) (0.171) (0.168) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.066 -0.065 -0.089 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.280** 0.338** 0.248* 
(0.137) (0.150) (0.144) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.032 0.059 0.049 
(0.127) (0.131) (0.129) 
North West 0.038 0.044 0.086 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107) 
Yorkshire & Humberside -0.021 -0.002 0.010 
(0.108) (0.111) (0.110) 
West Midlands -0.025 -0.044 0.023 
(0.110) (0.109) (0.112) 
East Midlands 0.163 0.181 0.260** 
(0.116) (0.118) (0.123) 
East Anglia 2D 
0.076 0.096 0.154 
(0.139) (0.145) (0.145) 
South West -0.102 -0.075 0.005 
(0.107) (0.110) (0.113) 
London 0.358** 0.289** 0.385** 
(0.150) (0.140) (0.151) 
Wales -0.014 0.010 0.048 
(0.124) (0.127) (0.130) 
Scotland -0.004 -0.026 0.017 
(0.111) (0.110) (0.110) 
41 -0.404 -0.354 -0.419 
(0.235) (0.248) (0.249) 
ý0 -0.052 0.303 0.610 
(0.235) (0.249) (0.249) 
g3 0.325 0.743 
(0.235) (0.249) 
ýt4 0.601 
(0.235) 
16 1.030 
(0.236) 
Number of observations 1731 1731 1731 
Pseudo R2 0.0299 0.0416 0.0408 
Pseudo-functional form X-(3)=5.856 
2 
X (3)=7.867 j2(3)=3.620 
Normality x2 (2)=5.280 X2 (2)=9.125 j2(2)=2.379 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (53)=95.761 X2 (53)=82.075 X2 (53)=85.661 
Notes: see notes table 5.2a. 
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Table 5.9a: OrderedDrobit with indict-. q vvvhidina 
Index I Index 2 Index 3 
Childhoodfamily background 
Teenage mother -0.311 -0.287** -0.371** (0.114) (0-116) (0.116) Father left school after 15 -0-020 -0.022 -0.051 (0-082) (0-080) (0.083) Mother left school after 15 -0-113 -0.131 * -0.128* (0.079) (0-077) (0.081) Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.045 0.158 -0.052 (0.349) (0-369) (0.328) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.058 0.079 0.001 
(0-063) (0-064) (0.066) 
Some parental incentive for school 0.008 OV6 -0.032 (0.145) (0-150) (0.157) 
Large parental incentive for school 0.054 0.032 0.035 
(0.136) (0,139) (0,146) 
Always lived with both natural parents 0,068 0.036 -0.026 (0.134) (0-131) (0.144) 
Family were at nsk of financial difficulties 0.279 0.268 0.333 
(0.275) (0.267) (0.270) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.011 0.027 -0.024 
(0.092) (0.094) (0.094) 
Father was at risk of unemployment 0.145* 0.138 0.111 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.094) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.205** 0.213** 0.164* 
(0.104) (0-106) (0.107) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.028 0.011 0.024 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.413 -0.477 -0.367 
(0.359) (0-354) (0-357) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.392 0.349 0.294 
(0.403) (0-348) (0.455) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) 0.008 0.026 0.026 
(0.069) (0-069) (0.071) 
Lone working mother (11) 0.080 0.042 -0.008 
(0.306) (0.322) (0.303) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.149 0.195 0.191 
(0.424) (0.410) (0.489) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.024 0.029 0.048 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.073) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.285 -0.283 -0.385* 
(0.262) (0.272) (0.256) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.087 -0.183 -0-033 
(0.296) (0-305) (0.353) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.078 0.090 0.074 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.134* -0.138* -0.184** 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
Settled within one month at school (7) -0.055 -0.065 -0.072 
(0.065) (0-064) (0.067) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.003 0.025 -0.004 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.084) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.181 * 0.281 ** 0.256** 
(0.106) (0.107) (0.113) 
Has been in care 0.169 0.084 0.067 
(0.218) (0.215) (0.219) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.207** 0.155** 0.187** 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.069) 
Reported badly behaved by mother 0 6) 0.117** 0.107* 0.103* 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) 
Referred to a social agency (16) 0.202* 0.223** 0.209* 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.120) 
Had contacts with the police (16) -0.007 -0.014 -0.018 
(0.106) (0ý 105) (0.113) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -0.026 0.001 0.056 
(0.101) (0.098) (0.101) 
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Table 5.9a (ctd. ) 
Skilled manuals 0.034 0.032 0.077 
(0.086) (0.084) (0.087) Other manuals 0.326** 0.350** 0.381 ** 
(0.104) (0.105) (0.108) 
Has children 0.236** 0.314** 0.281 ** 
(0.118) (0.120) (0.121) 
Other education -0.332** -0.327** -0.337** 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.136) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.325** -0.321 ** -0.369** 
(0.121) (0.123) (0.129) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.424** -0.480** -0.491 ** 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.130) 
A levels 
-0.308* -0-329** -0.410** 
(0-160) (0.159) (0.166) 
Highest vocational t, -0.408** -0.442** -0.481 ** 
(0.147) (0.145) (0.153) 
Degree 
-0-353** -0.445** -0.461 ** 
(0.169) (0-162) (0.172) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0-066 -0.085 -0.030 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.069) 
Partner unemployed or OLF -0-036 -0.095 -0.047 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
Region of residence at 33 
North -0-138 -0.096 -0.105 
(0.120) (0-122) (0.127) 
North West -0.047 0.006 -0.063 
(0.116) (0.117) (0.120) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.079 0.057 0.035 
(0.109) (0.107) (0.110) 
West Midlands 0.003 -0.001 -0.050 
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) 
East Midlands 0.008 0.070 0.052 
(0.118) (0.121) (0.126) 
East Anglia -0.149 -0.111 -0.117 
(0.143) (0.145) (0.149) 
South West -0.035 -0-030 -0.011 
(0.111) (0.110) (0.114) 
London 0.353** 0.399** 0.391 ** 
(0.146) (0.140) (0-150) 
Wales 0.078 0,074 0.074 
(0.123) (0.120) (0.128) 
Scotland -0.045 -0.069 -0.059 
(0.111) (0.109) (0.115) 
-0.079 -0.141 -0.287 
(0.250) (0.245) (0.266) 
g2 0.359 0.177 0.727 
(0.250) (0.246) (0.267) 
p3 0.705 0.530 
(0.251) (0.246) 
g4 1.256 0.919 
(0.250) (0.246) 
g5 1.412 
(0.248) 
Number of observations 1614 1614 1614 0.0649 0.0489 Pseudo R20.0443 2 2 
Pseudo-functional form X (3)=2.453 X (3)=2.936 X (3)=2.395 
Normality x2 (2)=7.631 x2 (2)=10.864 x2 (2)=7.277 
Heterosc edasti city x2 (53)=57.530 X2 (53)=102.08 x2 (53)=63.727 
Notes: see notes table 5.2a. 
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Table 5.9b: Ordered probit with indice s excludin2 "u employment" (women) 
_ . indexl jndex2 index3 Childhoodftimily background 
Mother was younger than 220 at birth -0.022 -0.023 -0.015 
Father left school after 15 
(0.098) (0.101) (0.100) 
0.034 
-0.021 0,020 
Mother left school after 15 
(0.086) (0.085) (0.087) 
0.153* 0.167** 0.190** 
Had a relative in contact with police 
(0.082) 
0 426* 
(0.083) 
** 
(0.084) 
. 0.520 0.406* 
Parents were tenants 
(0.243) (0.251) (0.248) 
0.072 0.073 0.051 
Parents wanted child to stay on at school once (+ missin ) 
(0.065) 
0 168 
(0.065) (0.066) 
g - . 0.043 -0.013 
Parents wanted child to stay on at school twice or more 
(0.145) 
-0 206 
(0.147) (0.150) 
. -0.084 -0.138 (0.138) (0.138) (0.140) Always lived with both natural parents -0-161 -0.300** -0.282** (0.133) (0.145) (0.142) Family never had financial difficulties (+missing) -0-313 -0.221 -0.216 (0.275) (0.328) (0-332) Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.129 0.162* 0.143 
(0-086) (0,090) (0.091) Father was never unemployed (+ missing response) -0.030 -0.025 -0.006 (0.097) (0.100) (0.100) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.004 -0-010 0.010 
(0.101) (0-103) (0.106) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 41 -0.018 -0.028 -0.045 
(0.064) (0.066) (0-066) 
Lone working mother (7) 0.015 0.143 0.060 
(0.271) (0.303) (0.293) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.448 0.279 0.813 
(0.359) (0.399) (0,566) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.078 -0-105 -0.099 
(0.070) (0.071) (0.072) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.223 -0.413* -0.484* 
(0.261) (0.266) (0.266) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.081 -0-038 -0.209 
(0.328) (0-355) (0.342) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.084 0.103 0.084 
(0.069) (0.071) (0.072) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.085 -0.160 -0.151 
(0.236) (0.244) (0.238) 
Lone non-working mother 0 6) 0.081 -0.052 0.155 
(0.238) (0.252) (0.257) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score at 7 -0.025 -0.031 -0.016 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Above average at reading test score at 7 -0.080 -0.140* -0.103 
(0.072) (0.075) (0.075) 
Settled within one month at school when 7 years old 0.053 0.022 0.051 
(0.067) (0,069) (0.069) 
Reported once to have below average knowledge -0.114 -0.137 -0.103 
(0.080) (0.082) (0.083) 
Reported twice to have below average knowledge 0.050 0.065 0.105 
(0.102) (0.105) (0.106) 
Has been in care as a child 0.051 -0.071 -0.004 
(0.202) (0.209) (0.208) 
Reported badly behaved by school at 16 0.084 0.087 0.068 
(0.069) (0.071) (0.070) 
Reported badly behaved by mother at 16 0.095 0.080 0.099 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) 
Referred to a social agency at 16 0.208* 0.114 0.144 
(0.115) (0.116) (0.118) 
Had contacts with the police at 16 0.042 0.185 0.131 
(0.144) (0.152) (0.148) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -0.013 0.102 0.064 
(0.094) (0.096) (0.096) 
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Table 5.9b (ctd. ) 
Skilled manuals 0.081 0.116 0.095 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.111) 
Other manuals 0.304** 0.311 ** 0.281 ** 
(0.084) (0.087) (0-088) 
Has children 0.172** 0.202** 0.151 ** 
(0-073) (0.074) (0.074) 
Other education -0.086 -0.187* -0-178 (0.105) (0.111) (0.113) 
0 leý els/ Lower vocational -0-065 -0.176 -0.185 (0.108) (0.115) (0.115) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.348** -0.443** -0.450** 
(0.125) (0.130) (0.131) 
A levels -0.220 -0.349** -0.382** 
(0.156) (0.158) (0.158) 
Highest vocational -0.436** -0.595** -0.594** 
(0.156) (0.162) (0.162) 
Degree 
-0.525** -0.663** -0.704** 
(0.180) (0.184) (0.185) 
Adulthoodfarnily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.209** -0.187** -0.181 
(0-068) (0.067) (0,069) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.163 0.263* 0.232 
(0.140) (0.149) (0.147) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.161 0.124 0.161 
(0.125) (0-131) (0.132) 
North West 0.006 -0.011 -0.039 
(0.112) (0.114) (0.115) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.019 -1.43E-7 -0.008 
(0.111) (0.113) (0.112) 
West Midlands -0.009 -0.072 -0.042 
(0.111) (0.113) (0.115) 
East Midlands 0.196 0.211 * 0.222* 
(0.119) (0.121) (0.124) 
East Anglia 0.147 0.156 0.161 
(0.135) (0.137) (0.142) 
South West -0.222* -0.226* -0.214* 
(0.112) (0.115) (0.116) 
London 0.502** 0.396** 0.480** 
(0.147) (0.143) (0.151) 
Wales -0-034 0.006 -0.020 
(0-131) (0-132) (0.134) 
Scotland 0.191 * 0.098 0.063 
(0.121) (0.123) (0.122) 
Al -0.146 -0-319 -0.320 
(0.240) (0.250) (0.251) 
g2 0.312 0.139 0.674 
(0.240) (0.250) (0.252) 
g3 0.388 0.737 
(0.240) (0.251) 
g4 0.738 
(0.241) 
g5 1.265 
(0.245) 
Observations 1742 1742 1742 
Pseudo R2 0.0550 0.0715 0.0796 
Pseudo-functional form 
2 
X (3)=1.750 X2(3)=2.228 X-(3)=0.868 
Normality x2 (2)=1.248 j2(2)=2.61 1 x2 (2)=2.195 
1 Heteroscedasti city x2 (53)=90.664 x2 (53)=67.230 X2(53)=56.991 
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Table 5.10a: Ordered Drobit Economic indi-v (m,, ni 
Index la Index 2a Index 3a 
Childhood fiiinil. v background 
Teenage mother -0-113 -0.111 -0,108 (0.119) (0.114) (0-117) 
Father left school after 15 -0-037 -0.019 -0-022 (0-093) (0.091) (0.092) 
Mother left school after 15 -0-035 -0.061 -0.027 (0-087) (0.085) (0.087) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.442 0.199 0.248 
(0.360) (0.308) (0.319) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.160** 0.174** 0.168** 
(0-069) (0-068) (0.068) 
Some parental incentive for school -0.099 -0.062 -0.073 
(0-14-4) (0.141) (0.144) 
Large parental incentive for school -0.200 -0.147 -0.188 
(0-133) (0.130) (0.133) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0-028 -0.031 -0.059 
(0-145) (0.143) (0.149) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties -0.026 -0.081 -0.119 
(0.393) (0.383) (0-355) 
Family had financial difficulties once or 0.094 0.111 0.115 
more 
(0-096) (0.094) (0.095) 
Father was at risk of unemployment 0.041 0.073 0.051 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.364** 0.335** 0.369** 
(0.111) (0.106) (0.108) 
Non-workinc, mother in couple (7) -0.070 -0.076 -0.069 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.432 -0.455 -0.401 
(0.382) (0.386) (0.415) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 0.822** 0.575* 0.508* 
(0-343) (0.318) (0.290) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) 0.075 0.084 0.075 
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074) 
Lone working mother (11) 0.079 0.046 -0.064 
(0-364) (0.372) (0.392) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.300 0.342 0.157 
(0-368) (0.355) (0.319) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) -0.021 -0.029 -0.012 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.077) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.257 -0.211 -0.157 
(0.258) (0.268) (0.283) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.593* -0.603** -0.574* 
(0.321) (0.314) (0.326) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.051 0.064 0.061 
(0.069) (0.068) (0.069) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.002 0.0003 0.009 
(0.080) (0.079) (0.080) 
Quick to settle in class (7) -0.044 -0.058 -0.041 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.052 -0-036 -0.045 
(0.088) (0.086) (0.088) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.117 0.195 0,141 
(0.115) (0.112) (0.113) 
Has been in care 0.204 0.154 0.260 
(0.209) (0.201) (0.209) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.089 0.056 0.098 
(0.072) (0.071) (0.071) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.095 * 0.115* 0.114* 
(0.063) (0.062) (0.062) 
Referred to a social agency (16) 0.221 * 0.126 0.166 
(0.128) (0.122) (0.128) 
Had contacts with the police (16) -0.005 0.031 
0.026 
(0.112) (0.110) (0.115) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -0.069 -0.060 -0.069 
1 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
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Table 5.1 Oa (ctd. ) 
Skilled manuals 0.026 -0.025 -0.009 (0.093) (0-093) (0.092) 
Other manuals 0.397** 0.356** 0.388** 
(0.113) (0.111) (0-112) 
Has children 0.362** 0.367** 0.373** 
(0.126) (0.126) (0-128) 
Other education -0.011 -0-090 -0-061 
(0.133) (0.129) (0-130) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.120 -0.166 -0-172 
(0.130) (0.127) (0-129) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.286** -0.363** -0.355** 
(0.134) (0.130) (0-132) 
A levels -0.132 -0.211 -0-201 
(0.171) (0.166) (0-170) 
Highest vocational -0.166 -0.258** -0-238 
(0.163) (0.158) (0-160) 
Degree -0.274* -0.361 ** -0.345* 
(0.180) (0.175) (0.178) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.219** -0.196** -0.244** 
(0.074) (0.074) (0-075) 
Partner unemployed or OLF -0.119 -0-136 -0-155 
(0.130) (0.131) (0-133) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.202* 0.141 0.210* 
(0.126) (0.122) (0.126) 
North West 0.065 0.093 0.092 
(0.127) (0.128) (0.127) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.209* 0.208* 0.231 ** 
(0.113) (0.110) (0.112) 
West Midlands 0.057 0.071 0.061 
(0.122) (0.120) (0-122) 
East Midlands 0.262** 0.264** 0.262** 
(0.129) (0.126) (0.128) 
East Anglia -0.343* -0.319* -0.370** 
(0.175) (0-179) (0.180) 
South West -0.137 -0.101 -0.153 
(0.123) (0-123) (0.123) 
London 0.441 ** 0.425** 0.390** 
(0.148) (0.141) (0.141) 
Wales 0.192 0.159 0.189 
(0.132) (0.128) (0.131) 
Scotland 0.048 0.043 0.062 
(0.118) (0.116) (0.117) 
gl 0.203 0.166 0.148 
(0.261) (0.255) (0.262) 
g2 1.110 0.700 1.231 
(0.261) (0.255) (0.263) 
g3 1.275 1.100 1.928 
(0.262) (0.256) (0.270) 
g4 1.536 
(0.260) 
Number of observations 1610 1610 1610 
Pseudo R2 0.0768 0.0635 0.0848 
Pseudo-functional form X (3)=6.461 
2 (3)=5.267 x 
2 
X (3)=5.507 
Normality X2(2)=4.957 
2 
X (2)= 1.148 X2(2)=6.062 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (53)=77.731 X2 (53)=72.827 X2(53)=87.154] 
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Table 5.10b: Ordered Drobit Cultural index (men) 
Index lb Index 2b Index 3b 
Childhood fiiinilY background 
Teenage mother -0.340** -0.383** -0.394** 
(0.119) (0.120) (0.119) 
Father left school after 15 0.006 -0-017 0.000 
(0-086) (0.085) (0.087) 
Mother left school after 15 -0.058 -0-102 -0.093 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.085) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.145 -0.005 0.123 
(0.363) (0.342) (0.358) 
Parents were tenants (16) -0.087 -0.152** -0.137** 
(0.066) (0.068) (0.069) 
Some parental incentive for school -0.028 -0.031 -0.075 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.168) 
Large parental incentive for school 0.064 0.045 0.014 
(0.148) (0.146) (0.156) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.186 -0.189 -0.186 
(0.146) (0.145) (0.144) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties 0.097 0.079 0.054 
(0.248) (0.236) (0.241) 
Family had financial difficulties once or -0.127 -0.133 -0.160 
more 
(0-093) (0.094) (0.097) 
Father was at risk of unemployment 0.045 -0.004 0.045 
(0-096) (0.094) (0.096) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.070 0.004 0.057 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.115) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.015 0.009 0.024 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.069) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.324 -0.211 -0.268 
(0.337) (0.364) (0-359) 
Lone non-working mother (7) -0.658 -0.692 -0.430 
(0.554) (0.540) (0.630) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.101 -0.062 -0.073 
(0-071) (0.072) (0.072) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.079 -0.054 -0.172 
(0.292) (0.309) (0.300) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.094 0.192 0.170 
(0.501) (0.494) (0.513) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.095 0.132* 0.095 
(0.074) (0.073) (0.075) 
Lone working mother (16) -0-314 -0.333 -0.383* 
(0.235) (0.234) (0.230) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 0.131 0.271 0.333 
(0.330) (0.347) (0.353) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.025 0.012 0.034 
(0-067) (0.066) (0.068) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.248** -0.310** -0.271** 
(0.074) (0.073) (0.074) 
Quick to settle (7) -0.060 -0.084 -0.057 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.030 -0.020 -0.016 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.086) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.158 0.217** 0.174* 
(0.105) (0.108) (0.109) 
Has been in care 0.145 0.050 0.170 
(0.186) (0.186) (0.197) 
Reported badly behaved by school 0 6) 0.227** 0.201 ** 0.207** 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) 
Reported badly behaved by mother 0 6) 0.053 0.047 0.079 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062) 
Referred to a social agency (16) 0.046 0.034 0.066 
(0.118) (0-119) (0.122) 
Had contacts with the police (16) 0.073 0.020 0.047 
(0.112) (0.113) (0.115) 
Adulthood personal characteristics 
Professional & intermediate 0.051 0.118 0.093 
(0.105) (0.101) (0.105) 
_ 
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Table 5.1 Ob (ctd. ) 
Skilled manuals 0.154ý14 6-232** 0.176* 
(0.090) (0.088) (0.090) 
Other manuals 0.260** 0.311 ** 0.279** 
(0.107) (0.104) (0.108) 
Has children -0.054 0.001 0.006 
(0.111) (0.111) (0-113) 
Other education -0.262** -0.304** -0.318** 
(0.124) (0.127) (0.126) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational -0.298** -0-361 ** -0.346** 
(0.121) (0.124) (0.125) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.313** -0.413** -0.391 ** 
(0.124) (0.125) (0.127) 
A levels -0.433** -0.511 ** -0.502** 
(0.164) (0.165) (0-168) 
Highest vocational zn -0.400** -0.467** -0.477** 
(0.150) (0.152) (0.152) 
Degree -0.281 * -0.402** -0.392** 
(0.173) (0.167) (0.173) 
Adulthoodfiarnily background 
Partner working -0.020 0.034 0.019 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.089 0.068 0.081 
(0.119) (0.117) (0.119) 
Region 
North -0.243** -0.191 -0.209 
(0.121) (0.124) (0.126) 
North West -0.061 -0.058 -0.098 
(0.121) (0.121) (0.123) 
Yorkshire & Humberside -0.058 -0.096 -0-108 
(0.110) (0.107) (0.111) 
West Midlands -0.103 -0.141 -0-134 
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) 
East Midlands -0.166 -0.110 -0.121 
(0.122) (0.129) (0.130) 
East Anglia -0.111 -0.017 -0.122 
(0.157) (0.162) (0-157) 
South West -0.027 -0.011 -0.005 
(0.112) (0.111) (0-116) 
South East 
London 0.191 0.182 0.155 
(0.156) (0.152) (0.153) 
Wales 0.072 0.081 0.048 
(0.135) (0-134) (0.135) 
Scotland -0.027 -0.085 -0.067 
(0.124) (0.122) (0.125) 
PI -0.231 -0-359 -0.336 
(0.270) (0.271) (0.279) 
g2 0.251 -0.045 0.975 
(0.270) (0.271) (0.281) 
IB 1.231 0.584 2.111 
(0.274) (0.272) (0.294) 
g4 0.974 
(0.273) 
Number of observations 1657 1657 1657 
Pseudo R2 0.0391 0.0443 0.0540 
Pseudo-functional form X2 (3)=2.566 x2 (3)=2.494 X2(3)=3.430 
Normality x2 (2)=0.666 X2 (2)=14.458 x2 (2)=9.530 
Heteroscedasticity Xý(53)=80 . 615 
2 
y, (53)=75.787 
2 
X (53)=99.021 
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Table 5.11a: OrderedDrobit Economic indi-v (wamoni 
Index Ia Index 2a Index 3a 
Childhoodfarnily background 
Teenage mother -0-097 -0.111 -0.132 (0.110) (0-107) (0.108) 
Father left school after 15 0.046 0.021 0.037 
(0-086) (0.086) (0.088) 
Mother left school after 15 -0.036 -0.042 -0.048 (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.461 * 0.606* 0.581 * 
(0.303) (0-316) (0-314) 
Parents were tenants (16) 0.214** 0.180** 0.183** 
(0-068) (0.067) (0.068) 
Some parental incentive for school -0.105 0.009 -0.061 (0.157) (0-152) (0.154) 
Large parental incentive for school -0-030 0.053 0.016 
(0.146) (0.140) (0.142) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0-314** -0-397** -0.364** (0.146) (0.148) (0.145) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties -0.178 -0.108 -0.122 
(0.268) (0.285) (0.285) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more -0.046 0.024 -0.021 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.093) 
Father was at risk of unemployment 0.018 -0.010 -0.001 
(0.101) (0.099) (0.099) 
Father was unemployed once or more 0.061 0.070 0.072 
(0.101) (0.102) (0.101) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) 0.119* 0.118* 0.130* 
(0.068) (0-068) (0.068) 
Lone working mother (7) 41 -0.049 0.061 -0-013 
(0.251) (0.253) (0.244) 
Lone non-working mother (7) -0-862 -0.810 -0.733 
(0.748) (0.809) (0.842) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.114 -0.137* -0.141 * 
(0.074) (0.072) (0.073) 
Lone working mother (11) -0-118 -0.194 -0-167 
(0.247) (0.241) (0.242) 
Lone non-working mother (11) 0.008 -0-130 -0.228 
(0.342) (0.321) (0.305) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) 0.137** 0.148** 0.152** 
(0.073) (0.071) (0.072) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.072 -0.153 -0.102 
(0.222) (0.227) (0.223) 
Lone non-working mother (16) -0.087 -0.116 -0.097 
(0.256) (0.259) (0.250) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.005 0.003 0.019 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.076 -0.093 -0.077 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.076) 
Quick to settle (7) -0.053 -0.063 -0-064 
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.132 -0.169* -0.150* 
(0.088) (0.086) (0.088) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.023 -0.002 0.021 
(0.110) (0.108) (0.109) 
Has been in care -0.084 -0.180 -0.125 
(0.206) (0.211) (0.210) 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 0.007 0.040 0.015 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.037 0.036 0.021 
(0.061) (0.060) (0.061) 
Referred to a social agency (16) 0.154 0.066 0.069 
(0.127) (0.124) (0.125) 
Had contacts with the police (16) 0.119 0.201 0.192 
(0.161) (0.160) (0.161) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -0.107 0.004 -0.038 
(0.095) (0.098) (0.098) 
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Table 5.11 a (ctd. ) 
Skilled manuals 0.065 0.128 0.115 
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111) 
Other manuals 0.384** 0.367** 0.401 ** 
(0.090) (0-088) (0.090) 
Has children 0.173** 0.199** 0.161 ** 
(0.076) (0.078) (0.077) 
Other education 0.030 -0.096 -0.047 (0.122) (0.120) (0.121) 
0 levels/ Lower vocational 0.030 -0.071 -0.028 (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational -0.178 -0.244* -0.206 
(0.134) (0-134) (0.135) 
A levels -0.065 -0.168 -0.128 
(0.164) (0.162) (0.163) 
Highest vocational -0.199 -0.357** -0-306* 
(0.163) (0-162) (0.162) 
Degree -0.083 -0.209 -0.161 
(0.178) (0.176) (0.177) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.177** -0.148 ** -0.168** 
(0.068) (0-067) (0.068) 
Partner unemployed or OLF 0.276* 0.366** 0.281 * 
(0.147) (0.150) (0.147) 
Region of residence at 33 
North 0.151 0.135 0.167 
(0-139) (0.140) (0.142) 
North West 0.276** 0.201 * 0.228** 
(0.112) (0-108) (0.110) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.048 0.054 0.054 
(0.120) (0-118) (0.119) 
West Midlands 0.151 0.157 0.204* 
(0-115) (0.115) (0.118) 
East Midlands 0.128 0.151 0.131 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.129) 
East Anglia 0.049 0.069 0.056 
(0.156) (0.154) (0.156) 
South West -0.024 -0.002 0.014 
(0.119) (0.120) (0.121) 
London 0.267* 0.217 0.218 
(0.156) (0.148) (0.149) 
Wales 0.124 0.116 0.123 
(0.134) (0.132) (0.134) 
Scotland 0.474** 0.363** 0.382** 
(0.116) (0.112) (0.113) 
gl 0.139 0.036 0.063 
(0.261) (0.260) (0.262) 
g2 0.913 0.567 1.118 
(0.262) (0.260) (0.264) 
43 1.021 
(0.262) 
Number of observations 1739 1739 1739 
Pseudo R2 0.0611 0.0550 0.0605 
Pseudo-functional form x (3)=1.434 
2 (3)=0.305 x 
2 (3)=0.901 x 
Normalitv X (2)=8.067 
2 
X (2)=7.648 
2 
X (2)=4.400 
Heteroscedasti city X2 (53)=90.435 X2 (53)=111.198 x2 (53)=111.918 
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Table 5.11b: OrderedDrobit Cultural indp. y (wnmpn 
Index lb Index 2b Index 3b 
Childhood. /amily background 
Teenage mother -0-026 -0.016 0.019 
(0,098) (0-103) (0.106) 
Father left school after 15 0,049 0.005 0.030 
(0-093) (0.089) (0-093) 
Mother left school after 15 0.244** 0.233** 0.249** 
(0-087) (0.084) (0.087) 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 0.532* 0.452* 0.580** 
(0.285) (0.276) (0.295) 
Parents were tenants (16) -0.050 -0.030 -0.050 (0-072) (0.071) (0.073) 
Some parental incentive for school -0.120 -0.063 -0.053 
(0-138) (0.143) (0.142) 
Large parental incentive for school in -0.271 ** -0.224* -0.252* 
(0-130) (0-134) (0.133) 
Always lived with both natural parents -0.181 -0.120 -0.200 
(0-152) (0.148) (0.159) 
Family were at risk of financial difficulties -0.406 -0.510 -0.556 
(0.426) (0-403) (0,400) 
Family had financial difficulties once or more 0.121 0.140 0.141 
(0.091) (0.094) (0.094) 
Father was at risk of unemployment -0.079 -0.103 -0.084 
(0.107) (0.102) (0.104) 
Father was unemployed once or more -0.002 -0.045 -0.014 
(0.110) (0.109) (0.111) 
Non-working mother in couple (7) -0.012 -0.036 -0-068 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.072) 
Lone working mother (7) -0.026 -0.087 -0.043 
(0.311) (0.302) (0.323) 
Lone non-working mother (7) 1.996** 1.261 ** 1.282** 
(0.656) (0.410) (0.498) 
Non-working mother in couple (11) -0.009 -0.002 0.021 
(0.079) (0.077) (0.078) 
Lone working mother (11) -0.53 1* -0.465* -0.606** 
(0.297) (0.295) (0.296) 
Lone non-working mother (11) -0.222 -0.229 -0.235 
(0.354) (0.351) (0.385) 
Non-working mother in couple (16) -0.111 -0.097 -0.109 
(0.077) (0.077) (0-078) 
Lone working mother (16) -0.122 -0.145 -0.215 
(0.268) (0.257) (0.261) 
Lone non-working mother (16) 0.164 0.102 0.174 
(0.261) (0.247) (0.266) 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) 0.032 0.007 0.010 
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) 
Above average at reading test score (7) -0.039 -0.120 -0.075 
(0.079) (0.079) (0-080) 
Quick to settle (7) 0.099 0,069 0.062 
(0.071) (0.072) (0.073) 
Reported once below average knowledge -0.002 0.031 -0.002 
(0.086) (0.087) (0.088) 
Reported twice below average knowledge 0.255** 0.329** 0.262** 
(0.106) (0.108) (0.109) 
Has been in care 0.191 0.221 0.257 
(0.193) (0.211) (0.213) 
Reported badly behaved by school 0 6) 0.057 0.053 0.030 
(0.076) (0.077) (0-077) 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 0.087 0.076 0.079 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
Referred to a social agency (16) 0.172 0.096 
0.121 
(0.126) (0.122) (0.124) 
Had contacts with the police (16) -0.042 
0.052 0.039 
(0.153) (0.155) (0.158) 
Adulthood personal characteristics (at 23) 
Professional & intermediate -0.078 -0.012 -0.040 
(0.107) (0.104) (0.105) 
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Table 5.11 b (ctd. ) 
Skilled manual s 0.059 0.078 0.084 
Other manuals 
(0.112) (0.114) (0-116) 
0.129 0.189** 0.126 
Has children 
(0.091) (0.092) (0-092) 
-0.137* -0.126* -0.146* 
Other education 
(0.079) (0.081) (0-081) 
-0.101 -0.078 -0.154 
0 levels/ Lower vocational 
(0.108) 
0 053 
(0.118) (0.115) 
- . -0.071 -0.110 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational 
(0.114) 
-0.238* 
(0.119) 
-0.248* 
(0.120) 
-0.325** (0.133) (0.139) (0.139) A levels 
-0.198 -0.208 -0.298* (0.159) (0.162) (0.162) Highest vocational Z: I -0.139 -0.166 -0.266 (0.167) (0.173) (0.170) Degree 
-0.409** -0.45 1 ** -0.543** 
(0.198) (0.195) (0.196) 
Adulthoodfamily background (at 23) 
Partner working -0.115 -0.095 -0-115 
(0.072) (0.071) (0.072) 
Partner unemployed or OLF -0.070 -0.116 -0-036 
(0.161) (0-158) (0.165) 
Region qf residence at 33 
North 0.163 0.048 0.168 
(0.143) (0.141) (0.145) 
North West 
-0.041 -0.043 -0.039 
(0.122) (0.127) (0.126) 
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.032 -0.076 -0.003 
(0.122) (0.121) (0.122) 
West Midlands -0.133 -0.235** -0.170 
(0.121) (0.119) (0.121) 
East Midlands 0.234* 0.185 0.256* 
(0.131) (0-133) (0.136) 
East Anglia 0.117 0.037 0.164 
(0.147) (0.149) (0.155) 
South West -0.180 -0.267** -0.164 
(0.118) (0.120) (0.123) 
London 0.479** 0.365** 0.391 ** 
(0.162) (0.151) (0.154) 
Wales -0.055 -0.039 -0.030 
(0.137) (0.141) (0.139) 
Scotland -0.110 -0.228* -0.145 
(0.132) (0.129) (0.132) 
0.146 0.124 -0.008 
(0.254) (0.260) (0.260) 
g2 1.036 0.776 1.360 
(0.254) (0.260) (0.264) 
1.075 
(0.262) 
Number of observations 1786 1786 1786 
Pseudo R2 0.0489 0.0497 0.0605 
Pseudo-functional form 2 X (3)=4.004 
2 
X (3)=1.092 
2 
X (3)=1.252 
Normality x2 (2)=1604.572 x2 (2)=10.854 x2 (2)=0.516 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (53)=140.315 72 , 
(53)=92.719 X2 (53)=82-302 
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Table 5.12a: Predicted probabilities for index I for men. 
Economic Maximum Cultural maximum 
integration economic integration cultural 
exclusion exclusion 
Base person 1 0.626 0.082 0.628 0.037 
Base person I but was reported and 0.469 0.160 0.472 0.082 
referred. 
Base person I but father was unemployed 0.445 0.175 0.649 0.032 
repeatedly and family had financial 
difficulties repeatedly 
Opposite of base person 1 0.296 0.296 0.494 0.074 
Base person 2 0.22 54 0.341 0.393 0.117 
Base person 2 but person has a degree 0.349 0.247 0.504 0.070 
Base person 3 0.272 0.321 0.498 0.072 
Base person 3 but has a partner who works 0.349 0.247 0.506 0.070 
Base person 3 but has a partner who does 0.313 0.280 0.463 0.085 
not work I I I II 
Notes: 
(1) Predicted probabilities are calculated at the means of variables except for specific dummies set to 0 or I (see following 
notes). 
(2) Base person 1: father never unemployed, family never had financial difficulties, child was not reported badly behaved (by 
either school or parents) and was not in contact with authorities (police or social services). All other variables at their actual 
values. 
(3) Base person 2: father repeatedly unemployed, family repeatedly had financial difficulties, child was reported badly behaved 
(by either school or parents) and was in contact with authorities (police or social services) and child has no education- All 
other variables at their actual values. 
(4) Base person 3: father repeatedly unemployed, family repeatedly had financial difficulties, child was reported badly behaved 
(by either school or parents) and was in contact with authorities (police or social services) and person has no partner at 23. 
All other variables at their actual values. 
Table 5.12b: Predicted probabilities for index I for women. 
Economic 
integration 
Maximum 
economic 
exclusion 
Cultural 
integration 
Maximum 
cultural 
exclusion 
Base person 1 0.614 0.244 
0.729 0.067 
Base person I but was reported and 0.489 0.228 
0.631 0.110 
referred. 
Base person I but father was unemployed 0.608 0.148 
0.688 0.084 
repeatedly and family had financial 
difficulties repeatedly 
Opposite of base person 1 0.483 
0.233 0.585 0.135 
Base person 2 0.467 
0.245 0.535 0.164 
Base person 2 but person has a degree 0.500 
0.219 0.691 0.083 
Base person 3 0.451 
0.257 0.558 0.150 
Base person 3 but has a partner who works 0.522 
0.204 0.603 0.125 
Base person 3 but has a partner who does 0.345 
0.354 0.586 0.134 
not work 
Notes: see notes of table 5.12a 
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Appendix A: Variables' definitions 
Paper's denomination Base category Definition 
Childhoodfainily background 
Teenage mother Older than 20 Mother was twenty or younger at delivery. 
Father, mother left school after 15 Before 15 0= 15 years old or younger, I= 16 years old or older. 
Had a relative in contact with police (by Did not A family member has been in prison, in contact with 11) police liaison, probation (for crime), police. (Reported 
when the child was II years old) 
Parents were tenants (16) Were owner or Parents were tenants when the child was 16 years old. 
other 
Some parental incentive for school Never wanted Question: Do the parents want the child to stay on at 
child to stay on school? Sweep 1: Stay on at secondary school. Sweep 
at school 2: Stay on longer. Sweep 3: Stay in some form of full 
(always time education beyond minimum leaving age. 
answered no) Answered yes once + missing responses in other waves 
Large parental incentive for school Answered yes at least twice 
Always lived with both natural parents Never or Question: Does the child live with his/her own mother 
sometimes (father)? 
Family were at risk financial difficulties Never in Questions: Sweep 1: View of the interviewer, Sweep 2 
financial and 3: Question to the parents (Have you had any 
difficulties (no financial difficulties over the past 12 months? ). 
in three waves) Missing answers + no across the three waves. 
Family had financial difficulties once or Said yes at least in one of the waves 
more 
Father was at risk unemployed Never Questions: Sweep 1: View of the interviewer. Sweep 2 
unemployed and 3: father or male head has been unemployed for 
(no in three more than 6 weeks over the past 12 months. 
waves) Missing answers + no (across three waves) 
Father was unemployed once or more Said yes at least in one of the waves 
Non-working mother in couple (7,11, Working Questions: Sweep 1: Any paid work since child's birth 
16) mother in (before and/or after the child started school). Sweep 2: 
Lone working mother (7,11,16) couple (7,11, Any paid work outside home since child was 7. Sweep 
Lone non-working mother (7,11,16) 16) 3: Does the mother do paid work? 
Mother works (7,11,16) Combined with information on whether there is no 
Single mother (7,11,16) Does not work father or male head living in the household. 
In couple 
Childhood personal characteristics 
Above average at maths test score (7) Below average Scores from reading and arithmetic tests held when the 
Above average at reading test score (7) child is 7. Marks go from 0 to 10 for arithmetic's and 
from 0 to 30 for reading. 0= below (same sex) 
average, I= above (same sex) average. 
Quick to settle (7) Not quick The child adapted to being in class within one month 
when they started school at 7 years old. Information 
obtained from the school. 
Reported once below average Never reported The teacher thinks the child 
has an (exceptional or 
knowledge Reported twice below below average above) average general knowledge. Reports when the 
average knowledge child is 7 and II years old. 
Has been in care Never in care Has the child ever been in care with a 
Local Authority 
or a Voluntary Society. I= yes, 0= no/ NA. 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) Not reported Index of social behaviour when the child is sixteen. It 
is equal to I if the child is found to have (often and/or 
sometimes) shown any of the following behaviours: 
irritable, fighting with others, destructive with his own 
and others' belongings, disobedient, lies, bullies other 
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Reported badly behaved by mother (16) Not reported 
Referred to a social agency ( 16) Not referred 
Had contacts with the police (16) No contacts 
Adulthood personal characteristics 
Professional & intermediate Skilled non- 
Skilled manuals manuals 
Other manuals 
Has children Does not 
Other education No education 
0 levels/ Lower vocational 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational 
A levels 
Highest vocational 
Degree 
Adulthoodfamily background 
Partner working No partner 
Partner unemployed or OLF 
Region South East 
children, truant from school, has stolen on one or more 
occasi I ions in the past twelve months, resentful or 
aggressive when corrected. It is equal to 0 if the child 
never shows any of these characteristics. 
Index of social behaviour when the child is 
sixteen. It is equal to I if the child is found to 
have (often and/or sometimes) shown any of the 
following behaviours: irritable, fighting with 
others, destructive with his own and others' 
belongings, disobedient, lies, bullies other 
children. It is equal to 0 if the child never shows 
any of these characteristics. 
It is equal to 0 if the child was not referred to an 
agency (because of difficulties that have affected 
their educational progress or behaviour) or to I if 
she/he was. List of agencies: Social services or 
social work department (incl. children's 
department), educational welfare department, 
police or probation department, child guidance 
clinic. 
Has the child been in contact with the police at 
16.0 = no, I= yes. (We combined the 
information obtained from the school and the 
parents) - 
Occupation at 23 years old. 
The cohort member has natural living children at 
23 years old. 
Highest qualification obtained by the age of 23. 
Whether the cohort member lives with somebody 
at 33 years old (as married or not) and situation of 
the partner. If he or she does, whether the partner 
is working or not. 
Region lived in at 33 years old: II regions. 
North, North West, East and West Riding, North 
Midlands, Eastern, London and South East, 
South, South West, Midlands, Wales and 
Scotland. 
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Appendix B: Weights given to variables included in indices I and 2. 
Table B. 5.1: Index 1, well-being equations. 
Devendent variable: Life satisfactionwari, 
Men Women 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
No vote 0.016 0.035 0.116 0.036 
No car 0.195 0.044 0.412 0.043 
Homeless 0.131 0.084 0.270 0.077 
Unemployed 0.255 0.034 0.085 0.034 
Problems writing 0.142 0.047 0.094 0.063 
No phone 0.158 0.061 0.076 0.062 
Alcohol problems 0.290 0.040 0.309 0.054 
Arrears 0.282 0.057 0.291 0.055 
[11 -1.278 0.030 -1.054 0.026 
-0.680 0.025 -0.445 0.022 
0.320 0.023 0.406 0.022 
1.013 0.026 0.974 0.024 
1.369 0.029 1.281 0.026 
[t6 1.817 0.035 1.806 0.033 
[0 2.163 0.042 2.132 0.040 
ýt8 2.592 0.057 2.452 0.051 
ý0 2.866 0.073 2.735 0.065 
ýtlo 3.055 0.089 2.929 0.080 
Observations 4 92 5 164 
Pseudo R squared 0. 015 0. 013 
Note: these results are presented for reference only. The 
specifications do not contain any additional controls. 
Table B. 5.2: Index 2, scoring coefficients 
based on first component. 
Men Women 
No vote 0.179 0.261 
No car 0.472 0.528 
Homeless 0.287 0.286 
Unemployed 0.428 0.203 
Problems writing 0.195 0.257 
No phone 0.512 0.524 
Alcohol problems 0.250 0.222 
Arrears 0.341 0.374 
Observations 5277 5449 
Contribution of first 
component (per cent) 20.55 19.43 
Note: the last row shows the proportion oi Lne LULW 
variance of the eight vanables which is explained by 
the first component. 
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Appendix C: Summary statistics 
Table C. 5.1: Summarv statistics for mim 
Whole sample Model I Model 2 Models 3 and 
4 
Obs. Means St. err. Mean S-E Mean S-E Mean S-E - 
No vote 5576 0.249 0.432 0.229 0.420 0.227 0.419 0.215 0.411 
No car 5541 0.152 0.359 0.138 0.345 0.137 0.343 0.138 0.345 
Homeless 5585 0.036 0.185 0.029 0.169 0.029 0.169 0.028 0.164 
Unemployed 5498 0.293 0.455 0.279 0.449 0.278 0.448 0.268 0.443 
Problems writing 5536 0.116 0.320 0.097 0.296 0.098 0.297 0.101 0.302 
No phone 5531 0.077 0.267 0.072 0.259 0.070 0.255 0.069 0.254 
Alcohol problems 5570 0.171 0.377 0.159 0.365 0.158 0.365 0.154 0.361 
Arrears 5555 0.079 0.270 0.068 0.252 0.067 0.250 0.069 0.253 
Teenage mother 8994 0.10 0.30 0.083 0.276 0.082 0.275 0.079 0.269 
Father left school after 15 5688 0.22 0.41 0.202 0.402 0.202 0.401 0.189 0.391 
Mother left school after 15 5853 0.21 0.41 0.205 0.404 0.204 0.403 0.196 0.397 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 9594 0.01 0.11 0.006 0.076 0.006 0.077 0.006 0.079 
Parents were tenants (16) 5975 0.60 0.66 0.463 0.499 0.461 0.499 0.466 0.499 
Some parental incentive for school 8021 0.32 0.47 0.149 0.356 0.149 0.356 0.152 0.359 
Large parental incentive for school 8021 0.64 0.48 0.796 0.403 0.797 0.402 0.797 0.402 
Always lived with both natural parents 4699 0.85 0.36 0.903 0.296 0.905 0.293 0.908 0.290 
Family were at risk of financial 8526 0.39 0.49 0.012 0.108 0.012 0.109 0.011 0.103 
Family had financial difficulties once or 8526 0.18 0.38 0.151 0.358 0.151 0.358 0.145 0.352 
Father was at nsk of unemployment 8471 0.48 0.50 0.116 0.321 0.117 0.322 0.116 0.320 
Father was unemployed once or more 8471 0.10 0.31 0.102 0.303 0.102 0.303 0.101 0.301 
Couple, only male working (7) 7240 0.49 0.50 0.529 0.499 
Single mother working (7) 7240 0.02 0.14 0.011 0.103 
Single mother not working (7) 7240 0.01 0.09 0.003 0.056 
Couple, only male working (11) 6901 0.38 0.49 0.391 0.488 
Single mother working (11) 6901 0.03 0.18 0.016 0.127 
Single mother not working (11) 6901 0.02 0.12 0.005 0.071 
Couple, only male working (16) 5764 0.31 0.46 0.296 0.457 
Single mother working (16) 5764 0.05 0.22 0.026 0.160 
Single mother not working (16) 5764 0.03 0.16 0.014 0.117 
Mother works (7) 7294 0.50 0.50 0.474 0.499 0.475 0.500 0.468 0.499 
Mother works (11) 7056 0.60 0.49 0.608 0.488 0.606 0.489 0.604 0.489 
Mother works (16) 5906 0.66 0.47 0.685 0.465 0.684 0.465 0.690 0.463 
Single mother (7) 7453 0.03 0.17 0.015 0.124 0.015 0.122 0.014 0.117 
Single mother (11) 6956 0.05 0.21 0.024 0.153 0.024 0.153 0.021 0.145 
Single mother (16) 5846 0.07 0.26 0.042 0.200 0.040 0.196 0.040 0.197 
Above average at maths test score (7) 5688 0.22 0.41 0.476 0.500 0.476 0.500 0.470 0.499 
Above average at reading test score (7) 5853 0.21 0.41 0.673 0.469 0.672 0.470 0.671 0.470 
Settled within one month at school (7) 6953 0.69 0.46 0.710 0.454 0.711 0.454 0.708 
0.455 
Reported once below average knowledge 6571 0.23 0.42 0.213 0.409 0.212 0.409 0.211 
0.408 
Reported twice below average knowledge 6571 0.17 0.38 0.128 0.334 0.127 0.333 0.125 0.331 
Has been in care 7522 0.05 0.21 0.027 0.161 
0.027 0.161 0.026 0.159 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 6139 0.41 0.49 0.341 0.474 0.340 0.474 0.335 0.472 
Reported badly behaved by mother (16) 5927 0.50 0.50 0.467 0.499 0.468 0.499 0.469 
0.499 
Referred to a social agency (16) 8133 0.15 0.36 0.130 0.336 
0.129 0.336 0.123 0.328 
Had contacts with the police ( 16) 6331 0.17 0.37 
0.131 0.337 0.130 0.336 0.131 0.338 
Professional & intermediate 5925 0.22 0.41 0.226 
0.419 
Skilled manuals 5925 0.41 0.49 
0.433 0.496 
_Other 
manuals 5925 0.21 0.40 
0.164 0.370 
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Table C. 5.1 (ctd. ) 
Whole sample Model I Model 2 Models 3 and 
4 
Obs. Means St. err. Mean S-E Mean S-E Mean S-E 
Has children 6264 0.18 0.38 0.152 0.359 0.149 0.356 
Other education 8152 0.18 0.39 0.160 0.367 0.144 0.351 
0 levels/ Lower vocational 8152 0.20 0.40 0.222 0.415 0.225 0.417 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational 8152 0.18 0.38 0.249 0.433 0.269 0.444 
A levels 8152 0.10 0.30 0.094 0.292 0.086 0.280 
Highest vocational 8152 0.06 0.24 0.089 0.285 0.100 0.300 
Degree 8152 0.08 0.28 0.089 0.285 0.086 0.280 
Partner working 6224 0.23 0.42 0.267 0.443 
Partner unemployed or OLF 6224 0.17 0.38 0.142 0.349 
North 5587 0.05 0.23 0.071 0.257 0.072 0.258 0.074 0.261 
North West 5587 0.11 0.31 0.088 0.284 0.087 0.281 0.086 0.281 
Yorkshire & Humberside 5587 0.10 0.30 0.104 0.306 0.105 0.306 0.108 0.310 
West Midlands 5587 0.09 0.29 0.093 0.290 0.093 0.291 0.093 0.291 
East Midlands 5587 0.08 0.27 0.075 0.264 0.076 0.265 0.074 0.262 
East Anglia 5587 0.03 0.18 0.038 0.191 0.038 0.192 0.038 0.191 
South West 5587 0.09 0.28 0.091 0.288 0.092 0.288 0.090 0.286 
London 5587 0.07 0.25 0.046 0.209 0.046 0.208 0.045 0.207 
Wales 5587 0.05 0.23 0.069 0.253 0.069 0.253 0.069 0.253 
Scotland 5587 0.09 0.28 0.101 0.302 0.102 0.303 0.100 0.300 
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Table C. 5.2: Summarv statistics for women 
Whole sample Model I Model 2 Models 3 and 
4 
Obs. Means S t. err. Mean S-E Mean S-E Mean S-E 
No vote 5763 0.215 0.411 0.198 0.398 0.198 0.399 0.192 0.394 
No car 5721 0.150 0.357 0.136 0.343 0.136 0.343 0.130 0.336 
Homeless 5778 0.040 0.197 0.036 0.187 0.036 0.186 0.036 0.185 
Unemployed 5688 0.225 0.418 0.240 0.427 0.239 0.427 0.231 0.422 
Problems writing 5744 0.061 0.240 0.054 0.227 0.054 0.226 0.054 0.227 
No phone 5730 0.072 0.259 0.065 0.246 0.065 0.247 0.058 0.234 
Alcohol problems 5747 0.079 0.270 0.068 0.251 0.067 0.250 0.065 0.246 
Arrears 5749 0.078 0.268 0.063 0.242 0.063 0.242 0.061 0.240 
Teenage mother 8406 0.10 0.30 0.088 0.284 0.089 0.285 0.091 0.288 
Father left school after 15 5404 3.93 1.63 0.201 0.401 0.202 0.401 0.197 0.397 
Mother left school after 15 5579 3.95 1.40 0.208 0.406 0.208 0.406 0.201 0.401 
Relative in contact with police (by 11) 8961 0.01 0.12 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.111 0.012 0.107 
Parents were tenants (16) 5679 0.59 0.65 0.489 0.500 0.488 0.500 0.484 0.500 
Some parental incentive for school 7507 0.31 0.46 0.155 0.362 0.155 0.362 0.153 0.360 
Large parental incentive for school 7507 0.65 0.48 0.789 0.408 0.790 0.407 0.794 0.405 
Always lived with both natural parents 4507 0.85 0.36 0.899 0.301 0.899 0.301 0.904 0.294 
Family were at risk of financial 8040 0.38 0.48 0.011 0.106 0.010 0.102 0.010 0.099 
difficulties 
Family had financial difficulties once or 8040 0.18 0.38 0.164 0.370 0.163 0.369 0.160 0.366 
more 
Father was at risk of unemployment 7977 0.48 0.50 0.120 0.325 0.121 0.326 0.116 0.320 
Father was unemployed once or more 7977 0.10 0.30 0.110 0.312 0.107 0.310 0.106 0.307 
Couple, only male working (7) 6888 0.48 0.50 0.497 0.500 
Single mother working (7) 6888 0.02 0.14 0.014 0.118 
Single mother not working (7) 6888 0.01 0.08 0.002 0.048 
Couple, only male working (11) 6586 0.37 0.48 0.353 0.478 
Single mother working (11) 6586 0.04 0.19 0.026 0.158 
Single mother not working (11) 6586 0.02 0.13 0.009 0.093 
Couple, only male working (16) 5431 0.31 0.46 0.278 0.448 
Single mother working (16) 5431 0.05 0.22 0.030 0.172 
Single mother not working (16) 5431 0.03 0.17 0.017 0.131 
Mother works (7) 6926 0.51 0.50 0.504 0.500 0.504 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Mother works (11) 6702 0.62 0.49 0.637 0.481 0.637 0.481 0.638 0.481 
Mother works (16) 5590 0.66 0.47 0.699 0.459 0.701 0.458 0.704 0.456 
Single mother (7) 7086 0.03 0.16 0.019 0.135 0.018 0.134 0.016 0.127 
Single mother (11) 6639 0.05 0.23 0.037 0.188 0.037 0.189 0.034 0.182 
Single mother (16) 5530 0.08 0.27 0.049 0.215 0.049 0.216 0.048 0.213 
Above average at maths test score (7) 5404 0.22 0.41 0.576 0.494 0.576 0.494 0.578 0.494 
Above average at reading test score (7) 5579 0.22 0.42 0.681 0.466 0.681 0.466 0.685 0.465 
Settled within one month at school (7) 6556 0.74 0.44 0.751 0.433 0.751 
0.433 0.752 0.432 
Reported once below average knowledge 6227 0.21 0.41 0.199 0.399 0.198 
0.399 0.198 0.399 
Reported twice below average knowledge 6227 0.18 0.39 0.135 0.342 0.135 0.342 0.135 0.342 
Has been in care 7238 0.04 0.20 0.021 0.142 0.021 
0.143 0.020 0.141 
Reported badly behaved by school (16) 5929 0.34 0.47 0.296 0.457 0.293 0.455 0.292 
0.455 
Reported badly behaved by mother 0 6) 5628 0.52 0.50 0.521 0.500 0.520 0.500 
0.517 0.500 
Referred to a social agency (16) 7617 0.10 0.30 0.080 
0.271 0.080 0.272 0.078 0.268 
Had contacts with the police (16) 5878 0.06 0.23 0.044 
0.206 0.044 0.206 0.043 0.203 
Professional & intermediate 6085 0.21 0.41 0.216 0.411 
Skilled manuals 6085 0.09 0.29 
0.086 0.281 
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Table C. 5.2 (ctd. ) 
Whole sample Model I Model 2 Models 3 and 
4 
Obs. Means St. err. Mean S-E Mean S-E Mean S-E 
Other manuals 6085 0.20 0.40 0.180 0.384 
Has children 6271 0.33 0.47 0.308 0.462 0.309 0.462 
Other education 7815 0.19 0.39 0.187 0.390 0.183 0.387 
0 levels/ Lower vocational 7815 0.24 0.43 0.258 0.438 0.255 0.436 
5+ 0 levels/ Middle vocational 7815 0.15 0.35 0.169 0.375 0.177 0.382 
A levels 7815 0.09 0.29 0.093 0.290 0.083 0.276 
Highest vocational 7815 0.07 0.25 0.091 0.287 0.100 0.300 
Degree 7815 0.07 0.26 0.085 0.280 0.087 0.282 
Partner working 6237 0.55 0.50 0.587 0.492 
Partner unemployed or OLF 6237 0.07 0.25 0.043 0.202 
North 5764 0.05 0.22 0.069 0.253 0.068 0.252 0.068 0.251 
North West 5764 0.11 0.32 0.107 0.309 0.107 0.309 0.107 0.309 
Yorkshire & Humberside 5764 0.10 0.30 0.085 0.279 0.085 0.280 0.085 0.278 
West Midlands 5764 0.09 0.28 0.101 0.301 0.100 0.300 0.104 0.305 
East Midlands 5764 0.06 0.24 0.064 0.244 0.064 0.244 0.066 0.249 
East Anglia 5764 0.04 0.19 0.049 0.215 0.048 0.215 0.049 0.216 
South West 5764 0.09 0.28 0.098 0.298 0.098 0.298 0.096 0.295 
London 5764 0.07 0.26 0.043 0.204 0.043 0.203 0.043 0.203 
Wales 5764 0.05 0.23 0.067 0.249 0.067 0.250 0.067 0.250 
Scotland 1 5764 0.09 
0.29 0.104 0.305 0.104 0.305 0.100 0.300 
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Chapter six 
Conclusion 
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This thesis has studied the economic and social consequences of 
unemployment and long-term (or repeated) unemployment. We have used a reglonal 
panel of data on British regions in chapter two, then the British National Child 
Development Study (NCDS) in the three other chapters. Economic consequences 
have been analysed in the first two chapters and social consequences in the last two. 
Many findings have been outlined throughout the thesis. We will review them 
in detail below, but first a general conclusion can be drawn from the research which 
has been carried out here. We have provided some evidence that might be used to 
justify intervention directed at the long-term unemployed or at preventing people 
from entering long-term unemployment. First, the estimated relationship between the 
composition of unemployment and wages has suggested that no inflationary pressure 
would be felt from reducing long-term unemployment. Although this finding does not 
give a direct reason for decreasing long-term unemployment, it suggests that there are 
no damaging economic consequences to doing it. Second, we have found evidence 
that intervention may be useful to compensate for unexpected rigidities (such as 
impediments to flexibility in the third chapter). Finally, we have found that the 
unemployment of one member of a household appears to have a detrimental impact 
on other members. In particular, the - repeated - unemployment of the father has a 
damaging effect on their children. These detrimental outcomes have been found both 
to occur during childhood and to have long-lasting effects. We have also been able to 
identify ways in which such effects could be alleviated. In particular, it is possible that 
improving the quality of parenting may have a role to play. Gaining educational 
qualifications also appears to offset these detrimental effects. 
Chapter two has checked the robustness of the hypothesis that a higher 
proportion of long-term unemployment in the economy counteracts 
the dampening 
effect of unemployment on wages. We have used regional wage equations controlling 
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for regional unemployment and long-term unemployment, other regional variables t5 
such as prices and manufacturing employment, as well as time and region dummies. 
Our results are tested for possible misspecification. They suggest that the Layard- 
Nickell hypothesis is verifiedfor manual or unskilled workers, but notfor non-manual 
or skilled workers. We attribute the apparent strength of these results to the fact that 
we use regional data. 
Chapter three is interested in the 'flexibility' of young unemployed people 
during job search. We define flexibility as the degree of willingness of unemployed 
people to consider the following choices: applying for a job which involves moving, 
for a job with lower pay and for a job which requires lower qualifications. As was 
expected, these decisions are found to be strongly positively dependent and 
simultaneously deterrnined. Therefore, using a model that incorporates this improves 
efficiency of the estimates. The results show that specifications which do not take into 
account the simultaneity between the decisions taken during job search tend to 
overestimate the effect of having a partner and of the region of residence. This 
suggests that considering only one of the many decisions taken during job search may 
lead to inexact findings concerning its determinants. We find that young unemployed 
people seem to be quite flexible when looking for a job. Moreover, the greater the 
number of previous unemployment spells, the more likely they are to have considered 
moving house. Past unemployment does not affect their wage and skill content 
expectations. The effect of unemployment benefits goes mainly through the decision 
on skill content; higher unemployment benefits decrease the willingness to accept a 
job with a lower skill content. People who use employment services are more 
flexible. 
Other results are consistent with the following conclusions: skilled manuals appear 
to 
be constrained in moving, and there appears to be a union wage premium. 
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Chapter four looks at the correlation between the parental labour market 
situation and the social behaviour of their children. We use panel data techniques as 
well as cross-section discrete dependent variable models. Although it is not easy to be 
certain of causal channels in social science, we discover many patterns in the data. 
The findings show that, controlling for - persistent - financial difficulties, the 
unemployment of the father during childhood seems to have a detrimental effect on 
his children's outcomes. It increases the probability that they have contacts with the 
police or with social authorities, and that they are reported to have anti-social 
behaviour by the school. There is also evidence that relationships between the parents 
and the children may be strained. Repeated spells of paternal unemployment are 
found to have additional detrimental effects in most cases. On the other hand, there is 
some evidence that those who have a non-working mother during early childhood are 
better off than others, except in cases where the mother is single. We also find 
evidence that children, in particular girls, who come from broken farnilies fare less 
well than others. Interestingly, we find that parental interest in the child's education 
may have a substantial offsetting (beneficial) effect. 
Chapter five analyses the relation between adolescent anti-social behaviour 
and family background and social exclusion in adult life. We control for external 
environment and adult family situation. A new index of social exclusion is 
constructed. We define social exclusion as being evidenced by the combination of 
eight outcomes (five "economic" outcomes: having been homeless, unemployed, 
owning a phone, a car, having rent or mortgage arrears; and three 
"cultural" 
outcomes: having voted in the last General Election, having writing problems and 
having drinking problems). We find that anti-social behaviour and social difficulties 
during childhood are associated with later risks of social exclusion. 
This is true even 
controlling for given personal characteristics such as ability and 
temperament 
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(measured by early social behaviour) and for the current environment (measured by 
regional dummies). Educational qualifications appear to provide offsetting effects, 
especially for women. We also find that outcomes in early adulthood (namely at age 
23) are related to future social exclusion. Being in a "disadvantageous" situation at 23 
years old appears to be associated with higher probability of social exclusion in the 
following years. 
We can conclude that there appears to be a certain degree of 
intergene rational transfer of difficulties. Social exclusion, which is generally viewed 
as the result of particular circumstances, is shown here to affect certain categories of 
people; in other words, people who suffered from social difficulties during their 
childhood are more at risk of social exclusion during adulthood. We also distinguish 
between economic and cultural social exclusion (defined above). Overall, those who 
have had anti-social behaviour and family difficulties see a greater decrease in the 
probability of econorn-ic integration than in the probability of cultural integration 
compared to those who did not suffer from those difficulties. Education offsets these 
negative effects especially for cultural integration. For those who had difficulties, 
having a partner is associated with lower economic exclusion compared to having no 
partner, even if their partner does not work, while the probability of cultural exclusion 
is slightly greater if the partner does not work. 
Although it may not be possible to quantify exactly the costs of these effects to 
society, it seems important to recognise that these additional 
factors should be 
considered in cost benefit analysis of labour market policies. 
We have argued 
elsewhere (Pierre, 1999) that policy evaluations based only on employment and 
earnings effects give a partial view of the impact of 
labour market policies on the 
labour market and on agents. Social and equity aspects are also relevant 
to society's 
well-being, and are desirable by-products of these policies. 
The findings of this thesis 
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suggest a set of additional effects to look at. In particular, children's social behaviour C: ý 
(measured for example by crime rate), and attainment at school could be taken into 
account when reviewing the costs and benefits of specific government policies. 
One of the weaknesses of the NCDS as far as this thesis is concerned is that it 
studies people bom in 1958. One might argue that the results are not relevant for 
today's labour market. It would be interesting to study similar questions for a cohort 
of people bom in the seventies, such as the British Cohort Study (BCS), which 
provides information on people born in 1970. At the moment, the BCS is not as rich 
as the NCDS and does not enable us to study the questions that interest us. The new 
2000 releases of NCDS and BCS could be useful for further research on the topics 
covered in this thesis. However, we contend that our results are not outdated. They are 
relevant to current labour markets. For example, one can find an illustration of these 
issues in the UK. The national unemployment rate now appears to be low, but pockets 
of unemployment exist in certain areas. The latter can be particularly deprived, and 
generally contain a high incidence of households where no adult works. As well as the 
usual macroeconornic policies, specific action can therefore be considered desirable to 
alleviate the immediate effects of unemployment. We have shown that the 
latter can 
be long lasting, especially when unemployment spells are protracted or recurrent. 
Finally, there is a need to control better for individual effects. We tackled this 
issue by using fixed effects models and by Including early personal characteristics. 
The latter are assumed to be close to true personality 
because they may not be 
contaminated by contacts with peers at school. 
Further use of longitudinal data in the 
form of panel would be interesting. In addition, one could study siblings 
to account 
for the fact that people may react to similar experiences 
differently, but also to have 
greater insights on how the evolution of 
how family situation affects different 
270 
siblings. Twin studies could provide additional control for individual characteristics; 
as identical twins share the same genes, these could then be held constant. 
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